Heirloom_Tomato

anti-smoking campaign

That, backed up with deep strike and ISR might just cause the Russian system to buckle under it own weight again.  Fog eating snow until we get systemic failure. Then a modest amount of highly mobile mech/armour might bring the whole rotten house down.  Massed mech/armour before that condition is met could just leave it as vulnerable as the Russian systems were on the offence.
Or at least that is the working theory.  We are talking about a battlefield where a principle of war, “surprise” does not seem to exist, at least for the Russians.  And as we have noted from early on, Mass is also behaving weirdly.  However, it is really hard to determine if both sides are fighting this way because it is all they can do with what they have.  Or is it all they can do because that is how things are now.
It is likely in between those statements but how much is key.  Right now no one knows the answer, the UA and RA are trying to figure it out (Russia is failing badly) and they are closest to the problem.  Its why I really do not listen to pundits, experts and analyst that try and say what the answer is, or is not.  I know enough to know that we are kinda off the map here and it is going to be a bit before things become clear.  The analysts to listen to right now are the ones asking the best questions, in my opinion.
I am not worried about Ukraine because they appear to have the learning advantage here.  They have access to all the western expertise and data.  They have some brilliant leadership, and they have shown they can adapt as fast as we can send them stuff.  
News for Russia not so good.  They were unable to really adapt or learn from Phase 1.  Many pointed to Phase 2 as some sort of Russian brilliant re-think when it was in fact a devolution back to an even older form of warfare.  One that did not produce results anywhere near fast or as far as they would need to.  So here we are entering Phase 3, Russia is in worse shape and Ukraine is starting to dance circles around them.

Bakhmut map time. I am playing with Google Earth now. So, I created two variants, tell me what is more convenient please. 
Usual type 
 
Map with highlighted areas

Discussion (obviously it is my humble opinion of armchair amateur):
Despite much hype RU push to Bakhmut is weak - they do not have enough forces for left hook to bypass the heaviest UKR defenses using the southern road from Pokrovske. (If they pushed only using Southern road, they would leave Soledar group flank open) The current push is unwise - they have to fight through the most difficult urban terrain with plants and industrial zone on the flank. They are still fighting in Pisky and Bakhmut is not Pisky. Unless they want to bleed to death wagnerites, I do not believe it is their main assault. Most probably they want to fix UKR defenders here and prevent them from reinforcing Soledar (North hook) or Zaitseve (South hook) Obviously Main UKR defenses are in Western part behind river. So, neither capture of eastern industrial zone or even Zabahmutske district is dangerous for UKR defenses.  Because both Bakhmut and Soledar are very strong positions I believe we need to worry only about left (southern) hook and specifically Vershyna-Zaitseve direction as the most easiest and fastest route to cut Bakhmut from supply.

Before I post map of Bakmut few updates.
RU Nat response to Saki-4 strike
My preliminary reports still stand but a few updates:
The topic is quickly disappearing - it might be an order from above, but I feel RU Nats do not want to discuss it at all (too painful) Some started to comprehend military implications but on following level - HIMARS caused troubles with artillery, this unknow weapon will cause problems with Air. Since these are our two main advantages things gonna be a lot more difficult for us. The fracture I mentioned led to some sobering of RU Nats. Before it was like - Girkin is right we have issues, but we are RU Ubermensch we will defeat UKR Untermensch gay pigs regardless.  And now for the first time they looked at the thought that UKR might win. Keep in mind that they believe it is US weapon and was launched by US officers because Untermensch gay pigs cannot do this. So, it is lot scarier for them because it means involvement of US (as I said they afraid of US)  Girkin about Saki-4
Girkin about offensive
My overall impression regarding the situation
At Donetsk direction it is completely stalled. RU is still failing to take Pisky and without it they cannot hope to capture Avdyyivka.  At Bakhmut direction they are still trying to push but it looks like only Wagnerites are somewhat successful (see my map) RU is trying to push from North toward Bakhmut but also do not see so far much success According to several reports LDPR infantry and mobilization reserves are completely wasted.  Something is happening in Kharkiv-Izum direction. RU claims it is impossible to advance there due to terrain. So, fights there should be mostly static. But according to RU reporters occasional posts RU artillery shoots there very intensely. I believe it is comparable to Donets-Bakmut offensive. We do not see any victorious post from there and Girkin avoids saying anything. So most likely UKR are pushing there but RU artillery is trying to hold the line at all cost. No changes for Kherson and Zaporozhye  

What does the Geneva convention say about meme-ing as hard as Ukraine does? Certainly, their media accounts aren't taking any prisoners.
 
