Sandokan

kind of funny.  With a significant amount of the armaments supply being former Russian equipment from former members of the Warsaw pact... Russia isn't really fighting NATO, they are fighting the Warsaw pact.    History is weird. 😎

At the risk of veering a bit off topic, it's also not widely known that for about 20 years, HALF of all the uranium we used in US nuclear power plants came from decommissioned Soviet nuclear warheads. That's roughly 10% of all the US electric power generated for 20 years. At an American Nuclear Society technical meeting years ago, a Russian nuclear engineer was describing the process. Someone asked a question about a step in the conversion/downblending process. Everyone had the same question because it made no technical sense.
"This? It's for political reasons only"
Took everyone a second but then it was "Ohhhhhhhh"  (disguising the actual original composition).
 
What better way to dispose of 10s of thousands of excess nuclear warheads?
Dave
PS -  Search for "Megatons to Megawatts"  - the name of the program
PPS - I should clarify - this is NOT the same 50% that we buy, although we did buy this. This program ended in 2013
 

Training of some Marines unit, which now in process of combat capabilities restoration. Reportedly they got MG3 and Browning M2 machine guns

Yes. It really is a semi-automated and easy to use system. A crew training on this machine is really very fast. Frankly for people who already know artillery, it takes days to really be comfortable. Where it got long and quite complicated was on the commander's post because you have to know how to resolve anomalies, shooting incidents, vehicle settings (that's really where the difficulty lies) to operate the vehicle the best way possible. It is a weapon that is quite secure and very efficient, which is a good thing for the gunners but it requires knowing how the system reacts so as not to have a blockage. Personally, I knew the first versions that had software defects etc (which is normal for any new vehicle) and I quickly saw its reliability increase drastically (at least a decade ago). On top of that, we've had the time to perfect it and use it in real combat situations in Afghanistan or Iraq. Regarding the crew, it also depends on the type of ammunition used. It's easier to train a crew that uses simple fuzes than electronics ones which need to be configured electronically (it's still very simple, don't get me wrong, but it's still more complicated) 

😁. This is exactly what I think. And I also think that this revelation, just before the weekend, is not insignificant.
For those who don't know, the second (and last) round of the French presidential elections takes place this weekend (Sunday) between Emmanuelle MACRON and Marine LE PEN.
Going back to the weapon donations, I think that we can clearly see the effect of the various anti-aircraft weapons. There are increasing reports of downed Russian planes and helicopters. This is also a good thing and a prerequisite before sending more ground-to-ground artillery type equipment. A proof that everything is carefully thought out and well organized.

Here's a 26 page report by esteemed UK think-tank, analyzing prospect of the long war. Sounds like very interesting read.
Edit: I read the whole thing and I really recommend you do it too. The highlights include breakdown of Western produced electronics used in Russian weapon systems (authors claim to personally inspecting Iskander cruise missiles! ) and an analysis of situation in Moldova.  @Battlefront.com @The_Capt I'm sure you'll find it interesting. 
Here's a direct link:
https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202204-operation-z-web.pdf
 

I am an expert on military operations and this war makes very little sense in both purpose and execution.

Good night. 

The first two are going out the window at an increasing pace. The third can be overcome for sure given time, money and will.
The last is the real problem really. With experience of Vietnam US should be wary of helping "just enough". With sufficient help, Ukraine case might be a resounding success in US foreign policy making I think, the biggest in few decades at least.

Slovakian artist Rado Javor, illustrator of Total War games series issiued two new artworks about the war in Ukraine. Recently he has drew series "seasons in Ukraine" about war of 2014-2015.
Seasons:
Spring in Ukraine (fighting around Sloviansk)

Summer in Ukraine (Ukrainian July offensive)

Autumn in Ukraine

Winter in Ukraine (Donetsk airport)

Also two other artworks
Sunflower fields (tank ram of sen.lt Abramovych 12th of August 2014)

Winter war (campaign of winter 2015)

And new arts:
The general

Moskva

More his arts on history, military, game, sci-fi tematics you can find here: https://www.deviantart.com/radojavor

On a lighter tone. This one about the tractor brigade is fun.
 

