BletchleyGeek

I had almost forgotten about Battlefields!  I followed the development of the this game for about 10 years before finally I gave up checking on it.  Seemed like a worthy successor to the V for Victory family...    

Great games, I still play them from time to time on DOSBOX. That way the memory doesn't fade away.
For a number of years Erik Rutins and Ludovic Coval were pushing a game called Battlefields!/Combined Arms. It went quite far but the AI was totally out in the weeds and development kind of collapsed. I read recently that they were trying to restart development... that was over a year ago.
There are some green shoots @JonS - it's not all doom and gloom.
In the tubes we have Desert War 1940-42 which is currently under closed beta
http://www.matrixgames.com/products/676/details/Desert.War.1940-1942
It was slated for release after summer, but seems development hit a snag too.
Last, there's also Armor Brigade
http://www.matrixgames.com/products/685/details/Armored.Brigade
Which is pausable real time, with a User Interface that aims at minimising "mandatory" micro. If it comes with PBEM over impulses we then would have a high fidelity, WEGO, grand tactical sim. A true successor to TacOps and Command Ops.
 
 

In the 1990s Atomic Games released the "V for Victory" series of games (Velikiye Luki, Utah Beach, Market Garden, Gold-Juno-Sword), later sequeled in the "World at War" series (D Day: America Invades, Operation Crusader, Stalingrad). They were set in WWII, and used the same WEGO system that CM uses (simultaneous planning phase, followed by simultaneous execution with no player interference), albeit in 2D and at the grand-tactical/operational level rather than 3D in the minor-tac realm.
I loved and played the hell out of those games, and have been deeply disappointed that no one has yet picked up the 2D/Operational/WeGo mantle. HPS' Panzer Campaigns was a poor and pale imitation.

Some stuff in general: There are many benefits in general from C2 page 66 of the 4.0 Engine manual explains some.  Also @Josey Wales did some testing which in part states Troops within C2 range of their HQ unit are less affected by the temporary impact of suppression upon Morale. Troops within the C2 link are less stressed by being shot at and the immediate impact of seeing team/squad mates killed & wounded is reduced.  The C2 effect is noticeable with senior HQ's over their junior HQ subordinates. For example, a Platoon HQ being in close visual C2 link with its Company HQ provides a clear resistance to the temporary Morale effect of being suppressed. 
Link to Josey Wales topic:  http://community.battlefront.com/topic/125728-the-relationship-between-soft-factors-morale-fatigue/?tab=comments#comment-1723417 
Some stuff specific to the information reference the two tanks:  The 4.0 Engine Manual pg. 68 states one of the benefits of good communications is spotting of enemy units.  It also states a unit isolated from C2 wouldn't be able to target something it didn't spot itself.  (I paraphrased both of those statements) 
The AI can't shoot at tentative contacts but it can generally acquire a confirmed contact quicker if it has a tentative contact to begin with.  (This is my opinion from playing the game I have not experimented with it.)  
And to paraphrase something @womble posted in February 2015 - In terms of situational awareness an intact C2 network will pass spotting information down to the fire teams more quickly, giving them an advantage when trying to acquire the hostile for themselves.   
Link to womble's post: http://community.battlefront.com/topic/118133-leaders/?do=findComment&comment=1582020
 

Just been watching a "new" German film with panzer grenadiers in action (not I should stress the usual one that crops up!) but a clip from this one:
https://filmhauer.net/kampf-schtzenpanzerwagen-herbst-1944-p-6426.html
In part 2 one of the SPW machinegunners is nailed from a distance by a Soviet ATR crew. Never seen that in "RL" before - but given training film it does illustrate a/ they were the guys the Soviet ATRs targeted and b/ the shield did not stop the bullet which punched through (pretty realistic depiction in the film) like a knife through butter.It has some great scenes with a mortar halftrack and gun track supporting the attack.

Aye interesting and unique film - the whole version is excellent - although there are only two fragments totalling ten minutes. What makes it unique is it illustrates the small unit tactics - battlefield recon, moving at speed through enemy artillery fire, heavy weapons (251/9 and 251/2 hanging back and suppressing or taking out enemy positions), platoon leader dismounting in cover to scope out enemy position, the attack moving at speed into and through the first line of the enemy positions (troops firing from the tracks) before dismounting to clear the main enemy position.
Bit moot come 44 how much of that type of attacking would be going in (if it was I guess it is how it was portrayed here - sealing or eliminating enemy breakthrough) but certainly makes for interesting watching.

They look good, but they aren't regulation. No Marine Sergeant would allow his men to wear unit patches like- God forbid- the ARMY! lol

Happy Thanksgiving Sir! Thank you for this wonderful game! I hope you and your crew and their families will do great this eve! 

In a different virtual universe I am known as Mord, Mordran when I am in trouble...