Probably the best social media since Wendy's went rogue and reshaped what was expected of corporate accounts. In the face of something so calamitous as a war of aggression by barbarians, it takes some big balls for official MoD accounts to start joking around.

I am sorry. I just want to tell the truth and that might sound rude and arrogant. But that's not my intention. 
 
This is mostly light unmotivated (for combat duty) infantry that by itself is good only to suppress unarmed civilians. They could be useful if the Kremlin feed them into RU regular units as replacement but then who is going to defend the regime? Yes, these guys have some combat units but even they are there to combat RU regular units not fighting UKR. Throw them away and get a coup. 
 
RU Cossacks mainly are LARPers or bandits. Often both. And every Cossack that is motivated to fight is already at the frontline. Which is a minority of Cossacks because as I said they are either LARPers or bandits. Here is good quote:
Moscow, July 6. The All-Russian ataman Nikolay Doluda criticized the leaders of the Cossack detachments due to insufficient participation in the special operation on demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. His statements were made during a teleconference between the leaders of Cossack societies.
Doluda stressed that the atamans have not yet been able to withdraw a satisfactory number of Cossacks; in general, their reluctance to play the role of "defenders of the Russian land" is noticeable. According to the All-Russian ataman, the Cossacks' avoidance of participation in the SVO casts doubt on the very meaning of the revival of the Cossack movement in Russia...
In the four months since the beginning of the special operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, the Cossacks have not shown themselves too actively at the front. According to some reports, no more than five thousand people went from the Cossack detachments to fight Nazism, who mainly perform rear functions and do not fight on the front line. At the same time, the Cossacks in Russia do not stop organizing festivals, reconstructions, exhibitions and other cultural events all the time.
 
These are even worse than Cossaks. Fountain swimmers are good mostly to fist fight with police while being drunk.  I did not mean they are good at it. I mean it is the best you can expect from them. And again, anyone who wanted to fight is already in the fight. The rest are extremely motivated not to fight.

 
The same as with Rosgvardia except these guys hold the line against criminals. Throw them away and enjoy RU cities overran with criminals. And this is extremely humiliating for Putin as he explicitly built image that under his rule never again RU cities will be overran with criminal like in 90s [which is BS as I do remember 90s].
 
which consist mainly of old overweight mall ninjas who definitely do not want to fight.
 
Drone integration is sort of good in units that have close relations with RU Nat volunteers.
 
At Pisky they demonstrated that under favorable CB conditions they can eventually wear down enemy even in serious field fortifications (without drones they could not do even that). That's it.
According to the latest info UKR were still defending the area even under RU barrage and RU could not do anything. However, as I said around 1-Aug RU assault group penetrated into north part (above ponds - check my map) of Pisky not far from dam. The point is both sides were extremely weak and could not dislodge each other. And the problem for UKR was that dam was the only reliable way to retreat toward the main defensive zone. So, UKR commander understanding risks ordered hasty withdrawal (they took their personal belongings but left some non-vital documents).
RU just followed them to around Church and that's it. They are still there because the urban underground is much more difficult than field fortifications.
 
I would like to see it because so far I see the following: where RU Nat volunteers are present RU FOO stands behind drone operator looking into his phone and says adjustments into his radio. Arty officer listens to him and put data into RU Nat app on his phone and gets result of calculations.
Where there are no RU volunteers it looks like this:

 It is how they shell Bakhmut now.

