domfluff

I've said before, but I think the NTC campaign might be my favorite across all of CM, precisely because of that sharp focus. Each mission and decision point serves a cohesive purpose, and the whole doesn't outstay its welcome.
I do think the final scoring might be a little scuffed, but I'm not sure it matters really.

I've said before, but I think the NTC campaign might be my favorite across all of CM, precisely because of that sharp focus. Each mission and decision point serves a cohesive purpose, and the whole doesn't outstay its welcome.
I do think the final scoring might be a little scuffed, but I'm not sure it matters really.

Wargaming is stochastic, so nothing will ever give you perfect information.
The question then falls to you - if you look at your scheme of manoeuvre, see a piece of terrain and think "gee, it'd really suck if there was an atgm team hiding in there", then you really have a few choices:
 
You can get eyes-on and try to spot something in there.
You can arrange for a recon by fire, exposing your scout position, but perhaps forcing a response.
You can send a scout element into the terrain piece to actively clear it
You could arrange for indirect fires to proactively deny this terrain feature.
 
Each option involves accepting a different level of risk, and each provides a different level of information and result. Which is best is part of the Art of the thing - the probabilistic basis of wargaming decisions means that there usually won't be a best answer, just a least-worst one, and which one is correct for you will differ.
 
Ultimately, you can't spot everything, so the trick is to engage with the things that really matter - to read the terrain and identify the areas that are going to cause you issues, so that your limited resources can be leveraged to the greatest effect.

I've been a busy bee recently. Someone has to fill the void! That, or I'm just talking to my own echo. Oh well. 
Anyways, this post is about hull down (a strangely controversial topic around these parts) and Berm Drills, an explanation as to what they are, their efficacy, and how to do them in CM. I used Cold War to make the examples in this post, so I figured I would post it here. That said, the lessons apply to every CM game.
The full post can be found here: https://millerswargamingvault.blogspot.com/2022/06/visualized-in-combat-mission-berm-drills.html
Here is a little vid I made to help entice: 
 

Wargaming is stochastic, so nothing will ever give you perfect information.
The question then falls to you - if you look at your scheme of manoeuvre, see a piece of terrain and think "gee, it'd really suck if there was an atgm team hiding in there", then you really have a few choices:
 
You can get eyes-on and try to spot something in there.
You can arrange for a recon by fire, exposing your scout position, but perhaps forcing a response.
You can send a scout element into the terrain piece to actively clear it
You could arrange for indirect fires to proactively deny this terrain feature.
 
Each option involves accepting a different level of risk, and each provides a different level of information and result. Which is best is part of the Art of the thing - the probabilistic basis of wargaming decisions means that there usually won't be a best answer, just a least-worst one, and which one is correct for you will differ.
 
Ultimately, you can't spot everything, so the trick is to engage with the things that really matter - to read the terrain and identify the areas that are going to cause you issues, so that your limited resources can be leveraged to the greatest effect.

Wargaming is stochastic, so nothing will ever give you perfect information.
The question then falls to you - if you look at your scheme of manoeuvre, see a piece of terrain and think "gee, it'd really suck if there was an atgm team hiding in there", then you really have a few choices:
 
You can get eyes-on and try to spot something in there.
You can arrange for a recon by fire, exposing your scout position, but perhaps forcing a response.
You can send a scout element into the terrain piece to actively clear it
You could arrange for indirect fires to proactively deny this terrain feature.
 
Each option involves accepting a different level of risk, and each provides a different level of information and result. Which is best is part of the Art of the thing - the probabilistic basis of wargaming decisions means that there usually won't be a best answer, just a least-worst one, and which one is correct for you will differ.
 
Ultimately, you can't spot everything, so the trick is to engage with the things that really matter - to read the terrain and identify the areas that are going to cause you issues, so that your limited resources can be leveraged to the greatest effect.