It has been a long time in the making, and was previously known as the project "Man of the Our", but is now "Rittersprung H2H".
Scenario description:
After being severely decimated in the battle for the Hürtgen Forest, the 28th Infantry Division was sent to the rear to rest and refit. The 112th Infantry Regiment got located in the tri-country area of Lieler-Ouren-Lützkampen, spanning Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium – a six mile stretch of land on both sides of the Our river where the Siegfried Line had its westernmost fortifications, now occupied by the Allies. The 28th ID had just about recovered 100 % strength, with replacement units getting basic combat training, when the Germans launched their massive attack in the Ardennes on december 16th 1944. The crossing of the Our at Ouren would be an important part in the German advance and it was upon the 112th IR of the 28th ID to protect it as long as possible.
It is 10:30 on Dec 17th and the 112th IR was engaged in combat with German forces on the 16th and throughout the night. The morning fog has lifted but it is still misty from the cold and the wet ground. Visibility is reasonable but it is hard to make out units in the mist. Units in Lützkampen and Harspelt were swept aside on the 16th. Sevenig town was also attacked by a green force of Volksgrenadiers but was able to hold on. The Volksgrenadiers suffered a lot of casualties and many prisoners were taken. They are now presumed to be hiding in the woods west of Sevenig.
Semi-historical scenario which is aiming to capture a “what-if” combat based on units and turn of events that happened in the opening days of the Ardennes offensive.



 
It can be downloaded here: http://www.thefewgoodmen.com/tsd3/uncategorized/rittersprung-h2h/
Enjoy, and all feedback is very welcome.

There, you got your +1. Well done.

Yes, ha ha. If you check his posts in this thread you'll find it. It surprised me because not a while ago he said human eyes cannot see frames above 30 fps.
Bottom line is 60 frames is not the upper limit as you claimed if the 1000 frames claim is a miss or not. 

Also, I don't know if anyone has mentioned it on this thread, but I have found that limiting the frame rate through NVIDIA Inspector to 60 fps greatly improves smoothness. On my system, this is due to the fact when I look at a scene that is not busy, such as the sky or the horizon, the GPU will render the scene at a very high frame rate. Even though a scene is simple, this increases the temperature of the GPU and even makes the fan kick in. Transitioning to a more busy scene creates a stutter where the frame rate can drop into the teens while the GPU cools down and the various clock speeds adjust themselves.

Well.
Here we are. 17 or more years later. Some of us have died. Some of us still live. I was here for a long time. Then I left. I had nothing else to contribute to the thread that bears my name. I think that is still true. But Berli and Stuka deserved better than what they got. Good men, maybe not the ideal of Gentlemen, but good men nonetheless. They deserved to live longer, see more, do more, **** more, drink more, smoke more and raise more hell than they were allowed. They are missed. But they are still alive in my head. That's all any of us have. Well except for that pillock dalem and the jackass of all trades, the Seanachai. They've got Berli's earthly goods. I say build a monument with them. Build a museum. Build a tribute to Berli, that will last longer than any of us. We are meat. We die. Life goes on.
Can I just say here that I'm glad Methuselah - I mean M. Emrys is still kicking. And that OSGF, our Manky Scot's Git has not given up on his shtick. 
Good night, and good luck.

Well, thank goodness you are in the minority with that opinion. 

I was talking about their use in the context of the discussion with Jon - they are not as prone to losing crew to small arms fire as ordinary SPW are. Hence work better (anti-armour threats notwithstanding) as close support for dismounted panzer grenadiers.

Thanks.
Esdaile; nope. To paraphrase one of the great statesmen of the 21st Century; as you know, you go to the typewriter with the bibliography you have, not the bibliography you might want or wish to have at a later time