I might dare for a longer post later, but confined to a phone I'll only say that what @The_Capt describes can be summarized as two robotic swarms battling it out - in the long term I agree that that's where we are heading. Technology is largely there, we just need to develop particular solutions and overcome ethical restraints
The concept was explored by various SF authors quite a bit, but I'd really like to recommend Stanislaw Lem's book "The Invincible". It was written in 1964, yet the maximalistic concept of the robotic swarm described there is really amazing even by today's standards, with 60 years of technology advancements. A pure hard SF gold, can't praise it enough. 

If my experience of gunnners is anything to go by they would probably reply:
Massed Infantry - Defeated by artillery
Machine Gun - Defeated by artillery
Tanks - Defeated by anti-tank artillery
Heavy tanks - Defeated by better anti-tank artillery (some of which may take the form of missiles)
ATGM - Defeated by artillery + drones
Drones - Defeated by AA artillery
EW AAA Light UGV Tank - To be defeated by precision artillery
Artillety - Defeated by ...nobody defeats artillery...Ubique.
 

Ok, so apologize for what will be a longish post, even for me.  So welcome to The Capt's terrain analysis for the possible upcoming fight between Izyum and Donetsk.  Basically I wanted to get a view of the terrain this next major fight is squaring  off over and try and pull some deductions from that.  
So here is what I did.  I booked an MS Flight Simulator (MSFS) flight from Donetsk to Kharkiv roughly along this google maps line:

For reference you can see the ISW map of where this next great Russian offensive is spooling up:

They buried Donetsk under the legend but this is the area of concern.  So I did not use live weather as it is pissing rain there right now and based on what I am seeing it is a big reason the Russian have not started anything.  I flew at 1000 feet up but employed the drone feature to get down and grab a birds eye view.  Overall I would summarize the terrain in military terms as such:
On the 8th day, while recovering from a hangover God looked upon the earth and said to himself "You know these shaved apes are going to go at each other the second I turn my back so I may as well make it interesting.  Let there be tank country!"



These shots are just south - southwest of Izyum.  So on the surface you can immediately see a lot of room for manoeuvre tailor made for armored warfare.  I mean I can see frontages of kms just aching for big ol tank formations to come charging through with all sorts of room for bypassing, flanking and all that good stuff.  But then go a bit deeper:

So if you take a look at that last one, check out the VFR map in the upper right.  There are a lot of water features distributed all over this area and in the spring they are going to be deep and muddy.  Little lakes and rivers just about everywhere that amphib IFVs can probably bounce but tanks, arty and logistics are going to have trouble with.  So what?  Target the engineering stuff with all them fancy switchblades, then arty, then C2...we will get to logistics.  Next how about all them rectangles:
 Yep, a lot of these little and big squares all over the place...damn Ukrainian real estate laws.  For armored warfare these are going to be a problem.  Easy button answer...arty them all!  Well no one on earth has enough arty for that as these things are everywhere.  Each one a short range tank hunting dream, with ready made tractor trails to boot off on once you have fired off a couple NLAWS and are falling back to the next one to re-set.  These thing will soak up attacking infantry to sweep and will slow things down a lot.  Oh wait there is more:
These are not CM3 previews (but we can dream) but in MSFS you can drop right down to eye-level and wow.  First off this area is not flat. "Undulating" is the term we would use, with lots of small hills and ridges, all of which give some sightlines we normally only see in a desert.  So if I had a smart, fire and forget ATGM system with a listed range of 4.0km and was trying to sell it, these are the marketing shots I would take.  I found these everywhere along the route but more so towards the south end of the likely Russian advance (or North from Donetsk but that is all trench country from the last war, so not likely). 
Ok so what? 
- First off if this thing goes off it will be a conventional battle for the history books.  I mean the next one with this sort of potential is likely Armageddon itself.  We have a near perfect storm of mass meets mass forming up.  The collision on this has potential to be heard around the world. 
- Second, this will be a major exam for conventional armored warfare.  "End of Tanks: No They Are Not" may very well be settled in this one.  You cannot really find much better terrain for armored warfare on one hand.  While on the other, this is also excellent terrain for an mobile defence.  The Russians should be able to create a break out with overwhelming mass here, if they play it right.  While at the same time between prepared defenses and a combination of short and very long sightlines the Ukrainian defence should be able to stop them cold - that is an epic collision in the making. 
- Third, so much of this will hinge on C4ISR it is looking more like an aerial dogfight than a traditional land-battle.   The side that can see first at the tactical level will likely hit and win first.  We should see more exchanges like were seen in the Nagorno-Karabahk which were very long range and then working in for the dirty work.  
- Fourth, the Russian offence is going to have to evolve.  They cannot bring their last fight to this one.  They will need to rethink C4ISR collection and sharing, logistical planning - pushing a lot more forward faster, and targeting.  The UA can keep doing what it was to be honest but it had better have made use of this pregnant pause to put in a lot of AT minefields that tie those water obstacles and rectangles together, they had the time and I can only hope they have the resources; this country is set up for nightmare defensive belts.
- Fifth, this will also be an exam for artillery, ATGMs, self-loitering and unmanned systems.  This will show what they can really do together, primarily in the defense but let's not forget the offence as well.  There are sightlines that can make full use of the ranges these systems can come bring to bear.  Honestly if I were the UA, I would stick with hybrid at the front end, and then wait for my moment for a conventional c-attack because it could be a bone crusher.  Given enough gas, a UA formation could drive right into the Russian rear areas and cry-freakin-havok back there looking at this terrain.
- Sixth, the awkward conversation about airpower.  This is perfect CAS country, the Russian's need it, the UA needs to deny it. With full on air superiority this country would be a challenge for an attacker, without it we could be looking at a nightmare. 
Finally, I would close by saying that I also get the sense that this is perfect terrain for an operational trap - it is what I would do.  