Wargaming is stochastic, so nothing will ever give you perfect information.
The question then falls to you - if you look at your scheme of manoeuvre, see a piece of terrain and think "gee, it'd really suck if there was an atgm team hiding in there", then you really have a few choices:
 
You can get eyes-on and try to spot something in there.
You can arrange for a recon by fire, exposing your scout position, but perhaps forcing a response.
You can send a scout element into the terrain piece to actively clear it
You could arrange for indirect fires to proactively deny this terrain feature.
 
Each option involves accepting a different level of risk, and each provides a different level of information and result. Which is best is part of the Art of the thing - the probabilistic basis of wargaming decisions means that there usually won't be a best answer, just a least-worst one, and which one is correct for you will differ.
 
Ultimately, you can't spot everything, so the trick is to engage with the things that really matter - to read the terrain and identify the areas that are going to cause you issues, so that your limited resources can be leveraged to the greatest effect.

Wargaming is stochastic, so nothing will ever give you perfect information.
The question then falls to you - if you look at your scheme of manoeuvre, see a piece of terrain and think "gee, it'd really suck if there was an atgm team hiding in there", then you really have a few choices:
 
You can get eyes-on and try to spot something in there.
You can arrange for a recon by fire, exposing your scout position, but perhaps forcing a response.
You can send a scout element into the terrain piece to actively clear it
You could arrange for indirect fires to proactively deny this terrain feature.
 
Each option involves accepting a different level of risk, and each provides a different level of information and result. Which is best is part of the Art of the thing - the probabilistic basis of wargaming decisions means that there usually won't be a best answer, just a least-worst one, and which one is correct for you will differ.
 
Ultimately, you can't spot everything, so the trick is to engage with the things that really matter - to read the terrain and identify the areas that are going to cause you issues, so that your limited resources can be leveraged to the greatest effect.

Wargaming is stochastic, so nothing will ever give you perfect information.
The question then falls to you - if you look at your scheme of manoeuvre, see a piece of terrain and think "gee, it'd really suck if there was an atgm team hiding in there", then you really have a few choices:
 
You can get eyes-on and try to spot something in there.
You can arrange for a recon by fire, exposing your scout position, but perhaps forcing a response.
You can send a scout element into the terrain piece to actively clear it
You could arrange for indirect fires to proactively deny this terrain feature.
 
Each option involves accepting a different level of risk, and each provides a different level of information and result. Which is best is part of the Art of the thing - the probabilistic basis of wargaming decisions means that there usually won't be a best answer, just a least-worst one, and which one is correct for you will differ.
 
Ultimately, you can't spot everything, so the trick is to engage with the things that really matter - to read the terrain and identify the areas that are going to cause you issues, so that your limited resources can be leveraged to the greatest effect.

Wargaming is stochastic, so nothing will ever give you perfect information.
The question then falls to you - if you look at your scheme of manoeuvre, see a piece of terrain and think "gee, it'd really suck if there was an atgm team hiding in there", then you really have a few choices:
 
You can get eyes-on and try to spot something in there.
You can arrange for a recon by fire, exposing your scout position, but perhaps forcing a response.
You can send a scout element into the terrain piece to actively clear it
You could arrange for indirect fires to proactively deny this terrain feature.
 
Each option involves accepting a different level of risk, and each provides a different level of information and result. Which is best is part of the Art of the thing - the probabilistic basis of wargaming decisions means that there usually won't be a best answer, just a least-worst one, and which one is correct for you will differ.
 
Ultimately, you can't spot everything, so the trick is to engage with the things that really matter - to read the terrain and identify the areas that are going to cause you issues, so that your limited resources can be leveraged to the greatest effect.

Another writeup for those of you who can pry yourselves from the Ukraine thread. This time, the topic is mission planning, specifically how to do it in relation to Combat Mission scenarios. 
The basic idea is:
Planning Framework for Combat Mission
The workflow for planning how to play a scenario in Combat Mission can be broken into four parts and are done in order. They are:
     1.      Receive OPORD/WARNO/FRAGO
     2.      METT-TC
     3.      OKOCA
     4.      Enemy Course of Action (ECOA)
Read along for the full breakdown and explanation! https://millerswargamingvault.blogspot.com/2022/06/introduction-planning-is-critical-to.html 
Feel free to discuss. Just remember that this is a very complicated subject if you decide to get really into the details. There are entire doctrinal publications covering each one of these topics. This is a more general overview meant to be easily digestible in a single sitting, as as such some nuance is lost.
Fair warning for my fellow rock bangers, there are no pictures in this entry besides the cover image.