Napoleon's Ulcer

When Napoleon invaded his erstwhile ally Spain in 1808 to complete his Continental System, he had little reason to think that his campaign on the Iberian Peninsular would be anything other than brief, glorious, and profitable. Instead he got none of those, and brutal French efforts to assert control over Spain only made the situation worse. French failure on the Peninsular was not due to lack of determination – the French attempted to control the guerillas through an extreme example of what today would be called ‘enemy-centric counterinsurgency’.1 However, according to Boot this approach of savage repression can only succeed ...
if the insurgents are devoid of outside support and if the counterinsurgents have some degree of popular legitimacy, if they can muster overwhelming force, and if they are willing to engage in mass murder on a scale that would be intolerable to a more liberal government.2
French revolutionaries had been able to meet all four conditions during The Terror in the 1790s, and thus succeeded in retaining their power, although at some cost to the legitimacy of the Revolution itself.3 Similarly the uprisings in Calabria in 1806 and in Tyrol in 1809 failed because external support was denied to them, and both were relatively modest affairs – geographically and demographically – so mustering overwhelming force against them was a practical proposition.4 Nevertheless, in Spain the same broad approach failed. Boot's four conditions provide a lens through which to examine the French failure in this longest running of the Napoleonic campaigns.
Throughout the campaign in Spain and Portugal the Royal Navy controlled the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of the Peninsular. This conferred a number of significant advantages on the forces opposed to Napoleon. For one thing, it meant that they always had a secure flank, and a potential means of escape. Moore took advantage of this at Corunna in 1809, when he was able to extract his outnumbered force rather than watch it be surrounded and destroyed. It also allowed the positive movement of forces, such as when the Spanish army in Denmark was relocated home in 1808, and when in 1811 Wellington was able to relocate his heavy siege train 230 miles from Lisbon to Lamego in just 18 days. The speed of this move can be judged by comparing the final stage of the move from Lamego to Ciudad Roderigo, a distance of just 130 miles which nevertheless took 26 days as it was conducted by road.5 Throughout the campaign the British were able to exploit the speed of maritime movement, whilst the French were limited to much slower land-bound transportation.
Similarly, controlling the ocean provided the British with the means a secure and efficient supply chain back to England, which was vital to the maintenance of Wellington's forces at Torres Vedras in Portugal and the last Spanish stronghold at Cadiz.6 Because of this, British supplies were able to arrive faster from England than the French were able to move their supplies from just across the Pyrenees border in France. This meant that the British forces were able to exploit opportunities and ward off defeats much more easily than their French opponents.
The oceanic flank also meant that the British were able to keep the Spanish supplied with arms, money, and other goods to keep the insurgency fighting. This suited the purposes of both the Spanish and the British.7 The British needed the insurgency to remain active and potent in order to keep significant French forces tied down across the length and breadth of Spain on occupation and security duties. For if the French had been able to concentrate their forces exclusively against the modest British forces, Wellington's forces would surely have been forced back into the ocean. Similarly, the Spanish guerrillas required a steady stream of munitions and money to sustain their means to continue the fight.
To meet the conditions of Boot's model the French had to either deny the insurgents popular legitimacy, or provide an alternative which had greater popular legitimacy. Prior to the French invasion in 1808, Spain was politically divided and ineffectually governed, and its army was small and powerless. Portugal was in an even worse position due to a weak economy and army that was poorly organised and had terrible leadership.8 As a result Napoleon was soon able to claim complete control of Portugal, and nearly complete control over Spain, and promptly installed his brother Joseph as king.9 For any other country in Europe between 1790 and 1815 that would have been the end of the campaign. However, on the Peninsular something unusual happened. Although their governments had failed them, the peoples of Spain and Portugal never collectively accepted defeat, and instead continued to resist the French on a regional basis. The central government in Spain had lacked popular legitimacy, so when the Napoleon replaced it many in Spain viewed the change not as a defeat but as an opportunity, one they weren't about to let the French usurp.10
The third factor in Boot's model that Napoleon required – overwhelming force – was almost achieved. Napoleon did commit large forces to Spain and, apart from some reduction prior to the invasion of Russia, maintained the force and improved its quality as time passed. Throughout the campaign the total number of French forces in the Peninsular seriously outnumbered the British, Spanish and Portuguese regular forces there. Despite that the French were never able to concentrate their superior numbers to achieve a decisive victory.
The most obvious reason the French forces were unable to bring their numbers to bear was due to the Spanish insurgency. The insurgents were spread across the length and breadth of Spain, and so the French forces were similarly spread in their efforts to combat them.11 However the insurgency itself depended on a number of additional factors which further hampered the French. The Iberian Peninsular is generally poor farming country, with a low population and meagre productivity. This meant that the land wasn't able to support large-scale foraging, which in turn meant that the French forces – who primarily depended on local foraging to support themselves – had to disperse to survive.12 This dispersal, plus large areas of mountainous terrain, made survival easier for the insurgents, and allowed them to conduct raids and ambushes on the dispersed French.
The lack of local foraging opportunities forced the French to establish supply lines back to France, with carts hauling supplies into the country. But these convoys were easy prey for the insurgents, which in turn forced the French to disperse their forces still more by establishing secure waypoints and providing close escorts to the convoys as they moved slowly across the countryside.13 British naval domination meant that the faster and safer route of carrying supplies into Spain on ships was not practical.14