#1 - Resist Russian main axis of advance...but just enough to attrit but give them hope.  I would use obstacles to keep them on those axis and help channel them to what they want.

#2 - Oh look at how happy they Russian are, they have their great pincer BUT do not give them time for reorientation or to dig in, or they could use this country against you.
#3- Bil Hardenberger.  That old bastard has snap the jaws closed on me more times than I care to remember.  This country is made for a conventional c-attack to cut that corridor up and off.#4 - Feeding time.
This terrain supports this and the Russians have given the UA a lot of time to set it up.  Higher risk but the payoff is intense. 
Just spit-balling here and I have every confidence they UA commanders on the ground have a grip on this but for a defender that 1) knows what they are doing, 2) are well resourced and 3) have the time to prepare, this could make for a textbook defence that could be turned into something else.

And now for something completely different: partisans! According to official Ukrainian sources, since the occupation of Melitopol started a month ago, 70 soldiers of the occupying forces were stabbed or shot on patrols. I wouldn't hang to this particular number very much, it might be inflated, but it gives some idea about how nice it would be for the occupying forces, even if they managed to roll all the way to the Polish border. Note that are around Melitopol was taken quite early, territorial forces didn't manage to form up properly there. I'd expect that if Russian take significant ground anywhere now, the stay-behind forces will give them much bigger headache. 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/04/13/7339369/