What a wonderful conversation we're having here

I think in reality that superiority might have faded faster than that - perhaps they had the edge in the seventies, and they probably did have the edge in the sixties.

CMCW represents this inflection point well - in 1979 the Soviets have some significant advantages, which are being eroded on a tactical level by 1982. Clearly the tiny number of Abrams, Bradleys and M60 TTS wouldn't have been *everywhere* in 1982, so the actual inflection point would have a longer tail in practice, even if the frontline would have been gnarlier than anticipated.
As an aside, I did come across an amusing/weak argument that the notable wargamer Paddy Griffith may have actually averted WW3.

He was a military historian, and participated in numerous wargames, both hobby and professional. A notable number of these professional, classified games were about Cold War doctrine, particularly with the US and modelling their policy of Active Defence - in particular the concept of an up-front defence, not giving up miles of West Germany to gain depth, as that wouldn't be politically viable.

We don't know the results of these games, or how extensive they were, but we do know that shortly afterwards the dial started to move, and the US policy position began to change (culminating in what became known as AirLand battle, but even changing the policy before that). This change in policy was then matched by a change towards a more defensive doctrine from the Soviet Union.

So... weak argument, but if we tentatively assume a direct line connecting all of the above, it's not impossible that a bespectacled British academic prevented an all-out nuclear war.

I think in reality that superiority might have faded faster than that - perhaps they had the edge in the seventies, and they probably did have the edge in the sixties.

CMCW represents this inflection point well - in 1979 the Soviets have some significant advantages, which are being eroded on a tactical level by 1982. Clearly the tiny number of Abrams, Bradleys and M60 TTS wouldn't have been *everywhere* in 1982, so the actual inflection point would have a longer tail in practice, even if the frontline would have been gnarlier than anticipated.
As an aside, I did come across an amusing/weak argument that the notable wargamer Paddy Griffith may have actually averted WW3.

He was a military historian, and participated in numerous wargames, both hobby and professional. A notable number of these professional, classified games were about Cold War doctrine, particularly with the US and modelling their policy of Active Defence - in particular the concept of an up-front defence, not giving up miles of West Germany to gain depth, as that wouldn't be politically viable.

We don't know the results of these games, or how extensive they were, but we do know that shortly afterwards the dial started to move, and the US policy position began to change (culminating in what became known as AirLand battle, but even changing the policy before that). This change in policy was then matched by a change towards a more defensive doctrine from the Soviet Union.

So... weak argument, but if we tentatively assume a direct line connecting all of the above, it's not impossible that a bespectacled British academic prevented an all-out nuclear war.

I do think there's some confusion of ideas in here, but I don't think that's unusual for wargaming in general, especially when it comes to conflating scope and scale.
 
Thinking is good.
What.
Okay, Clausewitz is an important work on military thinking, but this, like many things that quote Clausewitz, confuse scale significantly. I don't know how you "sue for peace" on a CM battlefield, really.
Wargaming has a focus on the decisive battle. Especially with CM, you're only ever seeing the sharp end. You're not necessarily seeing the main part, mind you. That's definitely a good point to bear in mind.
 
Uh... sort of. CM's focus is the tactical level, and that's the kind of questions it can ask and answer. Focus is a good thing, because it means you can answer one thing well, not a ton of things badly. It does mean you're not so concerned with stuff outside of your remit.
 
It's not only realistic, it's vitally important.
"The Soviets" may or may not have cared, but the chap in charge of the regiment certainly would, as well as the people fighting. It turns out that Russians are also people, and a CM-scale game is concerned with people above all else.

There are also broader points here about the extent to which numbers actually matter - it's been very common to have ratio-based CRTs in wargaming, but it's not actually clear how important that is.
 
