Hapless

At the end of my last video I promised to upload the bits of the conversation that @domfluff and I had and that didn't make it into the video, as a podcast. That's up now. Also included is an extra bit that we recorded later, where we answer some of the questions that were frequently asked in the comment section.
So, if you've got a long commute ahead of you, or it's your turn to do the dishes, or there is some other reason why you can't play CM.... here you go 😉.
 
 

Now this is great:

Now this is great:

It's worth to explain for other. UKR drone recons of K-2 unit of 54th mech.brigade have spotted dead Russian soldier with radio. They picked up radio with special equipment, attached to drone and could listen during nine days all radio traffic of Russian unit. Only since nine days Russians have suspected that something going wrong and changed settings of own radionetwork. 

Well I am not buying into a "mystery way of the East" in strategic thinking and planning.  I think we risk seeing patterns when they really are not there.
Russia employed very recognizable subversive-deterrence strategies in all those examples you note.  In 2014 they positioned subversive elements in Crimea and Donbas for years.  The basic game plan was Infiltrate-Divide/Exacerbate-Subvert-Proxy-Legitimate, they had end states/outcome aligned with method and means.  They understood thresholds and deterrence and employed them very well.  It took long games and careful planning and prepositioning.  They were working with poor assumptions but they had alternate plans and were deliberate.  A lot of this as a result of the first disaster in Chechnya.
Then in this war they threw out the playbook, tossed some dice that rolled a natural 1, and now are scrambling in a strategic vacuum. They are now at the back end of a Fernando Vidal strategy:  "War with Ukraine is like a game of chess..." 
 

I asked Domfluff to help me out in creating a video about Soviet military doctrine in the Cold War era, and how those principles can be applied in a Combat Mission scenario/QB. He played a game against me as the Soviet Army, gave me an arse kicking, and then sat down with me and explained why he did what he did. The result is the video down below!
 

Re: Naval Blockade of Russia

What are they importing by sea that isn't already sanctioned? Maybe oil etc from Venezeula, but they've got their own right?

I'd imagine supplies from Iran, China, North Korea and the other CIS members are much more important and they're not coming on ships.

Still fascinating that this pretty much exactly what we find in CM.

