hcrof

Just decided to add my couple of cents.
Infamous Murz recently stated that LDNR artillery is extremely low on 122mm ammo and Russian Western Military District is running out of 122mm stock. They are urgently converting LDNR artillery to 152mm caliber (D-20 guns from Russian military storages).
As result:
LDNR is not able to capitalize on fall of Mariupol due to some units are out of 122mm ammo and some units are in the midst of conversion to 152mm.  LDNR CB capabilities around Donetsk are negligible now and because of that UKR artillery is highly active there.  Murz also stated during fire missions they are encountering multiple problems with 152mm guns (D-20) taken from storage. Interestingly, his statement implies they (LDNR and Russians) are unable (unwilling) to thoroughly inspect these guns before sending them to the fight. 

This is one of theese problems - D-20 with torn barrel after several shots.

Has anyone else noticed that while russian tank losses have decreased from about 10 a day to about 3 a day, their artillery losses have increased from 2-3 a day to about 9 a day? This has happened over the last 2 weeks or so from memory.
Im not sure what it means but it seems to be a good thing - fewer tank targets and more effective UA CB fire? Or maybe the pressure is off a bit and UA artillery has more time to hunt russian guns?

Has anyone else noticed that while russian tank losses have decreased from about 10 a day to about 3 a day, their artillery losses have increased from 2-3 a day to about 9 a day? This has happened over the last 2 weeks or so from memory.
Im not sure what it means but it seems to be a good thing - fewer tank targets and more effective UA CB fire? Or maybe the pressure is off a bit and UA artillery has more time to hunt russian guns?

Unfortunately no. You really have to see it as a towed gun mounted directly on its tractor and not as an SPG. The crew must load the shell on the stretcher (the rest is done hydraulically), add the propellant charge etc. The shells are stored on the sides and therefore require to be installed on the stretcher. Barrel angle and movement can only be achieved with rear command box as well as for firing. When firing (depending on the number of propellant charges) the cabin at the front rises (up to about 1 meter in Afghanistan at maximum propellant charge). It could be dangerous for the crew.

Many pages past I saw comments about modern societies not prepared for high combat losses, and I would push back some. Many societies in history are not prepared for high losses, but can push through when the time comes.

United Kingdom lost only 85,000 war losses in 113 years of empire. Biggest loss is 22,000 in Cirmean War. Why would U.K. be prepared for for 900,000 deaths in World War 1? Is similar when look at U.S. why would nation be prepared for 1,00,000 losses in Civil War when before only maybe 100,000 losses in last 90 years?

I think some comments of people being prepared for losses leans too much on an idea of modern decadence, but I wonder if any British citizen would have been prepared in 1910 for the casualties rolls of 1916.
 
 

"A Ukrainian soldier rests before returning to the Donetsk front line, in the Donbass, on June 5, 2022. BERNAT ARMANGUE / AP"

Those generals don't all, or even mostly, sound like they had much to do w Ukraine failure.  This smells like dictator terrified of coup purging everyone in sight.  I like it.  I like it a lot.  Shows that things in the kremlin are getting rather toasty.

Nope, he explicitly mean 4 vehicles. Same number was pledged by Germany ( MARS II/ M270) vehicles, and an undisclosed number from the UK. Still can have an impact I guess, if enough ammo is provided, and will be shooting round the clock, but to really make difference a lot more is needed. I imagine they want to make sure Ukrainians are adult about the deal and don't bombard Belgorod straight away, and then more will follow.
Edit:
Here's a nice thread summarizing the whole press briefing:
 

Back to the war, US will now officially supply Ukraine with HIMARS, as was announced by Blinken a moment ago. Germany declared to follow suit (hopefully) and so did UK. UA will field a mix of M142 and M270 it seems. I wonder if the latter will be using regular M26 variants too, for sure there isn't a shortage of suitable targets.
There's also some interesting news regarding tube artillery - it turns out, yesterday Poland signed a contract with Ukraine for 54 ( three battalions complete with CB radars) Krab SPGs, worth $700M, on top of already transferred 18 guns. At this point it is not clear if this is for new builds, or for ones from our active forces ( we had a total of 80). UA artilllery is really becoming a force to reckon with.
Also, UA is apparently pushing south from Krivy Rih, continuing it's counteroffensive in Kherson region:
 

Sorry for spamming, but that one is also interesting. I can't imagine what would be the reason for putting MORE highly valuable assets on the Snake Island in light of GMLRS arriving to Ukraine - if anything, they should be hastily evacuating, this place will become even bigger death trap very soon.
 