"Why do people compare BMP-1 and M60?" - playing Top Trumps is absolutely not useful in the broad scheme of things, but the two also have to engage. If you're looking at it in terms of "which tank is the best", then that's never going to end well, but it's no different from saying "Well, if the Sherman and the Tiger were on a flat field, and they don't see each other until 200m., and there's no air cover, and..."

"Fair" is irrelevant, and playing Top Trumps with AFVs is useless. Comparing capabilities can be a lot more fruitful, but you need to consider a level or two higher than "my tank has a really large gun". It's very useful to know that both the ATGM and the 73mm HEAT round of the BMP-1 can penetrate an M60 from all aspects, since engagements will likely happen, but "which tank is best" is not useful.
Soviet doctrine is not, and has never been, about reckless charges into prepared kill zones. The whole reason for the CRP/FSE/main body march sequence is to avoid precisely this - attacking off the march trades risk for tempo, and correct movement techniques reduce risk.

You're still accepting risk - you are launching an offensive operation after all, and that's inherently risky - but you're going out of your way to minimise that risk as much as possible, whilst working within the bounds of a scheme which you believe offers you the best chance of actually achieving victory.
 
Attacks from the march would have been the most common, and typically the first engagements, because the emphasis was on speed. The Clausewitzian approach to war described above more accurately describes the Warsaw Pact approach than anything Western. There's a good argument to be made that the "bypass and force a capitulation" concept isn't terribly plausible in reality, outside of the 19th century context. There are a number of reasons for that, I suspect, but that's pushing the scope of this.
Prepared Soviet attacks would be something that would come later, especially if the attack from the march failed, or couldn't make progress otherwise. Maintaining tempo is the important thing.

I do think there's some confusion of ideas in here, but I don't think that's unusual for wargaming in general, especially when it comes to conflating scope and scale.
 
Thinking is good.
What.
Okay, Clausewitz is an important work on military thinking, but this, like many things that quote Clausewitz, confuse scale significantly. I don't know how you "sue for peace" on a CM battlefield, really.
Wargaming has a focus on the decisive battle. Especially with CM, you're only ever seeing the sharp end. You're not necessarily seeing the main part, mind you. That's definitely a good point to bear in mind.
 
Uh... sort of. CM's focus is the tactical level, and that's the kind of questions it can ask and answer. Focus is a good thing, because it means you can answer one thing well, not a ton of things badly. It does mean you're not so concerned with stuff outside of your remit.
 
It's not only realistic, it's vitally important.
"The Soviets" may or may not have cared, but the chap in charge of the regiment certainly would, as well as the people fighting. It turns out that Russians are also people, and a CM-scale game is concerned with people above all else.

There are also broader points here about the extent to which numbers actually matter - it's been very common to have ratio-based CRTs in wargaming, but it's not actually clear how important that is.
 
"Why do people compare BMP-1 and M60?" - playing Top Trumps is absolutely not useful in the broad scheme of things, but the two also have to engage. If you're looking at it in terms of "which tank is the best", then that's never going to end well, but it's no different from saying "Well, if the Sherman and the Tiger were on a flat field, and they don't see each other until 200m., and there's no air cover, and..."

"Fair" is irrelevant, and playing Top Trumps with AFVs is useless. Comparing capabilities can be a lot more fruitful, but you need to consider a level or two higher than "my tank has a really large gun". It's very useful to know that both the ATGM and the 73mm HEAT round of the BMP-1 can penetrate an M60 from all aspects, since engagements will likely happen, but "which tank is best" is not useful.
Soviet doctrine is not, and has never been, about reckless charges into prepared kill zones. The whole reason for the CRP/FSE/main body march sequence is to avoid precisely this - attacking off the march trades risk for tempo, and correct movement techniques reduce risk.

You're still accepting risk - you are launching an offensive operation after all, and that's inherently risky - but you're going out of your way to minimise that risk as much as possible, whilst working within the bounds of a scheme which you believe offers you the best chance of actually achieving victory.
 