This is why we need new folks, they keep us on point by (re)asking the central questions. So what happens next?
No idea.  I have ideas, opinions and what my instincts are saying but I really do not know.  In my thinking the main effort here is to create a mental framework that allows us to understand what we are seeing, when it happens.  As we confirm phenomenon a lot of other realities die quickly.  For example, we knew about 3-4 days into this war that it was not going to be quick because all the observable phenomenon killed that reality, it collapsed into unreality and fantasy.  
So what am I looking for now?
Strategically - The major shift and re-framing of strategic ends by Russia clearly signaled a change in negotiation position.  Ukraine's increasing strength in dictation of the terms they will accept was another signal.  We should keep an eye on this as it will continue to evolve; negotiation positions are directly tied to viable options (which I have gone on about at length) and as options spaces collapse or expand negotiation positions shift.  Further it is a sign of confidence in those options, we have seen Russia shift its negotiation position dramatically in this war: hard-medium-softer-hard.  That last "hard" negotiating position was the last we heard, likely because Putin thinks his current offensive options will give him what he needs now that the political ends have been conveniently reframed.  So for the strategic, track the options and negotiation positions.
Operationally - There is an indicator here that we have not discussed much but for what is coming will be important: decisions.  A "decision" in military terms seems simple on the surface but it is in fact very complex.  Basically a "decision" is the "death of alternatives" or a collapsing point of options.  Germans lost at Stalingrad, Russians won = German strategic offensive options die in the East...forever (insert ironic trombone sound).  This is primarily how conventional operational military planning thinks, in terms of lines of effort/operations that link "decisions" together in a linked framework that creates a successful outcome - victory (yay!).  These are what I refer to as "positive decisions".
However, in the wacky world of warfare, there are more than "positive decisions".  There are at least two, maybe three more types: null, negative and strange.  A null decision is basically a "non-decision" or an undecidable condition.  It can be generated and projected.  Ukrainian defence has been a master class in the projection of null-decisions onto an opponent; the Ukrainian approach has left the Russian military machine unable to solve for X operationally.  The end result of all those unsolvable decision spaces, along with attrition, create positive decisions for the Ukrainian defence when the entire Russian operational offensive collapsed - so you can see how this can get complex fast.
Wait, there is more!  All human decisions are metastable, which is a fancy word for "semi-permanent but subject to review".  So it is possible to "undecide" something within human perception and cognition to very real effect.  For example, SOF's primary contribution to warfare is not primarily positive decision space, or even null -they contribute here but this is not home turf - they are at home in creating negative decision, or undeciding things.  Classic example is the SOE in WW2.  Its job was not to create positive decisions in Western Europe, it was to "undecide German victory and control" - in the minds of the home front in the UK, the populations in Europe and in the minds of the Germans themselves.  Through demonstration-thru-communication (e.g. raids) the SOE did a lot of damage to German reality in undeciding things.  I am not going to get into Strange but it speaks to a human ability to "remember the future" and relative rationality, but let's leave off that one.
So what? Well for the upcoming fight in the SE, I will be looking for decisions (all types) at the operational level.  The Russians need positive, the UA will likely project null and negative on that...right up to a moment when they think they can get positive ones of their own.  The playout of that decision space will be key in reading the operational flow of things.  Next question is "which ones", well that could fill a separate post but for the Russians is likely means a decisive use of mass to pull off this pincer movement they are lining up, and then resist the UA c-moves. However, we will likely see a lattice work of decisions form up, the shape of that will dictate how things are really going.
Tactical.  Steve covered off a lot of this already.  I will add:
- Russian Mass - will it start working again?  Because it has failed (erm) decisively, so far.   Is there a tipping point in this war where mass will still work?  I suspect yes, but can the Russians build it and project it effectively?  This includes some sort of re-invention of combined arms and joint integration, which Russia desperately needs to create any of those operational decisions I was talking about.
- Russian Fragility - A tactical warfighting unit, within a formation system is a complex beast.  It has redundancies built in but it takes years to build an effective tactical unit and minutes to destroy it.  The Russian war machine has been severely beat up.  Estimates are now circling 25% losses for the initial invasion force. Normally it would take months to re-constitute damage like this and Russia is going to make a run at fixing it in days/weeks.  This will mean the Russian machine going into this phase is more fragile than the first attempt.  What remains unknown is what offsets the Russians have been able to bring to bear for this, if any.
- Ukrainian Friction - What has been amazing to watch in this war is the Ukrainian ability to create and project friction.  This is a primary role in defence, along with attrition but the breadth and scope that Ukrainian defence has been able to project friction in all domains has been breathtaking. Ukrainian defence has been able to create friction across the entire length and breadth of the Russian offensive.   If they can keep that up tactically, they will likely simply grind this next Russian offensive to a halt.
- Ukrainian Mass - they have conventional mass in this fight but are using it judiciously.  I suspect the UA is waiting for its moment, and if it times it right, it will be spectacular.
Beyond these big ticket items, we should be looking out for shifts in equipment and vehicles.  More T90s (and T-14...everyone wants to see a tractor pull on that one) or T62s all start to show something.  Cannon fodder troops in front with the good ones in the back will likely be the order of march, massed dumb artillery fire across broad frontage with little precision.  All this sort of stuff adds up, along with mass surrenders and uncontrolled movements. 
Anyway, strap in because we should see at least a few more big muscle movements before this thing winds down, or falls apart on the Russian side.  How this goes will determine if a stalemate option is even on the table for Russia and what the end-game will look like.  I still consider this the "posturing for end-game" phase with Russia racing for some sort of stalemate and Ukraine not letting them.
Either way, we will be here doing this for the duration.