So I totally get the impulse to unpack this attack, especially from a forum of - let's just say - "detail orientated" wargamers.  Kudos to those that continue to Zapruder this thing, and I am sure in time the details of how the UA pulled this off will come out (my bet is missile strike, but I would not rule out one helluva SOF black bag job - could be both in reality; complex attack).
But for all the lurkers out there I would recommend we all keep an eye on the follow-on impacts of this strike on a strategic and political level.  We bounced around this a few pages back but here are some thoughts:
- All war is communication and that is a complex concept of 'the message', 'the means to send the message', and 'the method of transmission'.  Every piece of those components in themselves create information that is interpreted in multiple dimensions.  For example Ukraine said things thru this attack that create certainty and uncertainty - in case the second one is the most powerful:
Ukraine stated, with certainty, that they can hit a high value target with extreme precision at 225km (at least) behind Russian lines.  I say 'extreme precision' because it appears they did more damage with the secondaries than the initial strikes, and that takes a very high level of precision in time and space.  This was not lobbing a missile at a target, they hit exactly where they needed to in order to create a very high profile "boom".  That is communicating 'capability' that I am pretty sure the Russians were sure they understood, right up until yesterday afternoon - based on the scrambling narratives in the Russian info sphere. Ukraine has clearly communicated intent.  If they wanted to hurt Russian airpower, they would have cratered the runway and then FASCAM'd the thing...but this was not about airpower.  They were signaling that they are coming for Crimea, and the Russians were not safe...anywhere.  This will likely create a lot of uncertainty in Russian thinking, as the pretty much figured they had Ukraine pinned down in the Donbas in a grinding war.  We talked about it before but this is strategic manoeuvre thru strike.  The kind of thing the US does by hitting Afghanistan from the other side of the world back on 2001 (https://www.airforcemag.com/PDF/MagazineArchive/Documents/2016/December 2016/1216hours.pdf).  This was a high profile attack that both demonstrated and signaled intent and resolve in a very visible manner - that is certainty creating uncertainty in their enemy. I don't care how constipated the Russian political machine is, and it is already trying to spin this in crazy directions to blunt the message - they get that much.  No way to dodge it, this is very bad news for the Russians.  They have been relying on the narrative of "hopeless cause": Russian has 'escalation dominance', it can create a never-ending 'stalemate', it can and will fight forever...there is no way Ukraine can win: so stop spending your money in a pre-recession...look we even have Steven Segal!  This is clearly playing on the western psyche and our recent scars from places like Afghanistan. Ukraine just demonstrated that they can still hit a strategic target, with breathtaking precision, at the time and place of their choosing.  That directly attacks the Russian narrative.   Militarily, this type of attack creates enormous uncertainty.  The fact we have people on vacation on a beach watching this happen, and then blow it up all over social media, is a clear indication that Russia considered this area outside the warzone.  You can ignore or sidestep "industrial accidents" and the rash of weird fires we saw back in Mar-Feb, you can ignore HIMARs that hit your logistical system within 70-100kms.  You cannot ignore a strategic strike, that just happened in front of the entire world, at over twice that range.  The Russian military now needs to not only figure out how to secure itself at ranges it thought safe, it has to figure out how to defend Russian certainty, which just got seriously mauled. So what?  Well the first reaction will be "it was a lucky one off", and "this is war, these things happen".  However, information is funny with humans, we cannot un-think it.  As a minimum, Russian has to re-think the battlespace, significantly.  That is a lot of assumptions that just cracked in military planning - the fact that they did not see it coming in time to interdict is the biggest one.  Russians may try to ignore it, but I am betting western ISR is picking up a lot of scrambling going on in the Russian rear areas right now.  Again, this is more friction being imposed via uncertainty.  And that uncertainty will spread like a virus.  All those beach goers will scramble back home with it.  The Russian reaction will be key to determining just how badly this strike hurt them. 
Now the war is not over.  This was not positively decisive, at least not yet.  The UA will have to follow up with more of these, humans are also able to ignore reality - which is paradoxical I know.  More of these strikes will build up pressure until something gives.  But for the west, this is a clear demonstration that our proxy is not only still in this thing, it demonstrates they are getting better at it.  Better they are emulating warfare we recognize - high precision deep strikes on clear military targets with almost zero collateral civilian casualties.  Nice, clean and very western - worth investing more into.
I have heard at some pretty high levels the idea that "Russia has shifted this war into one that favors them"...well strikes like these send the message that Ukraine is shifting it back.  May have been a 'one-off' or a lucky day; however, it is going to cause the Russians a lot of hot and bother to figure that all out...and in a war, that is good communication.