Attacks from the march would have been the most common, and typically the first engagements, because the emphasis was on speed. The Clausewitzian approach to war described above more accurately describes the Warsaw Pact approach than anything Western. There's a good argument to be made that the "bypass and force a capitulation" concept isn't terribly plausible in reality, outside of the 19th century context. There are a number of reasons for that, I suspect, but that's pushing the scope of this.
Prepared Soviet attacks would be something that would come later, especially if the attack from the march failed, or couldn't make progress otherwise. Maintaining tempo is the important thing.

I do think there's some confusion of ideas in here, but I don't think that's unusual for wargaming in general, especially when it comes to conflating scope and scale.
 
Thinking is good.
What.
Okay, Clausewitz is an important work on military thinking, but this, like many things that quote Clausewitz, confuse scale significantly. I don't know how you "sue for peace" on a CM battlefield, really.
Wargaming has a focus on the decisive battle. Especially with CM, you're only ever seeing the sharp end. You're not necessarily seeing the main part, mind you. That's definitely a good point to bear in mind.
 
Uh... sort of. CM's focus is the tactical level, and that's the kind of questions it can ask and answer. Focus is a good thing, because it means you can answer one thing well, not a ton of things badly. It does mean you're not so concerned with stuff outside of your remit.
 
It's not only realistic, it's vitally important.
"The Soviets" may or may not have cared, but the chap in charge of the regiment certainly would, as well as the people fighting. It turns out that Russians are also people, and a CM-scale game is concerned with people above all else.

There are also broader points here about the extent to which numbers actually matter - it's been very common to have ratio-based CRTs in wargaming, but it's not actually clear how important that is.
 
"Why do people compare BMP-1 and M60?" - playing Top Trumps is absolutely not useful in the broad scheme of things, but the two also have to engage. If you're looking at it in terms of "which tank is the best", then that's never going to end well, but it's no different from saying "Well, if the Sherman and the Tiger were on a flat field, and they don't see each other until 200m., and there's no air cover, and..."

"Fair" is irrelevant, and playing Top Trumps with AFVs is useless. Comparing capabilities can be a lot more fruitful, but you need to consider a level or two higher than "my tank has a really large gun". It's very useful to know that both the ATGM and the 73mm HEAT round of the BMP-1 can penetrate an M60 from all aspects, since engagements will likely happen, but "which tank is best" is not useful.
Soviet doctrine is not, and has never been, about reckless charges into prepared kill zones. The whole reason for the CRP/FSE/main body march sequence is to avoid precisely this - attacking off the march trades risk for tempo, and correct movement techniques reduce risk.

You're still accepting risk - you are launching an offensive operation after all, and that's inherently risky - but you're going out of your way to minimise that risk as much as possible, whilst working within the bounds of a scheme which you believe offers you the best chance of actually achieving victory.
 
Attacks from the march would have been the most common, and typically the first engagements, because the emphasis was on speed. The Clausewitzian approach to war described above more accurately describes the Warsaw Pact approach than anything Western. There's a good argument to be made that the "bypass and force a capitulation" concept isn't terribly plausible in reality, outside of the 19th century context. There are a number of reasons for that, I suspect, but that's pushing the scope of this.
Prepared Soviet attacks would be something that would come later, especially if the attack from the march failed, or couldn't make progress otherwise. Maintaining tempo is the important thing.

Was playing this last week. Is John's semi-rigid Kriegspiel of the first couple of weeks of Ukraine, discussed here:

http://wargamingco.blogspot.com/2022/03/ukraine-2022-why-are-our-wargames-wrong.html

Brigade level, but I think it did a pretty decent job of modelling some of the fundamental problems with this, notably in how easy it was to stymie the Russian advance by using depth (and how ridiculously big Ukraine is).

Was playing this last week. Is John's semi-rigid Kriegspiel of the first couple of weeks of Ukraine, discussed here:

http://wargamingco.blogspot.com/2022/03/ukraine-2022-why-are-our-wargames-wrong.html

Brigade level, but I think it did a pretty decent job of modelling some of the fundamental problems with this, notably in how easy it was to stymie the Russian advance by using depth (and how ridiculously big Ukraine is).

