Combatintman

As much as I have been trying to stay out of this, I think this brings up a interesting background info point on "How to Research for a PC game". 
I am not going to weigh in on the specific argument, except to say I don't think we are going to see modeling of the current ammunition characteristics change dramatically - if for the reason alone that it basically feels about right.  We may see minor tweaks but right now we are not advocating for major mechanical changes to weapon systems (we would like to see some shifts in ammo types but that is another issue).
So as to these CIA documents.  Well first off, as impressive as the CIA is as an intelligence agency (and here movies and media have probably done more to promote the myth than anything), it is in the end a government agency.  Being government means that any information you glean immediately must take into account the broader context, and all of it with healthy grains of salt.
So John's first link I have actually seen before and it basically lays out the "threat" as they understood it in 1984.  It is a "memorandum" and as such is probably one of the better sources one could draw upon.  It really lays out the Soviet "tank position" and is not bad.  My only concern is that I am left wondering if it is a "say nothing new...because" report that sticks to the party line that the current administration wanted to hear...remember it was 1984 and the US was trying to attrit its way out of the Cold War, which turned out to be a good strategy.
The second link I take with a lot more critical eyes.  First off, it is a "thought piece" which the agency clearly puts at arms lengths ("the opinions of the authors"), so this is a trick that gets played all the time.  When one is trying to make a big argument, get some reputable senior folks to write an "opinion piece".  If it works, great.  If it creates blowback we just say "well it was their opinion".  Further, any "thought piece" sponsored by the agency that basically promotes "a modest improvements in intelligence..." (pg 2) set off that little yellow light. Was this real or was it a promotion piece to try and get more CIA funding. 
Then when one starts to dig a bit and open the aperture, I get more odd smells.  This piece was written in the Carter administration and that was not a great time to be in the CIA (we allude to this in the CMCW backstory), or National Defence for that matter.  Finally, the Director of the CIA at the time was ADM Turner ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stansfield_Turner) who not only was a big fan of technical intel (and put HUMINT in the back seat) but was Navy through and through.  This thought piece is very technical - play to the boss - but also very Army who were competing heavily to get their AirLand Battle concept off the ground and fighting for tenuous funding, all after Vietnam. 
In this context that paper really should be taken cautiously.  It does lay out what was a dangerous situation.  We know the US had fallen behind both technologically but also in over all mass, all the while with no offset strategy beyond nukes...not good.  But is it possible that an Army General is over-polishing the threat to simultaneously promote agency and Army funding...absolutely. 
In the end, when researching one has to remember that we can only see snippets of a much larger game being played at the time...and that matters.  Probably some of the best historical references that I found (and used) weren't locked away in TOP SECRET CIA drawers (and trust me, government overclassifies everything) they are in minutes from appropriation meetings: https://www.google.ca/books/edition/Department_of_Defense_Appropriations_for/llZ5mbGatSYC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=US+defence+spending+TOW+missile&pg=PA534&printsec=frontcover
These are not dark assessments, made in the shadows...this is the money trail of what actually happened.  The "truth" is far more mundane in reality and is largely guarded by accountants.

John give it up will you - 'would note that it is extremely dangerous to ...' is just shunting the argument around as is bringing in Soviet aircraft design vs NATO aircraft design.  I go back to Suvorov is a big fat fibber and has been proven to be so yet you stubbornly refuse to admit this despite the evidence presented here and elsewhere to the contrary.  You lack the same degree of knowledge of BAOR/1 (BR) Corps that I have, having served in both but felt that you were qualified to comment about them and refuse to back down when challenged on it.  Your initial assertion about Matsimus being a Cold War veteran was absurd based on the evidence presented - did you even look at how old he looks in his video of a 2011 tour to Afghanistan and think ... too young to have joined the Army in 1989 ... or establish whether 7 Armoured Division was in 1 (BR) Corps ... or compare the relative strengths of 1 (BR) Corps and 3 Shock/Combined Arms Army before talking about mightiness and fear ...  Do I have to post the map of Lvov to Bielefeld again?  Do I need to give you the details of every single Chieftain that was delivered to the British Army up until the Czechoslovakia invasion in 1968 - because I have them (see image for the 1968 ones) - although that again was a shifting of you argument away from your initial position.  Your credentials are the only ones being challenged here ... That alone should tell you something.  Or put another way - no-one believes what you are saying in this thread.  You're in a hole - stop digging.

