Combatintman

Here is something I posted elsewhere on Saturday (so this is definitely no lightning war) ... which remains relevant in the light of the activity just reported in Zarichne and Yampil.  Zarichne is just north of Torske in the schematic below and Zampil is two boxes down from Torske and one to the right.
Here's what I wrote then ...
Activity in the area of Torske is quite interesting.  Should it be captured, it offers a lot of possibilities for the Russians with a series of bridges over the Siverskyi Donets River.  Even if the bridges are dropped, there are also a number of areas that could be bridged with tactical bridging with river widths in some places just shy of 40m (although the average is approaching 90m) which is bridgeable by a TMM set (40m) (Bde/Regt asset).  The banks in many areas also look from the imagery to be suitable to launch tactical bridging and subsequently ferry sites or larger pontoon bridging.  Once south of the river, the ground offers at least a couple of BTG/battalion-sized avenues of approach to hook west towards Slovyansk.  These are shown as red arrows on the schematic below with the black boxed areas as fairly coarse grained NAIs designed to find, track and confirm likely COAs.  Crossing in this area is certainly a better option than trying to grind through Lyman, then the wooded feature beyond before attempting a river crossing in the area of grid square 37U DQ 08 19.

Here is something I posted elsewhere on Saturday (so this is definitely no lightning war) ... which remains relevant in the light of the activity just reported in Zarichne and Yampil.  Zarichne is just north of Torske in the schematic below and Zampil is two boxes down from Torske and one to the right.
Here's what I wrote then ...
Activity in the area of Torske is quite interesting.  Should it be captured, it offers a lot of possibilities for the Russians with a series of bridges over the Siverskyi Donets River.  Even if the bridges are dropped, there are also a number of areas that could be bridged with tactical bridging with river widths in some places just shy of 40m (although the average is approaching 90m) which is bridgeable by a TMM set (40m) (Bde/Regt asset).  The banks in many areas also look from the imagery to be suitable to launch tactical bridging and subsequently ferry sites or larger pontoon bridging.  Once south of the river, the ground offers at least a couple of BTG/battalion-sized avenues of approach to hook west towards Slovyansk.  These are shown as red arrows on the schematic below with the black boxed areas as fairly coarse grained NAIs designed to find, track and confirm likely COAs.  Crossing in this area is certainly a better option than trying to grind through Lyman, then the wooded feature beyond before attempting a river crossing in the area of grid square 37U DQ 08 19.

Since I am also curious about the state of play of the slo-mo "Potemkin" offensive against Slovyansk, I went back over the last 90 pages of this thread (only 15 April!) and pulled out some of the key assessments made by our esteemed experts. All hail and praise unto them!
1. @The_Capt scans the terrain for the Izyum axis (page 532)
2. @Combatintman maps out the potential axes for a 'pincer' attack (page 548)
3.  @Haiduk confirms the attack (page 553)

4. @Kinophile shows us vividly how exposed are the northern approaches to Slovyansk (page 556)
5. @Combatintman revises the axes in light of the actual Russian advances (p557)

6. @Combatintman estimates RA force strength around Izyum at 16 BTGs not the 22 advertised
7. @The_Capt floats the interesting hypothesis that this is a 'look busy but don't bleed too much' offensive.
8. @Haiduk updates the actions around Izyum as of 23 Apr (p593)


9. @Combatintman evaluates the Engagement Area around Dovenkhe (Izyum-Slovyansk road)
 

10.  @The_Capt assesses the state of play: "using BTGs to try and find a hole in the UA defence instead of a recon screen" 
 
11. @Haiduk's latest update, noting RA gains in contested Zarichne village and a flanking operation at Yampi (which has netted them some UA prisoners)(p.610)
12.  This....
 
 

Here is something I posted elsewhere on Saturday (so this is definitely no lightning war) ... which remains relevant in the light of the activity just reported in Zarichne and Yampil.  Zarichne is just north of Torske in the schematic below and Zampil is two boxes down from Torske and one to the right.
Here's what I wrote then ...
Activity in the area of Torske is quite interesting.  Should it be captured, it offers a lot of possibilities for the Russians with a series of bridges over the Siverskyi Donets River.  Even if the bridges are dropped, there are also a number of areas that could be bridged with tactical bridging with river widths in some places just shy of 40m (although the average is approaching 90m) which is bridgeable by a TMM set (40m) (Bde/Regt asset).  The banks in many areas also look from the imagery to be suitable to launch tactical bridging and subsequently ferry sites or larger pontoon bridging.  Once south of the river, the ground offers at least a couple of BTG/battalion-sized avenues of approach to hook west towards Slovyansk.  These are shown as red arrows on the schematic below with the black boxed areas as fairly coarse grained NAIs designed to find, track and confirm likely COAs.  Crossing in this area is certainly a better option than trying to grind through Lyman, then the wooded feature beyond before attempting a river crossing in the area of grid square 37U DQ 08 19.

you are just trying to kiss up to @Combatintman

Sort of - remember recce is designed to find stuff so it has to be stealthy and agile, not massively protected; however, I agree the point about when all you have is BTGs, then everything must be done by BTGs.  If we go back to the old school battalions, none of them had organic recce and; therefore, the grown-ups have no idea as to how to employ it effectively.  Every move becomes in effect an advance to contact which is fine if you have an HQ that can cope with assessing the situation on the fly, adapting accordingly and having sub-unit (Coy/Sqn) commanders empowered to use their own initiative to execute the direction given in line with the commander's intent.
Qualities which have been amply demonstrated to be absent in the Russian Army.