This is an older post by JasonC about how the Soviets should attack:
That specifically describes one method of attack (the attack in column), which is not the only method, but the principles there are sound.

Do you "just accept you're going to take 50% casualties"? absolutely not. One of the main principles of Soviet everything is mass, and that follows things like Lanchester laws - as in, if you have enough mass, then you end up taking less casualties than you might expect, because trades aren't 1:1.

So the attack above describes infantry moving to contact, then going to ground, let the supporting assets take the weight, then repeat. The infantry will take losses, sure, but they don't have to be heavy, and the second company then takes over and picks up the remains of the first.


In general terms, "thinking one level up" isn't quite accurate, but it's a good shorthand. You use a Soviet platoon as a single unit, on-line, and the support comes from somewhere else, like a second platoon or supporting assets. As a basic idea, treat a Soviet platoon like an extended squad, and move them as one unit.

This is an older post by JasonC about how the Soviets should attack:
That specifically describes one method of attack (the attack in column), which is not the only method, but the principles there are sound.

Do you "just accept you're going to take 50% casualties"? absolutely not. One of the main principles of Soviet everything is mass, and that follows things like Lanchester laws - as in, if you have enough mass, then you end up taking less casualties than you might expect, because trades aren't 1:1.

So the attack above describes infantry moving to contact, then going to ground, let the supporting assets take the weight, then repeat. The infantry will take losses, sure, but they don't have to be heavy, and the second company then takes over and picks up the remains of the first.


In general terms, "thinking one level up" isn't quite accurate, but it's a good shorthand. You use a Soviet platoon as a single unit, on-line, and the support comes from somewhere else, like a second platoon or supporting assets. As a basic idea, treat a Soviet platoon like an extended squad, and move them as one unit.

Between Two Fahrbahns March 1979 Brauersdorf July 1981 Czechmate June 1982 Direction Found July 1981 Everyone - Get Out of Dodge August 1980 Fleeing Altdorf May 1982 The Grieshof Meet and Greet August 1979 Hunter or Prey October 1982 Killing Time at Kirtof August 1982 Kriegsburg 1979 July 1979 Kriegsburg 1980 May 1980 Kriegsburg 1981 July 1981 Kriegsburg 1982 July 1982 Mittelaschenbach sudden awakening - 1979 March 1979 NTC If it aint cav… October 1982 NTC Tank Training 1979 May 1979 NTC Tank Training 1980 May 1980 NTC Tank Training 1981 May 1981 NTC Tank Training 1982 May 1982 Rumpenheim Rumpus Sept 1982 Scouts Out October 1979 Skirmish at Sichenhausen May 1981 Stem the Tide March 1982 The Last Starship Sept 1981 TRAINING Soviet Tactical Doctrine 1 (MRB) June 1982 TRAINING Soviet Tactical Doctrine 1 (TB) June 1982 TRAINING Soviet Tactical Doctrine 2 (MRB) June 1982 TRAINING Soviet Tactical Doctrine 2 (TB) June 1982 A Hille to Die On July 1982 Bad and Worse July 1982 Bear in the Sun July 1982 Bumps in the Dark '82 July 1982 Dollbach Heights July 1982 Racing the Moon '82 July 1982 Route 66 July 1982 The Citadel July 1982 They Own the Night '82 July 1982 Unhook the Leesh July 1982 Valley of Ashes July 1981

And no, the spread won't be shifted in the wind direction, because you're simulating humans firing the thing. Each round is fired individually, and wind speed is taken into account. The adjustment won't be perfect, but that's the reason why windage adjustment exists:



(US 60mm M2 mortar)

The lever/spring assembly here allows you to tilt it left and right to adjust.

I suspect I agree with this. My specific feelings about this scenario is that the lessons it's teaching are the most fundamental ones - particularly around coordination with artillery and the importance of mass (especially when it comes to overcoming deficiencies in spotting). I have seen people fail this scenario, which means I think it's doing it's job.

