Richi

160K?
Now THATS more like it.

The isolation of the mobik probably starts in their training period, if they have one. Given the "training methods" traditional to the RA, and the, ahem, "accelerated timescale", there's probably little or no cultivation of the attitudes that lead to the development, once deployed to unit, of the "bond between squadmates" that remains the primary motivation to fight of an infantryman. And there's no leadership at the low level with the competence to compensate.
This might contribute to the execrable treatment of casualties, fatal and otherwise: there just isn't any motivation to waste any effort on the guys around you, since you barely know them from Adam.
Both sides have been using tanks for indirect fire, so the Russians digging deeper into their reserves to find (temporarily) mobile HE chuckers that don't need new barrel linings isn't really a surprise. Putting artillery guys in the vehicle might be a good way of getting more effect out of the platform, or it might be an indication that they haven't anything better to serve.
If the UK is sending 10 score Storm Shadow, the US commitment of ATACMS can't be far behind. What temperature is the frog-water at now?
 

Seeing as the United Kingdom sending the AFU Storm Shadow missiles is such a hot topic today here is Ben Hodges's take on the news.
I approve this message.
 
Here is a bonus tweet for you guys, I can't be the only one around here who enjoyed watching the television show Vikings. If you watched the show I'm sure you remember this lady. 😁
 

I occasionally post updates on the war to Facebook, to keep my friends and family in the loop. I'm still trying to piece together what happened in this attack near Bakhmut based on ISW's report and what people have posted here. So before I actually post this, and potentially mislead my friends and family, I submit the following for comments, criticisms, additions, and revisions:
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From what I can piece together, the Ukrainians conducted two limited counterattacks on May 9th and 10th. One to the northwest of Bakhmut, the other to the southwest of Bakhmut (neither were in the city itself). The one that I mentioned yesterday, pending details, seems to have been the one to the southwest, occurring on May 9th. The area was apparently held by the Russian 72nd motorized rifle brigade. There are a few competing narratives about what happened. The most likely version is that the brigade's 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses, but the brigade itself was not destroyed. It is the most specific version of the story, and other versions could be consistent with it with some interpretation. The story that "the brigade was destroyed" could easily be an exaggeration of "its 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses". And that it broke and ran is completely consistent with two of its companies suffering heavy losses. At least one Ukrainian spokesman has claimed that the brigade suffered serious losses, but was still intact, which is also consistent. The Ukrainians reportedly advanced 2.6 kilometers along a 3km front as a result of this attack, though none of my usual sources are able to independently verify this.
That would be a good result on its own for a limited counterattack. But a Wagner assault group reportedly also moved into the area shortly after the attack in order to stop the Ukrainian advance and re-establish the frontline. The Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade (the unit that conducted the attack) had already stopped and entrenched itself, and the Wagner assault group blundered straight into their positions.
There are already some estimates of the Russian casualties, although they should be taken with the usual grain of salt. Prigozhin, the owner of Wagner PMC, claims they lost 500 men. I'm not sure if that number applies to 72nd's losses, Wagner's losses, or both, or whether they refer to just killed or total casualties. I don't normally put a lot of stock in what Prigozhin says. He views the regular Russian military as a rival, not a partner, so he likes to play up their failures in order to make Wagner look better. Ironically, he also likes to play up the difficulties faced by Wagner forces in order to squeeze more resources out of the regular Russian military, which he is dependent on for supplies. But in this case his claim seems to be corroborated by a statement from the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, to the effect that his claim was accurate (although they may also be biased). The confirmed Russian losses are somewhere from 69-92 (either 64 or 87 Russian bodies were collected, and 5 prisoners taken). Based on the confirmed body count I'd say that 250-500 total casualties is plausible, closer to 500 if there are uncounted Russian dead (there have generally been at least 3 or 4 WIA for every KIA in this war so far). Even if the brigade was at full strength, 500 casualties would be a serious blow, representing a loss of about 25% of the brigade in a single action. But the brigade has been in action for some time, and was probably nowhere near its full strength. So this may have represented an even heavier blow to its remaining strength.
By itself, this action is not significant. But it may be significant as an indicator of what is happening in the larger picture. This attack, and the attack to the northwest of Bakhmut, together indicate that the Russians have well and truly run out of steam in Bakhmut (mere inches from the finish-line at that (the last report I heard was that the Ukrainians only hold 2.35 square kilometers in the westernmost corner of the city)). It was looking like the Russian attack had culminated about a week ago, but I didn't want to say anything yet in case it was just a lull. At that point the Ukrainians held 2.5 square kilometers. At a pace of 0.15 square kilometers a week, it would take the Russians another 4 months to secure the remaining 2.35 square kilometers of the city. That's almost the amount of time it took them to secure the first 39.1 square kilometers of the city. So to say that the Russian advance has noticeably slowed down is an understatement.
More importantly, this is only the latest in a series of small, limited counterattacks that have been occurring along the entire frontline in Ukraine. I don't know whether these attacks are occurring on an ad-hoc basis on the initiative of local commanders, or as part of a larger plan to shape the battlefield in preparation for the main offensive. If the former, it means that local commanders are seeing more and more openings to conduct limited attacks, which bodes very poorly for Russia's chances of resisting the big offensive (keep in mind that none of the units conducting these counterattacks so far are the 9-12 fresh brigades that are still being held back, and have been specifically trained and equipped, for the upcoming offensive). If the latter, then it means we are already seeing the opening phase of the big offensive. Whether they are part of a larger plan or not, the combined effect of these attacks will be to dilute whatever reinforcements the Russians have available by forcing them to respond to local emergencies, cause confusion about where the main offensive will land, and possibly even create cracks in the Russian line ahead of the main offensive. 
I still don't know when the main offensive will begin. My gut says it will be any day now, but my gut is biased by impatience. I think it will most likely start in June. That is based on current weather forecasts and an assumption that the Ukrainians will want more than two weeks without rain. That is supported by statements by Zelensky to the effect that they need more time for more of the promised equipment to arrive. There are plausible options for offensive actions along pretty much the entire frontline. But my guess is still that it will land in Zaporizhia Oblast, aimed at reaching the coast and cutting off Russian forces in Crimea and southern Kherson Oblast. The latest news I've heard is that Britain has now provided Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles, which have enough range to reach the Kerch bridge from anywhere along the coast of Zaporizhia Oblast, meaning that trapping Russian forces in Crimea is now a realistic option.