What's wrong with the war we've already got ... in terms of scenarios, campaigns and stuff - this is being reported in enough detail for any budding scenario maker to make a whole bunch of stuff or contemplate what-ifs and alternate scenarios with CMBS.  If Battlefront makes Korea or whatever - you're only going to see it through a less detailed prism than what you're getting now - all those iterations of Barkmann's corner or Wittman knocking over 7 Armd Bde in WW2 are all interpretations by a scenario designer of information with far less granularity than what's available now.  If you're truly interested in warfare, wargaming and/or simulating warfare then hoover up what you're seeing now, buy CMBS and hook into it.  It has been interesting to note from recent events that maybe 'T-72 spotting is nerfed' and 'Troops running from hard cover is unrealistic' have been proved to be fallacies due to the coverage that is emerging from the tragic events in Ukraine.
 

Staffed with people like me and you naturally ... milk with that brew sir?

Don't get hung up about the ISR nomenclature - I've been through Recce, RISTA, ISTAR, ISR etc .... all of which amounted to the same thing employing almost the same but slightly fewer resources with each name change (peace dividend, lighter and agile and other great buzzwords) - the bottom line is that FIND is a core function in combat and has been for donkey's years.
The Russian/Soviet Army has never had dedicated/organic recce assets below regiment/brigade level in the 30+ years I've been looking at it (on and off).  The recce component that you see on the oft posted slide of a BTG is, in essence, what used to be called a regimental recce coy and some sources indicate that the old regimental recce companies in the new-fangled brigades were retitled as brigade reconnaissance companies.
Now ... I apologise for being vaguely parochial and slightly platform focused ... but bear with me ... that 'company' that sits in either the old school Soviet regiment, the new fangled brigade, or chopped to a BTG is what in the two armies I've served in would be called a recce platoon.  If you've got CMSF crack open any of the UK battalions (minus the formation reconnaissance regiment) and see what I mean.
Anyway ... back to effect, rather than platforms ... you can have all of the information/reporting in the world, but it is no good if you don't have an HQ that is capable of processing it and empowered to act on it in a timely fashion.
In my trade and in the reconnaissance game, you are looking for redundancy and multiple source information so there is nothing wrong with UAVs and SIGINT in the mix.  I'm sure I posted an example on this thread a few days back as to how you cross-cue your collectors to confirm or deny various activities.  Doing so; however, (I'm getting boring now) requires grown-ups to be able to plan, task, process and act on what is collected.

Staffed with people like me and you naturally ... milk with that brew sir?

Fixed that for you mate ...

Don't get hung up about the ISR nomenclature - I've been through Recce, RISTA, ISTAR, ISR etc .... all of which amounted to the same thing employing almost the same but slightly fewer resources with each name change (peace dividend, lighter and agile and other great buzzwords) - the bottom line is that FIND is a core function in combat and has been for donkey's years.
The Russian/Soviet Army has never had dedicated/organic recce assets below regiment/brigade level in the 30+ years I've been looking at it (on and off).  The recce component that you see on the oft posted slide of a BTG is, in essence, what used to be called a regimental recce coy and some sources indicate that the old regimental recce companies in the new-fangled brigades were retitled as brigade reconnaissance companies.
Now ... I apologise for being vaguely parochial and slightly platform focused ... but bear with me ... that 'company' that sits in either the old school Soviet regiment, the new fangled brigade, or chopped to a BTG is what in the two armies I've served in would be called a recce platoon.  If you've got CMSF crack open any of the UK battalions (minus the formation reconnaissance regiment) and see what I mean.
Anyway ... back to effect, rather than platforms ... you can have all of the information/reporting in the world, but it is no good if you don't have an HQ that is capable of processing it and empowered to act on it in a timely fashion.
In my trade and in the reconnaissance game, you are looking for redundancy and multiple source information so there is nothing wrong with UAVs and SIGINT in the mix.  I'm sure I posted an example on this thread a few days back as to how you cross-cue your collectors to confirm or deny various activities.  Doing so; however, (I'm getting boring now) requires grown-ups to be able to plan, task, process and act on what is collected.

Sort of - remember recce is designed to find stuff so it has to be stealthy and agile, not massively protected; however, I agree the point about when all you have is BTGs, then everything must be done by BTGs.  If we go back to the old school battalions, none of them had organic recce and; therefore, the grown-ups have no idea as to how to employ it effectively.  Every move becomes in effect an advance to contact which is fine if you have an HQ that can cope with assessing the situation on the fly, adapting accordingly and having sub-unit (Coy/Sqn) commanders empowered to use their own initiative to execute the direction given in line with the commander's intent.
Qualities which have been amply demonstrated to be absent in the Russian Army.