Right this is getting silly.  Bottom line is that John made a couple of sweeping statements about the Matsimus video.  The first was that Matsimus had claimed to be in 7 Armoured Division during the Cold War.  That was debunked by @IICptMillerIIand acknowledged by John.  I then pointed out various things about BAOR/1 (BR) Corps in relation to comments that John had made which has now resulted in the frame of the debate being shifted around a bit.  From my perspective, this is not a personal attack on John, it is an attempt to frame this discussion on the basis of facts.
The lesson here is that when you're in hole, you stop digging.  That point was reached when @IICptMillerIImade his observation.

Suvorov, as I have pointed out, is not a credible source.  With regard to Chieftain, if we subtract the 66 prototype/development tanks issued in 1962 we end up with a figure of 230 in service.  According to the UK's own vehicle database, 107 of those were issued in 1964, 86 in 1967 and 37 in 1968.  According to a UK Defence Parliamentary debate in 1967 - the 11th Hussars in BAOR had reequipped with Chieftain that year with 17/21 Lancers due to be the next regiment in BAOR to receive it.  It is also reported that a significant slice of the 107 issued in 1964 went to training regiments in Bovington and Catterick.  So, at best three BAOR Regiments, which in US parlance = three battalions, could conceivably have been Chieftain-equipped by the Czechoslovakia Invasion of 1968 with the third probably having just received Chieftain and thus in the process of working up to a full operational capability in that year.  For clarity, the UK Staff Officer's Handbook for 1968 has the tank strength of an armoured regiment as 51 tanks.  I doubt very much; therefore, that Chieftain movements featured highly in the Carpathian Military District's collection deck, which as I have already pointed out, would unlikely have had the capability to collect that sort of data in that area.  To use tradecraft terminology - 1 (BR) Corps would likely have been, and I'm being generous here, an Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) rather than an Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AOR) for the Carpathian Military District.  Now I have no idea what your experience is with collection and collecting in an AII versus an AOR is - my experience is that you focus on your AOR and, if you're lucky, you might have something to cover the AII.  In reality - the assets of the organization whose AOR in which 1 (BR) Corps sat (i.e., GSFG) - would provide this information/intelligence.  So ... further evidence that Suvorov was a big fat fibber.

The Soviets did not rate 1 (BR) Corps at all before the Falklands War, in fact 1 (BR) Corps was deemed weak by the Soviets up until then.  In the early to mid 1970s it only had three Armoured Divisions (1, 2 and 4) with only two brigades each.  In 1978 a third division (3) came across to Germany and each of the brigades were renamed Task Forces (1 Armoured Division as an example Task Force A and B - 2 Armoured Division Task Force C and D etc).  In the whole 1 (BR) Corps AO, which incidentally did not include Hannover, there were eight so-called armoured/mechanised task forces and one non-mechanised infantry task force (5 Field Force).  In 1982, the 2nd Armoured Division was moved back to the UK and became an Infantry Division with one regular and two reserve brigades with a 1 (BR) Corps rear area security role.  The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armoured Divisions remained in Germany and by now the title brigade vice task force was back in favour.  The 7th Armoured Division, for what its worth, ceased to exist in 1958 so it missed most of the Cold War.
Don't start me on the 'mighty' 3 Shock Army because it wasn't.  It only had three divisions for most of its existence which is nothing compared to the tasks that were envisaged for it.
Apart from that, you're absolutely right.

