The Steppenwulf

I don’t think the risk is with Putin.  It is the Russian people.  Despite our tendency to dehumanize them and plaster all sorts of broad brush assumptions, they are in the end people.  As these stressors stack up over time eventually something is going to break.

I'm not a fan of our UK government, but I am a fan of their support for Ukraine and I don't think there's any call in the country for that to change.  For example see PM Sunak's speech today in Parliament, and the agreement of the opposition leader Starmer.  They both mentioned a hope that renewed UK support will become a model for other countries...

I think that idea was probably discussed at length - pulling the entire thing.  But the game had already been out since 2014…and that was even before the whole Crimea thing.  So I suspect that the assessment was that the risk was low.  This is less about being “morally wrong” and more about the perception of being “morally wrong” and its impact on the business.  I have no doubt that BFC does have moral qualms about the whole thing but the final arbitrator is back to risk and exposure.  Releasing a DLC based on a war that just happened could easily see a serious backlash.
Games and books have been pulled by events (see Stephen King and Rage).  But in the case of CMBS I suspect enough time had passed to make the risk assessment acceptable.  Honestly, people are looking for “woke” when it is just business.  We live in a hyper sensitive socially aware culture that keeps re-writing the rules as we make them up.  So I get BFC deciding to stay out of this.  Finally, BFC is partnered up with other corporate entities in all this, so it is not just their own risk at play here.

You also are accepting zero actual risk in all this.  This entire issue comes down to risk/opportunity for BFC.  While for you it is entertainment and convenience.  Those are entirely different frameworks.
The opportunity for BFC is modest - DLCs do not make as much money as main title releases so ROI is limited.  They also have multiple lines of product, so they can offset any losses by shifting focus to offset lost investment in development.  The risk for BFC, in this environment, is significant.  Beyond the fact that releasing a wargame set in an active war zone (there are actual game maps that overlap RL) while people are dying, is going to be considered “bad taste” by most and “a social crime” by some - companies have been cancelled for less.  The risk of significant loss due to perceived exploitation of human suffering is high.
This is existential for BFC.  It is their livelihood.  Are you willing to personally pay for the financial damage this move could do to the company?  Are you willing to put your job on the line for a CMBS DLC?  Because that is what you would be asking BFC to do.  BFCs job is not to make you happy.  Their job is to sustain the business that makes you happy.  Right now risking everything on a single DLC does not make business sense. 

They may have done, but Steve already said they are all on the same page.  And I agree with them.

Little example that things are hard for at least some of the the RU forces (note there's a close up of desiccated corpse if that bothers anyone).  He does look a bit under nourished compared to the Chechen's we used to see.
And a Leo 2 looking very workman like (the Balkenkreuz on one of these might annoy some though).
 

On other hand FPV mostly fly with HEAT ammunition. It's good for vehicles, but not so effective against groups of infantry (if this not about to strike MG or ATGM crew on position). Yes, we already begin to use some other sort of ammunition, including HE airburst, but looks likel this is "garage-produced", not serial. So in present time FPV can't substitute 155 mm arty and mortars by delivered HE weight. 

I continue to maintain, as I stated on this thread a few months into the very start of this conflict, that the specific strategic goal here is about maintaining off-ramp conditions for the Kremlin. In other words, 'you (Russia) cannot win this war so negotiate your way out of it, when you are ready, and whenever that might be!'

Such an event (perhaps an inevitability) leaves Russia with strategic defeat - for all the reasons that have been discussed ad nauseum on this thread - yet during the process of reaching this realisation, there is superlative management of risk avoiding direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. Thus Russia decides its own losing fate, rather than defeat being imposed directly upon it by decisive military action.

This then is the escalation management strategy; the west maintains control of the levers but only pulls them as required to shut down Putin's options and drive Russia into an ever decreasing cul de sac.

Consider the vast majority of post WW2 military conflicts undertaken by the 'super-powers', and the 'moral of the tale' is telling; assuming continuing resistance to invasion/occupation, the long term cost-benefit is so damaging to the aggressor/occupier that withdrawal negotiations (off-ramp) is inevitable. 

In this then, the west has already sowed the conditions for the end of the current Russian regime, simply a repeat of events following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the 90's.
 

I continue to maintain, as I stated on this thread a few months into the very start of this conflict, that the specific strategic goal here is about maintaining off-ramp conditions for the Kremlin. In other words, 'you (Russia) cannot win this war so negotiate your way out of it, when you are ready, and whenever that might be!'

