Haiduk

Thanks. I think, Polish Army can be represented, especially since they had the same TO&E like Soviet troops and actively participated in Visla-Oder, Berlin and Prague operations.

1st Army of Polish Army (Wojsko Polske), which was in operative subordination of 1st Belarusian front, at the enf of July 1944 settled positions along Visla and seized with Soviet trops two bridgeheads on western bank of the river near Magnushew and Pulavy. Magnushev - the nearest town, laying in 60 km south of Warsaw. Though, Germans continiously counter-attacked. Near Studzianky village on Magnushev bridgehead there were intensive clashes betwen Soviet and Polish infantry, supported by 1st Polish Army tank brigade from one side and units of 1st "Hermann Hering" Fallschirm panzer divizion and 19th pazner division form other side. 10th September 1st infantry division of Polish Army, operating in subordination of 125th rifle corps of 47th Army of 1st Belarusian front srarted offensive on eastern Warsaw outskirts. After five days of heavy clashes, they seized Praga - Warsaw's district on the eastern bank of Visla. 16th September to the Praga arrived other three Polish infantry divisions and cavalry brigade. The day before commander of 1st infantry division recieved an order from Chief of the Staff of 1st Belarusian front to prepare a crossing of Visla. Оn September 16th night, after artillery barrages and striking by 2nd night bomber regiment "Krakow" (Polish airforce unit with Po-2 biplanes, they also supplied and supported rebels in western-bank part of Warsaw), the first group of Polish troopers in the force of recon company and infantry battalion of 9th infantry regiment (about 420 personnel) successfully crossed the river. Next night, other battalion and five guns crossed the river and joined to first group. But strong enemy resisting didn't allow to establish firm communications with rebel groups. Their situation was becoming worth and worth, so the order about overall crossing of the Visla was issued on 19th September. Next bridghead was established by two battaliones with six guns of 8th infantry regiment of Polish Army. But in the night on 20th Sep. the German tanks counter attack threw them down to the Visla - from about 800 men only 164 could cross Visla back. In other sector 2nd Polish Division forced Visla with 6 companies, but during the crossing and keeping the bridghead suffered heavy losses and couldn't set a communication with rebels. Since 21st of Sep. Germans received new reinforcements in armor and after heavy fights pushed off Polish troopers to the Visla. Almost all sapper equipment for river forcing of 1st Polish Army and attached Soviet units was lost, so there was no opportunty to move reinforcements on the western bank. Staff of the Belarusian front on 23rd of Sep. ordered Polish Army to withdraw. The infantry with small number of guns and without tanks couldn't resist to tank counter atatcks of the enemy, dense urban development didn't allow divisional and corps artillery to effectively support the troops. Also infantry couldn't conduct assault actions in the city. Polish army lost more than 2800 men.

I am about the reflection of Warsaw uprising in the game. The game is just a modelling of combat scenarios and there are no "civilain units" in the game to be butchered. Germans also massacred civilians in USSR, so according to this logic, CMBB/Red Thunder should be banned on the stage of idea...

Also IS-1 (initially IS-85) was third among them. From October 1943 to January 1944 107 or 130 tanks were produced. Further ISU-152 SP-gun was designed on its base. This tank was on armament of five Guard breakthrough heavy tank regiments and participated in Korsun-Shevchenkovskyi and Proskurov opertations. But this tank like KV-85 showed own weakness against new German tanks - up to the May 1944 all IS-1 already were out of service.

119 B&W and color(ized?) photos of Warsaw Uprising: https://www.facebook.com/piotr.perykasza/media_set?set=a.1138042689738010&type=3 Some examples is below. The question about "No playing the German side butchering civilians" is disqussional. Any civilian, who takes a weapon in the hands and put some sort of insignias consider itself like combatant. Also Polish side except own formations in Soviet army also had own partisan wovement - Armia Krajowa (supports legal government in exile) and Armia Ludowa (support pro-communist political forces of Poland).