Definitely wanted to weigh in on this one.  So there was an earlier draft out of RUSI but this is likely one of the most comprehensive analysis/assessments of the first 6 months of the war - outside of our little forum here, of course.  There is nothing in the summaries and conclusions that does not match a lot of what we have been seeing and saying on this forum - at least in the main.  So if you are following this war with us here at BFC, I highly recommend downloading the document and giving it a good going over, you will walk away smarter and with what appears to my eyes a very objective and balanced narrative of the first two phases: Russian invasion & Battle for the Donbas, or perhaps it was really a single strategic phase - the Russian Offensive.
However, I would caution that this is a "Preliminary" analysis, it is in the title.  It is incomplete, and in at least one or two spots that incompleteness is leading to what I think are incomplete conclusions.  Even being likely the best professional analysis we have seen what struck me most about this document is "what it did not say" - there are a lot of gaps here in both scope and scale.  I do not think they are deliberate or a result of laziness at all.  The authors state up front in the introduction "This report is methodologically problematic" because they could only employ data that was provided to them by the UA General staff.  That is not small but that data was filtered - they note this as well - for OPSEC and political sensitivity reasons.  Further there is massive amounts of data missing that will be required for a more accurate picture.  Data from the other two parties in this war - Russia and The West.  A lot of deductions on Russian intent, capability and performance are made here without a lot from those other two data streams, so I am very cautious in accepting gospel at this point.  So that said up front I will dig into this with some initial takeaways/observations for any who are interested:
Pre-Invasion
So this pretty much confirms what we suspected from very early on - Russian had only planned for a 10 day "war".  Russia, like many in the west, way over-estimated the relative symmetry and competitive advantage at the outset of this war.  Russia, like many western analysts, were using outdated concepts and metrics with respect to mass while at the same time were way over-estimating their own capabilities and readiness.  Russian planners were experiencing what has been referred to a progressive unreality, which is a fancy way of saying they built a house of cards on a foundation of shifting sand.
Russian "shock and awe" through operational surprise was a flawed concept in the 21st century.  It appears the UA was initially somewhat dislocated, the authors even go so far to say that Russian operational surprise was achieved by convincing the UA that the main effort would be the Donbas:
"As it became apparent that the Gomel axis was the enemy’s main effort and that another group of forces would
strike through Chernihiv, a redeployment of Ukrainian forces was ordered approximately seven hours prior to the invasion. This took considerable time. The result was that many Ukrainian units were not at their assigned defensive positions when the invasion began and, especially on the northern axes, were not in prepared positions."
So this highlights a really important missing peice from this whole analysis - the role of western ISR.  I have no doubt the authors and UA General Staff scrubbed any mention of this from the data used for many very good reasons.  But given the massive pre-war ISR effort by the west and the open-door policy with respect to intel from the US - how on earth did the UA miss the indicators on the Gomel axis?  This one sounds very weird to my ears and there is definitely a story here that is going to need unpacking.  Was there a failure in western ISR?  Was there a breakdown in communications?  Did UA planners fall for progressive unreality of their own?
It appears that Russia bet the entire farm on "the mighty Russian bear" in a series of increasingly unrealistic assumptions, built upon unrealistic assumptions.  Here we hit the other missing peice - what was the actual Russian thinking?  We cannot know this from data given - although authors lean in pretty hard, and I am not sure we will ever get a full Russian internal picture.  
Initial Invasion
The big takeaway for me here was the serious disparity in RA C4ISR and catastrophic misalignment in the levels of warfare.  There were a lot of systemic targeting problems and the failure to establish operational pre-conditions in favor of operational surprise - destruction of transportation and communications infrastructure.  However the indicators of lack of targeting enterprise integration are pretty bold:
"A critical weakness of the Russian strike campaign was battle damage assessment. First, the Russian military appears to have presumed that if an action had been ordered and carried out then it had succeeded, unless there was direct evidence to the contrary."
This speaks to a fundamentally flawed Russian joint targeting enterprise.  Further confirmation bias is pure poison in warfighting.  It causes can be so deep that there are examples worse than what we saw in the first days of the war.  In Russia's case they seem to be a combination of deep cultural biases combined with a rigid military-political hierarchy where "push back" or critical thinking is simply not a thing.  There is a fear in every military that the worst thing that can happen is "the death of formation" - the military organization collapsing into an armed mob.  Russia demonstrated in the initial invasion of Ukraine that the only thing worse than taking a military mob to war is taking a military cult.  
Based on what I can see the failure in the first three days was a combination of very poor planning and preparation, failure to establish operational pre-conditions and way under-estimating the complexity of the operation while at the same time way over-estimating the RA's capabilities.  In much more blunt terms, from a military operational point of view it was amateur hour.  Russia had not undertaken an offensive operation of this scope, size and scale since the Second World War, and they figured it would be "2014+ a little bit".  When the reality is that complexity and friction do not scale linearly - they do so exponentially; Ukraine 2022 was not 2x harder than 2014, it was 2 orders of magnitude (100x) more difficult and clearly the RA was not prepared for it.
Battle for Kyiv
To my mind this is the biggest blank spot in the document.  Even given the RA poor performance in the first 72 hours, they were able to achieve "12:1" force ratios on the Gomel axis towards Kyiv.  The authors appear to lay the majority blame for the RA stalling and eventual collapse largely on tactical "confusion".  They point out the BTG as a flawed concept - which frankly does not track as it mirrors western Battlegroup and TF constructs very closely.  Very few militaries have permanent combined arms units - they are largely modular by design.  So when the authors highlight:
"In addition to BTGs being units that had not trained together and lacking staff who knew one another, they were also non-uniform in their composition. These deviations did not appear to derive from the tasks they were assigned but instead arose from the equipment available from the units that generated them. Yet, to commanders at higher echelons, the Russian battle management appeared to treat all BTGs as comparable units of action with no tailoring of tasks to their respective capabilities. When military advances are used as a mere demonstration of force this would not have been critical. But once the force tried to transition to fighting, units were now assigned tasks for which they were poorly equipped.
As an example, consider the composition of two BTGs, which operated in almost the same area in the east of Ukraine at the end of April 2022. One of them was from the 228th Motor Rifle Regiment of the 90th Armoured Division of the Central Military District (Svatove district): 23 APCs; six tanks; a 122-mm selfpropelled artillery battery; three MLRS BM-21 ‘Grad’; up to 40 vehicles; and about 400 personnel. Another was from the composition of the 57th Motor Rifle Brigade of the 5th Army of the Eastern Military District (Rubizhne district): more than 30 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs); 14 tanks; a 122-mm self-propelled artillery battery; a 152-mm self-propelled artillery battery; a MLRS BM-21 ‘Grad’ battery; up to 60 vehicles; and about 800 personnel."
So I find this confusing and lacking.  So how were the 228th MRR and 57th MRB BTG mis-employed?  It alludes to higher level RA commanders treating all BTGs as uniform and failure to "task tailor" and I really want to see the evidence of this.  The lack of uniformity is very common throughout modern militaries all over the place.  When I look at these two BTGs I see one "light" and one "heavy" - so what?  How was the 228th asked to do a job it was not capable of?
