Haiduk

In Soviet army humor there was a proverb "war is a сrap - maneuvers are main!" Opportunity of maneuvering with own forces is important thing, especially in modern warfare. One side can suddenly outflank opponent and other side can detect this meneuver and hit them with artillery to prevent outflanking. Or unit on approach can be detected with UAV and wiped out before contact... Most of CM maps really allow only "knife range fighting". If for WWII such large density of forces per 1 km and narrow map space can be explained because of operative and tactical conditions of that times, but modern warfare modelling should operate with much more space. For example, most Donbas war clashes demand about 4 x 4 km maps as minimum! And this is just about a scale of reinforced company size operations!

@akd thanks for ShISB TO&E, adopted for CM, this is interest variant, though it slightly differs from information of Nikiforov's book and have some errors, I will tell about this in next post. Now about ShISBR brigade structure. The initial May 1943-structure of brigade had several changes during winter 1943 and spring 1944, so I am writing the late structure, actual for timelaps of CMRT module. Four ShISBR, which usually operated on major directions had slightly other number of personnel in some detachments and it will be pointed with [...] Engineer-sapper assault brigade on May 1943 (2231 men, 244 rifles/carbines, 1684 SMG, 104 LMG, 8 cars, 64 trucks, 54 special trucks, 8 tractors, 7 motorcycles with sidecar, 205 horses,13 radios) Brigade HQ - 48 [59] men: 35 officers, 4 NCO, 1 pvt, 8 civilian servicemen (armed with pistoles and rifles) Control company (100 [98] men armed with pistoles, carbines and rifles, 3 cars, 24 trucks, 4 tractors, 2 special vehicles, 3 radio) - HQ - commandant platoon - communication platoon (2 x RBM radio with long antennas, 1 RSB-F radio on special radio-vehicle) - 2 x auto-tractor platoon - maintenance platoon - administerial squad medical platoon (16 men: 7 officers, 3 NCO, 6 pvt, 2 medical trucks, 1 truck) Established in Nov 1943 by removing of part of ammo bearer squads of assault companies light crossing park NLP (37 men armed with pistols and carbines, 30 trucks, 28 pontoon-boats) Each pontoon-boat could take onboard 25 equipped soldiers and 5-9 rowers from this unit. Also pontoon-boats were using for pontoon bridges building or like pontoons for up to 5 tons equipmnet crossing. motorized engineer-recon company (73 men armed with carbines, sniper rifles?, 4 LMG? , SMG and hand grenades - 1/3 of them were anti-tank, , 2 cars, 7 motorcycles with sidecars, 6 trucks, 2 RB radios) - HQ - motorcycle sapper platoon - motorized sapper platoon - administerial squad This unit initially had 101 men because had also mine-detection dog platoon (probably 29 men in four squads per 7 men and 6 dogs per each), but in Nov 1943 they were removed from recon company and on their base were formed separate mine-detection dog company in 90 men, 72 dogs and 3 trucks. But in spring 1944 these companies were removed from engineer-assault brigades and turned on formation of mine-detection dog battalions I have found more detailed info about motorized engineer recon company of motorized engineer-sapper brigade (MShISBR) - it had some other TO&E then the same company of ShISBR: 67 men, 53 SMG, 12 