Well, I thought this documents will motivate BF to add some new features in the new module or separate pack and can be useful for players, but looks like this is now have a sense just for historical knowledge, if you want to continue... So, last time I finished in the place, when a tank was hit with faust. I am skipping translation about half of the page, just retelling that author describes further how 152 mm SP-gun moved to this building on 50 m, but after several shots also was hit with faust, the crew abandoned vehicle [look at this again, 152 mm several times hit the building, but even after this, walls didn't collapse and enemy troopers kept capability to fight]. The author complains that assault group commander didn't give even though 3-4 SMG-gunners for covering of vehicles. Because of this, that building was assaulted whole day instead to do it faster. And now I'm continuing translation: The guns of 11th and 9th of our brigade were deployed on the open fire position on Zeidelstrasse street. The task to our battalion put the artillety commander of 295th rifle division. He pointed just about the place for gun deployment and the target also just about. It was necessary to communicate with commaners of battaliones and companies of 48th and 38th rifle regiments of 295th rifle division for [correct] target receiving. When the target was received, our guns, of course, without any covering from our infantry side, were set up in firing positions and opened fire. The effect of fire was exclusively large, but the infantry didn't take advantage on this. Jr.lt Malakhov, command platoon leader of 11th battery [spotters is usually appointing from this unit] was sent to the infatry to notice that we will fire at such-and-such target, be ready to attack, but give a sign, when we must to cease fire. But jr.lt was met rudely, nobody was preparing for an attack. The building was ruined, but didn't seiz, because in rubles enemy soldiers settled again. With darkness falling, the artillery commander of 295th rifle division col. Zhokhin ordered our 11th battery to change firing position. For escorting he sent a major, who completely unawaring what's going on ahead, ordered to drag the gun. He was warned that there impossible to pass - the tanks interfered - they agglomerated ahead and couldn't drive further because of the faust-shooters influence on them. Thus, the gun standed amid the tanks whole night and up to 12-00 of the next day. Near the tanks, lt Kirichenko had saw the commander of 416th Guard rifle division and ask to give opportunity to move forward. Mayor-general answered: "There is no special need on your gun, so let it stand". Then, lt.Kirichenko appeal to the colonel Zhokhin with similar question and he answered: "For now let the gun stand, if necessary, open fire from where it stands". Subsequently, we was forced to maintain firing position on this place. At the moment, when the gun was prepared to combat, the representative of Zhokhin arrived with demanding to change firing position in the area, where again it was impossible to drive. The question had to be settled with col.Zhokhin. Thus, we opened fire at 19-30 instead 2-00. From the foregoing in must be concluded that for the leadership over direct fire [high-power] guns it is necessary to appoint not the [infantry] battalion commander, which somtimes doesn't imagine what is that 203 mm howitzer and thinks it can be rolled out manually whereever as him see fit, but appoint the artilleryman, who has complete not only grasping, but also and knowledges of how to use one or another system. To be continued...

I know about 203 mm and higher сalibers as off-map, but this is not the same that you have a gun on the street. Also, as you read above, indirect fire suport in conditions of urban combat was very difficult or even impossible and caused severe friendly fire effect. How it is possible to make the module about Visla-Oder and Berlin operations without "siege warfare"? This was major component and culmination of these operations! Red Army, moving to Berlin, was forced to nibble heavy Germans defense. 60 km of distance between Oder river and Berlin Soviet troops was overcoming about three months! I always respected BF for attention to historical details, but in this case, making the module about this period of war the same like previous periodes, where warfare conducted mostly on wide open terrains and resistance of the enemy in the cities (except some cases) was not so rugged, you are making big mistake. Special assault units and equipment vs. new heavy fortifications could be new interest feature of the new module and reflect historical reality. Instead you will issue next usual "tankfight" sandbox Germans vs. USSR ver.1945 with some other toys, but in this time almost devoid of the sense. But if your conception of the game is just "meeting engagement", well I'm finishing to post next translated episodes about heavy guns and assault groups usage, this is havn't any sense and just wasting my time...

No. Аs I posted above, FlackTowers had walls about 2,8 m thick and its resisted to 203 mm shells. Looks like it was some military fortification (maybe fortified barrack) of 18-19th century. Not only military, but usually administrative buildings of those times had built with stone or many layers of tough bricks and this gave big margin of safety. By the way, most tough old buildings and fortresses there were in Kenigsberg and Poznan, even big guns often can't completely destroy it and then assault-engineers did this work with hundreds kg of TNT.

The fragment of book "Artillery in Great Patriotic War". Chapter 14. The last assault So, on one of the streets of Berlin, the enemy fortified himself in the round form building with the walls up to 1,5 m thick. During a long time 152 mm guns fired at this building, but couldn't destroy it. But this building it was necessary to destroy as quick as possible, because MG- and SMG-shooters of the enemy, who were settled in it, delayed the advance of the whole battalion with their fire. For the destruction of this building, turned by the enemy in strong point, it was decided to attract a battery of 203 mm guns. With ten shots of 203 mm howitzers, brought to the target at a distance 250 m, the building was partially ruined and set on fire. The assault group burst into the burning building and completely destroyed the enemy that strenghtened in it. This module, which reflects last stage of the war, where huge amount of assaults of heavy fortified positions took place, needs new heavy fortified buildings, much more stronger than this "new large independent factory building". Else very important layer of developments and warfare will be thrown out.