Those small counterattacks are getting more numerous; one Russian TG wrote about assault groups made of 2-3 tanks and platoon size Ukrainian infantry, targeting weaker regular Russian troops. It's still local and conducted by forces at place, but perhaps we are starting to see begginings of shaping operations.
 

I think a lot of us are looking beyond the grisly stuff in most of the videos. That is probably because most of us are beyond our prime. The young and the dumb watch them for the gorey factor, but I think at least a majority of the people here are looking at the rest of the information provided.
Personally, I have found that I am watching the evolution of the drone more than the actual "kill shots". The complexity of drone operations continues to evolve and watching the videos is how you see that. Think way back to the early days and it was a solitary drone used for artillery observation and now sometimes we are seeing three levels of drones being used in the same videos, so at the same time and place. Used for overall command awareness of the battle, recon up close, and actual attack. And that is just what we are seeing. Then the advent of the FPV drones working in concert with the recon drones. Now whole dedicated drone warfare units are being trained up so who knows what all levels and capabilities they will bring with them with evolving tactics and platforms. Watching the videos gives some insight into these things that would otherwise be a few years away in the books that will cover it.
Also, like @The_Capt said, looking at all the other stuff gives good insight into a unit's field craft. That gives you insight into their training and discipline levels. I think it was just yesterday on the surrendering video that people were talking about the bodies laying around and what that means psychologically and even professionally about the unit occupying that space. You can tell a lot about the overall quality of a unit from how they move individually and as a group, how they maintain their equipment, what equipment is observed, etc. These observations help with the overall understanding of the situation in that area.
Overall I think there is a lot of value from the video footage of this war. There is a lot of nasty stuff posted out there as well and sadly a bunch of it is just about the grisly side of it. Almost everything I've seen on here has some value to it, whereas on other sites it seems to be much more of the nasty shock value stuff.