There were also structural problems with the organisation of French forces which worked against their ability to concentrate. When Napoleon was personally in command he was able to effectively coordinate his Marshals. However he soon left, and thereafter showed curiously little interest in the continuing Spanish campaign.15 His brother Joseph wasn't able to command the same cooperation from the marshals, despite his titular position as King of Spain. Napoleon exacerbated this when he undermined Joseph's position by making the marshals answerable to himself rather than the King, and then worsened the situation by making them each the supreme ruler of their assigned regions, responsible for maintaining control and raising their own finances. This divided French command, and set the marshals up as competing rivals. Any incentive for them to coordinate their forces or even cooperate with each other was thus removed. Therefore, instead of a single powerful force, Napoleon perversely created for himself several small independent armies scattered across Spain, and each army was itself scattered across its area of responsibility as it tried to impose order and retain control.16
The French forces attempting to concentrate to defeat their enemies faced a paradox; they couldn't defeat the British army in Portugal without first clearing their lines of communications which ran through Spain, but they couldn't defeat the insurgency in Spain without first defeating the British in Portugal. The French failure to do either contributed directly to their eventual defeat.17
The third factor required in Boot's model is that the French were willing to engage in mass murder on a scale that would be intolerable to a more liberal government. The French invasion, occupation and attempt to rule Spain was culturally tone deaf from start to finish. Napoleon's diplomatic humiliation of the Spanish throne at the 'ambush of Bayonne' in 1808 might have allowed him a bloodless conquest if he'd considered how his arrogant actions would play out with the Spanish people. Instead of crowning Ferdinand VII in place of his discredited father Charles IV, Napoleon treated Spain much the same as any other conquered territory and peremptorily installed his own brother as king.18 Murat effectively opened the guerrilla war two months before Joseph's coronation with his Dos de Mayo massacre, behaviour which was subsequently emulated by other French commanders in other regions.19
As the campaign ground on murder and retaliations and counter-retaliations became the norm, in an ever escalating spiral of violence. Napoleon appears to have realised that this was counter-productive and attempted put a halt to it. On 12 December 1808 he noted the undesirable effects of plunder and ill-discipline, and ordered that
1) Any individual who stops or mistreats an inhabitant or peasant carrying goods into the city of Madrid will be immediately tried before a military tribunal and condemned to death;
2) Any individual who pillages and prevents the establishment of order will be tried before a military tribunal and punished with death.20
Despite the savage punishments - and the apparent disregard for due process - Napoleon’s general lack of interest in the Spanish campaign inevitably allowed his attention to be distracted, and incidences of mass murder by French forces soon resumed. However, since the other factors required by Boot's model for the French to suppress the Spanish by brutal repression – lack of external support, denying the insurgents popular legitimacy, and overwhelming force – were absent, continued murder only fueled ongoing resistance by the Spanish people.
Contrary to the usual French experience in Spain, General Suchet was able to subdue the guerrilla uprisings in Aragon and Valencia once the Spanish regular army there had been defeated and the ports closed to British. He also used a lighter touch than was the norm in other parts of Spain, seeking to win the goodwill of the Spanish people through measures such as easing trade restrictions to increase prosperity, treating the clergy with respect, and providing effective controls against graft. In contrast to most French forces, Suchet waged a population-centric counter insurgency, rather than the typical enemy centric approach of Napoleon and the other Marshalls. As a result his forces were able to control their corner of the Peninsular without living in constant fear of being ambushed.21
Suchet was made a Marshal for his successful operations in Spain, but his experience remained the exception. Overall Napoleon's long and futile Peninsular campaign caused a drain on French manpower because of the steady stream of casualties, and also due to the distraction required of maintaining the large standing garrison army needed to retain even some control. Financially the campaign was a failure, despite the efforts of the Marshals to make their forces self-supporting through local imposts.22 Furthermore, the campaign lowered morale throughout the French forces with a posting to Spain being seen as akin to a death sentence.23 A marker of this effect on morale is the high rate of desertion amongst French forces – in one case eight out of ten conscripts in a levy headed for Spain had deserted before they even reached the Pyrenees.24 Another marker of poor morale was suicide, tragically common amongst the French in Spain.25
Napoleon's personal prestige also suffered because of his ill-advised decision to install his brother as king, only to have him hastily evacuate Madrid within a few months. His prestige fell when he left Joseph in position to fail again and again, even while Napoleon was removing the levers of power Joseph might have used to attempt to restore the situation.
Overall the Peninsula War, once started, was such an ongoing military problem for Napoleon because when he attempted to use brutal repression to control the Spanish guerillas he was never able to separate the insurgents from the external support provided by the British, he was not able to install a central ruler with greater popular legitimacy than the provincial guerrilla leaders, and the French forces were never able to muster sufficient overwhelming force to defeat either the regular forces led by the British out of Portugal or the insurgencies spread across Spain. Napoleon attempted to use the same approach that worked elsewhere without recognising that the Spanish context in which he was trying to apply it was different to France, the Tyrol, or Calabria. Then, once the campaign began to go off the rails, he was unable to develop and implement an alternate strategy, despite the success Suchet demonstrated with his population-centric approach. Instead the spiraling cycle of murder and reprisal only served to inflame passions, making the soldier's experience in Spain all the worse.