 

I doubt 700 000 meant as "in the army", more likely this is all force structures - Armed Forces (Ground Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, Territorial Defense Command, Air-assault command), SOF + their volunteers, SBU special forces + their volunteers, National Guard, State Border Guard Service. Also very likely special police units like KORD. Or maybe even whole police. I have no clue where to place 700K in current army structure even with Reserve Corps deployed. 
Pre-war picture in artillery was much worse. Because of losses of 2014-2015 and exhausting of barrels life in 2016-2021, the number of artillery was significantly reduced. Mech. or tank brigade had 18 2S1 (3 batteries x 6 barrels), 12 2S3 (3 batteries x 4 barrels) and 12 Grad (3 batteries x 4 launchers). Maybe, when the war started, all "shortened" battalions got additional guns/launchers for 36/18 number, but I don't know.
Number in 17 brigades also not correct. We had 13 "heavy" brigades (tank, mech. and mountain-assault) +1 training center, which can consider as brigade or at least "large BTG". For this 13 brigades we should have 234 122 mm SP-howitzers and per 156 152 mm SP-howitzers and 122 mm MLRS launchers. OK, I will add per 18/12/12 for training center too. 
Next we had 4 "light" motorized infantry brigades, which should have the same brigade artillery group, but 152 mm towed D-20 howitzers insted 2S3. And probably because D-20 was enough quantity, they could have 18 howitzers in battalion. So +72/72/48
One yager infantry brigade. There is few info about it, but it 100 % had battalion of 2S1. +18 122 mm
Next, 4 Air-assault/airborne brigades: 2 battalions of 122 mm howitzers in each (D-30 and 2S1) + MLRS battalion (12 Grad), also one BTG in 80th brigade has own arty battalion (18 D-30), also separate artillery battalion of Air-Assault Command level (12 2S3), So +162/12/48
Next, 2 Marines brigades - each had 18 2S1 and 12 Grad-1. Also at least two separate battalions of theese brigades had own 2S1 batteies. So +48/0/24
National Guard. Among all units there are 5 x 122 mm battalions and one 122 mm battery = 96 x 122 mm (2S1, D-30)
So pre-war ground forces brigade level required 648 x 122 mm, 252 x 152 mm, 288 x 122 mm MLRS
Artillery brigades 5 in Ground Forces and one in Naval Forces. I assume they had reduced 4-barrel batteries too, so we should have 18 x 152 mm battalions (2S19, 2S5, 2A65, 2A36) with 212 barrels and 4 x 203 mm battalions (2S7) with 48 barrels.
MLRS brigades - 3 in Ground Forces and 1 in Naval Forces. Total 6 battalions of 220 mm Uragan per 8 in each = 48 launchers, and 11 battalions of 300 mm Smerch/Vil'kha per 4 in each = 44 launchers
Missile brigade:  4 battalions of Tochka-U = 12...16 launchers
Since the war began, Reserve Corps was depolyed 3 tank, 3 mech., 3 infantry/yager, 2 air-assault and 2 artillery brigades. This is potentially +234 x 122 mm howitzers, at least 108 x 152 mm howitzeres, 120 x 122 mm MLRS and 72 x 152 mm long-range howitzers (2A65)
Territorial defense brigades don't have artillery (except MT-12), looks like some of them received D-20, but this more exception, so I will not count them. 
So, totally we should have:
882 x 122 mm howitzers (147 batteries). I think, they still in service, because a lot of ammunition remained. But Air-assault and marines units probably will be betetr to re-arm on 105 mm caliber (35 batteries). Or to made one battalion on M777 and the second on L118. M777 is light and mobile howitzer, it should be in mobile units, I think, but because of its range, theese howitzers now first of all go to artillery brigades. 
360 x 152 mm howitzers (69 batteries). Or to reach all full-strenght batteries in 6 barrels we should have 486 x 152 mm howitzers. I see M109 or Krab, replacing 2S3/D-20
212 x 152 mm long-range guns/howitzers (53 battreies). Or 318 barrels for full-strength. Caesar, Pz2000 or our perspective Bohdana is our future in this class.
420 x 122 mm Grad-class MLRS (35 batteries). Or 630 launchers for full-strength battalions. I think, Grads can be taken from former Warsaw pact/Aisa/Africa stores. In future we are capable to close this class with own developments.
48 x 220 mm Uragan (6 batteries). This is dead end Soviet MLRS branch. After the war we should say goodbye to it. But Uragans can be substituted with M270 MLRS. 
44 x 300 mm Smerch (11 batteries). M270 ATACMS or HIMARS critically needs to this class! Or at least future modifications of our Vil'kha
16 x ballistic missile launchers. HIMARS ATACMS. Or our Hrim-2 in future.  
Of course for reserve and losses substitution we should have +20-30% more of each class. 
 