I am moving slowly but surely. Here is a map for Maryinka battle. Maryinka settlement is located on another end of RU offensive. You undoubtedly heard many claims about it like 2/3 are captured or almost captured and so on. Well, let's look closer. This time I will use Google Earth. It is less pleasing for my eyes, but it does show terrain and in the case of Maryinka it is important.

The red line is the approximate border before the war. Yellow dashed line is the contested area where major fighting is happening. As far as I understand assault groups of both sides infiltrate contested area and engage each other often with arty. But to define what is generally happening we can use several notable features.
On the right just in front of the border line there is farm fully under RU control from 6-Aug. There are just several hundred meters between the farm and RU forward positions and 10 days between start of offensive and statement of full control. The dominant feature that controls the eastern part of the village is the landfill of the former Shchurovo Mine.
According to RU sources the landfill was always in UKR hands. So, nobody really knows how RU almost captured Maryinka without capturing the landfill. Well, possibly they infiltrated several assault groups in to several places in contested area, declared Maryinka is almost captured and then got killed (see insert from sample video).
However, we have an interesting development. Yesterday, two weeks after start of the offensive RU stated they captured position at the landfill and were moving toward the center. But I need a definite statement that the landfill is captured because I know how RU propaganda works. Let's wait and see.
Last is checkpoint Maryinka. There is no any information about it. So, we can assume RU did not reach it at all.  This should give you an idea how RU is progressing at both ends of the offensive. 

Thank you. Just doing what I can. Would like to do more but I do not have the required contacts.

Civilian "Girkin" (Nesmyan)
 

Time to talk about what has happened in Pisky aka Pisky crisis. This is my personal opinion of what has happened there in the last few days.
General crisis of UKR Artillery
As we all know UKR artillery suffers from lack of soviet caliber ammo and tubes. However, it appears the problem has become worse recently (end of July), and RU started to notice it in different parts of the front. The situation could be especially hard at Donetsk direction due to alleged RU strikes of UKR warehouses a s@Haiduk told us. 
As I understand UKR Command tries to mitigate it by creating NATO caliber arty groups (Girkin talked about them few times). There are not a lot of them (maybe even 1). When this group is present UKR have either relative parity with RU offensive arty group or some superiority over RU defensive arty group.
Probably this is the reason we do not see serious UKR pushes and collapses of RU defenses so far. UKR arty group can suppress RU local defending arty, but it cannot CB large amount of arty RU can concentrate in one place. So, if there is major UKR push RU concentrate arty there and effectively stops everything.
Cause of the crisis in Pisky.
According to RU discussions UKR Command removed the arty group from Pisky around week ago. As I see it was calculated risk - they do not have enough groups, and this is supposedly the most heavily fortified portion of front (I have not seen fortifications/defense myself, cannot comment). RU banged their head at UKR defense here like 6 days and still did not penetrate it completely.
RU on other hand had a real crisis - the progress was negligible. Despite local penetration somewhere else they were stalled by critical Avdiyvka defenses and the only way to deal with them is to encircle Avdiyvka through Pisky and Vodiane (North of Pisky). The inaccurate and inflexible but heavy RU artillery hammer was dropping on Pisky.
As per previous experience UKR defenses could withstand significant RU battering and continue to fight. However, for this offensive RU had little know but very influential trump card - more widely available drone teams prepared by RU volunteer groups in previous months. They started to feed observation videos directly to arty observers allowing RU arty to discover and hammer even pinpoint UKR targets. The RU hammer became significantly more accurate (judging by RU standarts). 
Initial disposition
Let's look at what we know about initial disposition. 

Just to get a feel here is an old RU video of shootouts at Volvo center and Pisky. RU forward position with sniper and spotter looks like from trench in front of Volvo center and they shoot toward Cowshed.
And here is photo of Volvo-center from RU Drone operator/propagandists Tatarsky (who fought there in 2014-2015 and now again) on 3 of August.