 
Bibliography
Asprey, Robert B., War in the shadows. Little, Brown and Co., 1994
Boot, Max, Invisible armies. Liverlight Publishing, 2013
Connelly, Owen, Blundering to Glory: Napoleon’s Military Campaigns. Wilmington, Delaware, 1987.
Dwyer, Philip G. (ed.), Napoleon and Europe. Longman, 2001
Dwyer, Philip G. (ed.), The French Revolution and Napoleon, a sourcebook. Routledge, 2002
Ellis, John, From the barrel of a gun, a history of guerrilla, revolutionary and counter-insurgency warfare, from the Romans to the present. Greenhill Books, 1995
Elting, John R., Swords around a throne, Napoleon's Grande Armée. Oxford, 1988
Haythornthwaite, Philip J. (ed.), Napoleon, the final verdict. Arms and Armour, 1996
Jaeger, Matthew C., Imperial Soldiers and the experience of guerrilla war in Spain, 1808-1814. M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina, 2003
Kilcullen, Dave, Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency, Small Wars Journal Blog. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-of-classical-counterinsurgency January 27, 2007
Knight, Roger, Britain against Napoleon, the organization of victory 1793-1815. Allen Lane , 2013
Record, Jeffrey, Beating Goliath, why insurgencies win. Potomac Books, 2007
 