Staffed with people like me and you naturally ... milk with that brew sir?

Further to my last post - here's a little more precision ...

The red lines which form an offset cross on the complex are the extreme left/right and up/down plots.  L-R distance is 138m and up/down distance is 281m.  The red line in the top left hand corner of the image is what was reported as the FEBA on 10 April.  This sequence; therefore, tells me it hasn't moved much in nearly two weeks.
Complex Strike.kmz

Dovhenke is certainly useful if you want to motor down the main road into Slovyansk but indirectly.  It sits in dead ground to that road so direct fires onto it are not possible but I see this as either an operation to secure the flanks for anything rolling down the road by denying a safe haven for shoot and scoot ATGM equipped parties or potentially using a covered approach to get into the wooded feature east of the village which does offer LOS onto the road.  That then serves as a jumping off point to clear the woods SE and east.
This area of ground leapt out at me early on when I was doing the terrain analysis as either a potential Named Area of Interest (NAI) or a Target Area of Interest (TAI).  It is not a bad Engagement Area (EA) and sits between a battalion and company-sized defensive position.  If resources permit, the Ukrainians could bottle that road up comfortably with a battalion (see diagrams) and if resources are tighter, it is possibly doable with a company, particularly if supported by a reasonably swept up obstacle plan with some gunnery on priority call.  My instinct for the latter option would be to position the company where the southernmost company astride the road is located in the battalion laydown.

 

Writing bollox or making UAVs?

Further to my last post - here's a little more precision ...

The red lines which form an offset cross on the complex are the extreme left/right and up/down plots.  L-R distance is 138m and up/down distance is 281m.  The red line in the top left hand corner of the image is what was reported as the FEBA on 10 April.  This sequence; therefore, tells me it hasn't moved much in nearly two weeks.
Complex Strike.kmz

Staffed with people like me and you naturally ... milk with that brew sir?

What's wrong with the war we've already got ... in terms of scenarios, campaigns and stuff - this is being reported in enough detail for any budding scenario maker to make a whole bunch of stuff or contemplate what-ifs and alternate scenarios with CMBS.  If Battlefront makes Korea or whatever - you're only going to see it through a less detailed prism than what you're getting now - all those iterations of Barkmann's corner or Wittman knocking over 7 Armd Bde in WW2 are all interpretations by a scenario designer of information with far less granularity than what's available now.  If you're truly interested in warfare, wargaming and/or simulating warfare then hoover up what you're seeing now, buy CMBS and hook into it.  It has been interesting to note from recent events that maybe 'T-72 spotting is nerfed' and 'Troops running from hard cover is unrealistic' have been proved to be fallacies due to the coverage that is emerging from the tragic events in Ukraine.
 

To be fair to the Russians - there is only one military that is any good at SEAD and that is the US.  It pioneered the techniques and spent a lot of effort in acquiring the means to do it competently.  Nobody else spends enough money to properly resource the capability.  A jamming pod and an anti-radiation missile strapped to a fast jet (which is pretty much the extent of every other nation bar the US's capability) do not a SEAD capability make.

To be fair to the Russians - there is only one military that is any good at SEAD and that is the US.  It pioneered the techniques and spent a lot of effort in acquiring the means to do it competently.  Nobody else spends enough money to properly resource the capability.  A jamming pod and an anti-radiation missile strapped to a fast jet (which is pretty much the extent of every other nation bar the US's capability) do not a SEAD capability make.

Dovhenke is certainly useful if you want to motor down the main road into Slovyansk but indirectly.  It sits in dead ground to that road so direct fires onto it are not possible but I see this as either an operation to secure the flanks for anything rolling down the road by denying a safe haven for shoot and scoot ATGM equipped parties or potentially using a covered approach to get into the wooded feature east of the village which does offer LOS onto the road.  That then serves as a jumping off point to clear the woods SE and east.
This area of ground leapt out at me early on when I was doing the terrain analysis as either a potential Named Area of Interest (NAI) or a Target Area of Interest (TAI).  It is not a bad Engagement Area (EA) and sits between a battalion and company-sized defensive position.  If resources permit, the Ukrainians could bottle that road up comfortably with a battalion (see diagrams) and if resources are tighter, it is possibly doable with a company, particularly if supported by a reasonably swept up obstacle plan with some gunnery on priority call.  My instinct for the latter option would be to position the company where the southernmost company astride the road is located in the battalion laydown.

 

His wife had probably insisted on a pink bathroom or something ... 😉

To be fair to the Russians - there is only one military that is any good at SEAD and that is the US.  It pioneered the techniques and spent a lot of effort in acquiring the means to do it competently.  Nobody else spends enough money to properly resource the capability.  A jamming pod and an anti-radiation missile strapped to a fast jet (which is pretty much the extent of every other nation bar the US's capability) do not a SEAD capability make.