Again, what is really missing here is "what killed the RA north of Kyiv" because tactical confusion was very likely a contributing factor but the UA took on an opponent with a 12:1 force ration advantage and that opponent pulled out a month later in tatters.  A lot of themes here to unpack - zombie orders, complete lack of operational/tactical C2 integration, capability misalignment and logistical issues (only alluded to).  But while all of this definitely contributes to operational system strain - it does not blow up the amount of hardware we saw unfold on Oryx.  
From my read the UA held off a 12:1 force overmatch with a couple artillery brigades, SOF and ad hoc TD units - who "did not have enough ATGMs to really make a difference anyway?"  So the RA drove towards Kyiv - its main effort - in a confused and rambling fashion.  Sat on the roads in "tactical confusion" and lack of air superiority for a month while the UA killed them like freakin buffalo, largely with indirect fire from two formations?  Huh?
So here I think we need a lot more depth.  How many RA vehicles were killed by indirect fire and how much indirect fire?  How was that indirect fire targeted?  Where was the RA c-battery: did the RA really just sit there and let UA artillery hammer them without responsing?  How many vehicles were killed by those ATGMs?
[aside: I am pretty confused by the ATGM assessment to be honest.  The UA did not have enough ATGW to make a difference:
"The tactical employment of ATGWs by the UAF prior to the conflict was largely aimed at fixing or blunting enemy armoured manoeuvre and for use in raiding by light forces because of the speed with which units with these systems could displace. There were too few missiles, however, for these to be the primary means of attriting enemy forces."
Ok, well earlier they note that the UA had purchased close to 20,000 soviet-style and homemade ATGMs after 2014.  to which they received about 3000 Javelins and NLAWs.  So what did all that do to "attirting" enemy forces?  What was the effect of "raiding" on an already confused RA.  What was the role of integration of those light forces and indirect fires.?]
On the Battle of Kyiv I am left with far more questions than answers, and a whole lot here is still not adding up.  Again, missing is the role western ISR support played.  RA troops broad casting in "the clear" is not great but it cannot explain the level of precision lethality to effectively cold-stop a military system with the kind of over-match the RA had.  If western space-based ISR was fully engaged the fact that the RA used cellphones is not why they died - it was because they could be seen from space in real time.  While the RA clearly lacked the same.
Tanks?  Critical and the UA had lots...but mostly for indirect fire....WTF?!  There are so many weird sounds with respect to military mass coming out of all this it is starting to sound like a piano being fed into a woodchipper to me.
EW and UAS - wow.  Ok, so clearly this is what the environment looks like with UAS being very effectively countered.  This is not open skies, the RA has been knocking these things down like crazy and yet it has not really helped them as UA unmanned is still being used to great effect.  And again, EW is going to do nothing against higher altitude and space-based systems. 
Battle for the Donbas
Really no surprises here - we did see a lot of this here on the forum.  The political spin on why the UA did not simply pull out and stayed and fought was very interesting - i.e. war crimes in occupied areas effect.   The density of RA fires and essentially human wave attacks really highlight something else with respect to mass - the unbearable weight requirement.  So in order for the RA to achieve enough overmatch they had to concentrate so much that mobility was basically sacrificed.  They appear the limiting factor on the rates of advance in the Donbas because moving all those guns with their ammo could not be done quickly.  This appears to be what "dumb mass" risks on the modern battlefield.
I am stumped however, on why the RA never achieved breakthrough.  The massive sacrifices of the UA cannot be understated here but was that the thin blue and yellow line that held off all that weight?  Or was there something else going on to explain why after literally annihilating ground with HE, the RA was never able to breakthrough and manoeuvre?  What was the comparative UA density in these areas?
After this I am getting the sense that the Donbas was a modern day version of Verdun as the RA broke itself further for very little gain.  The damage to the UA and how much it was able to push-back is incomplete, so the nature of how this contest unfolded is unclear.  What we do know is that the RA lost the offensive after Donbas, and the UA picked it up. 
Conclusions
Despite leaning in hard and taking risks in some parts of this assessment - e.g the inner working of the RA.  The authors are actually pretty cautious their conclusions.  These are all sound but my take away is, again, something happened to military mass in this war.  "No Sanctuary" and "Disperse or Die" are basically the same point - the traditional use of mass is beyond challenged, it has proven fatal to the RA. I am very interested on how the UA employed dispersion throughout this war, particularly on the offensive.  "Fighting for the Right to Precision" is very interesting, and I think hints at the "cloud-based warfare" we have been tossing around: however, it also lacks the effects of western space based ISR.  I am convinced that fighting for the right of precision will extend into space and cyber (which gets mentioned exactly twice in the entire document).  Further as unmanned systems get smarter I am more convinced that "Fighting through Precision" is the emerging theme.
For example I have used the term "anti-mass" a few times.  This appears to be a combination of speed and precision combined to create a pressure wave of smart-attrition to systematically deconstruct an opponents operational system.  Further precision is becoming a key component in survivability.  The document alludes to this:
"Precision is not only vastly more efficient in the effects it delivers but also allows the force to reduce its logistics tail and thereby makes it more survivable. Precision weapons, however, are scarce and can be defeated by EW ."
I am left wondering what happens when precision weapons are no longer scarce and ISR clouds that go from sub-surface to space are created that cannot be defeated by EW?
Finally the "significant slack capacity" point is at odds with precision, or perhaps they are mutually supporting in reality.  Precision really means very high efficiency combined with effectiveness.  So one does not need massive amounts of dumb war stocks, but one may need massive amounts of smart-war stocks because they are now on the critical path.  I do not think either side in this war has fully expressed what mass-precision looks like but the UA is coming damned close.
The_Capt's axiom update:
Mass beats isolation, connected precision beat mass, integrated massed precision beats everything.
Re-thinking War
I am coming to a growing sense that warfare is in need of a serious rethink.  We have principles and foundations that remain unchanged - e.g. selection and maint of the aim, morale, attrition.  But we have others that are looking more and more as though they are in the wind - surprise, manoeuvre, concentration of mass.  I think we need to start looking through different lens's and frameworks, as many of our old ones are challenged.  Our planning processes and how we make assumptions, how we define "decision" and "victory".  How we think about the translation of military power - to capability - to effect - to decisions and outcomes.  How we think about capability itself.  To my mind this is a good thing, if we do it ahead of evolution.  Whether or not we are in a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is an entirely different question.  Many thought we were in the 90s and early 00's but it kind of petered out.  I suspect RMAs take longer than a couple decades to culminate so we could very well be in the middle of one; however, it is very hard to say without more evidence. 
I can only say the best course is to keep watching carefully, critically and continuously as you can.  For me the progress of this war has been both terrible, wasteful and simply tragic.  It has also been professionally mesmerizing - the entire point of mastery of warfare is so you do not have to fight one, or if you do it is short and sharp as possible.  The lessons from this war all point to reinforcing the primacy of this idea. 
   