Notes
1 Kilcullen, Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency, on Small Wars Journal blog
2 Boot, Invisible armies, p.81-82
3 Dwyer, Introduction, in Dwyer, Napoleon and Europe, p.6-7
4 Esdaile, Popular resistance to the Napoleonic Empire, in Dwyer, Napoleon and Europe, p.143-144, 150-152
5 Knight, Britain against Napoleon, pp.202-3, 241-2, 427
6 Knight, Britain against Napoleon, p.427-8
7 Tone, The Peninsular War, in Dwyer, Napoleon and Europe, p.231-2
8 Esdaile, Popular Resistance to the Napoleonic Empire, in Dwyer, Napoleon and Europe, p.149
9 Asprey, War in the shadows, p.77
10 Tone, The Peninsular War in Dwyer, Napoleon and Europe, p.226
11 Dempsey, The Peninsular War: a reputation tarnished, in Haythornthwaite, Napoleon, the Final Verdict, p.106
12 Elting, Swords around a throne, p.565
13 Ellis, from the barrel of a gun, p.75-76
14 Jaeger, Imperial Soldiers and the experience of guerrilla war in Spain, p.37-8
15 Arnold, Napoleon and his men in Haythornthwaite, Napoleon, the Final Verdict, p.239
16 Tone, The Peninsular War in Dwyer, Napoleon and Europe, p.231. Dempsey, The Peninsular War: a reputation tarnished, in Haythornthwaite, Napoleon, the Final Verdict, p.101, 103
17 Record, Beating Goliath, p.36-37
18 Connelly, Blundering to Glory, p.120-122
19 Jaeger, Imperial Soldiers and the experience of guerrilla war in Spain, p.51, 53
20 Napoleon, Order of the Army, 12 December 1808, quoted in Dwyer The French Revolution and Napoleon, A sourcebook, p173-174
21 Elting, Swords around a throne, p.151-2
22 Connelly, Blundering to glory, p.132
23 Jaeger, Imperial Soldiers and the experience of guerrilla war in Spain, p.78
24 Tone, The Peninsular War, in Dwyer, Napoleon and Europe, p.231
25 Jaeger, Imperial Soldiers and the experience of guerrilla war in Spain, p.72-5
... back to contents

Hi Hister
I did give the player a couple of 'Red Shirt' scout units in the first mission - just to ease them in!
Aye the discussion re recce is an interesting one and full of variables. There is no 'one size fits all' approach. As a designer, I'm aware players often like to lead with scouts...
Hence there will be a counter in place where it counts... BTW snipers are excellent spotters - you don't have to get within firing range - the fact they have scopes and binos is their key strength I think. So keeping this team out of harm was a good move - you'll find them very useful in future missions so treat em right!
Re the victory conditions - yup how this works in CM for victory conditions if the enemy spot a marked unit they get points (much like how they would if they 'killed' the unit).Does not matter if you kill them after they spot you. This reflects these Soviet units as recce in their own right. Their job is to get intel on where a German attack is coming from and what strength.
I'm still working on the other campaign - taking a bit longer now my wife and I have a wee baby. I've way less free time than I used to have. The campaign is coming along though.
Cheery!
George

It's funny - it's pretty big and significant part of our history, yet it totally gets glossed over. Not as much as in the past, but still a lot. Titokowaru, for example, was spectacularly successful against the British and colonists in the 1860s, for which he was paid the honour of being written out of our history. At school I learnt more about British kings and the British Civil War than I did about our own wars.
I very much recommend that you make space for Belich, J. (2015). The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict, Auckland: Auckland University Press in your library and reading schedule. It was first written in the 1980s, but has aged well.

Interesting and eclectic selection of topics @JonS
 
In a very specific sense my answer to @Sgt.Squarehead question is yes to "older texts". Columbus was a man of his times, the Renaissance, when the scientific and mathematical literature of the Greek and Roman tradition started to disseminate throughout Western Europe beyond the vaults of monastic orders, which very often in turn acquired formerly lost pieces by way of its curation through the ages by Muslim and Jewish scholars based on the Middle East, North Africa and Spain.
The Spanish entry for Christopher Columbus - https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cristóbal_Colón - has a very good discussion on this specific topic:
 
 
which translated into English by yours truly reads:
So no mysterious hermetic or atlantean - as invented by Von Daniken 1970s acolytes, see We Are Not The First and other books of the same ilk  - knowledge preserved by warrior monks - but actually wishful thinking (Marco Polo's Travels) riding on the back of unsound mathematical calculations (those  of Posidonius) which had been preserved verbatim for over 1500 years, and dumb luck. See the path of the first of Columbus travels

Columbus pretty much sailed (left Palos in Huelva in 3 August 1492) on the wake of the easterlies that push the hurricanes along the Caribbean archipelagos island chains right into Florida... and came back on the westerlies.... following pretty much the same route that Spanish galleons hauling bullion out of Mexico and Peru followed for the next 250 years. Columbus wanted to set sail much earlier... probably finding himself right in the middle of hurricane season. He was actually lucky that the trading families his ships were confiscated from by order of the King and Queen of Spain, retaliated by blackballing him. That prevented Columbus from gathering supplies as quickly as he wanted. Also, the whole notion of the travel sounded crazy to most captains and sailors in the area, delaying the trip for two months as no sailors or senior experienced seamen were coming forward to man the ships...
 