The second training scenario pair takes those same basic principles and puts them in a significantly more complex scenario, with a lot less hand-holding. That scenario is still simple, but there's a good progression from the absolute basics, into something more applied.

I have been slowly playing through Cold War's campaigns and standalone scenarios and have been completely blown away with the fidelity of the singleplayer experience. The AI plans have almost universally been some of the best I've seen in any title. It's been immersive. As I often do when I play, I started snapping pictures and making small gifs. When I arrived to scenario 3 in the US Campaign I thought "I should start making an AAR." So, I paused, went back to play the NTC campaign, a few of my favourite scenarios from the Soviet perspective, and started writing. 
I've learned two things: I can't write to save my life, and I really enjoyed it regardless. I already have 6 AARs completed of my experiences and will share them with you all, if only to distract. They strike a more narrative tone, but I have done my best to explain the tactics and decisions. I will label the scenario/mission at the start of every AAR. Without further ado...
 
Prologue:
Kiev Military District, Ukraine SSR.
It was a clear, late spring day somewhere south of Kiev. The open pastureland was starting to show the signs of recovery following the harsh winter. Grass grew tall and the sea of mud was firming up into dry terrain. To any casual observer it would seem a scene of idyllic pastoral calm.

It is a façade. The calm is shattered in an instant, and a brutish ballet begins.

A thunderous barrage deforms and rapes the landscape. It builds to a howling, shrieking crescendo. A cacophony of mortars, howitzers and “Grad” rockets form the orchestra. The impacts smother two wooded hills with a mix of high explosive, smoke, and chemical irritants similar to CS gas. It was all the fury and violence of war, at its apparent worst.
This was not war, however. Merely a facsimile of it. An exercise. To the stern-faced evaluators observing from several kilometres away, and the attached state TV camera crews, it was real enough. Real enough for citizens of the Soviet Union who would watch these scenes play out on their TVs, real enough for Western defence analysts who would pore over every frame of the video, and real enough indeed for young conscripts sat waiting in their tanks and personnel carriers a few kilometres away, in readiness behind a low ridge.

Belly crawling forward among tree, bush and scrub on this same ridge, were more of these young Soviet conscripts. These men were equipped with heavy weapons:  machine guns, recoilless rifles, grenade launchers and potent anti-tank missiles. They would soon make their presence felt, reaching out into the roaring inferno across the open field, destroying any target they could see which remained unharmed from the bombardment. Their missiles began reaching out, flying towards real and simulated targets. TV cameras panned, keeping up with the missiles, visible as green dots against the background.


The evaluators would duly note “hits” recorded by these weapons and, using an intricate set of rules and modifiers, adjust the amount of fire (and therefore casualties) the unit would be deemed to receive when they began their attack. The prospects were good: everything appeared to be within nominal parameters for this drill. The artillery was on target, the missile fire accurate.
As the artillery fire began to abate, the MRB commander – a tough, professional soldier who had been through several prestigious state academies and had seen service in Afghanistan – knew the time was right to begin his attack. Ensconced within his personnel carrier, his voice simultaneously filled the headset of every vehicle commander of this force: begin, armour forward, came the command.
A company of T-64s, a marvel of Soviet technology and a demonstration of its single-minded design philosophy, rumbled up the ridge they had sheltered behind. Taking effective hull down positions, their imposing 125mm cannons crashed out in volleys, striking targets on the forward edge of the forested hills.

The fire is deemed highly effective, scoring several “kills” of enemy vehicles.  With this report crackling through his headset from the tank company commander, the MRB leader issues the next orders, this time via pre-assigned codeword. Repeating himself so there could be no confusion, he tersely speaks: Hornet, hornet, hornet. The unit roars forward as one.
Again, the tanks lead, pushing up and over the ridge at top speed. They fire, with much less accuracy now, on the move, too fast for even the gyro stabilizers to compensate. It is no matter, movement now is key, rather than fire. 