carbines, 2 sniper rifles, 45 SN-42 cuirases, 80 hand grenades, 80 AT hand grenades, 2 trucks for radio, 7 trucks engineer-sapper assault battalion x 5 flamethrower battalion (288 men: 11 officers, 38 NCO, 239 privates armed with rifles, SMGs, 240 ROKS-3 flamethrowers ) - HQ - recon seсtion (3 men with SMG) - transport company - 2 x flamethrower company There is no senece to write in details structure of flamethrower battalion - it never used as whole unit. Main tactical unit of such battalion was flamethrower squad, which divided between asault groups. Very rare flamethrowers used by platoon formations. Flamethrowere squad had sqaud leader (SMG), 9 flamethrowers (ROKS-3) and driver () with truck from transort company. During assault actions the squad divided on 2-3 flamethrower sections, which operated on relatively big distance each from other. Squad leader physically couldn't effectively manage his squad, so was almost useless. There was proposition to change structure from squads to sections with scheme 2 flamethrowers+section leader x 3 + squad leader, but this wasn't implemented. Four engineer-sapper assault brigades and one motorized engineer-sapper assault brigade got also per two tank regiments each - engineer tank regiment and flamethrower tank regiment Engineer tank regiment (267 men, 22 tanks (18 with minesweepers), 2 cars, 4 motorcycles, 55 trucks, 1 mediacl truck, 2 workshop trucks, 1 crane, 1 charging station truck) - HQ (21 men) - control platoon (13 men: 1 T-34 of regiment comamnder, radio squad, transport-motorcycle squad - 4 bikes) - engineer-recon platoon (22 men with SMGs: platoon commander + 7 men in eng.recon squad x 3 + driver and truck) - SMG platoon (27 men with SMGs: 2 men in HQ + 8 men in SMG squad x 3 + driver and truck) - maintenance company (92 men: repair platoon, ammunition&fuel supply platoon, minesweeper&spareparts supply platoon, administerial platoon) - medical point (6 men, 1 medical truck) - engineer tank company x 3 (30 men, 7 T-34) ------- Company HQ (1 T-34 with radio, 6 men - two of them technical specialists) ----------- 1 st Platoon HQ (1 T-34 with PT-3 minesweeper and radio) ------------------ 2 tanks T-34 with PT-3 minesweepers ----------- 2nd Platoon HQ (1 T-34 with PT-3 minesweeper and radio) ------------------ 2 tanks T-34 with PT-3 minesweepers Flamethrower tank regiment (240 men, 3 T-34, 18 OT-34, 6 BA-64, 7 motorcycles, 53 trucks) There is no full description of TO&E of this unit, so in short: - HQ - maintenance units - control platoon (1 T-34 with radio) - reece platoon (6 BA-64) - Flamethrower tank company x 2 ------ Company HQ (1 T-34 with radio) -------------- 1st Flamethrower tank platoon (3 OT-34, plt.cmdr. tank with radio) -------------- 2nd Flamethrower tank platoon (3 OT-34, plt.cmdr. tank with radio) --------------- 3rd Flamethrower tank platoon (3 OT-34, plt.cmdr tank with radio) Some ShiSBR on period of river crossing were receiving in subordination special purpose motorized battalions, eqippied with FORD-GPA or GMC DUKW amphibious. About its structure I have posted here: http://community.battlefront.com/topic/136558-fire-and-rubble-update/page/10/ Also in 1944 four motorized engineer-sapper assault brigades (MShISBR) were established. MShiSBR had similar structure and had less personnel - 1810 men only and more trucks, then ShISBR.