 

Let our hearts be dark
The role of mana and rangatiratanga in the conflicts in New Zealand during the 1840s
 
To the soldiers only, who are enemies to our power, to our authority over the land, also to our authority over our people, let our hearts be dark.
Hone Heke, 1844[1]
 
In the 1840's the British settlers and Māori were each striving to achieve different aims in New Zealand.  Following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi the British believed they had sovereignty over New Zealand and therefore the right – if not the physical wherewithal – to expand immigration, purchase land wholesale, and impose British legal norms across the country.  On the other hand, based on their understanding of the Māori translation, Māori believed the Treaty secured their right to rule as they saw fit, and only sell land to the British as and when they wanted.  This subtle mismatch would drive the first round of the New Zealand Wars.
At the core of the Māori grievances which led to conflict were the related concepts of mana and rangatiratanga. Mana was the prestige, influence, and spiritual capital that an individual held, and was thus the root of chiefly authority and status.[2]  It derived in part from birth and whakapapa, but was sustained and enhanced by demonstrated leadership, particularly in war.[3]  Indeed, “the purpose of war was to restore the integrity of chiefly and/or group mana, or to redress its loss after a defeat.”[4]  This was significantly different from the European view of war; in Māori culture, war was fought for mana rather than simply for conquest.  Conquest of another hapu or their land might be the outcome of a war, but it would not generally be the cause.
Rangatiratanga was the leader's chiefly authority, which was in turn derived from mana.[5]  The two concepts were bound tightly together, such that a reduction in mana reduced a chief's rangatiratanga.  Similarly a curtailment in the ability of a chief to wield his rangatiratanga reduced his mana.
By examining the three main conflicts of the mid-1840's – the Wairau Affray, Hone Heke's Northland War, and the Hutt Valley Campaign – it is possible to see the role that mana and rangatiratanga had in their outbreak and conduct.
In the early 1840's Captain Arthur Wakefield of the New Zealand Company came into possession of a deed, apparently signed in 1839, in which Te Rauparaha had apparently sold the Wairau area.  Te Rauparaha claimed that the treaty was fraudulent, and it is clear that he was never recompensed as stipulated in the deed.[6]  The following year he signed the Treaty of Waitangi and indicated he was prepared to negotiate for the sale of land, but in 1843 the Company began attempting to enforce the existing deed.
Te Rauparaha advised the Company that he refused to recognise the 1839 contract, and wrote to William Spain to request assistance. Spain had been appointed Land Claims Commissioner, with the role of investigating land purchase agreements made before the Treaty of Waitangi.  Spain agreed to review the Wairau deed, but not immediately.[7]  In the meantime the New Zealand Company began surveying the Wairau Plain north of what is now Blenheim.
Te Rauparaha recognised the threat this activity posed to his rangatiratanga over the land, and demanded they stop.  He was reluctant to use violence as he realised this would hinder his efforts to trade with the British, and would quite possibly involve the crown with whom Te Rauparaha wished to maintain relations.  However it became clear that more forceful means would be needed before the Company ceased its activities.  Still reluctant to spill blood, but needing to challenge the surveyors in order to preserve his mana, Te Rauparaha damaged or destroyed the surveyors’ tools and equipment, and burnt their huts and sheds.
This angered the settlers, and Wakefield resolved to bring Te Rauparaha into line. Gathering an armed posse, Wakefield confronted Te Rauparaha and a group of his tribe, including a number of armed warriors, on 17 June 1843.[8]  Still seeking to avoid bloodshed, Te Rauparaha attempted to negotiate with Wakefield.  This was effort was abruptly halted when one of the English party fired their weapon, leading to a general exchange of gunfire, and what became known as the Wairau Affray[9] was in full swing.  Despite not seeking violence, Te Rauparaha’s party were more than ready to respond in kind, and soon gained the upper hand, killing several of the British, including Wakefield. In a running battle more of the scattering British party were killed, with the first survivors reached Wellington the following day.
Once the fighting began Te Rauparaha no longer attempted to show restraint.  He had not sought a fight, but would not risk his mana by preventing his tribe restore balance through utu on the British.  Further, because the brief battle was so successful, and swept the British out of the Wairau, Te Rauparaha’s mana was enhanced and his rangatiratanga over the both the land and his tribe confirmed.
Subsequently there were calls from the British settlers in Wellington to bring Te Rauparaha to justice.[10]  However after reviewing the original contract, the operations of the NZ Company in the upper South Island, and Wakefield’s conduct on that fateful day, Governor FitzRoy felt that although Te Rauparaha’s behaviour in killing 22 British was deplorable, it was justified. No further action would be taken by the crown – yet.[11]  This outcome further enhanced both Te Rauparaha’s mana and his rangatiratanga; his mana was protected then enhanced by confronting the British and beating them in battle, confirmed his authority over the Wairau, and used the British laws to shield himself and his people from retaliation.  As the custodian of his tribe’s mana, he had admirably fulfilled his role.
Prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Northland tribes were in the happy position of being able to dictate terms of trade, and also being the first port of call for most traders.  This gave them a steady income through tariffs, as well as first call on any imported products and a superior ability to sell their own goods.  The Chiefs saw much advantage in maintaining the status quo since their mana was enhanced as their tribes prospered.
However, once the Treaty was signed, the right to impose tariffs passed to the crown.  Shortly afterwards the capital moved from Kororareka to Auckland, and with it went many of the ships that had previously called into the Bay of Islands.  This double blow to the economy of the Northland Māori threatened the mana of the Chiefs, and with it their rangatiratanga.[12]  Some of the Chiefs, such as Waka Nene, felt that continued support of and trade with the British would be best, even if not as lucrative as previously.  Some chiefs adopted a wait-and-see approach.  Hone Heke chose a third course, and adopted a policy of confrontation, although he was disciplined in the application of violence.  Like Nene, Heke wanted to continue trading with the colonists, but he felt that the loss of the right to impose tariffs and the loss of trade to Auckland could not be overlooked.[13]
Heke was clear that his quarrel was with the crown, and throughout his war he ensured that civilians and missionaries were allowed to continue their business unmolested.  This policy reflected Heke’s understanding of mana; how it could be enhanced, and how it could be damaged.  Since the crown was responsible for the loss of tariffs and trade, it was only by successfully confronting them that his mana could be restored and rangatiratanga maintained.  Attacking civilians would undermine that objective and would further threaten the trade that still remained in Northland, while attacking the missionaries would threaten the source of education for his people.[14]
Having identified his target, Heke also considered his objectives.  These were strictly limited to restoring mana and maintaining rangatiratanga.  Heke desired to defeat the British in battle in order to demonstrate his superiority and fitness to be chief, his rangatiratanga.  But he did not seek to conquer the British, nor drive them from Northland.  This seems like a very fine line to tread, but it was in fact a conceptually simple and traditional limited war for specific aims.[15]
Heke’s problem was that he knew that in a straight up fight against the British Army he would lose because his warriors lacked numbers and firepower.  His genius was to recognise these shortcomings, and develop the modern pa to overcome them.  At Puketutu, Ohaewai and Ruapekapeka Heke built pas in locations which were easy to approach and attack from one direction yet difficult surround.  He equipped them with artillery proof shelters, trenches to protect his warriors while they engaged the British, protruding bastions to allow enfilade fire, obstacles to slow the assaulting infantry and expose them to fire for longer, and dispensed with elevated or exposed positions.  Unlike traditional pa, these modern versions were not intended to defend villages or resources, they were purely locations at which the British would be fought, and they could be readily abandoned at any time with no penalty.[16]
The British commanders were singularly unable to develop a tactical response to Heke’s modern pa, and suffered defeat at each of them.  Although claiming victory on the basis that they held the ground at the end of each battle, the Governor nevertheless agreed to peace on terms that were favourable to Heke.  By defeating the British in battle his limited aims were accomplished so Heke was satisfied that his mana was enhanced and his rangatiratanga assured, and therefore had no wish to continue the war.[17]
The causes of the third conflict in the mid-1840s were broadly similar to the Wairau Affray.  The colonists that had been landed in Wellington by the New Zealand Company sought land, especially flat land that could be farmed.  The only ready source was in the Hutt Valley, and tensions soon rose when both sides believed the other wasn't abiding by settled agreements.  The New Zealand Company's earlier purchases had largely been overruled by Spain, nevertheless the limits of the land he had granted to the Company were unclear.[18]
The chief, Te Rangihaeata, had been a member of Te Rauparaha's party at Wairau, and felt a similar challenge to his mana from the steady encroachment.  Matters came to a head when Governor Grey bought the power of the government in unambiguously on the side of the colonists and ordered the destruction of the pa at Makahinuku.  Te Rangihaeata responded by murdering settlers and attacking a British stockade.  However, as was the case with both Te Rauparaha and Heke, Te Rangihaeata's response was proportional and measured – he did not seek total war with the British, or to drive them from the Wellington region.  He did however demand that they respect Māori claims to land in the Hutt Valley, and his could not allow his mana and rangatiratanga be diminished by allowing the encroachment and attacks on Māori villages go uncontested.  At the tactical level Te Rangihaeata was reasonably successful, generally inflicting more casualties than he suffered during fights in the Hutt Valley, slipping smoothly away from the pa at Pauatahanui as it was being invested, and deftly checking the British advance at Battle Hill.[19]  Although Te Rangihaeata was able to retain his role as chief, he was driven out of the Wellington region, and only settled in the flax swamps west of Shannon. As part of Grey's campaign against Te Rangihaeata, Te Rauparaha was illegally arrested and held for many months.  Although it had taken several years, Grey thus extracted a revenge for Wairau by diminishing both men's mana.[20]
During the New Zealand Wars of the 1840s the British and Māori were each seeking to achieve quite different objectives, and both could therefore claim victory.  The three conflicts were each started by affronts to mana and rangatiratanga, and from the Māori perspective were waged within that context.  These were not wars for territory, per se, nor for conquest.  This confused the British no end since it was far outside their traditional understanding of war.  Given this narrow context, the Māori chiefs were far more successful at the tactical level, restoring or maintaining their mana and rangatiratanga through fighting and winning in on Māori terms.  However in the longer term, and with the benefit of hindsight, these three conflicts can perhaps best be seen as holding or delaying actions.
 