As my friend Sherlock once said, "the plot thickens".  UKR making small attacks against depleted RU forces -- depleted thru unbelievable RU stupidity.  Mixed messages from every level of UKR govt. More & more gear and trained units coming online.  Infighting amongst the RU gangs around Bakhmut.  If UKR can continue to weaken RU while getting stronger, why risk everything in May/June?  Keep increasing the corrosion and then hit later.
war porn?  Maybe.  Also something we've rarely seen-- tactical level fighting, which isn't just porn, it of great interest to those interest in that subject, like me and many of those on the forum and everyone that plays CM games.  Do I like seeing people die & be maimed -- no.  Do I like seeing those that would threaten not just UKR but countries beyond that getting knocked out of action -- yes.  So, once again, the need to hold two conflicting concepts in one's head at once.
Including this summary today.  Not a lot we don't already know but there's a Downfall meme that is really really pointed and hilarious.
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/5/10/2168549/-Ukraine-Update-Russian-military-teeters-on-the-brink-of-chaos-as-Ukrainian-forces-advance
 

Another reason why Battlefront needs to make CMSU. I really need these Ukrainian style Challenger 2s.

Russians aren't getting Bakmuht, this decade, or century for that matter.

We should have gone with a US naming convention and called it the M1.
Informally known as "Bloody Large Ordnance to Shoot at Targets Using Firecontrol of Unimaginable Precision", aka BLO-STUF-UP

According to news two hours ago - 3rd assault brigade "Azov" had next success in their local (?) counter-offensive. Detalis probably will be tomorrow. 

Inside Bakhmut, Wagners continue to advance slowly in western part in cottadges quarters. Rest streets without significant changes.
 

So, now officially: Ukrainian air defense for the first time in history successfully intercepted "ininterceptable" Kh-47 "Kinzhal" missile on 4th of May with "Patriot". After a leak in the media and a day of denials and showdowns inside press-service, Air Force Command recognized this fact. 

unexpeted
EDIT: suspected photos have been taken with the training vehicles. So not for ukraine necessarily 

And even with the one guy hitting his limit, it seems like solid, well run unit.

Best meme I have seen in a while.

This former Bradley crewman loves it!

It looks like M2 in Ukrainian service will be called „Kitty Cat” (I do not dare to suggest another name, commonly used for both cats and ladyparts). UA are really good with social media and I love witty videos they usually post - but this one is just too much 🤣😂
 

What is weird about this one is that the UA did not need to construct the "most extensive systems of military defensive works seen anywhere in the world in many decades" and they held off multiple assaults that went on for months all along the line.  

🙏🤞🙏
 

Bradley in UKR pixel )

Lucky marine from 35th brigade %)
 

It's been called as a defeat for UKR I'm afraid.  If they're this good at clearing trenches I'm hopeful UKR can start training their own Beaver units.
Edit - anyone else seeing a NAFO pic on the twitter home button and loading screen?

A long, well written article about the lessons China is drawing from the Ukraine war. Primary lessons learned.
1) Putin waving the nuclear stick has been effective at keeping NATO from doing more in Ukraine. Waving the nuclear stick will be China's primary strategy to keep the U.S. from committing to defending Taiwan.
2) Starlink has been absolutely critical. They need their own version, and a way to take Starlink down.
3) They seem to be absorbing many of the lessons the board has discussed at length. Don't bleep up your supply lines, do have enough infantry, no such thing as too many drones, and so on.
My two main take aways.
1) A war over Taiwan will absolutely trash EVERYTHING in low earth orbit. There needs to be a plan to deal with that, a good well resourced program to deal with that. The economic damage will be vast too, but a war over Taiwan is going to trash the world economy regardless.
2) The U.S. needs to put a truly large military force on the ground in Taiwan. Large enough to reduce ambiguity to zero. I like the entire Marine division idea, but regardless it needs to big enough that their is no question that the U.S. is going to fight. Ambiguity is how Ukraine happened, if we make it absolutely clear attacking Taiwan is starting a war with the U.S. China might not do it. I have real doubts about anything less, barring a complete change in China's approach.
My two cents, worth what you paid.