Good one, but this is not assault engineer platoon structure. This is structure of assault group, formed by mixing of riflemen and assault engineers. This was a usual way of using of this units. It's needs to know, that such mixed groups hadn't fixed structure, each time such groups were forming due to current combat task. Wrong translation. Not 2 marksmen, this is really 2 guns (i.e artillery pieces). You can tell him about this ) As you could see in the topic about big guns, to the infantry assault groups could be attached guns, SP-guns and tanks due to tasks.

BM Bulat, which reportedly were moved to reserve, remain in active service anyway. Maybe this is not 1st tank brigade, but tank brigade of Reserve Corps.

The full battalion set of 31 T-72AMT now at service of 24th mech.brigade

Brief history of assault-engineer units forming and order of using. The first attempt of using special equipped sapper units of Red Army for assault actions against heavy fortified positions took place during Soviet-Finnish war, when Red Army broke through Mannerheim Line. Assault teams also were equiped with steel cuirasses SN-38 and used special tactic, but in time of many different changes in Red Army structure, their experience was forgotten. Only when Red Army went to offensive actions in 1943, suddenly turned out that Soviet infantry assault capabilities and training was much worth than German. Losses were too much for troops could consolidate experience and there wasn't much time for proper training of conscripted. Experience of fighting in Stalingrad already sketched a tactic of assault actions by specially established combined assault groups, but due to fast substitution of infantry personnel because of losses, infantry couldn't gain quality skill of assault. Thus, there was decided to establish special brigades of High Command Reserve (RGK in Russian) , which could be breakthrough force during large offensive operations on major directions. All combat units of these brigades was planned to arm with SMGs and equipped partially with new SN-42 cuirasses. New troops had to provide recon, engineer-recon, minecleaning/wirecleaning, demolition and assault tasks. But where to get such universal soldiers in quick time? Then their eyes fell on existed engineer-sapper brigades of RGK and on tactic and organizatoin of German division pionner battalions. These brigades maintained large-scale operations, but weren't used like usual infantry, so weren't suffer big losses, had proper experience and cohesion inside units and units usually had compenetnt commanders. The directive was issued on 21st of May 1943 and in whole up to the July first 15 assault engineer-sapper brigades (rus. ShISBR) were established. From old brigades were removed all personnel older then 40 years and personnel with illness and with poor phisycal conditions. Remained personnel got enchanced trainings in recon and assult actions, hand-to-hand combat. Some commanders used real bullets to shell personnel during trainings in order to they became stable under fire. First baptism of fire ShISBR got in the mid of August 1943. Up to the end of August five ShISBR more were established and their number became 20. According of High Command intention, SHiSBRs had to attach from RGK to Front Commands on the period of active offensive operations. Front Command in own part attached ShISBR under subordination of the Army, which operated on major direction, where enemy had most strong positions. Army Command divided assault battalions of the ShISBR among rifle divisions. Division commanders in own turn divided assault battalion on companies and attached its to rifle regiments of first echelon. Regimental commanders formed assault groups on the base of rifle companies, to which assault-engineer platoons or squads attached. Also, when there was need to take large heavy fortified object and this was too hard for infantry, then assault-engineer battaliions or companies opearted on they own and infantry and their artillery only supported. Though, initially were happns that rifle division commanders, who seen well-trained, equipped with body armor soldiers used them like usual infantry in order to save own personnel and this caused to big losses among assault-engineer battalions. They were very tough in breaking though of enemy defense, but weak in defense of seized positions. When Germans were counter attacking with armor, assault-engineers could hope only on own skill and bravery - they hadn't heavy weapon to repell tank attacks and could only set minefields if had time to that. To the December of 1943 the tactic and order of use of ShISBR was developed and these units was prohibited to use for infantry tasks. After sucessfull breakthrough of enemy lines or seizing objects, they had to susbstitute on infantry units and moved to closde rear for preparing new attack. Since May of 1944 each ShISBRs were reinforced with flamethrower battalion, several ShISBR got engineer-tank regiment and flamethrower-tank regiment. All captured Panzerfausts and Panzerschreks were going to armament of ShISBR. Also new five assault engineer units were formed - motorized assault engineer brigades (rus. MShISBR). They had less personnel, but were equipped with trucks, that made its more mobile. Unlike ShISBRs, belonged to High Command Reserve, MShiSBRs were subordinated to Front Command. Almost each front got one MShISBR. ShISBRs and MShISBRs actively participated in operations in Poland, East Prussia and Germany Next time I will tell about TO&E of these brigades. On the photo assault engineers crawling with HE on their backs ShISBR trooper fires with Panzerfaust Also another assault-engineer with Panzerfaust. But this guy used this weapon in non-standard way. During hand-to-hand combat he took Panzerfaust like a cudgel or mace and killed 10 German soldiers with it. Such pointed in awarding list.

Well, so if Germans now have own amphibious vehicle, will the Soviets have the same for parity? Mentioned in other topic Ford-GPA or GMC-DUKW as vehicles of Special purpose motorized battalions

Much more like anti-partisan and security forces in the rear, wich more or less were equipped with armor. Neither Wehrmacht security divisions nor other OrdnungPolizei units hadn't own armor. Though, I specially didn't research how wide these units used in operations for this module timelaps.

Whole SS organization was recognized by tribunal like guilty in atrocities. So, with this logic and morale position any SS troops - frontline or auxiliary should be banned. Troopers of many SS-divisions also murderd civilians and sometime guarded deathcamps. Though, SS-politzei regiments also used in many operations (for example in Warsaw apprising, which has been discussing here), one interst point for me - they had tank companies with rarity trofy armor. So just for combat modelling i don't see any obstacles. They are part of operation history, part of WWII. This reminds me Soviet times, when were prohibited for manufacturing any models of WWII-time German planes, armor, soldiers etc. Even the model of Dutch Fokker-21 fighter wanted to prohibit despite Netherland fought against Hitler. Soviet censorship did not like name "Fokker", which associated with shorten name of German FW-190 among Soviet soldiers.