For those affected by this and worried - here's what I had for my evening meal ... 😀

John give it up will you - 'would note that it is extremely dangerous to ...' is just shunting the argument around as is bringing in Soviet aircraft design vs NATO aircraft design.  I go back to Suvorov is a big fat fibber and has been proven to be so yet you stubbornly refuse to admit this despite the evidence presented here and elsewhere to the contrary.  You lack the same degree of knowledge of BAOR/1 (BR) Corps that I have, having served in both but felt that you were qualified to comment about them and refuse to back down when challenged on it.  Your initial assertion about Matsimus being a Cold War veteran was absurd based on the evidence presented - did you even look at how old he looks in his video of a 2011 tour to Afghanistan and think ... too young to have joined the Army in 1989 ... or establish whether 7 Armoured Division was in 1 (BR) Corps ... or compare the relative strengths of 1 (BR) Corps and 3 Shock/Combined Arms Army before talking about mightiness and fear ...  Do I have to post the map of Lvov to Bielefeld again?  Do I need to give you the details of every single Chieftain that was delivered to the British Army up until the Czechoslovakia invasion in 1968 - because I have them (see image for the 1968 ones) - although that again was a shifting of you argument away from your initial position.  Your credentials are the only ones being challenged here ... That alone should tell you something.  Or put another way - no-one believes what you are saying in this thread.  You're in a hole - stop digging.

Suvorov, as I have pointed out, is not a credible source.  With regard to Chieftain, if we subtract the 66 prototype/development tanks issued in 1962 we end up with a figure of 230 in service.  According to the UK's own vehicle database, 107 of those were issued in 1964, 86 in 1967 and 37 in 1968.  According to a UK Defence Parliamentary debate in 1967 - the 11th Hussars in BAOR had reequipped with Chieftain that year with 17/21 Lancers due to be the next regiment in BAOR to receive it.  It is also reported that a significant slice of the 107 issued in 1964 went to training regiments in Bovington and Catterick.  So, at best three BAOR Regiments, which in US parlance = three battalions, could conceivably have been Chieftain-equipped by the Czechoslovakia Invasion of 1968 with the third probably having just received Chieftain and thus in the process of working up to a full operational capability in that year.  For clarity, the UK Staff Officer's Handbook for 1968 has the tank strength of an armoured regiment as 51 tanks.  I doubt very much; therefore, that Chieftain movements featured highly in the Carpathian Military District's collection deck, which as I have already pointed out, would unlikely have had the capability to collect that sort of data in that area.  To use tradecraft terminology - 1 (BR) Corps would likely have been, and I'm being generous here, an Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) rather than an Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AOR) for the Carpathian Military District.  Now I have no idea what your experience is with collection and collecting in an AII versus an AOR is - my experience is that you focus on your AOR and, if you're lucky, you might have something to cover the AII.  In reality - the assets of the organization whose AOR in which 1 (BR) Corps sat (i.e., GSFG) - would provide this information/intelligence.  So ... further evidence that Suvorov was a big fat fibber.

Suvorov's writings are at best debatable - in fact Glantz, who is reputable scholar of WW2 is very critical of Suvorov's writings about that war.  Others are, albeit less so, critical of his works on the Cold War era.  As an intelligence professional I certainly do not assess Suvorov as credible.  As to agents of the Carpathian Military District reporting every movement of Chieftains - a quick look at a map has to tell you that this is a dubious claim.  Image below shows the distance between the HQ of the Carpathian Military District and HQ 1 (BR) Corps.

 
That sort of data would more likely be tracked by fused IMINT and ground reporting by SOXMIS which reported to GSFG/WGF and not the Carpathian Military District.  In the case of the latter, I worked for seven  months at the desk in BAOR that monitored SOXMIS touring activity and I'll tell you for free that it could not and did not track 'every movement.'

Well according to Feskov - a source cited at your link - 207 (Guards or otherwise) Motor Rifle Division was not in GSFG in 1979 although I grant that it is a difficult work to pick through and other reporting suggests it was in GSFG. 

From 1964 to 1983 (and CMCW only covers 1979-1982) 3 Combined Arms/Shock Army comprised three divisions - It got its fourth division, 7 Guards Tank Division, in 1983 - a year after the period covered by CMCW.
Otherwise whether you claim special knowledge or not of BAOR - if you're not going to claim special knowledge then it might be helpful if you caveat sweeping statements on the subject like "would it comfort him to know that the [sic] BAOR was the old NATO ground unit that truly concerned Red Army [sic] planners?" with a qualifier to the effect, I haven't a clue why I'm saying this.  