Thanks, I think I also will open separate thread about Soviet assault actions specificity and about troopers of ShiSBR, which played major role in all breakthroughs and fortified cities assaults during 1944-1945. Their contribution in success is exclusive and maybe even larger, then high-power artillery. I hope, engineer-assault battalions will be represented in this module. But well, I am continuing translation: ... 2. The character of actions The main type of combat were the actions of assault groups of infantry, reinforced with guns of direct fire and with tanks. It should be noted the lack of specific leadership and organization of interaction on the side of assault group commander between attached assets and infantry. So, for example, on 30.04.1945 on Kommendantenstrasse street near the fork with the Neistrasse street in the corner house several faust-shooters and SMG gunners of the enemy [Soviet memories and reports often named all German infantry like "avtomatchiki" - i.e."SMG gunners" - this borned a mith, popular in Soviet Union, that all Wehrmacht infantry was armed with MP-40, what widely was reflected in Soviet GPW films]. They didn't give an opportunity to move along liberated part of Kommendantenstrasse and to cross it without endangering. To the corner house was moved the tank, which wasn't covered with fire of infantry's small-arms and therefore without firing a shot it was hit with impunity by the faust-shooter from the window of the above house, and its crew was injured. To be continued....

All was not so easyly with synchronization between 203 mm shot and infantry attack - about this will be told further in this document. So, this wasn't easy walk and wunderwaffe. Historical facts say, even several Germans with MG and fausts, positioned in strong building could delay advance of whole battalions, supported with tanks, guns and SP-guns. And Soviet troops had two solutions - either sappers with HE boxes (or better assault-engineers of High Commande Reserve with HE and flamethrowers ), which blew up the walls, but suffered big losses, or heavy howitzers on direct fire, which saved hundreds lifes. Sappers pulling boxes with HE to destroy the building, Strasse der S.A., Breslau Fighters of ШИСБР (ShISBR) - Assault engineer-sapper brigades of High Command Reserve, equiped with steel breastplates during assault of Berlin

... Battalion commander received a task of bringing forward one battery for direct fire on 24.04.1945 at 8-00. According to this 11th battery was put forward. Battery commander cpt. Frolov was attaced to disposal of artillery commander of 416th Guard rifle division, which put tasks to him. Firing positions chosen on crossroads of the streets, where was an opportunity to deploy the system. The fire conducted at the buildings along the streets. With the advance of the infantry, due to the lack of the ability to turn around, the guns were towed on the hawsers with barrels forward. Due to the great destructive force of 203 mm shell, the using of high-power howitzer for direct fire gives exlusively great effect. The buildings, affected by our guns were taken whithout firing a shot, if actions of the infantry coincided with the moment of our ceasfire. The disadvantage of our system is its bulkiness, especially in conditions of Berlin city, where the streets are semi-piled with debris of ruined buildings and with bricks. Hence there was no way to roam with gun and the latter often could not be moved out after firing from own position and was exposed to fire from the enemy side. Hence big losses in personnel and disabling of the material parts [means guns] and tractors. Moreover, by deploying our gun amidst the street, we bloked the pass for smaller [gun] systems and tanks. The latter were forced to stay behind of our gun and to be idle. If smaller systems were in front of our howitzer, then we couldn't fire, because form the flight of the shell, the gunners of those guns scattered [shell flight wave caused short-time panic among gunners ahead], and the dust form the explosions and shots coveres the target for a long time. It was not possible to choose a separate firing position. For six days of direct firing, 96 shells was wasted by one gun of 11th battery ... to be continued.