  

Hi all
I've created this post to make available some resources that may be of use to players.
I've attached the Five Days One Summer campaign flowchart - so you can see where you are going, if you wish. If you'd rather not see into the future then best not read it.
I've attached the Tigers at Ogledow campaign flowchart - again possible spoilers here so if you'd rather not know, don't look!
Also I've attached a SPW Training Missions Tactics and Lessons document. This document provides a deeper overview of the doctrine and tactics taught (and used) by German armored panzer grenadier units equipped with the Sdkfz 251 halftrack and its variants (referred to as a Schützenpanzerwagon or SPW) in the later part of the war, around 1944. Its main intent is to provide additional background to the series of scenarios and missions in the battle pack for Red Thunder, in particular the series of three SPW ‘Lesson’ series scenarios. My thanks to @domfluff who reviewed this and provided tactical insight, oh and it was his idea originally.
Five Days One Summer Wiking panzer grenadier mods - I've added a wee package of mods I used for the grenadiers in the Five Days One Summer. I basically assembled others excellent mods to create a look which is in the Wiking Mods GMc Mix . Main changes are grenadiers are in light battle rattle - no extraneous kit, crusher caps are M43s and senior officer has a 'Wiking' cuff band and a M43. My thanks to the talent and good will of Aris, @EZ (WSS Senior Officer and WSS camo uniforms), @Frenchy56 (Crusher and side caps to M43) @kohlenklau (No-gear mod - the campaign is mod tagged 'no gear') @Lucky_Strike (Senior officer peaked caps to M43s). I used Aris' Soviet tank mods, his Soviet faces and VM's summer Soviet uniforms.
Five Days Campaign Overview_v1.pdf SPW Training Missions Tactics and Lessons_FINAL.pdf
1831305623_FiveDaysOneSummerMods.rar
Tigers at Ogledow Campaign Overview_v1.pdf

So, my quick 2p on the Polish Missile Incident while we wait for more facts to come out:

On the one hand, it seems likely that it was an accident, or at least unintentional (which is not quite the same thing). Missiles can do funny things in flight- I don't think it's unreasonable to think that a Russian cruise missile got lost somehow, that a Ukrainian air defence missile missed it's target and keep going west, or that a Russian missile was damaged by a Ukrainian one and went off course.