 
And here is link to the video of him at Cowshed.
https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/15302
He says nothing important, just celebrating that the best Warrior Nation in the World managed to walk less than 700 meters in 8 years, 5 months and 6 days of new offensive against pig Untermensch. 
And this is the biggest issue of RU - despite all efforts RU could not capture and clear forward UKR position until the Crisis happened on 2 of August.
Pisky Crisis 1-2 August
For several days RU kept drones above Pisky and relentlessly hammered any movement on UKR positions. For the feel here is the sample video of that work. UKR Squad commander Sergey Gnezdilov commented that Pisky was receiving 6500 rounds per day from RU. UKR arty fire was weak. No CB. And only 120mm and 82mm tried to answer occasionally.  The only local UKR command could do was to hold the line patching it with fresh reinforcements.
On the 1-Aug while artillery kept UKR defenders in cover first RU assault groups managed to reach the outskirts of Pisky from the Airport direction. They overran a small UKR outpost taking half-dozen of UKR POW. Yet, it seems RU assault group was weak and preferred not to push forward into small arms fight with UKR defenders relying instead on artillery fire.  UKR defenders on other hand became too weak to dislodge it. UKR defense started to crack but still was holding.

Until 2-Aug. On 2-Aug probably after RU arty caught fresh UKR reinforcement and from 15 hloptcev 14 became casualties, morale cracked and UKR command started to lose control over forward positions.
We do not know what happened there (push from RU assault groups or too eager withdrawal). What we do know though is that UKR forces pulled back from Cowshed and the eastern part toward western part. RU immediately followed UKR on both sides of ponds.
However even this modest effort was too much for RU forces. Seems to be exhausted and weak after the previous 5 months fighting RU decided not to pursue UKR into UKR rear defensive zone and to dig in at the area reached by nightfall - Dam.  
The sudden loss of control caused Sergey Gnezdilov to write an emotional Facebook post describing difficult situation and heavy losses. Shock waves amplified by UKR volunteers reposts reach both UKR public and RU Nats. Word of imminent UKR defense collapse and RU breakthrough caused quite a stir everywhere. Yet, there was neither UKR collapse no RU breakthrough. 
Quiet Endgame 3-Aug
Unlike stormy UKR social networks situation in Pisky was relatively calm. RU was probing and hitting anything suspicious very hard at western part.  UKR side on other hand seems decided to withdraw toward Donetsk Ring Road and Bridge Republic positions. Also, according to Sergey Gnezdilov vague new post UKR command decided to return the arty group and RU became uninterested in further major pushes. 
It was all back to the old arty Ping Pong game. 
P.S. 4-Aug
According to latest RU Nats posts they moved on from Pisky toward new and exciting topics - China-US scandal, RU shelling Donetsks and murdering civilians while pretending UKR did it, and Glorious advance RU troops are making in the whole Donbass area. Fighting in Pisky became just another topic hinting that RU either took a pause or they are returning back to crawling pace.
We will know when the time comes.

I found yesterday interview of UKR Reserve Colonel, military expert Roman Svitan. It was in RU language, so I decided to translate. 
As usual take it with a grain of salt but I believe his opinion is very interesting.
Part 1
The situation at the front
There is no operational pause as such First hot front is from Belogorovka near Seversk to Uglegorskaya TPP [Thermal power station] south of Bakhmut. where battles are constantly taking place, without any breaks and pauses The second hot front is from Izyum to Slavyansk. There are also exchanges of blows, mainly artillery The third hot spot is from Kharkov to Old Saltov.  UKR forces, which have been trying to conduct offensive operations on Kupyansk for the second month, are constantly being attacked from Belgorod UKR is conducting counter-offensive actions in the area from Kherson to Krivoy Rog Over the past few weeks, from Vasilyevka (south of Zaporozhye) to Novotroitsky (south of Donetsk), the AFU has been conducting successful counter-offensive actions  
The situation in Donbas
RU cannot seize the entire territory of the Luhansk region because there is a good line of defense in the Belogorovka area Slavyansk is important to RU because of the major water intake in the village of Raygorodok RU can take it but needs to gather troops from all other fronts RU will not be able to take the whole Donetsk region RU can't take cities like Slavyansk and Kramatorsk because it is all one huge city with a large number of industrial zones UKR burning out more RU resources than RU can assemble for battle End of Part 1