Such an event (perhaps an inevitability) leaves Russia with strategic defeat - for all the reasons that have been discussed ad nauseum on this thread - yet during the process of reaching this realisation, there is superlative management of risk avoiding direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. Thus Russia decides its own losing fate, rather than defeat being imposed directly upon it by decisive military action.

This then is the escalation management strategy; the west maintains control of the levers but only pulls them as required to shut down Putin's options and drive Russia into an ever decreasing cul de sac.

Consider the vast majority of post WW2 military conflicts undertaken by the 'super-powers', and the 'moral of the tale' is telling; assuming continuing resistance to invasion/occupation, the long term cost-benefit is so damaging to the aggressor/occupier that withdrawal negotiations (off-ramp) is inevitable. 

In this then, the west has already sowed the conditions for the end of the current Russian regime, simply a repeat of events following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the 90's.
 

I continue to maintain, as I stated on this thread a few months into the very start of this conflict, that the specific strategic goal here is about maintaining off-ramp conditions for the Kremlin. In other words, 'you (Russia) cannot win this war so negotiate your way out of it, when you are ready, and whenever that might be!'

Such an event (perhaps an inevitability) leaves Russia with strategic defeat - for all the reasons that have been discussed ad nauseum on this thread - yet during the process of reaching this realisation, there is superlative management of risk avoiding direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. Thus Russia decides its own losing fate, rather than defeat being imposed directly upon it by decisive military action.

This then is the escalation management strategy; the west maintains control of the levers but only pulls them as required to shut down Putin's options and drive Russia into an ever decreasing cul de sac.

Consider the vast majority of post WW2 military conflicts undertaken by the 'super-powers', and the 'moral of the tale' is telling; assuming continuing resistance to invasion/occupation, the long term cost-benefit is so damaging to the aggressor/occupier that withdrawal negotiations (off-ramp) is inevitable. 

In this then, the west has already sowed the conditions for the end of the current Russian regime, simply a repeat of events following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the 90's.
 

You missed the point of my post. I am not saying there is some dark and secret conspiracy for a forever war in Ukraine.
I am saying that I think Western leaders probably say quite different things in public than they say at high-level meetings. And they think different things than they say even there. That is not a conspiracy, that's politics.
The goal is not to keep the war in Ukraine going forever. But the primary war aim is not that Ukraine wins this war or takes back all territory. That's also an aim, but it's secondary.
I think that the reason we see so slow drip-feeing of assistance is that the primary Western goal is to avoid escalation, and not only on the battlefield, but also to avoid a chaotic collapse of Russia.
The real goal would be to keep Russia intact but to effect regime change. And for that to happen, Russia has to be worn down, not crushed by a sudden shock on the battlefield.
The average Russian has to be made well and truly sick of this war, and responsibility has to be eventually placed on Putin. I think that's the actual US (and therefore Nato) plan.

Meanwhile in the U.S. Congress, ...
I sure hope he is successful.
National Security Challenges Are Test Of America’s Credibility, Senate Must Not Fail
https://www.republicanleader.senate.gov/newsroom/remarks/national-security-challenges-are-test-of-americas-credibility-senate-must-not-fail

By the second winter, the boots had worn out...

Even Comrade Lenin underestimated both the anguish of that 900 mile long front, and our cursed capacity for suffering.

I have to quibble with this one. Sudan is in the midst of a full blown cicvil war. It isn't getting any press because both sides are awful and the humanitarian situation is hopeless, but is nevertheless the case. The fact that Ukraine is providing some competent help to the side that seems to be winning is actually a pretty big deal. If Russia wants send its proxies on the other side more help all of it comes from a set of resources that could otherwise be directed at Ukraine. Furthermore since Ukraine has picked the side that actually wants to fight, Russia would have to send in a great deal more assistance than Ukraine is providing in order to move the needle back the other way. Losing in Sudan would make all of Russias other recent gains in Africa a lot more tenuous. In the cold math of war I think it is a net benefit for Ukraine.