We've got some spectacular footage of a missile in Luhansk deciding to do a 180 and return itself to sender- it's not a stretch to think that one might be damaged or off by a small error when fired and end up miles off target.

On the other hand... it seems like there's a lot of potential deniability to this and thus uncertainty. The fact that missiles malfunction and get lost, the fact that Russia and Ukraine both use similar weapons, the fact that the missile hit a random location in Poland rather than a specific target... this is all leads to a pretty murky picture (at least, right now).

Does that deniability and murkiness make it more likely that it's actually some kind of Russian signalling attempt? The timing is interesting- NATO leaders are split between Europe and Bali because of the G19 (those in Indonesia, including Biden having to be roused at stupid o'clock over there to be briefed) and the Russians have just suffered a significant set-back at Kherson.

They certainly blew the Nordstream pipeline after the Kharkiv Offensive took off in what was almost certainly a signalling attempt... that obviously did not warn NATO off, so are the Russians taking a step up the escalation ladder? Just drop a missile somewhere on the Polish border at random- enough to pass off as a malfunction, or ideally a Ukrainian error- but also enough to say "Look guys, we can hit the cross-border supply routes. You've been warned."

Signalling? Coincidences? Or the unfortunate but natural result of firing a hundred cruise missiles at Ukraine? Of course, it stands to reason that it could be both, with the risk of missile malfunction generating this kind of incident accepted as an opportunity to send a signal.

But, too early to know yet. We'll see.

So, my quick 2p on the Polish Missile Incident while we wait for more facts to come out:

On the one hand, it seems likely that it was an accident, or at least unintentional (which is not quite the same thing). Missiles can do funny things in flight- I don't think it's unreasonable to think that a Russian cruise missile got lost somehow, that a Ukrainian air defence missile missed it's target and keep going west, or that a Russian missile was damaged by a Ukrainian one and went off course.

We've got some spectacular footage of a missile in Luhansk deciding to do a 180 and return itself to sender- it's not a stretch to think that one might be damaged or off by a small error when fired and end up miles off target.

On the other hand... it seems like there's a lot of potential deniability to this and thus uncertainty. The fact that missiles malfunction and get lost, the fact that Russia and Ukraine both use similar weapons, the fact that the missile hit a random location in Poland rather than a specific target... this is all leads to a pretty murky picture (at least, right now).

Does that deniability and murkiness make it more likely that it's actually some kind of Russian signalling attempt? The timing is interesting- NATO leaders are split between Europe and Bali because of the G19 (those in Indonesia, including Biden having to be roused at stupid o'clock over there to be briefed) and the Russians have just suffered a significant set-back at Kherson.

They certainly blew the Nordstream pipeline after the Kharkiv Offensive took off in what was almost certainly a signalling attempt... that obviously did not warn NATO off, so are the Russians taking a step up the escalation ladder? Just drop a missile somewhere on the Polish border at random- enough to pass off as a malfunction, or ideally a Ukrainian error- but also enough to say "Look guys, we can hit the cross-border supply routes. You've been warned."

Signalling? Coincidences? Or the unfortunate but natural result of firing a hundred cruise missiles at Ukraine? Of course, it stands to reason that it could be both, with the risk of missile malfunction generating this kind of incident accepted as an opportunity to send a signal.

But, too early to know yet. We'll see.

So, my quick 2p on the Polish Missile Incident while we wait for more facts to come out:

On the one hand, it seems likely that it was an accident, or at least unintentional (which is not quite the same thing). Missiles can do funny things in flight- I don't think it's unreasonable to think that a Russian cruise missile got lost somehow, that a Ukrainian air defence missile missed it's target and keep going west, or that a Russian missile was damaged by a Ukrainian one and went off course.

We've got some spectacular footage of a missile in Luhansk deciding to do a 180 and return itself to sender- it's not a stretch to think that one might be damaged or off by a small error when fired and end up miles off target.

On the other hand... it seems like there's a lot of potential deniability to this and thus uncertainty. The fact that missiles malfunction and get lost, the fact that Russia and Ukraine both use similar weapons, the fact that the missile hit a random location in Poland rather than a specific target... this is all leads to a pretty murky picture (at least, right now).