As I already said in the thread about on-map bug guns, the late warfare phase was some different from the previous phases. Soviet troops encounterd with strong enemy defense, which relied on perfect ordered system of trenches, different bunkers, minefields, heavy defended water obstacles and the cities with old strong fortifications and very tough stone buildings. Sieges, assault actions, bloody fights in attempts to breakthrough rugged defense - this a feature of battles in late 1944 - 1945. In that places, when neither tanks nor infantry could handle and even high-power guns on direct fire culdn't help, then on the scene of the theater of war they appeared - ShISBR troopers , elite "Stalin's panzer infantry". ShISBR is from "Shturmovaya Inzhenerno-Sapiornaya BRigada" - Assault Engineer-sapper brigade. Under those rush, bravery and non-standart actions didn't remain standing no one strongest German fortress. It is very starnge that such interest unit wasn't reflected by BFC in CMBB, and I think, in CMRT they also weren't in the plans. I hope, theese guys in bodyarmor will appear if not in this module, then in some pack. Here I will tell in short about these troops, their TO&E the kind of application in operations and examples of their actions. For now, just several photos

...continuing Conclusion. 1. It is advisable to use high-power guns on direct fire only at the targets, which can not be destroyed with fire of lesser artillery systems. There are happens, that the brick buildings were stiched through and the 203 mm rounds exploded itself out of the building. 2. In conditions of the city with narrow streets it is necessary to calculate the requirement of barrels and calibers, because they drew together so many guns into one street, and tanks also to them, that they only interferred each other, but didn't bring any benefits. Moreover, this entailed excessive losses of equipment and personnel. Where one 76 mm gun could handle, several 76 mm guns, 1-2 152 mm and 203 mm howitzer could be seen. Neither drive along such a street, nor pass. This hindered both the movement of tanks and the supplies of ammunition to infantry. 3. When using high-power guns on direct fire, it's necessary to interact with infantry more closely, and infantry chiefs nust look at this not as a favor of their part to artillerists, but as a means of facilitating of fulfillment a combat task. 4. Infantry chiefs must be commanders of the assault groups, but for assist to them it should be appointed aretillery commanders, who can deploy and use correctly, given means of [artillery] support. 5. When using high-power guns on direct fire it's necessary to detach the means of their cover, because such guns absolutely defenseless against enemy fire assets. Hense there are losses take place, especially in the phase of prepararion of firing position and removal from position, when the gun doesn't fire. A lot of time is spent on the aforecited. 6. For more or less effective using artillery fire from closed positions it's need close connection with the infantry and its information as weel as correct targeting. When firing in the depth [of defense], it's necessary to use aerial reconnaissance. 7. The main type of communication in urban combat can be telephone communication, since communication lines are short, there is complete possibility to bring it up. The radio communication in a presence of large agglomeration of walkie-talkies and other interferences [channels and frequencies mixing, reflection and blocking from walls etc] can be only backup means in the work. THE END. _____________________________________ So, what should be assumed for modelling of this guns using and on the strenght of circumstanses of street combat, pointed above : 1. There are very strong buildings existed, which were little vulnerable or invulnerable for usual artillery, represented in CM. 2. Indirect fire support of infantry is very hindered. Big probability of friendly fire. 3. Radio communication "from spotter to the guns" and between inf.HQs and units can be interfered like in modern EW conditions due to report above 4. Guns should be set up as "deployed" at the start of scenario 5. Guns can be pulled manually with slow speed ot with tractor 6. The shot of such gun must to inflict a short-time panic or suppression of any personnel, which find out themselve ahead the gun along the street. 7. Guns use concrete piercing ammunition, so this is not wunderwaffe to destroy all buildings in scenario. It is must be not so effective against usual buildings (slitched through), but only against special "strong" buildings, which also need to include.