 

The introduction of any new system and its predicted impact on the battlefield remains one of the dark arts of force development, and frankly it is more often than not, wrong.  History shows that a weapon system can literally change a war (e.g. machine guns), however, it also shows we rarely accurately predict this.  There are a lot of reasons for this however the primary factors are:
- What are the capability metrics of the weapon system itself?  Are they incremental or are they significant improvement over what is already there? Or are they completely new?  This is the end-point of analysis for most people which is well short of what is required.  For example, HIMARS/MLRS definitely have longer range and likely higher precision (munitions dependent) so on paper the capability definitely raises an eyebrow but there is a lot more to the story.
- Capacity and density of the new capability.  So people should not take my musings on mass as "mass is dead", in warfare mass will always have a role, but I am talking mass effects - what appears to be changing in this war, on the defence at least, is how those effects are generated and projected.   Most new capability is going to have to arrive with enough mass effect to have an impact on the overall exchange.  This does not necessarily mean millions of systems, particularly if the system has wide effects built in, but you still need enough to make an impact.  Take the ME 262, game-changing technology, however, Germany could not produce enough of them to get the effects the weapon system was capable of to make a difference.  In this war the NLAWs/Javelins and other smart-ATGMs are an excellent example of enough capacity and density to make mass effects possible.  I agree that these systems likely contributed to the stalling and collapse of the norther Russian front, however, how that happened was also dependent on the next key factor -  
-  Integration of, or Around.  The ability to integrate a new capability into a war is likely one of the most decisive factors in its impact. Normally we integrate new capability into an extant operational system and it makes that system more effective or efficient, or provided more decisive effects and broader options.  We also normally get this wrong.  You can see it with the introduction of the machine gun, they were treated the same as field guns and brigaded together because we rarely build a operational system around new capability...at first.  As we saw in WW1 the machine gun (and massed fired artillery) soon became the core of a new operational system built around them.   It does happen (rarely) that militaries take risk and get out in front of this such as the German employment of combined arms warfare before WW2 and US AirLand Battle, all before the technology and capabilities they were designed around came to full realization.  In this war, I think the smart-ATGMs were not only integrated into the Ukrainian defence, they became a core/foundational piece.  So what?  Well for any new capability a very important question is "will it be integrated into, or around?" 
- Sustainability and enablers.  The full realization of any new capability often hinges on the ability to sustain and enable it.  Very few capabilities come entirely self-contained and need other capabilities to allow them to develop fully mature impacts.  Back to machine guns, useless without the industry to keep manufacturing them and their ammunition.  Also useless without rail systems to get them and the troops needed to the front quickly, and also useless without an ability to feed those troops (enter the mighty tin can).  
- Modularity and cost.  Most very successful war-changing capabilities have been cheap and very modular - however here there are noted exceptions and I will come back to these.  This not only reinforces density and capacity, it build in a high level of capability agility to allow those impacts to adapt to counter-capabilities over time.  It is of little use to simply have a wonder-weapon if in 6 months it has been made obsolete.  Modularity allows for rapid add-on to ensure whatever you are pushing into the war remains competitive.   
Now all this hold historical water and explains why "average" weapon systems like the Sherman won wars.  The Sherman tank was not the highest on capability metrics when compared to the German top tier tanks but it easily beat them on almost every other axis.
And now for The Exceptions, and there always are.  Strategic game-changing weapons are extremely rare but they do happen.  Nuclear weapons for example are able to create such massive effects that their very existence has forced a re-write of how wars happen.
We were expecting cyber in this war, and even though it is on the battlefield I have yet to see evidence that it is in the league of other war-changers yet.  Information has definitely been war-changing in this war - how it is collected, process and utilized, I suspect history will show that C4ISR was one of the decisive capabilities in this war and how it was employed will likely change wars from here on out.  Unmanned is also likely in this league - does anyone think we are going into any future wars without thinking about unmanned systems calculus?  And finally smart-man portable systems of all types have re-written how we think about denial and superiority - we will be studying that for a generation.  I also expect that once the details come out we are in for more surprises but we will just have to wait and see.
 