Does that deniability and murkiness make it more likely that it's actually some kind of Russian signalling attempt? The timing is interesting- NATO leaders are split between Europe and Bali because of the G19 (those in Indonesia, including Biden having to be roused at stupid o'clock over there to be briefed) and the Russians have just suffered a significant set-back at Kherson.

They certainly blew the Nordstream pipeline after the Kharkiv Offensive took off in what was almost certainly a signalling attempt... that obviously did not warn NATO off, so are the Russians taking a step up the escalation ladder? Just drop a missile somewhere on the Polish border at random- enough to pass off as a malfunction, or ideally a Ukrainian error- but also enough to say "Look guys, we can hit the cross-border supply routes. You've been warned."

Signalling? Coincidences? Or the unfortunate but natural result of firing a hundred cruise missiles at Ukraine? Of course, it stands to reason that it could be both, with the risk of missile malfunction generating this kind of incident accepted as an opportunity to send a signal.

But, too early to know yet. We'll see.

Well guys, at last I got this!  Symbolically in the day of Kherson liberation ) 
Thank you @Kinophile for this initiative and enough "family diplomacy" in resolving of sudden obstacle on "last mile" 😀
Thank you @Battlefront.com - Steve, your "bribe" ) will be worked out ))))
Thank you all, who donated anonymously
Thank you, all other, who just have been reading and support our country - first two months were some nervous and psychologically hard, so this my 24/7 "marathone" here was giving me some emotional relief. 
 

Whelp that'll do it.  Pretty standard for the last one out to turn out the lights.  Still not entirely clear but this whole thing has an "ending with a whimper" feel to it, as opposed to a clever trap or valiant last stand.  Could be some holdout positions but it kind of looks like the RA doesn't have the human capital to throw away on a hopeless urban slugging match.
So I can see some are disappointed here, but once again - check your metrics.  The bad news is that the RA appears to have adapted to retreating and can do so in a more orderly fashion.  The good news is that the first real sign of RA operational learning is within the area of retreating.  Offence was a hard fail, defence looks pretty shaky, but retreating is off to a solid start.
So before everyone gets all glum let take a hard look at this whole thing:
Tactical/Operational - While not being able to bag thousands of PoWs, and sending another few thousand RA troops face down out to the Black Sea is disappointing, let reflect a moment on the tactical and operational achievements of this Fall.  First the UA managed to stage two operational offensive on both ends of a very long front, simultaneously.  This is an incredibly hard peice of work.  The logistics coordination and synchronization of operational support and enablers is truly epic - I have zero doubt the post-war analysis will show this.  We all saw Kharkiv, as the UA crushed the right flank of the famous Russian "encirclement" in the Donbas.
Next, for Kherson, I would really like to see an accurate comparison of force ratios in what just happened.  Because I am willing to bet very good money that they were nowhere near 3:1 for the UA.  In fact I would not be surprised to see them inverted the other way on paper - the little guy just kept crushing toes until the big guy left limping.  This breaks a lot of rules of warfare as we understand them (again).  This is not small in the least and it makes the case for corrosive warfare as being highly effective in both defence and offence - fog eating snowmen in either direction.  This operation did exactly what such on operation of infiltrate - isolate - fix/finish - repeat should, it went slow...and then it went fast at the end.  I fully I admit that I was getting worried there for a minute as well as perhaps the RA had finally proven that the entire theory was weak on the offence, and the potential to freeze this conflict was more real, but Kherson just put another nail in that coffin.
Finally, the very good news is that so long as 1) the RA cannot adapt at levels outside the scope of this war (e.g. C4ISR) and 2) the UA are sustained and supported to keep doing what they are doing = it won't matter where the RA digs in (with maybe one exception), this approach can be repeated.  It is only a matter of UA concentration of focus.  The RA can put in massive obstacle belts but I am not sure they will even work against the UA's approach.  Also, even though we did not get the bloodthirsty itch scratched at the end, do not forget just how much damage was done to the RA in this sector before they decided to pull out - the RA has continued to lose things they cannot get back.
So by other metrics the UA Fall Offensive will be one for the history books.  Beyond it being an incredibly ambitious and bold set of offensive operations - both were successful on many levels. I await what happens next with bated breath.
Political/Strategic - Massive victory - I mean Trafalgar Square massive in this entire Fall Offensive.  All war is communication and negotiation - and the UA might have just changed the narrative of this entire war for good which will directly impact the outcome.  This is no longer a war of Ukrainian survival, it is one of liberation.  By re-taking a major regional capital the political pay off is potentially immense with the strategic narrative in the west, we love a winner and we love a freedom fighter.  Up until now - even though everyone here knew it was about liberation since the spring/early summer, as did everyone in Ukraine - I suspect the mainstream west still saw this through the lens of survival.  Kharkiv was cool but it might have just been a fluke.  If spun right, and I suspect it will be, Kherson should be pivotal in shifting that perspective towards "freedom for all freedom loving peoples" (insert music) - the entire narrative has potential to upscale (there is that word again). OR there is a possibility that the west goes "ok, well they proved their point lets tie this off so I can worry about the price of my Cheetos" - gawd I hope it is the latter.
So What?  Well it should reinforce external support and possibly shift the pressure of tying this off "right now" towards something else.  I am not sure it means the entire Donbas and Crimea back in the sweet loving embrace of Ukraine by next summer, we have discussed this at length and I am still not entirely sure it is a good idea - at least not immediately.  However it has very likely bought Ukraine time and options, while taking time and options away from Putin.  Putin and his cronies should be looking out the window of the Kremlin right now saying "damn, we are in a tight spot!" 
Finally, something I have been thinking about a lot, beyond options, is alignment.  Ukraine has near perfect alignment between its micro and macro structures - Russia does not, and for them it is getting worse.  That alignment serves as the foundation of collective Will.  Now how that alignment is created, reinforced and sustained has filled volumes of books, but right here and now it is clear that one side of this war is very different from the other.  All that is left to screw up is the third party's alignment in this war - the West.  We have been analyzing this instinctually but the alignment between the macro and micro social spaces in the West with respect to this war are likely going to determine its outcome - unless Russia totally implodes and then we have got a whole new set of problems.  So What?  Tell your family, neighbors and friends the good word - the micro-social space starts in your own living room. 