Unfortunately, many people in the EU are either cowards (look at Le Pen wants out of NATO) or only interested in their comfort. If it were up to me, the gas would have been off long ago (yet my heating runs on gas). I've kept it to a minimum ever since, blankets and sweaters are enough. Afterwards, I can understand the position of the politicians from the point of view of the economy, it is essential to have a good economy for the war and to hold on in the long term, but we must not be fooled, we Westerners will lose there. with this conflict and losing money to buy useless stuff is nothing compared to the suffering of Ukrainians. We must also be positive and think about the future. When this war ends and I hope in favor of Ukraine, it will be a great opportunity for us Westerners to have a better Europe. Ukraine is in ruins but we can help them rebuild and develop. Their pride and glory, however, they will have won alone and by themselves.

Russia seems pretty clear that it wants the war over by the beginning of next month, and wants to cement its gains in the DR/LR region and along the Kherson-Mariupol axis. As long as Mariupol holds out its a herringbone in the landbridge, and really AFAIK there havn't been many gains to speak of in the DR/LR region. The UA situation in both areas is, however, quite precarious. Mariupol may be heading towards falling, I dont think many expected it to hold out even this long. While some UA forces in the DR/LR seem in danger of a conventional encirclement. All this taken together suggests to me that Putin has a strategic drive for a second offensive, as well as an operational opportunity. Moreover Russia has been routing troops from north, through Belarus, to the south. These will almost certainly be in poor condition, but could make for an ugly numbers situation, especially if you think that UA is more exhausted than is being reported in the media. This would, by a conventional estimate, lead me to conclude that Russia is poised to at least make modest gains in the east and accomplish its new, more limited, objectives. Many of which it already holds. 
Of course thats by a conservative, bearish, and conventional reasoning. The UA is almost certainly in much better shape than the Russians, even it wasn't it has basically infinite supplies and manpower given the nature of the war. Second, one assumes that a conventional encirclement would matter for those UA troops. It seems like Russia has done a pisspoor job of holding down territory that they cant bring under the direct fire of their rifles and tanks. I would imagine any encirclement would be so leaky as to be more of a danger to the attacker than the defender. And third we assume that Russia can bring a number of troops to the line that are truly decisive. As Steve, Capt, and I have discussed previously I suspect that Russia may need to move above a 6:1 combat ratio, roughly, before its numbers really begin to matter. I dont see them operationally being able to do that, especially as Ukraine brings in more and more trained volunteers, with more and more western hardware. I would imagine any man they can is being shipped east right now. And without an overwhelming advantage, I dont see how Russia can achieve tactical superiority, especially with beaten and depleted units. 
So IMO there will probably be another offensive in the east. If I were a betting man I would put money on Russia not conquering another major city, and also that UA counterattacks will continue to snap up more territory. But of course Ukraine and NATO have to worry. They have to prepare for the worst case eventuality even though things may look more upbeat. Surely the situation in the Ukraine Army is far more dire than any of us here realize. Theyve been fighting high intensity warfare for over a month now and their casualties are surely mounting. They will need a constant influx of every military supply the west has to stay in action as local supplies are used up. 

Apologies I was kind of referring to BornGinger's original post - The one that looked like an Excerpt from "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion"  - which curiously had some Russian Origins as I recall . As a complete aside - there is a good Novel by Umberto Eco  called The Prague Cemetery  which is an entertaining  (fictional) read on the subject .

