poesel

Yes - and you need to have two wires in the cable and your arrow points must hit & stick to the plus and minus pole of the battery long enough to discharge the battery. Did I mention that the cable must have a certain thickness else they melt or it takes too long?
If you manage to do THAT, you could as well just put a normal arrow through the battery. That does discharge it, too.

An EW gun could indeed fry the motor control. That leads to an uncontrolled flight. This could be anything between dropping out of the sky or skyrocketing to god knows. I guess that happened.

That is physically impossible. Utter BS.

That is physically impossible. Utter BS.

That is physically impossible. Utter BS.

https://www.clingendael.org/publication/specialising-european-defence

No. This forum is exempt from Godwin’s Law. Else most discussions here would be extremely short.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin's_law
 

They're getting ready to change sides. Paint an "A" over the top and you have the letters of "Azov"!

I think we think of drones of different sizes. I was more at the tactical level. What is now mostly OTS drones with a range of <5 km. Used by infantry, ATGM or light mortar teams for reconnaissance or target correction for organic or long range artillery.
To kill these things, you can use drones of a similar size. As a weapon, you just need something like a net or wire - anything that entangles well in a propeller.
How to find enemy drones and if that fight is autonomous or human controlled are the problems that need to be solved.
I agree that for the bigger ones the solution is SAMs.
Care to explain? I would have assumed that rockets should be easier to detect than artillery grenades. Missiles are larger and slower. Since they are maneuverable, you cannot just calculate their trajectory backwards, but if you track them from the start? Thanks!

But you cannot track them from the start as they do not fly vertically up. You can detect them when they are finally in your line of sight but as you said you cannot calculate their trajectory backwards. 

Morning map time (I know I am a bit late, but have to deal with you know this thing called life outside). Keep in mind that the Morning map is not about what is happening right now. 
I am removing settlements that became inactive and add where offensive action occurs. 

Notes:
For a second day I see a significant decrease in RU Nats interest in offensive. So, not many updates from RU side (yes, it is good indication that UKR resistance is much stronger than RU expected). Today I marked the first settlement Pokrovske as lost. Have no info but Deep State mark it as lost between 30 and 31. Still, I believe UKR are contesting the area as RU made airstrikes there (not that I care much - holding settlements just to hold them is not a wise tactics) 

Maybe that Kherson pocket is a trap of a different sort.
UA ‘declares’ attack on Kherson, RA moves forces there, UA cuts retreat. Now you have many good RA soldiers in that pocket that can’t be easily transferred elsewhere.
So you attack elsewhere where the forces are missing. Don’t need to (really) attack Kherson where they actually are. Very Sun-Tzuish.

Maybe that Kherson pocket is a trap of a different sort.
UA ‘declares’ attack on Kherson, RA moves forces there, UA cuts retreat. Now you have many good RA soldiers in that pocket that can’t be easily transferred elsewhere.
So you attack elsewhere where the forces are missing. Don’t need to (really) attack Kherson where they actually are. Very Sun-Tzuish.

Maybe that Kherson pocket is a trap of a different sort.
UA ‘declares’ attack on Kherson, RA moves forces there, UA cuts retreat. Now you have many good RA soldiers in that pocket that can’t be easily transferred elsewhere.
So you attack elsewhere where the forces are missing. Don’t need to (really) attack Kherson where they actually are. Very Sun-Tzuish.

Maybe. But Russian generals can think so too. I believe our General Staff knows what they do, because taking into account what forces Russians are moving now to the south, the bear can tear off the trap and to catch the hunter himself...

That is sot true in oh so many different ways. I should print that out in huge letters and hang it into the office. Nobody would read it, though.
 
That will eventually happen. Maybe it will become one of the horrors that will be banned from warfare in the future. But, like chemical weapons, we will have to see that horror at least once before we react.
 
Short answer: if _you_ can assess the outcome of a war, a program can or will eventually do it, too (if someone deems it worthy to spend the money and with war, they will).
Why: it is all just processing of information. No magic in the human brain (unfortunately).
The 'when' I don't know, but I guess not more than a few decades.
You are mixing up statistics with single events. You cannot draw conclusions from a general probability to what is going to happen to a specific element.
If your hard disk has an MTBF of 5 years, it does not mean that exactly that hard drive in your PC will die after 5 years. It could also mean that _none_ of that batch of hard disks die at the 5 years mark.
Again, this is about probabilities. Here on this forum, we are quite sure that Ukraine will win this war (whatever winning actually is), but only few (of a more enthusiastically and less mathematical inclined) will put a 100% on it.
Probabilities can also be accurate.
The 'universal' part is more difficult. Any formula/AI will have the same problem as any expert to understand, what kind of war is fought here. And to adjust to the realities of it.
If adjusting is easier for humans or programs, I don't dare to answer.