Not as major as you might think. Assuming the goons are well trained, and the head technical NCO knows his business, it's a one-day job for the battery-level light aid detachment.
That said, 2,000 efc's seems really low 😯 I would have expected 10 or 20,000.

I didn't serve, but this is an example of low morale, right? 🤣
 
Also, +8 L52 155mm SPGs from Slovakia. I wonder to what degree training on Danas is applicable to these new guns:
 

Looks like this is not antimaterial rifle, but DSHKM-TK, popular crowdfund upgrade of DSHKM during positional war since 2016. Each fire support company in battalion has 6 such HMGs or mix of TK and usual DSHKM. This is some average between HMG and AM rifle, which shoot with short bursts. Mostly used against fortified positions, MG nests, light armor etc. Unlike ususal DSHKM, which just maintaned "density of fire", upgrades of DSHKM-TK allows it to fire with more accuracy and precision, so skilled gunner can use it like a sniper rifle. DSHKM-TK also can be equipped with thermal sight. Special trainings since 2016 were established for DSHKM-TK gunners, so the gunner could hit a "man" target from 800 m at least with one bullet from ten, usung usual mechanic sight.

This map some incorrect. What I could understand from some information from locals, our troops crossed the river in Bilohirka, where we can see natural bridgehead, but not in Davydiv Brid (meaning in eng. "Davyd's ford") - this village still under Russian control or in grey zone, according to different information. Against our troops, again, according to differnet information either elements of 11th air-assault brigade or 56th air-assault regiment. Very likely first line of defense occupied LDPR conscripts, so our forces hit exactly their positions to breakthrough, but this is just my opinion. 
As I know, the clashes for Inhulets crossing have been lasting about 10 days or even two weeks, maybe not very intensive, maybe there were some unsuccessful probes, and only now, when our troops firmly took the ground and could push the enemy, OPSEC curtain was lifted officilally

Good thread here on 'why' the T62....
 

Galeev describes vividly how these levies use the USSR era bureaucracy against it. "Collapse" may be Kafkaesque....
"Procedure of mobilisation requires a compulsory medical examination. Nobody examined us. Many have chronic illnesses"
Btw: every young Russian male with an IQ above the room temperature collects as many certificates about chronic illnesses as possible. For this very reason.
 
Galeev also points out elsewhere that Kafka was an experienced bureaucrat, highly valued by his superiors.

I bet Polish "parts" deliveries for MiG-29s worked the same way, I doubt we have many left at the moment.