Colonel (Chaplain), retired in 1989 after 22 years.  His final posting was in the department which was responsible for keeping in touch with retired chaplains who were still on the potential recall list.  That is why it was so funny that he was recalled.  Mom called the general and told him "If Chuck shows up, let me know.  I have some questions for him"

He passed Jan. 1 1991, about 1 1/2 months before the liberation of Kuwait, which is why he was recalled.  As my cousin said "God needed him to welcome any incoming troops"

@Battlefront.com
Here is some recommendations from UKR frontline soldier for your collection
ATTENTION TO ALL, WHO FIRST TIME COMES TO EASTERN FRONT
1. Enemy has significant advantage in aviation and artillery.
2. There are no more stupid conscripts, but really trainned murderers, whick know own work
3. Our positions have been betraying by locals and drones ajust fire
4. Vehicles are target #1
RECOMMENDAIONS FOR DOGFACE
1. Dig in deep, but never wide.
2. Dig in in the places with additional protection (tree) or with obstacles for enemy artillery (hill,railwau embarkment)
3. Dig several positions, join its after in the trench (if enemy allow you to do this)
4. Do not concentrate many people in one shelter - no more 2-3
5. For rest and cover to dig a grave. Yes, a grave with steps (on the photo) for two. While the first on position, the second rests in the grave, then change.
6. Evacuation point must be maximally hidden, to make a pathway and the hole for aid. In the hole only combat medic have to work, you shouldn't be there.
7. Do not bring with you neither too much ammunitions nor any other supply - its betrays you. Get out the trash - bury even cigarette butts.
8. Prepare good off-road jeep, take away all superflous, take away lights and give NV device to the driver. Let he stays in 5 km from your positions. This will save most of your WIAs.
9. Ammunition and supply delivers when jeep drives to take WIAs or if you have a need in resupply. Two days reserve of ammunition and supply for comany have to be always near the jeep. 
10. BMPs and BTRs are also have to be in the rear, dug in deeply and disguished or hidden. They drive to the battle only and dont's carry people! Your trucks you can shot out yourself, thus will be less victims. But better hand over its to artillerists. 
11. Comms, steady encriptes comms and interaction with tanks and artillery. Infantry finds targets, recons ajust arty with drones, arty fires. But artillerists are people too and they also primary target for the enemy. They will not stand-by continuously and they also have a limit of ammunition and supply. 
12. Do not deploy on infantry positions ATGMs or MANPADs. Deployits aside or behind, but never on positions. If this stuff works at least once, your position will grounded.  
13. Most important!!!! The time for supply it's twilight (dawn or dusk). Safe time you will understand yourself.  And do this with jeeps with engine volume no more 2,5 l
14. Despite on written above, the war is dictating own rules. At this war the best are speed and mobility. And remember - they don't know how much of you, until you expose yourself. And during this time eliminate as more of orcs as possible, while they will be probe. Best way - to shot, when you see the enemy, and not hear his bullets. In this way they check your nerves. When the come close, try to kill as more as possible in order they will not call or adjust own artillery, because without accurate adjustment their arty is skew and only something random can hit your positin.   
 
The "grave with steps" for R&R
 

Huh?  So beyond mashing a lot of terms that describe everything from types of warfare theory to campaign themes to a joint operation - of which maybe only one applies, you are kind of losing me here.  Combined arms is what land forces do inside each one of those - it is an inner working gear of the several clocks you just put up.
Well I am not sure how you can be helped then.  I presented the doctrinal definition...no good.  Then a description of how it applies to this war, or at least how it has been unfolding, meeting the terms in that doctrine...no good. 
A combination of dispersed light infantry positioning forward through manoeuvre, and artillery supporting them through fires...is a combination of arms. I opened up the aperture to offer alternate and emerging forms of what an "arm" is, normally contributing to firepower and manoeuvre effects but we could do well to perhaps widen that definition.  For example, at what point are unmanned aerial systems to be considered an "arm" in the land force, much like tac aviation?
So right now we seem to be lacking what your personal definition of "combined arms" is, and is not.  You are entitled to your opinion of course; however, I am going to have to go with modern military doctrine as opposed to "some guy on the internet".  However, I did some searching around and maybe NATO agrees with you:
In land operations, relating to the synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm were used against the enemy in sequence. (https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc).  
We (Canadians) do not go with this one either, we follow the US one because by this definition infantry and armor together are not combined arms - several meaning more than two but not many.  The important part is not two, three or more, it is: synchronization and the ability to achieve greater effect together - both conditions well met by the examples provided by Steve in the Ukraine.  