John give it up will you - 'would note that it is extremely dangerous to ...' is just shunting the argument around as is bringing in Soviet aircraft design vs NATO aircraft design.  I go back to Suvorov is a big fat fibber and has been proven to be so yet you stubbornly refuse to admit this despite the evidence presented here and elsewhere to the contrary.  You lack the same degree of knowledge of BAOR/1 (BR) Corps that I have, having served in both but felt that you were qualified to comment about them and refuse to back down when challenged on it.  Your initial assertion about Matsimus being a Cold War veteran was absurd based on the evidence presented - did you even look at how old he looks in his video of a 2011 tour to Afghanistan and think ... too young to have joined the Army in 1989 ... or establish whether 7 Armoured Division was in 1 (BR) Corps ... or compare the relative strengths of 1 (BR) Corps and 3 Shock/Combined Arms Army before talking about mightiness and fear ...  Do I have to post the map of Lvov to Bielefeld again?  Do I need to give you the details of every single Chieftain that was delivered to the British Army up until the Czechoslovakia invasion in 1968 - because I have them (see image for the 1968 ones) - although that again was a shifting of you argument away from your initial position.  Your credentials are the only ones being challenged here ... That alone should tell you something.  Or put another way - no-one believes what you are saying in this thread.  You're in a hole - stop digging.

Right this is getting silly.  Bottom line is that John made a couple of sweeping statements about the Matsimus video.  The first was that Matsimus had claimed to be in 7 Armoured Division during the Cold War.  That was debunked by @IICptMillerIIand acknowledged by John.  I then pointed out various things about BAOR/1 (BR) Corps in relation to comments that John had made which has now resulted in the frame of the debate being shifted around a bit.  From my perspective, this is not a personal attack on John, it is an attempt to frame this discussion on the basis of facts.
The lesson here is that when you're in hole, you stop digging.  That point was reached when @IICptMillerIImade his observation.

Suvorov, as I have pointed out, is not a credible source.  With regard to Chieftain, if we subtract the 66 prototype/development tanks issued in 1962 we end up with a figure of 230 in service.  According to the UK's own vehicle database, 107 of those were issued in 1964, 86 in 1967 and 37 in 1968.  According to a UK Defence Parliamentary debate in 1967 - the 11th Hussars in BAOR had reequipped with Chieftain that year with 17/21 Lancers due to be the next regiment in BAOR to receive it.  It is also reported that a significant slice of the 107 issued in 1964 went to training regiments in Bovington and Catterick.  So, at best three BAOR Regiments, which in US parlance = three battalions, could conceivably have been Chieftain-equipped by the Czechoslovakia Invasion of 1968 with the third probably having just received Chieftain and thus in the process of working up to a full operational capability in that year.  For clarity, the UK Staff Officer's Handbook for 1968 has the tank strength of an armoured regiment as 51 tanks.  I doubt very much; therefore, that Chieftain movements featured highly in the Carpathian Military District's collection deck, which as I have already pointed out, would unlikely have had the capability to collect that sort of data in that area.  To use tradecraft terminology - 1 (BR) Corps would likely have been, and I'm being generous here, an Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) rather than an Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AOR) for the Carpathian Military District.  Now I have no idea what your experience is with collection and collecting in an AII versus an AOR is - my experience is that you focus on your AOR and, if you're lucky, you might have something to cover the AII.  In reality - the assets of the organization whose AOR in which 1 (BR) Corps sat (i.e., GSFG) - would provide this information/intelligence.  So ... further evidence that Suvorov was a big fat fibber.