Well, here is a document "Сombat report of 4th battalion commander of 122nd high-power brigade 14.04 - 1.05.1945. For Russian speakers I am just posting a link: https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=451667467&backurl=q\120-я габр БМ РГК::begin_date\16.04.1945::end_date\31.05.1945::use_main_string\false::group\all::types\opersvodki:rasporyajeniya:otcheti:peregovori:jbd:direktivi:prikazi:posnatovleniya:dokladi:raporti:doneseniya:svedeniya:plani:plani_operaciy:karti:shemi:spravki:drugie::page\2 For other I will translate as much per day as can ) 1. Action of the artillery. Control platoons of the battalion have entered to Berlin city in 19-00 Apr.23th. Observation points were chosen in close proximity from forward units of our infantry. At the first onset it turned out insufficient opportunity of close support of infantry with artillery fire from closed positions because of presense of tall buildings in front of the enemy defense line, hence there was a possibility of scraping of storeys by our shells. And therefore, in such case, the fire from closed positions could be fired only at targets, located in the nearest depth of the enemy, that of course couldn't play a major role for advancing of our infantry on contact line. Except for the above reason, there was a difficulty in fire adjustment in the firing from closed positions, because of tall buildings hide bursts. For effectve support of infantry it was necessary to put forward a part of own artillery for direct fire. This kind of firing is most appropriate to use in conditions of street fights in the large city, thanks to the great fire effect, small ammunition waste, opportunity of fast fire affection at aliving and new appearing targets, at which is possible to provide firing from already occupied firing position. To be continued... Example of the page:

Set up times pointed "45 minutes...2 hours depending of season and ground conditions". But looks like this is time for deployment with full preparation of firing position. In conditions of urban combat it could be less, but as you read higher, B-4 as a rule moved to the firing position at the night and crews have a time to set it up. So, maybe MikeyD have a sense, when said such gun should "already stuck in place at startup" with possibility for crew to move it manually.

I have a document, which says howitzers moved or rotated manually with steel hawsers by crew and possibly infantry. This is big, but exclusively interesting document, I will translate it page by page. Though if B-4s will be included, then their heavy tractor Voroshilovets also should be added.

Here is report of 120th high-power artillery brigade commander about actions of brigade's batteries during 29-30th April during Berlin assault. Short translation: 29th April. Our units came to the line of Potsdam railroad station. The brigade was condicting fire for elimination of the enemy weapon emplacemants (WE) in Tiergarten and Reichstag areas. Commander of 5th battery sen.lt. Pavlovskyi fired directly for elimination of enemy WE in stone buildings. 39 shells have wasted, 30 direct hits fixed. 5 WE destroyed. Commander of 6th battery cpt. Marchenko fired for elimination of enemy WE in stone buildings. The fire has conducted by spotting of explosions. Two stone buildings destroyed, under ruines about 20 enemy soldiers burried. Total destroyed by brigade: 11 WE, 17 buildings with WE, eliminated 70 soldiers and officers of the enemy. According to the order of the commander of 18th artillery breakthrough division, two batteries of the brigade were deployed for direct fire. Losses: heavy wounded and moved to medical sanitary battlion - 1 sergeant, 5 privates. Light wounded and stayed in service: 2 sergeants, 5 privates. Losses in technic: no. 30th April Our units seized Reichstag. The brigade conducted fire for elimination of the enemy WE in the area of Potsdam railroad station Commander of 5th battery sen.lt. Pavlovskyi fired directly for elimination of enemy WE in stone buildings. 60 shells have wasted. 9 WE destroyed. Commander of 9th battery lt. Morgunov fired for elimination of enemy WE in stone buildings. The fire has conducted by spotting of explosions. 10 shells wasted, 4 direct hits fixed. Total destroyed by brigade: 20 WE (among them 13 with direct fire), 3 trucks, 23 buildings with WE, eliminated 40 soldiers and officers of the enemy. Losses: after artillery shelling of firing positions of the guns, deployed for direct fire 1 private KIA, 1 sergeant and 3 privates WIA, 3 guns taken out of service