Oh.
I looked only at the Steam version.
Ok, I have a purchase to make.

It is the same process. Pick your forces as Axis vs Allies. You then set it to Axis vs Axis, select your captured asset, and then set it back to Axis vs Allies. 

In the editor, under the Mission menu is the data tab. At the bottom of the data tab is the force vs force selection. Set this to Axis vs Axis and you will be good to go.

Interesting piece I saw on Global News' website about one of the civilian volunteer drone operators who provided intel during the opening days of the invasion:
Exclusive: How a 15-year-old Ukrainian drone pilot helped destroy a Russian army column
This one raises some very complicated ethical and legal issues... This kid is a hero, and I don't want to diminish that or second-guess the decisions of commanders who can't afford to be fussy about where their intel comes from. But a 15-year-old drone operator supplying intel does come uncomfortably close to a child soldier. I really cannot say I am comfortable with the implications of it.
I have so far avoided directly mentioning that I was ever in the reserves myself, mainly because what I did was not at all comparable to the frontline service many of the people here have. But in this case my experience is kind of relevant... I was a secondary reserve CF officer in the Cadet Instructors Cadre for just over twelve years, part of a quarter-century involvement with the Royal Canadian Air Cadets. For a fair chunk of my stint in the CIC, I used to fly L-19 Bird Dogs and later Cessna 182s towing gliders sometimes flown by student pilots his age (the requirement for Glider is 16 by the end of August, so a course cadet's birthday could fall after the grad parade). So I know from experience how assiduous cadet programs are about the civilian status of cadets (I think Canada may be slightly unusual for the officers running the program to have reserve force status, I know in the US and UK they're uniformed civilian auxiliaries and I think that's the case in Australia). Avoiding even the appearance of combat related training is a real concern, as activists sometimes claim cadets are "child soldiers" and it can also be a whataboutism other countries use in response to Canadian diplomatic pressure on the subject.
I haven't seen the potential for underage personnel getting involved mentioned in the ethical discussions around drone warfare, but this definitely puts the issue in the spotlight. Reflecting on having provided intelligence that led to enemy casualties is a lot for someone that age to have to bear.
As I said before, not going to pass judgment. But with my background I cannot help but be uncomfortable with the ramifications...

In the editor, under the Mission menu is the data tab. At the bottom of the data tab is the force vs force selection. Set this to Axis vs Axis and you will be good to go.

Thanks ) Just became some more of work, my wife turned back and often occupies PC because her work, also it's hard to live three months 24/7 as war news translator, so I took small vacations 