John give it up will you - 'would note that it is extremely dangerous to ...' is just shunting the argument around as is bringing in Soviet aircraft design vs NATO aircraft design.  I go back to Suvorov is a big fat fibber and has been proven to be so yet you stubbornly refuse to admit this despite the evidence presented here and elsewhere to the contrary.  You lack the same degree of knowledge of BAOR/1 (BR) Corps that I have, having served in both but felt that you were qualified to comment about them and refuse to back down when challenged on it.  Your initial assertion about Matsimus being a Cold War veteran was absurd based on the evidence presented - did you even look at how old he looks in his video of a 2011 tour to Afghanistan and think ... too young to have joined the Army in 1989 ... or establish whether 7 Armoured Division was in 1 (BR) Corps ... or compare the relative strengths of 1 (BR) Corps and 3 Shock/Combined Arms Army before talking about mightiness and fear ...  Do I have to post the map of Lvov to Bielefeld again?  Do I need to give you the details of every single Chieftain that was delivered to the British Army up until the Czechoslovakia invasion in 1968 - because I have them (see image for the 1968 ones) - although that again was a shifting of you argument away from your initial position.  Your credentials are the only ones being challenged here ... That alone should tell you something.  Or put another way - no-one believes what you are saying in this thread.  You're in a hole - stop digging.

John give it up will you - 'would note that it is extremely dangerous to ...' is just shunting the argument around as is bringing in Soviet aircraft design vs NATO aircraft design.  I go back to Suvorov is a big fat fibber and has been proven to be so yet you stubbornly refuse to admit this despite the evidence presented here and elsewhere to the contrary.  You lack the same degree of knowledge of BAOR/1 (BR) Corps that I have, having served in both but felt that you were qualified to comment about them and refuse to back down when challenged on it.  Your initial assertion about Matsimus being a Cold War veteran was absurd based on the evidence presented - did you even look at how old he looks in his video of a 2011 tour to Afghanistan and think ... too young to have joined the Army in 1989 ... or establish whether 7 Armoured Division was in 1 (BR) Corps ... or compare the relative strengths of 1 (BR) Corps and 3 Shock/Combined Arms Army before talking about mightiness and fear ...  Do I have to post the map of Lvov to Bielefeld again?  Do I need to give you the details of every single Chieftain that was delivered to the British Army up until the Czechoslovakia invasion in 1968 - because I have them (see image for the 1968 ones) - although that again was a shifting of you argument away from your initial position.  Your credentials are the only ones being challenged here ... That alone should tell you something.  Or put another way - no-one believes what you are saying in this thread.  You're in a hole - stop digging.

Right this is getting silly.  Bottom line is that John made a couple of sweeping statements about the Matsimus video.  The first was that Matsimus had claimed to be in 7 Armoured Division during the Cold War.  That was debunked by @IICptMillerIIand acknowledged by John.  I then pointed out various things about BAOR/1 (BR) Corps in relation to comments that John had made which has now resulted in the frame of the debate being shifted around a bit.  From my perspective, this is not a personal attack on John, it is an attempt to frame this discussion on the basis of facts.
The lesson here is that when you're in hole, you stop digging.  That point was reached when @IICptMillerIImade his observation.

Right this is getting silly.  Bottom line is that John made a couple of sweeping statements about the Matsimus video.  The first was that Matsimus had claimed to be in 7 Armoured Division during the Cold War.  That was debunked by @IICptMillerIIand acknowledged by John.  I then pointed out various things about BAOR/1 (BR) Corps in relation to comments that John had made which has now resulted in the frame of the debate being shifted around a bit.  From my perspective, this is not a personal attack on John, it is an attempt to frame this discussion on the basis of facts.
The lesson here is that when you're in hole, you stop digging.  That point was reached when @IICptMillerIImade his observation.

Suvorov's writings are at best debatable - in fact Glantz, who is reputable scholar of WW2 is very critical of Suvorov's writings about that war.  Others are, albeit less so, critical of his works on the Cold War era.  As an intelligence professional I certainly do not assess Suvorov as credible.  As to agents of the Carpathian Military District reporting every movement of Chieftains - a quick look at a map has to tell you that this is a dubious claim.  Image below shows the distance between the HQ of the Carpathian Military District and HQ 1 (BR) Corps.

 
That sort of data would more likely be tracked by fused IMINT and ground reporting by SOXMIS which reported to GSFG/WGF and not the Carpathian Military District.  In the case of the latter, I worked for seven  months at the desk in BAOR that monitored SOXMIS touring activity and I'll tell you for free that it could not and did not track 'every movement.'