...continiuing 5. Organization of [artillery] reconnaissance. Organization and conducting of artillery reconnaissance was difficult due to inability to select a place for observation points (OP), from which one could observe the enemy in own sector and action of own infantry. For appropriate coverage of battlefield in the sector of [our howitzer] batalion there was need to send per 2-3 forward observation points at the head of command platoons leaders and the chief of reconnaissance, which dislocated in [infantry] battalions and companies and conducted reconnaissance as well personally, as also used data of infantry, because often the battlefield couldn't be seen - in one house is our infantry, and in another, standing next to it - the enemy; or in the same house both our infantry and the enemy and the command conducted though the telephone or radio, and if both were abscent - with foot meesengers. Main OPs selected on the frontiers of closest [infantry] OPs, also on the roofs of high buildings. Personnel of OPs covered in the cells of these buildings. Howitzer battlion HQ dislocated at the main OPs. With advancing of the infantry, the forward OPs moved follow the infantry, and the main OPs occupied their previous positions after forvard OPs established a proper battlefield observation on new place. Features of artillery using in the battles for city were: a) The need to have the wide network of mobile observation points and close connection with infantry, otherwise artillery fire was "blind" and hadn't any effect, but there were victims of friendly fire. b) because of after the infantry captured next several buildings, there was appeared a need to change OPs as well as firing positions for guns at the direct fire. Thus, personnel had to be kept always in readiness to move forward. If you delayed, fell behind, don't know the situation - start over to lookeing for own infantry and the enemy. c) almost complete impossibility to use an artillery from closed positions for indirect fire (if these positions are in the city and fire at the city), beacuse the fire is possible to conduct only at the enemy defense depth, and latter doesn't spot iself, so to shot for nothing, you do not give any effect. ...to be continued...

There were 11 special purpose motorized battalions created since spring 1944. Their task was maintaining of forcing the rivers by rifle units or crossing the rivers themeselves, also troopers of that battalions received sapper training and were able to clear mines and wire obstacles in the places of landing along the rivers. Typical TO&E HQ + 2 x motorized companies per 3 platoons per 3 squads with amfibious vehicle each + mortar battery per 3 platoons per 3 mortar crews with amph.veh each + sapper company with 3 amph.veh and 5 trucks. + maintennance company There are FORD-GPA and(or) GMC-DUKW were on armamemt. I can't say anything about PIATs/Bazookas in these units, but UK really sent to USSR 1000 PIATs and 100000 projectiles to them. In neighbor thread about Warsaw uprising I've meant some Soviet "amphibious battalion", which maintained attempts of Polish Army to take bridgehaeds on westrn bank of Visla - there was 274th special purpose motorized battalion. Further in Berlin operation about half of all these units participated.

Maybe that T-90M about what you say is T-90MS, export version, which still use 2A46А5 gun

T-90M is not the same as T-90AM in CMBS. Main differences are 2A82 gun like in T-14 Armata and 12,7 mm remote controlled AAHMG instead 7.62 mm

...Continuing... I'am skipping part 3. "Effectiveness of the gun on direct fire", author just repeats own previous words that the fire was exlusevly effective, but success depends on coherence in actions of artillery and infantry. Again he says that infantry often was too slow and thus, success of their combined actions was only in the fact of destruction of the building, but not in immediate seizing its by infantry after ceasefire. 4. The actions of the enemy and his artillery. About actions of enemy artillery in street combats it is never to say because it was almost never used [in other exapmple, which I posted above, the battery of B-4 suffered losses from enemy indirect arillery fire, so there is shouldn't to make conclusions only by one report]. The enemy relied mainly on the actions of own SMG-shooters and faust-shooters. It should be noted big effectiveness of panzerfausts using in street combats, because there is full opportunity to use its in any conditions and eefect is large as weel as firing at the tanks as at the personnel. But this sort of weapon is effective only in case of adjusted fire. When our infantry fully use own automatic weapon and provide reconnaissance, the enemy has mach more less oportunity to conduct adjusted fire and fausts turn out not so scary as it is painted. It is should be noted the exclusive tenacity of the enemy defense, especialy in last 4-5 days and maximal of own fire assets using on the contact line. To be continued...

In the developments, described above, I've meant different equipment, used for the river forcing. That were heavy floating pontoons N2P which in different combinations allowed to ferry from rifle platoon to one tank for one route, that were light floating pontoons NLP, different boats DSL, SDL, LG-12 for one squad (or mortar/light gun) and land-lease amphibious vehicles. Alas, East front CM2 hasn't any one of this stuff. Though even CM1 had assault boats. I doubt BF will add this stuff. If it problem could be solved by modding... Though, for this existed floatng model anyway is needed.