That is pretty low. I figured the Russians as losing ~300-350 soldiers per day. I based that on an extrapolation from casualty figures the Russians released in the first month of the war, from which I guessed that the Russians (as in the Russian side, so Russians + L/DPR + paramilitary groups fighting for the Russians) were taking ~10,000 casualties a month. Assuming 200,000 soldiers on the Russian side that's a proportional casualty rate of about 150-175 casualties per day per 100,000 troops. If that guesswork is about right that means that the proportional Russian casualty right is about on par with historical casualty rates in high intensity warfare. I spent several hours working out proportional casualty rates for various campaigns based on information on Wikipedia, but the text document I made with the exact figures is back home and I'm typing from work, so these are approximate figures. In Poland the Germans took about 80 casualties per day per 100,000 troops, in Barbarossa 160 casualties per day per 100,000, at the Somme the Germans took about 300+ casualties per day per 100,000 troops while the Entente took about 175 casualties per day per 100,000 (similar total casualties divided between more troops). At Kursk the Soviets took 650 about casualties per day per 100,000 to the Germans 350 casualties per day per 100,000, and in Sicily the Allies too about 130 casualties per day per 100,000 troops. So the low end of normal seems to be about 80 casualties per day per 100,000 and the high end of normal seems to be about 400 casualties per day per 100,000 (there were several more battles that I didn't list here with casualties in the range of 300-400 per day per 100,000, while the 600+ the Soviets took at Kursk didn't recur much in the battles I looked at). "disaster" casualty rates seem to be about 1000+ per day per 100,000, with the Soviets taking over 1,200 casualties per day per 100,000 in Barbarossa and the Allies taking over 1,400 casualties per day per 100,000 in France 1940 (I wish I had that text document with the exact numbers in front of me). On the extreme low end the Coalition in Desert Storm took around 23 casualties per day per 100,000 troops and on the extreme high end the Iraqis in Desert Storm took 5,000+ casualties per day per 100,000 troops (very rough estimate).
So the estimated Russian casualty rate seems to be about the middle of normal for a high intensity war. If the Ukrainians are taking 60-100 casualties per day, total, with a frontline strength of ~200,000, then they are taking ~30-50 casualties per day per 100,000 troops. That is shockingly low for a high intensity war. That is especially shocking if, while they are taking these low casualties, the Russians are taking "normal" casualties for a high intensity war. Either I have overestimated the Russian casualty rate, Zelensky has underestimated the Ukrainian casualty rate, or the Ukrainians are absolutely slaughtering the Russians at a rate somewhere between 3:1 and 5:1.
edit: So the Ukrainian casualty figure of 60-100 per day is apparently KIA, not all casualties. And considering that KIA are generally a third or a quarter of all casualties, that means the full casualty rate is probably somewhere between 180-400 casualties per day (or 90-200 casualties per day per 100,000 troops), which puts it roughly on par with the estimated Russian casualty rate.

The average load of grain we ship/recieve here at work, in Canada, is in the 40 metric tonnes range. In order to meet the 6,000,000 metric tonnes a month it works out to 5,000 truckloads of grain to be moved every single day. 
The new and modern rail cars here hold 100 metric tonnes. The new modern grain handling facilities are being setup to accommodate trains of 134 cars in length with load/unload times of 12 hours per train. This means with the most modern equipment and facilities, 15 trains need to be loaded and leave Ukraine every day. If they are using systems designed 30 years ago, it becomes 20 trains a day. If facilities are any older, the three "modern" elevators around me were all built in the sixties, then it will be closer to 40 trains. Of course this all assumes everything is going to work perfectly without any maintenance issues. 
If you are lucky enough to live in a location with a lawn, it is not too late to rip up some grass and plant some vegetables. 

The average load of grain we ship/recieve here at work, in Canada, is in the 40 metric tonnes range. In order to meet the 6,000,000 metric tonnes a month it works out to 5,000 truckloads of grain to be moved every single day. 
The new and modern rail cars here hold 100 metric tonnes. The new modern grain handling facilities are being setup to accommodate trains of 134 cars in length with load/unload times of 12 hours per train. This means with the most modern equipment and facilities, 15 trains need to be loaded and leave Ukraine every day. If they are using systems designed 30 years ago, it becomes 20 trains a day. If facilities are any older, the three "modern" elevators around me were all built in the sixties, then it will be closer to 40 trains. Of course this all assumes everything is going to work perfectly without any maintenance issues. 
If you are lucky enough to live in a location with a lawn, it is not too late to rip up some grass and plant some vegetables. 

The average load of grain we ship/recieve here at work, in Canada, is in the 40 metric tonnes range. In order to meet the 6,000,000 metric tonnes a month it works out to 5,000 truckloads of grain to be moved every single day. 
The new and modern rail cars here hold 100 metric tonnes. The new modern grain handling facilities are being setup to accommodate trains of 134 cars in length with load/unload times of 12 hours per train. This means with the most modern equipment and facilities, 15 trains need to be loaded and leave Ukraine every day. If they are using systems designed 30 years ago, it becomes 20 trains a day. If facilities are any older, the three "modern" elevators around me were all built in the sixties, then it will be closer to 40 trains. Of course this all assumes everything is going to work perfectly without any maintenance issues. 
If you are lucky enough to live in a location with a lawn, it is not too late to rip up some grass and plant some vegetables.