Suvorov's writings are at best debatable - in fact Glantz, who is reputable scholar of WW2 is very critical of Suvorov's writings about that war.  Others are, albeit less so, critical of his works on the Cold War era.  As an intelligence professional I certainly do not assess Suvorov as credible.  As to agents of the Carpathian Military District reporting every movement of Chieftains - a quick look at a map has to tell you that this is a dubious claim.  Image below shows the distance between the HQ of the Carpathian Military District and HQ 1 (BR) Corps.

 
That sort of data would more likely be tracked by fused IMINT and ground reporting by SOXMIS which reported to GSFG/WGF and not the Carpathian Military District.  In the case of the latter, I worked for seven  months at the desk in BAOR that monitored SOXMIS touring activity and I'll tell you for free that it could not and did not track 'every movement.'

Always got to be better eh ... 😀

I wonder if all of the German WW2 tanks in perfect running order in tunnels under the parade squares of those camps survived 😉.  For those not in the know - this was a common myth bandied around about practically every single sizable barracks that was inherited by the UK from the ... ahem ... former German regime.

Suvorov's writings are at best debatable - in fact Glantz, who is reputable scholar of WW2 is very critical of Suvorov's writings about that war.  Others are, albeit less so, critical of his works on the Cold War era.  As an intelligence professional I certainly do not assess Suvorov as credible.  As to agents of the Carpathian Military District reporting every movement of Chieftains - a quick look at a map has to tell you that this is a dubious claim.  Image below shows the distance between the HQ of the Carpathian Military District and HQ 1 (BR) Corps.

 
That sort of data would more likely be tracked by fused IMINT and ground reporting by SOXMIS which reported to GSFG/WGF and not the Carpathian Military District.  In the case of the latter, I worked for seven  months at the desk in BAOR that monitored SOXMIS touring activity and I'll tell you for free that it could not and did not track 'every movement.'

Suvorov's writings are at best debatable - in fact Glantz, who is reputable scholar of WW2 is very critical of Suvorov's writings about that war.  Others are, albeit less so, critical of his works on the Cold War era.  As an intelligence professional I certainly do not assess Suvorov as credible.  As to agents of the Carpathian Military District reporting every movement of Chieftains - a quick look at a map has to tell you that this is a dubious claim.  Image below shows the distance between the HQ of the Carpathian Military District and HQ 1 (BR) Corps.

 
That sort of data would more likely be tracked by fused IMINT and ground reporting by SOXMIS which reported to GSFG/WGF and not the Carpathian Military District.  In the case of the latter, I worked for seven  months at the desk in BAOR that monitored SOXMIS touring activity and I'll tell you for free that it could not and did not track 'every movement.'

Suvorov's writings are at best debatable - in fact Glantz, who is reputable scholar of WW2 is very critical of Suvorov's writings about that war.  Others are, albeit less so, critical of his works on the Cold War era.  As an intelligence professional I certainly do not assess Suvorov as credible.  As to agents of the Carpathian Military District reporting every movement of Chieftains - a quick look at a map has to tell you that this is a dubious claim.  Image below shows the distance between the HQ of the Carpathian Military District and HQ 1 (BR) Corps.

 
That sort of data would more likely be tracked by fused IMINT and ground reporting by SOXMIS which reported to GSFG/WGF and not the Carpathian Military District.  In the case of the latter, I worked for seven  months at the desk in BAOR that monitored SOXMIS touring activity and I'll tell you for free that it could not and did not track 'every movement.'

Well according to Feskov - a source cited at your link - 207 (Guards or otherwise) Motor Rifle Division was not in GSFG in 1979 although I grant that it is a difficult work to pick through and other reporting suggests it was in GSFG. 

From 1964 to 1983 (and CMCW only covers 1979-1982) 3 Combined Arms/Shock Army comprised three divisions - It got its fourth division, 7 Guards Tank Division, in 1983 - a year after the period covered by CMCW.
Otherwise whether you claim special knowledge or not of BAOR - if you're not going to claim special knowledge then it might be helpful if you caveat sweeping statements on the subject like "would it comfort him to know that the [sic] BAOR was the old NATO ground unit that truly concerned Red Army [sic] planners?" with a qualifier to the effect, I haven't a clue why I'm saying this.