Thanks. I think, Polish Army can be represented, especially since they had the same TO&E like Soviet troops and actively participated in Visla-Oder, Berlin and Prague operations.

1st Army of Polish Army (Wojsko Polske), which was in operative subordination of 1st Belarusian front, at the enf of July 1944 settled positions along Visla and seized with Soviet trops two bridgeheads on western bank of the river near Magnushew and Pulavy. Magnushev - the nearest town, laying in 60 km south of Warsaw. Though, Germans continiously counter-attacked. Near Studzianky village on Magnushev bridgehead there were intensive clashes betwen Soviet and Polish infantry, supported by 1st Polish Army tank brigade from one side and units of 1st "Hermann Hering" Fallschirm panzer divizion and 19th pazner division form other side. 10th September 1st infantry division of Polish Army, operating in subordination of 125th rifle corps of 47th Army of 1st Belarusian front srarted offensive on eastern Warsaw outskirts. After five days of heavy clashes, they seized Praga - Warsaw's district on the eastern bank of Visla. 16th September to the Praga arrived other three Polish infantry divisions and cavalry brigade. The day before commander of 1st infantry division recieved an order from Chief of the Staff of 1st Belarusian front to prepare a crossing of Visla. Оn September 16th night, after artillery barrages and striking by 2nd night bomber regiment "Krakow" (Polish airforce unit with Po-2 biplanes, they also supplied and supported rebels in western-bank part of Warsaw), the first group of Polish troopers in the force of recon company and infantry battalion of 9th infantry regiment (about 420 personnel) successfully crossed the river. Next night, other battalion and five guns crossed the river and joined to first group. But strong enemy resisting didn't allow to establish firm communications with rebel groups. Their situation was becoming worth and worth, so the order about overall crossing of the Visla was issued on 19th September. Next bridghead was established by two battaliones with six guns of 8th infantry regiment of Polish Army. But in the night on 20th Sep. the German tanks counter attack threw them down to the Visla - from about 800 men only 164 could cross Visla back. In other sector 2nd Polish Division forced Visla with 6 companies, but during the crossing and keeping the bridghead suffered heavy losses and couldn't set a communication with rebels. Since 21st of Sep. Germans received new reinforcements in armor and after heavy fights pushed off Polish troopers to the Visla. Almost all sapper equipment for river forcing of 1st Polish Army and attached Soviet units was lost, so there was no opportunty to move reinforcements on the western bank. Staff of the Belarusian front on 23rd of Sep. ordered Polish Army to withdraw. The infantry with small number of guns and without tanks couldn't resist to tank counter atatcks of the enemy, dense urban development didn't allow divisional and corps artillery to effectively support the troops. Also infantry couldn't conduct assault actions in the city. Polish army lost more than 2800 men.

I am about the reflection of Warsaw uprising in the game. The game is just a modelling of combat scenarios and there are no "civilain units" in the game to be butchered. Germans also massacred civilians in USSR, so according to this logic, CMBB/Red Thunder should be banned on the stage of idea...

Also IS-1 (initially IS-85) was third among them. From October 1943 to January 1944 107 or 130 tanks were produced. Further ISU-152 SP-gun was designed on its base. This tank was on armament of five Guard breakthrough heavy tank regiments and participated in Korsun-Shevchenkovskyi and Proskurov opertations. But this tank like KV-85 showed own weakness against new German tanks - up to the May 1944 all IS-1 already were out of service.

119 B&W and color(ized?) photos of Warsaw Uprising: https://www.facebook.com/piotr.perykasza/media_set?set=a.1138042689738010&type=3 Some examples is below. The question about "No playing the German side butchering civilians" is disqussional. Any civilian, who takes a weapon in the hands and put some sort of insignias consider itself like combatant. Also Polish side except own formations in Soviet army also had own partisan wovement - Armia Krajowa (supports legal government in exile) and Armia Ludowa (support pro-communist political forces of Poland).