Another shot. Fascinating to consider that sustained long range precision corrosion didn't blow the bridge, but instead made the enemy do it themselves.



Also, I guess one for the engineers to turn around to the missileers and say "That's how you do it!"

Another shot. Fascinating to consider that sustained long range precision corrosion didn't blow the bridge, but instead made the enemy do it themselves.



Also, I guess one for the engineers to turn around to the missileers and say "That's how you do it!"

Another shot. Fascinating to consider that sustained long range precision corrosion didn't blow the bridge, but instead made the enemy do it themselves.



Also, I guess one for the engineers to turn around to the missileers and say "That's how you do it!"

Mashovets post.
 
There was no electricity for almost the whole day ... so today is short and only about the main thing ...
1. The Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Svatovo direction are very close to cutting off the R-66 road (of course, where exactly ... I won’t say), but I emphasize that a significant section of it between Svatovo and Kremennaya is already under their effective fire control. the section north of Svatovo has already been cut in at least two places. Therefore, the command of the enemy troops is forced to carry out the logistics of their tactical grouping in the Svatovo area exclusively through Troitskoye, or all around, through Starobelsk.
2. The tactical group of enemy troops (up to 3 BTGr, probably from the 3rd Motor Rifle Division of the 20th CAA, reinforced by two "rifle battalions of the mobilization reserve" of the 2nd AK), did not go over to the expected offensive on Zarechnoye and Torskoye ... They tried with the help of two platoons, with the participation of 3 units of armored vehicles, to advance in a southwestern direction (it must be understood that this was a kind of reconnaissance in force) ... to no avail ...
3. A unit of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 1st Guards Tank Army (up to the "combined battalion"), which is defending along the Vladimirovka-Kuzemovka line and covering the direction to Nizhnyaya Duvanka, on the night of October 24-25, 2022, received massive fire damage from forward units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine . After that, the Russian command warned him about the high probability that the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine would go on the offensive in the direction of Berestovo (Kharkiv region), but this did not happen ... and the enemy got the opportunity and was forced to replenish him with manpower and several units of weapons and military equipment for the next 2 days.
4. The enemy units defending to the west and south-west of Svatovo (probably we are also talking about units of the 20th CAA), along the Raygorodok-Novodyanye line, suffered a significant fire defeat and now, according to their command, are "on the verge of combat capability", as a result, they are forced to gradually retreat to the northeast... The distance between the positions of the forward units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which continue to gradually move towards Svatovo from the southwest, and the surroundings of the city has been reduced to 12 km.
5. On the right bank of the Seversky Donets, the enemy (with the forces of 1.5 BTGr of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st CAA, the "combined assault squad" BARS-13, 19 and the BTGr from the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Army Corps) continues its "stopping" attacks from the east in the direction of the eastern outskirts of Belogorovka and from the LNPZ in the direction of Verkhnekamenskoye.
The main goal, obviously, is to prevent, under any circumstances, the advance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the Shipilovka-Privolye-Novodruzhesk triangle and to the Zolotarovka-Verkhnekamenka line. After all, if this happens, then the position of the Russian troops in the area of Lisichansk and Kremennaya - Rubizhnoye will deteriorate very sharply.
6. For 2 days, the enemy continued stubborn attacks north of Bakhmut, trying to break through to Krasnaya Gora through Bakhmutskoye and Soledar from one side and at the same time attacking in the Podgorodny area ... to no avail.
Moreover, after an unexpected counterattack by units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the area of the SINIAT ODO plant two days ago, units of the Wagner PMC, which had previously attacked from Pokrovsky in the direction of the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut, were forced to withdraw at least 1.5 km and move to defense...
South of the city, at least two reinforced companies from the 31st separate assault brigade and units of the 6th mrr of the 2nd AK, reinforced with separate tanks of the tbn "Diesel" of the 1st AK and the 3rd "assault detachment" of the PMC " Wagner" are trying to break into Bakhmut by stubborn attacks from the intersection of the M-03 and T-0504 roads and also through Experienced, Ivangrad. So far ... also - to no avail.
6. In the Avdeevka direction, the enemy also did not achieve significant changes in his favor. Stubborn attacks along the Vodyanoye-Experimental and Peski-Pervomaiskoye line south of Avdiivka and north of it in the Krasnogorovka area, with the obvious goal of breaking through on the flanks of the Avdeevka defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and encircling it, continue to be stubborn, hard, but to no avail for the enemy.
South of Avdiivka, the "main actors" are the units of the 1st "Slavic" motorized rifle brigade of the 1st AK, a separate assault battalion "Somali" and a separate reconnaissance battalion "Sparta", well known to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Due to the large troubles of this offensive, associated with periodic counterattacks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the command of the enemy forces also has to involve separate units of the 9th MRR, assault battalion "Storm"  and the "Pyatnashka" battalion in these attacks.