Well, to start - a lot of those were shaping/recon ops for a massive amphibious invasion and follow-on ground war. Dieppe was in many ways a test, a bloody one but that directly informed later ops to huge allied benefit. Every SOF operation did something useful, with varying results. Some were hugely important but relatively tiny - eg the sinking of a ferry carrying German (well, Norwegian  ) heavy water before it could be used for an atomic bomb. See, I can read Wikipedia; well really, I read actual books about this stuff about three decades ago and ever since.
So no, I don't consider any of them useless, but I'll posit your comparison is.
A better comparison might be the German effort in North Africa, where the front was existential for the Brits but strategically opportunistic for the Nazis. There SOF raids had actual impact, outsized for the forces involved and were very difficult for the the Afrika Korps to defend against.
But that flips the analysis backwards, as it's Ukraine opportunistically and with low investment attacking a strategic Russian priority. 
I was initially skeptical that what Ukraine has going on in Africa is having a strategic military effect; but I noted ref Russian elites being sensitive to effects from Africa and as @The_Capt has pointed out much more clearly, its more likely a geopolitical signalling effort, with effects that are currently unseeable at our worms-eye level.
Using this framework also negates the WW2 Western Europe comparison and North Africa and re-proves the point that we've run into many times in this thread - WW2 is not a good comparative starting point to this war.
But hey, you've discovered how to post a wikipedia link. Good for you.

Wow, you got that from a single "Hollywood" comment?  It must be January.  Seriously, I must be showing my age because this sort of back and forth is positively gentle where I come from.  Whole lotta internal translation occurring here.
So this is not about tactical or operational effects it is about strategic ones.  Russia might not give a "rats-***" about Wagner in Africa - and I would challenge that, somewhat - but we definitely do.  The fact we are hearing about it signals to allies and partners that Ukraine is thinking globally and can reach same.  This combined with deep strikes into Russia is basically doing what Churchill invented modern SOF for - to undecide the current stasis of this war.  It is opening another conceptual front.
As for Russia "not caring" - good god that list appears endless!  Russia doesn't care about Wagner.  It does not care about mobiks and brutal losses on the battlefield.  It does not care about Sevastopol.  It does not care about losing almost all of its frontline warfighting capability in the last two years.  Now it does not care that a regional minor power is conducting deep strikes in Sudan, and may very well be jumping into the special warfare game - with US assistance of course.
I for one am not really confident about what Russia "does not care about".  If I were on the other side of this, UKR SOF teaming up with 5-Eyes SOF to make my life miserable in Africa might just cause a slight eyebrow raising.
I have all the time in the world for civilians who want to either learn or contribute.  If someone starts Dunning-Kruger flexing I will perhaps be a bit more pointed in my responses.  As far as UKR SOF, they are doing pretty much what they are designed to do.  We are likely seeing the tip of what is actually happening under the waterline - for example, UKR SOF did not simply get off the plane and wander around Sudan until they saw someone who looked vaguely Russian.  They got intel and targeting data from allies - or god forbid their own architecture (that one alone should scare the bejeezes out of Russia).  Considering that UKR SOF is inter-linked with US SOF right now, I am pretty sure your inability to fully "see" what they are up to is by design.  The thing about using SOF to signal is that one can tightly dial in the intended audience and in this case I am guess that it is not all about you. 

No. PMC Wagner just changed owners and divided between several PMCs. Part of Wagners incrorporated to Rosgvariya as special purpose unit. But many of Wagnerites now under control of MoD still conduct own missions in Africa. Enlistment to PMC for "Africa travel" is continuing.
I don't know plans of Ukraine in Africa, but Zelenskiy told we have to pay more attacntion to this region, Ukraine for example already loing time ago had weapon supply partnership with Sudan (story of "Faina" freighter with tanks, captired by purates, if you remember)
Russian aggressive expansion into Africa forced France to withdraw from countries (CAR, Burkina-Faco, Mal) with strategical resources - uran, gold, etc. China is also rapidly expanding own influence on this continent, when European countries weaken under bla-bla-bla of "colonizers legacy". So, who knows, if EU afraid to fight and just avoid this, maybe Ukraine will di this work...