Bibliography
. (21 June 1843). New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator. Retrieved from https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/new-zealand-gazette-and-wellington-spectator/1843/6/21 , 26 Mar 2017.
Ballara, A. (2003). Taua : 'musket wars', 'land wars' or tikanga? : warfare in Māori society in the early nineteenth century. Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books.
Belich, J. (2015). The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict (This edition 2015. ed.). Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Bohan, E. (1998). To be a hero : Sir George Grey : 1812-1898. Auckland, N.Z.: HarperCollins.
Keenan, D. (2009). Wars without end : the land wars in nineteenth-century New Zealand. Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin.
King, M. (2003). The Penguin history of New Zealand. Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books.
Moon, P. (2009). Hone Heke : Nga Puhi warrior. Auckland, N.Z.: D. Ling.
Prickett, N. (2002). Landscapes of conflict : a field guide to the New Zealand wars. Auckland, N.Z.: Random House New Zealand.
 
[1]Quoted in Belich, James, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2015 (1986), p.32
[2]Ballara, A. (2003). Taua : 'musket wars', 'land wars' or tikanga? : warfare in Māori society in the early nineteenth century. Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books, p.79
[3]Belich, J. (1986). The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict . Auckland: Auckland University Press (2015. ed.), p.23-24
[4]Ballara, A. (2003). Taua : 'musket wars', 'land wars' or tikanga? : warfare in Māori society in the early nineteenth century. Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books, p.26
[5]Belich, J. (1986). The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict . Auckland: Auckland University Press (2015. ed.), p.21
[6]King, M. (2003). The Penguin history of New Zealand. Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books. p.182
[7]King, M. (2003). The Penguin history of New Zealand. Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books. p.181-2
[8]Keenan, D.(2009). Wars without end: the land wars in nineteenth-century New Zealand. Auckland, N.Z.:Penguin. p.135-7
[9]The Affray was initially known as the Wairau Massacre, reflecting British-centric reporting, and attempting to colour the narrative by falsely hinting that the only reason the Māori won the fighting was because the British had fallen victim to an underhanded ambush. Ballara, A. (2003). Taua : 'musket wars', 'land wars' or tikanga? : warfare in Māori society in the early nineteenth century. Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books. p.182
[10]New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 21 Jun 1843, p.2
[11]Belich, J. (1986). The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict . Auckland: Auckland University Press (2015. ed.), p.21
[12]Moon, P. (2009). Hone Heke : Nga Puhi warrior. Auckland, N.Z.: D. Ling. p.19
[13]Belich, J. (1986). The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict . Auckland: Auckland University Press (2015. ed.), p.34-5
[14]Belich, J. (1986). The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict . Auckland: Auckland University Press (2015. ed.), p.232-3
[15] Ballara, A. (2003). Taua : 'musket wars', 'land wars' or tikanga? : warfare in Māori society in the early nineteenth century. Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books.
[16]Moon, P. (2009). Hone Heke : Nga Puhi warrior. Auckland, N.Z.: D. Ling. p.140
[17]Belich, J. (1986). The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict . Auckland: Auckland University Press (2015. ed.), p.58-64
[18]Keenan, D.(2009). Wars without end: the land wars in nineteenth-century New Zealand. Auckland, N.Z.:Penguin. p.152-3
[19]Prickett, Nigel, Landscapes of Conflict; a field gide to the New Zealand Wars, Auckland, 2002, p.49-53
[20]Bohan, E. (1998). To be a hero : Sir George Grey : 1812-1898. Auckland, N.Z.: HarperCollins. p.84-85
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This last article about the Maori - British wars is my current favourite of the series @JonS. Thanks and keep them coming

That's funny, my job is your hobby, and my hobby is your job.
BBM (Before the Beard Mord).

 

 
 
Ok, Steve, I am willing to compromise on the trees because I like you and I think you are a decent member of this race we call humans, BUT PLEASE, PLEASE, PLEEEEEASE don't leave out new terrain features that would fit with the Syrian landscape; foot path, stream, weeds, grass tall, flowers, grass extra tall (VERY IMPORTANT), lt forest, hvy forest, deep marsh, reeds, heavy rocks, crop types. These are all excellent additions that will give map makers much more flexibility in future scenario design. I implore you with every fiber of my Mordness don't deny us the ability to make maps as great as they can be. These options are in all the other titles please allow them in CMSF2.
 
On another note the regular marsh is impassable for infantry in SF but passable in the other titles.
 
Will the Marines be able to use the amphibious capabilities of the AAVs?
 
Mord.
P.S. And how did you dodge that hellacious storm? CMP just got our power on down here, today. It's been out since 1:30 Monday morning! I missed Halloween!