I have conducted some research about B-4 heavy guns in Berlin assault, so 102nd, 104th, 120th and 124th high-power artillery brigades were involved. In street fights for direct firing were used 38 B-4 guns of theese brigades. They turned out single weapon system, wich could defeat extremely strong stone buildings in the Berlin center. Germans also blocked streets with heavy barricades, built with massive blocks, so for its destruction also used direct fire of 152-203 mm barrels. If direct fire with heavy guns wasn't possible, 280 mm Br-5 mortires (34th sep.high-power artillery battalion, 6 barrels) and 305 mm howitzers mod.1915 (322nd sep.high-power artillery batalion, 6 barrels) were coming to game. Was enough 1-2 305 mm shells to collapse heavy fortified building. As told memories, using of heavy guns for direct fire also had a next reason - artillery spotters often could't see places of indirect fire shells impact because of high density of tall buildings and couldn't ajust fire. Indirect firing also couldn't supress enemy strongpoints on lower floors of buildings. Also bad communication between infantry and artillery, fast changing of tactical situation caused Soviet artillery and rockets often hit with indirect fire own troops, sufferng to them heavy losses and foling further advance. Here some examples: 1. Assault group in 80 SMG gunners and riflemen, having in support 4 tanks, 6 76 mm guns, 4 45 mm guns, 4 120 mm mortars, 4 82 mm mortars, 2 152 mm howitzers had a task to advanse in Alexanrowplatz area from the crossroads of Fridenstrasse and Lansbergstasse. During advansing the group encountered that crossroads was blocked by heavy barricade and main buildings turned out in fortified positins. In the night B-4 has arrived and set up in front of barricade road block. On the morning the 20 minutes artillery barrage was conducted on nearest deep of enemy defense. Under artillery cover, part of the guns, appointed for direct fire, rapidly moved forward. B-4 with several shells wiped out the part of barricade. In the hole Soviet infantry rushed, supported by tanks, arttillery pieces moved with infantry by pairs - all forces mutually covered each other. 2. Rifle unit couldn't take a heavy fortifierd building. All attempts to blow up the walls by sappers failed, because from the deep of the street this building covered by MG nests and snipers. B-4 has arrived. Infantry moved two regimental guns, which opened fast fire along the street in direction of MG nests. The street LOS was closed by smoke and dust and in that moment loaded B-4 moved to the street and hit the building. 3. During the fighting in Warshauerstrasse area, Soviet infantry was stopped by heavy resistanse - Germnas turned out dozens buildings in deadly fortress. Artillery of assault groups was useless. Even support fire of 122 mm barrels didn't give anything. Then four B-4 were moved there and they during 20 minutes from 200 m distanse complitely destroyed 11 buildings - infantry moved further. 4. One Army, which operated in Berlin on the front of 3 km, used during several days for street fights and direct fire 14 203 mm howitzers, 34 152 mm guns and 12 152 mm howitzers, not counting barrels of less caliber. In most cases big guns were taking own positions after meticulous recon and as a rule under the cover of darkness, rarely in the daylight when it was extremely needed. Before opening fire, guns covered behind the buildings, covering by its walls. In some cases guns deployed in rubbles, behind ruined walls (its height adjusted if needed by crews and sappers). Range of using was 150-300 m, rarely 500-600 m. For the covering of guns infantry commanders detached special groups. Guns almost didn't fire in spotted targets, they often fired in middle part of buildings, causing severe destructions. As a rule about 7-10 203 mm shells was enough to destroy heavy building. More strong churches and stone buildings demanded 9-12 shells. Though were single fortifications in Berlin, which couldn't be crushed with no one of Soviet heavy artillery system - that are Flack-towers. Their walls has 2,8 m of thick, overlaps had 4 m, windows had steel plates 50-100 mm. For example flack tower in Tiergarten (Zoo-tower) was shooting out with 152 mm and 203 mm guns from 200 m but shells left only dents in the walls!

New module will cover time span where Red Army was involved in bloody assaults and sieges which don't limited only Berlin operatin. Poznan, Kenigsberg, also more early operations in Lithuaniua, Western Ukraine - in all these operations Soviet troops encountered with extremaly strong buildings and heavy field fortifications, which successfully resisted to all types of heavy infantry support guns, even 152 mm. Thus, Soviet command was forced to use for direct fire in urban combats and positions breaktrough high-power artillery of High Command Reserve. Beacuse of this theme summoned discussion, I am opening separate thread and transfering my previous posts here. I hope BFC will follow historical developments and will include at least 203 mm B-4 howitzer in the game as well as super-strong modular buildings and fortifications, almost invulnerable for infantry support guns. B-4 on the Berlin street, towed by Voroshilovets heavy artillery tractor

Ah, ok, I will do it manually

I meant it is possible you to transfer existing posts about subj in the new topic?

Real developments of war showed this was mistaken decision. Both sides widely used BM-21 (but ususally in the force of single launcher or platoon, less by battery ) and single-tube Grad-P for contact line hit. By the way this is the same brigade-level support system like 2S1 and 2S3. I hope this will adjusted in next module.

BF always payed many attention to historical details. If this module is about Berlin operation, it should adhere to historical developments. Without big guns Red Army would have suffered much bigger losses and assuulted Berlin much more time. So I think, they have to include in the game new type of modular buildings, which should have strenght on a level higher, than cathedrals and on-map big guns (B-4 will be enough, I think) as an instrument to destroy it. PS. @BFCElvis It is posible to pick up discussion about big guns in separate thread?