I'm questioning the practical strategic use of these resources, as I'm doubting their usable operational or even tactical effects. I'm also curious about the nature and objective of Ukraines presence in Africa. 
I assumed signaling, but I'm not convinced it has any actual long term effect locally or internationally. If The UKR are saying, Look Out Russkies, We'll Get You Anywhere!, well so far they have failed to give Russia pause, and and I don't see how Russia would really care. This isn't projecting power, it's useless pinpricks on a boars skin. Russia does not give two flying rats arses about some dead mercs in Africa, There's always more coming. Brave effort, but feels useless. 
Russia has not paused anything in Africa, their effort is inordinately larger than anything the ZSU can do and is steadily growing each year. It's functionally self-funded at this point by control of local resources, which UKR does not have.
If there is a UKR signal its pretty much overwhelmed by Russian noise and has zero chance .. So why bother? 
Or, heres what you seem to think I'm saying:
DURRRR WHY UKR NOT RAMBO-ING STUPID WAGNERITES?! MORE BOOM BOOM NOW! ME WANTY HEADSHOT VIDEOS! 
But I'm not. 
I'm not warped by Hollywood. I don't deserve that condescension. It's often your go-to knee-jerk attitude and while often funny frankly it can also be indiscriminate and needlessly wearing.
Ironically, It makes me pause to post, because I don't want to be shown up as foolish, so I try to put a bit more thought into things - which is a good effect! But it seems your snottiness is a hammer and (almost) everyone's question is a nail. 
Yes I'm a civvy but I'm not stupid. Perhaps you can bite down on the snarkiness as your first response? Maybe I am being too sensitive. 

I would very strongly suggest reading up on the February insurrection in Paris of 1934 or Troublesome Young Men by Lynn Olson just for a quick starter. Britain was ruled by appeasers who frankly admired the fascists for their anti-Bolshevism and that was pretty universally true of the right in France as well.
In other news, the view of this war from the other side isn't particularly rosy either:  https://www.thedailybeast.com/shocking-reality-of-ukraine-blowback-hammers-putin-at-home
 

Galeotti on the slow squeeze working on Russia: 
 

The issue of advantages and disadvantages of democracies vs autocracies at war is in general a very complex one and admits a lot of subtle arguments.
However, in the case at hand the test seems quite simple:  autocratic Russia had blundered into a war, where it managed to piss away its entire standing military, and then turned that war into a repetitive peformance of head-on assaults, exchanging high casualties for minute territorial gains of a village here, half a village there. Their theory of victory mostly consists of outlasting Ukrainian artillery ammunition stock.  If they succeed because Western countries cannot maintain focus on this war for more than a year or so, and Russians win by default by just being there - then (without unnecessary generalisations) I would say at least this set of democratic countries sucks big time, at war, policy, everything.  

You know, it's very hard to tell how a large, complex, very dynamic situation is going to end, until it ends.
I have to keep reminding myself of Danish politician Karl Kristian Steinke advice, 'It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future'
I, as I believe others here, have an affinity for the history of conflict in the last century. I suggest if you'd asked the man on the street, any street, how they thought democracy was doing in 1931, 1936, 1937, 1939, 1940, 1941, pretty much through the middle to end of 1942, I imagine the response would have been, 'not very well.' The death, destruction and abject misery continued for quite a while after that before things got better for even just some people.

This take is highly redolent of the attitudes of pessimists in the 1930's and contra your claim, there was very extensive German/fascist influence in Western democracies during that period. But then, as now, the extremist states were driven by the dynamics of authoritarian rule and could not stop themselves from over reaching.  Why? Because such states are not good at running countries very efficiently and must needs export the internal contradictions they suffer from to survive. Nuclear weapons change the way these things play out somewhat but Russia and China are simply not a match for an aroused and committed US/EU. It is a rough truth for Ukraine (and one that I find shameful) but the West has room to dither. Russia in particular, will not know when to quit and it is already working towards Russia's undoing. 

And if we think of economics in terms of decision space, democracies being a bit slower than autocracies has some active advantages. Japan's economy had very little slack in 1941, and consequently when the action war revealed that many of their economic priorities were misaligned with their strategy, they couldn't easily retool. Same story in Germany. But the United States had enormous slack and could therefore invest heavily in what combat revealed to be good strategic priorities.
The war in Ukraine has revealed that we had lots of bad ideas about strategy and procurement. That offers the west the opportunity to retool towards things that will matter strategically. We need to take that opportunity, though.

It is an astonishingly strong conceit that autocracies are somehow better at war than more liberal states. Even looking at *this* war...Russia's autocracy has screwed up in every conceivable way, taken grossly disproportionate losses and cannot regain its earlier standing *even if it prevails* in Ukraine. It has inflicted on itself a strategic, economic and demographic disaster.