Yes, much as I feared, Putin is working frantically to shift the rules of the game to ones he can play and win. Kobayashi Maru. Having bungled his original plan, he is scrambling to recover, and he may well do it!  He has no choice; it is literally do or die for his regime.
In spite of the tough talk and righteous anger, I believe a cease fire will be inevitable at some point in 2022.
So sorry guys, I'm gonna be a pessimist again here. If nothing else, it forces us to reexamine what underlies our faith in victory.
1.  Sure, by early winter the UA can likely build up enough combined arms ground strength for a massive 1918 offensive to retake these (now refortified) areas. 
But with miltech very clearly favouring defence at this moment (unless that changes!), I also find it entirely possible that Ukraine (under Western pressure) ultimately decides it can't accept the large human and material cost of that offensive. 
However intense and righteous their anger at present, that victory will need to be paid for in their blood, and it won't be easy.
Also, other world crises may well arise by year end that sap foreign attention and funds.
2.  And sure, Russia's army and economy could collapse between now and then, going bankrupt gradually then all at once, starved of beans, bullets and motivated men.... Revolts, mass surrenders, or RA troops simply leaving their trenches and walking home as Saddam's army did in 2002.  I don't think the pain and privation meter is nearly high enough yet for that though. I hear the arguments and the anecdotes, but I can't personally see a disintegration, absent a major military defeat  (i.e. where a full RA CAA army is blasted / routed from its defenses by large scale UA offensive action).
3.  A cease fire that leaves Russia in possession of most of Donbas plus (far more valuable) the Dnepr south bank/land bridge will absolutely be spun at home as a Win and most Russians will shrug and accept it.
This will leave Putin and/or the national-fascist power structure in power in Moscow. Russia will patch up its broken army and economy and regear for its next move (which will surely not be a repeat of 2022, but also won't let its neighbours breathe easy).
4.  Once the guns fall (mainly) silent, there will be zero consensus in the West to sponsor a Ukraine-initiated 'Liberation War'. They will look like 'aggressors' (yes, I know, but that's how it will be spun and lots of people will agree). 
5.  So the Ukraine partition will become 'facts on the ground'. 
I take note of the valid points by @The_Capt about the drain on battered Russia of manning such a long frontier (and resettling/rebuilding a now devastated okrajina with whom? Cossacks and Kadyrov's Chechens?).
But remember, they have no choice but to make that heavy commitment, realign their shredded economy to China and wait for better days to resume their mucking around.
I don't buy Steve's thesis that there will be sustained partisan warfare. That won't force out (brutal) occupying forces by itself, and only so many citizens will risk martyrdom or deportation. Most will merely accept the new reality, as was true in Donetsk and Lukhansk.
6.  Let us also consider the huge drain on Ukraine (40 million souls) of becoming an armed camp for the foreseeable future, manning a long hostile frontier with a huge (Western-armed) standing army.
7.  Also, a long term Western blank cheque for nonmilitary rebuilding and subsidies is NOT a given. Aid monies will be stolen or wasted, vile factional politics will resume, etc. Zelenskyy doesn't have the personality to become either a Lee Kwan Yew or a caudillo; his hero aura will fade with time, and growing citizen frustration.
With no clear end game, a country can only hang fire as a huge armed camp for so long. Ukraine is not South Korea, and it took the latter 15 years to get off the floor after 1954, with massive US aid (plus large US bases).
8.  Unlike the attractive investment market I could see following a decisive victory where Russia is forced back to the Feb start line (or, at minimum loses the 'land bridge' which menaces Odessa and Dnipro), private foreign investors aren't going to deploy capital in a country where so many key cities lie in Russian artillery range. They will look elsewhere.
CONCLUSIONS:
A.  A summer Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake Kherson and the land bridge, and rout the Russian armies in that zone before they dig in too deeply, remains critical in shaping the postwar fate of both Ukraine and Russia.
B.  Waiting and building up, a la COSSAC/OVERLORD, for winter or 2023 hugely *raises* the cost of victory, it doesn't lower it.  And I think it doesn't end up happening.
IMHO, FWIW. Have at it, Steve et al.

I doubt its the BMPTs themselves are the cause, but the use of mech infantry in a sensible manner. The BMPTs are definitely useful and dangerous, as more modern vehicles than the usual BMP trash, but if used in a dumb manner a la the last 3 months then they'd be easily turned into grainy black and white videos.
For me, the danger of Popasna isn't the breakthrough itself, but that local RUS command adapted enough to force it, chose a good spot do do it and seem able to carry it through to a full encirclement.  I know there's doubts about the logistics for this push, but I don't think UKR will be able Kiev-style its logisitics and stop the Popasna spearhead's push. The GLOC is short, easily defended (no massive forests and bad terrain) well protected and now has the psychological weight of a desperately needed tactical victory behind it. They'll get what they need at the price of any other AO, and Russia can  take those hits. 
They've got several people in command positions in that AO who are smart, adaptive, experienced and determined, but most importantly have been given the leeway from higher ups and the correct forces to try this approach.
It bodes badly because it means that the required changes within the RUS army are starting to happen, and have been very clearly proved on the battlefield. It means that the competent officers are finally floating to the top and more battlefield success will accelerate that process, as successful officers are rewarded and promoted and bring like-minded people with them. This process was and is inevitable - unless totally ****ed with politically by higher ups.
But Russia needs success, Putin needs success, the Russian Army high command needs success; so successful officers will be protected and elevated.
If UKR was to launch a proper offensive somewhere it needs to do it ASAP, before the RUS army can populate those better officers throughout the front. Even then, any offensive that starts to succeed will be met by those more capable cadres.
UKR/US decapitation efforts need to ramp up significantly.

An interesting article.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/5/24/what-is-putins-end-game-in-ukraine