Well, I thought this documents will motivate BF to add some new features in the new module or separate pack and can be useful for players, but looks like this is now have a sense just for historical knowledge, if you want to continue... So, last time I finished in the place, when a tank was hit with faust. I am skipping translation about half of the page, just retelling that author describes further how 152 mm SP-gun moved to this building on 50 m, but after several shots also was hit with faust, the crew abandoned vehicle [look at this again, 152 mm several times hit the building, but even after this, walls didn't collapse and enemy troopers kept capability to fight]. The author complains that assault group commander didn't give even though 3-4 SMG-gunners for covering of vehicles. Because of this, that building was assaulted whole day instead to do it faster. And now I'm continuing translation: The guns of 11th and 9th of our brigade were deployed on the open fire position on Zeidelstrasse street. The task to our battalion put the artillety commander of 295th rifle division. He pointed just about the place for gun deployment and the target also just about. It was necessary to communicate with commaners of battaliones and companies of 48th and 38th rifle regiments of 295th rifle division for [correct] target receiving. When the target was received, our guns, of course, without any covering from our infantry side, were set up in firing positions and opened fire. The effect of fire was exclusively large, but the infantry didn't take advantage on this. Jr.lt Malakhov, command platoon leader of 11th battery [spotters is usually appointing from this unit] was sent to the infatry to notice that we will fire at such-and-such target, be ready to attack, but give a sign, when we must to cease fire. But jr.lt was met rudely, nobody was preparing for an attack. The building was ruined, but didn't seiz, because in rubles enemy soldiers settled again. With darkness falling, the artillery commander of 295th rifle division col. Zhokhin ordered our 11th battery to change firing position. For escorting he sent a major, who completely unawaring what's going on ahead, ordered to drag the gun. He was warned that there impossible to pass - the tanks interfered - they agglomerated ahead and couldn't drive further because of the faust-shooters influence on them. Thus, the gun standed amid the tanks whole night and up to 12-00 of the next day. Near the tanks, lt Kirichenko had saw the commander of 416th Guard rifle division and ask to give opportunity to move forward. Mayor-general answered: "There is no special need on your gun, so let it stand". Then, lt.Kirichenko appeal to the colonel Zhokhin with similar question and he answered: "For now let the gun stand, if necessary, open fire from where it stands". Subsequently, we was forced to maintain firing position on this place. At the moment, when the gun was prepared to combat, the representative of Zhokhin arrived with demanding to change firing position in the area, where again it was impossible to drive. The question had to be settled with col.Zhokhin. Thus, we opened fire at 19-30 instead 2-00. From the foregoing in must be concluded that for the leadership over direct fire [high-power] guns it is necessary to appoint not the [infantry] battalion commander, which somtimes doesn't imagine what is that 203 mm howitzer and thinks it can be rolled out manually whereever as him see fit, but appoint the artilleryman, who has complete not only grasping, but also and knowledges of how to use one or another system. To be continued...

I know about 203 mm and higher сalibers as off-map, but this is not the same that you have a gun on the street. Also, as you read above, indirect fire suport in conditions of urban combat was very difficult or even impossible and caused severe friendly fire effect. How it is possible to make the module about Visla-Oder and Berlin operations without "siege warfare"? This was major component and culmination of these operations! Red Army, moving to Berlin, was forced to nibble heavy Germans defense. 60 km of distance between Oder river and Berlin Soviet troops was overcoming about three months! I always respected BF for attention to historical details, but in this case, making the module about this period of war the same like previous periodes, where warfare conducted mostly on wide open terrains and resistance of the enemy in the cities (except some cases) was not so rugged, you are making big mistake. Special assault units and equipment vs. new heavy fortifications could be new interest feature of the new module and reflect historical reality. Instead you will issue next usual "tankfight" sandbox Germans vs. USSR ver.1945 with some other toys, but in this time almost devoid of the sense. But if your conception of the game is just "meeting engagement", well I'm finishing to post next translated episodes about heavy guns and assault groups usage, this is havn't any sense and just wasting my time...

No. Аs I posted above, FlackTowers had walls about 2,8 m thick and its resisted to 203 mm shells. Looks like it was some military fortification (maybe fortified barrack) of 18-19th century. Not only military, but usually administrative buildings of those times had built with stone or many layers of tough bricks and this gave big margin of safety. By the way, most tough old buildings and fortresses there were in Kenigsberg and Poznan, even big guns often can't completely destroy it and then assault-engineers did this work with hundreds kg of TNT.