As they pass the exposed area, their rate of advance slows again. Their fire becomes highly effective once more, volleys crashing out across the valley. The observers would note “losses”, of course, losses would always result as an attack neared an objective. They were well within normal parameters, however. What was expected, acceptable, in the science of the attack.

Then come the personnel carriers, surging over the ridge. They move with alacrity behind the armour, in two extended lines.

With pinpoint timing, the artillery fire redoubles on the wooded hills, once again smothering the MRB’s objectives. Any surviving enemy who would chance a shot at these vulnerable vehicles would undoubtedly be discouraged by the howling high explosives.

Again, losses are incurred by the observer/evaluators. Not enough, however. Again, everything is within acceptable parameters.
The MRB closes with shocking speed, crossing several hundred meters in only a few minutes. The momentum and impetus is irresistible. Most of the tanks halt 500 meters away from the wooded tree line, redoubling their fire into and around it. A handful of T-64s move forward with the personnel carriers to provide intimate support. They close the distance aggressively, moving through the final rounds of their own artillery. This particularly impresses the camera crews, still diligently recording, delighted at the realism of the exercise.


The vehicles rumble into the woods, their heavy machineguns thumping away at silhouette targets meant to simulate enemy infantry in their foxholes. Then, the orders come: “Dismount! Forward!” Soviet infantry scramble out of rear hatches and side doors, over engine decks, and into action. Units move in an extended line, firing bursts from their assault rifles. Occasionally, a squad halts at the knee, spraying down foxholes with automatic fire and rocket propelled grenades. They press forward, moving with astonishing speed, newer conscripts desperately sucking for air as they gallop forward.

Leaning out of the hatch of his command vehicle, the MRB commander witnesses his forward companies safely debussing on the objectives. Smoke, as planned, begins to land at the edges of the hills, isolating them from one another. Exultant, for he knows his unit is performing excellently, he urges forward the remainder of his force. Not onto these terrain objectives, these are not of the greatest importance, but beyond them. Breakthrough.
The tanks form into two columns and  roar through the hole ripped in the enemy’s defence, and the MRB commander pushes his command group, air defence vehicles and his third company through in the vacuum they create. They fire as they move, riflemen spraying the smoke-shrouded treeline from open cargo hatches on the rear of the personnel carriers.


***
“15 minutes.”
“What was that, comrade Colonel?” the TV producer asks, overhearing the supervising Colonel despite the dull thuds and crunches in the distance.
“15 minutes. That’s the average time it usually takes to complete this drill.” He explains.
“Is that good?”
The Colonel laughs, “Yes, 15 minutes is quite acceptable… this commander has done it in 12.”
The dismounted infantry may take hours, in reality, to comb through the wooded hills and defeat the surviving enemy infantry. That they would suffer heavily whilst doing so was not in dispute, nor was it of any particular importance. Even the uninitiated TV crewmen could deduce that. The real takeaway, the true objective, was that most of a tank company and an entirely unscathed set of motor riflemen were through the enemy’s defensive position. Havoc would ensue, and the destruction of the notional enemy unit was almost presaged. What the Colonel observing knew, and that the TV crewmen did not, was that inexorably, inevitably, behind this breakthrough would come a tank battalion, then another regiment, and then entire brigades. Victory would follow. It was as simple as that.
Notes/Thoughts
So, the scenario played here was "Soviet Tactical Doctrine 1 (MRB)" by Miller. I wanted to play because I thought it would make a great little compare and contrast piece to how the US would have to do things, especially in the NTC campaign. It's also just a solid concept for a mission, and a trend that I hope continues. For the absence of doubt, I played it straight, precisely as the briefing guides you to do. 
I also think there's some subtle criticism to be made, through the scenario, of how we know the Soviets trained in reality. Big, choreographed exercises. Useful for producing units that knew a series of SOPs and battle-drill evolutions, perhaps not as useful for producing units that know how to keep pushing through when BTRs and BMPs are exploding. They weren't organic like say, I feel the NTC was. Keep that in your minds for now.