I have conducted some research about B-4 heavy guns in Berlin assault, so 102nd, 104th, 120th and 124th high-power artillery brigades were involved. In street fights for direct firing were used 38 B-4 guns of theese brigades. They turned out single weapon system, wich could defeat extremely strong stone buildings in the Berlin center. Germans also blocked streets with heavy barricades, built with massive blocks, so for its destruction also used direct fire of 152-203 mm barrels. If direct fire with heavy guns wasn't possible, 280 mm Br-5 mortires (34th sep.high-power artillery battalion, 6 barrels) and 305 mm howitzers mod.1915 (322nd sep.high-power artillery batalion, 6 barrels) were coming to game. Was enough 1-2 305 mm shells to collapse heavy fortified building. As told memories, using of heavy guns for direct fire also had a next reason - artillery spotters often could't see places of indirect fire shells impact because of high density of tall buildings and couldn't ajust fire. Indirect firing also couldn't supress enemy strongpoints on lower floors of buildings. Also bad communication between infantry and artillery, fast changing of tactical situation caused Soviet artillery and rockets often hit with indirect fire own troops, sufferng to them heavy losses and foling further advance. Here some examples: 1. Assault group in 80 SMG gunners and riflemen, having in support 4 tanks, 6 76 mm guns, 4 45 mm guns, 4 120 mm mortars, 4 82 mm mortars, 2 152 mm howitzers had a task to advanse in Alexanrowplatz area from the crossroads of Fridenstrasse and Lansbergstasse. During advansing the group encountered that crossroads was blocked by heavy barricade and main buildings turned out in fortified positins. In the night B-4 has arrived and set up in front of barricade road block. On the morning the 20 minutes artillery barrage was conducted on nearest deep of enemy defense. Under artillery cover, part of the guns, appointed for direct fire, rapidly moved forward. B-4 with several shells wiped out the part of barricade. In the hole Soviet infantry rushed, supported by tanks, arttillery pieces moved with infantry by pairs - all forces mutually covered each other. 2. Rifle unit couldn't take a heavy fortifierd building. All attempts to blow up the walls by sappers failed, because from the deep of the street this building covered by MG nests and snipers. B-4 has arrived. Infantry moved two regimental guns, which opened fast fire along the street in direction of MG nests. The street LOS was closed by smoke and dust and in that moment loaded B-4 moved to the street and hit the building. 3. During the fighting in Warshauerstrasse area, Soviet infantry was stopped by heavy resistanse - Germnas turned out dozens buildings in deadly fortress. Artillery of assault groups was useless. Even support fire of 122 mm barrels didn't give anything. Then four B-4 were moved there and they during 20 minutes from 200 m distanse complitely destroyed 11 buildings - infantry moved further. 4. One Army, which operated in Berlin on the front of 3 km, used during several days for street fights and direct fire 14 203 mm howitzers, 34 152 mm guns and 12 152 mm howitzers, not counting barrels of less caliber. In most cases big guns were taking own positions after meticulous recon and as a rule under the cover of darkness, rarely in the daylight when it was extremely needed. Before opening fire, guns covered behind the buildings, covering by its walls. In some cases guns deployed in rubbles, behind ruined walls (its height adjusted if needed by crews and sappers). Range of using was 150-300 m, rarely 500-600 m. For the covering of guns infantry commanders detached special groups. Guns almost didn't fire in spotted targets, they often fired in middle part of buildings, causing severe destructions. As a rule about 7-10 203 mm shells was enough to destroy heavy building. More strong churches and stone buildings demanded 9-12 shells. Though were single fortifications in Berlin, which couldn't be crushed with no one of Soviet heavy artillery system - that are Flack-towers. Their walls has 2,8 m of thick, overlaps had 4 m, windows had steel plates 50-100 mm. For example flack tower in Tiergarten (Zoo-tower) was shooting out with 152 mm and 203 mm guns from 200 m but shells left only dents in the walls!

B-4 also used for heavy bunkers destroying - in Finnish war and in late period of WWII, so it can be used for distance fighting too.

I meant such historical situation must be reflected in the module that Red Army encoutered with heavy fortified city defense (and not only in Berlin). Poznan, Kenigsberg, Praga and many other, so not only usual infantry support weapon couldn't deal with it, but even often 152 mm SP-guns. Though on other hand, buildings in CM has big disproportions in defensive capabilities. Their roofs easyly resist direct hits of 120-152 mm calibres, but infantry inside has a poor protection from small arms evan this building is looks strong.