My money is on cyber being the dog that didn't bark... because it's not a dog. And it can't bark.

This tickled me.
In particular- "In the books everything is written, you just need to know it and be able to apply it."
There's a website floating around listing VDV manuals (http://russianairbornetroops.info/) and while I can't read Russian, judging from the pictures, knowing and applying what's in the books might not help:


Which is just... wow. Advance down a street with dismounted infantry sandwiched between two BMDs? No thank you.
Then there are elements in these manuals that seem fairly sensible, but are somewhat sabotaged by the er, quality of the art:

This is all from the manual with the CMx1 screenshots in, for extra bonus points.
Of course, there's a chance it's not legit, but still the mind continues to boggle.

DNA-modified pigeon from secret US biolab in Ukraine. Their poo after contact with air turn out to HE substance with around-nuclear TNT equivalent. Several grams of this HE **** can reliase so much energy, like Excalibur warhead ) 

This tickled me.
In particular- "In the books everything is written, you just need to know it and be able to apply it."
There's a website floating around listing VDV manuals (http://russianairbornetroops.info/) and while I can't read Russian, judging from the pictures, knowing and applying what's in the books might not help:


Which is just... wow. Advance down a street with dismounted infantry sandwiched between two BMDs? No thank you.
Then there are elements in these manuals that seem fairly sensible, but are somewhat sabotaged by the er, quality of the art:

This is all from the manual with the CMx1 screenshots in, for extra bonus points.
Of course, there's a chance it's not legit, but still the mind continues to boggle.

This tickled me.
In particular- "In the books everything is written, you just need to know it and be able to apply it."
There's a website floating around listing VDV manuals (http://russianairbornetroops.info/) and while I can't read Russian, judging from the pictures, knowing and applying what's in the books might not help:


Which is just... wow. Advance down a street with dismounted infantry sandwiched between two BMDs? No thank you.
Then there are elements in these manuals that seem fairly sensible, but are somewhat sabotaged by the er, quality of the art:

This is all from the manual with the CMx1 screenshots in, for extra bonus points.
Of course, there's a chance it's not legit, but still the mind continues to boggle.

As stated in @kohlenklau's Christmas 2022 Scenario Thread ....
My offering is set during the current Ukraine conflict.  The scenario is fictional but set in a real place and was certainly an action that could have been fought had Russian forces made a serious attempt to push south to Barvinkove in May this year.  The scenario is centred on Chervone on a 4.8km x 3.6km map:
Topo Overlay

Google Earth Overlay

The Combat Mission Editor View

The Combat Mission 3D Map Preview View

More details to follow ...