Another one for the tractor brigade 🙂
 
 

a good summary of recent fighting & ground gained. 
ALERT>  LIBERAL website, so if you don't like that just don't stray from this military summary page else you might be displeased w what you see
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/3/26/2088342/-Ukraine-update-So-much-talk-about-logistics-let-s-talk-strategy-today
 

Guys,
So beyond the obvious competing narratives out there (nazis, bio-weapons, crisis actors etc) let's remember what this entire thing is, an egregious violation.  There has been no, and I mean zero, casus belli established for this invasion. 
People are pointing to the US invasion of Iraq in '03 in some weird "well two wrongs make it ok to kill thousands of civilians", however, the US did take their case to the UN, they were attacking a strongman dictator who had; invaded a neighbor for "reasons", used massive oppression on his own people, and had even employed chemical weapons against civilians.  So we are not even in the same strategic context here as Ukraine; a free democracy that had not even coming close to behaving like Saddam Hussein.
I have stayed out of a lot of these conspiracy theories floating around but even if the wildest ones are true (which I do not believe for a second) and let's say the Ukrainians were employing a combination of recovered nazi-occult and alien technology to make all Russian bears impotent...in the modern world your first response to that is not rolling in 120 BTGs!!  Worse, you cannot back that up with "well they were gently rolling in 120 BTGs"...no such reality exists.  That much metal + ammo + scared teenagers is never going to equal "gentle violation of sovereignty".
We can play the point-counter point game all day and try to gain political points but all of that is noise around the central and incontrovertible fact that Russia illegally invaded another sovereign European nation in a gross violation of sovereignty and global order...this is not "ok", this will never be "ok".
Finally, I know there are theories floating out there that the Russian Restraint can explain the slowness and stalling on the Russian side.  This is abject nonsense.  It is much, much harder to try and do a soft invasion.  The US military tried in Afghanistan and Iraq and they found it nearly impossible to avoid collateral damage and civilian deaths.  I have seen nothing to suggest that Russian ISR and Joint Targeting is so sophisticated and disciplined that they have any idea what they are hitting beyond..."hit there".  This baby hospital thing has been brought up, right sure....how exactly did Russian Joint Targeting know the hospital was empty (which it was not)?  How did Russian C2 know this when they don't even know where most of their own troops are?
So I am going to offer some simple rules that people can chose to adopt or not:
- Precision is hard, incredibly hard.  If your theory depends on greater Russian precision in anyway shape or form stop and think.
- Organization is hard.  If your theory depends on highly organized Russian capability...stop and think.
- Conspiracies are hard, in this day and age nearly impossible.  If your theory is relying on a "big secret"...stop and think.  All western governments leak like a sieve and even the autocratic ones bleed data like a stuck goat.  No government on earth, even NK, has an airtight seal on what information it leaks out.  So if you are relying on a "star chamber" or "black sites"...stop and think.
- If it looks like a Duck, stop calling it a Kitty Cat.  War is incredibly hard so the simplest explanation tends to be the right one.  It is the principle that has actually put this thread and forum out in front.  We have avoided over-analyzing (I know right?!) compared to others chasing some theories.  If Oryx has 297 open source pictures of destroyed/abandoned Russian tanks, well given the UA was outfitted with thousands of next gen ATGMs...it is not a hard squint to see the freakin quacking water fowl.  This is not some photoshop campaign for the ages, the Russians have lost a lot of tanks.  Is it 297, probably not could be more or Orxy might have some double accounting but it is a lot. 
- Assumptions, Factors and Deductions.  All this comes down to Assumptions, Factors (or Facts) and Deductions.  As I tell dead-eyed Majors, "make sure the line between these items is as straight and short as possible".  Make damn sure your Assumptions and Facts stay on speaking terms and then do not under any circumstances let the line between Factors and Deductions turn into a Pollock painting.  War is hard enough, complex enough and weird enough...it does not need your help in any of these areas. 
Go with the god of your choice grognards,  and try and stay out of trouble.
 

As soon as you see the words "crisis actor", you should know whatever the story is, it's nonsense.
I'm not aware of any event in the world that was actually staged using "crisis actors" - it's just a right-wing meme.
In fact, if you thought about it critically for a bit, you'd realise that such a thing would be almost impossible to pull off - you'd have to get everyone for miles around to buy into it, or someone would be saying "they're not from around here" and variations on it.
PS: the woman you're calling a "crisis actor" died of her wounds.