Most important is that several columns of potential Russian prisoners (2-300 each) cut off on other side of Dnieper could have unforseen PR consequences for Putin regime, especially when mixed with obvious defeats. It wcould broke the charm of RU propaganda, especially if some Chechens would be cut off as well.
 
You literally descibed Max Weber theory of authority Putin represents legal state authority (with small mix of charismatic, mainly a relict coming from Tsarist times) while Chechn system is more based on traditional model but with Kadyrov pushing it to charismatic model (strongly manifesting in 'Warlord" type, not "Priest" type). Dagestani leader Shamil in XIX cent. tried to do the same in Caucasus, but with more push into Priesthood/Religious manifestation of power. Of course he didn't succedd, as differences beteen various peoples were too much and Russians use them against him.
Very true. Just on side not of this interesting discussion, there was a reason why Clausewitz practically started his narration of 'On War" from Napoleon Bonaparte, almost excluding Ancients/Medieval (god Forbid!)/Early Modernity as source of inspiration. Which was very bold idea at this time, especially refuting Roman heritage in light of esthetical interests of the era.
Interesting school of interpretation is to pair him with Hegel, who had some similar views on nature of the State. For him, State was epitomy of civilization(especially Prussian State-but there are debates here if it was "ideal" or "existing" state and if really History should "culminate" in Germany), where society/politics/military came together in most balanced fashion and reached most advanced forms. Everything that came before was highly, let's say, "imperfect". Clausewitz had similar limitations in his viewing of other societies and polities, including military systems (and "why" they were there, not only "how" they worked). Just like Hegel, Shakespeare, or other great names his heritage is both universal and very limited in time and place.
Ok, this adds nothing to this discussion, just still try to make up and proceed what was written before.
 

It seems to me that it's probably akin to the Drake equation- a fairly simplistic equation with multiple independent terms. The difficulty with Drake is that we have little idea what value to assign each of the values. Reasonable assumptions lead to wildly different outcomes, from "we're alone and always will be" to "Alan the Alien should be here next week".
In the warfare equivalent we have some idea for the factors (recruitable population, GDP, access to trade, ...) there is no certainty about the weighting for each from war to war or even month to month. For example: Allied GDP was crucial in WWI and WWII, yet all but irrelevant in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russian manpower reserves was crucial in WWII, but having no impact so far in Ukraine. Technology was overwhelmingly important at Omdurman, but irrelevant in Vietnam. And so on. We know the factors, but the damn weightings keep changing.

Being german ive only ever read it in german only really ever taking english quotes for such conversations. My background is also in sociology and political science though ive since gone on to become a soldier.
I found his book(s) reasonably easy to read especially compared to some other sociology books and lets be clear that is where war studies belong.
I need to start this another way though i think
what is it you want to look at?
Because what clausewitz provides is a framework on how to think about war. He then uses it to make several observations and then removes himself from that discussion and looks at tactics and strategy.
His tactics and strategy are entirely outdated except for the very basics like concentration of force, logistics mattering etc.
The how to think about war part though id consider basically timeles and ass close to the truth of the matter as were going to get for quite some time.
War is the use of force by one group of people on another group to compell it to do its will
Serves as a usefull check for a policy maker
What do i want, what does my oponent want, how can i force him to comply with my whishes.
And depending on each sides will and ability looking through this lense may sometimes lead to the conclusion that war may be unable to achieve what you want.

So, then, war is *not* about "killing the enemy in as large a number as possible"?

So go back to the actual term Clausewitz used: Will.
Converting to your religion is imposition of your will.
Achieving commercial goals through warfare is imposition of your will on those that would otherwise prevent your commercial success.
Adding Ukraine to your empire is imposing your will on Ukrainians and on those that would see Ukraine retain its independence.
 
Why does this matter? Because war is not about killing people. War is about achieving outcomes. Maybe two centuries later we can use business language instead of political language but you still need to understand what the person you're at war with is trying to actually achieve. You also need to really understand the outcomes that you want. Imposing your will on your opponent to achieve your outcomes doesn't even need to prevent him achieving his.
What do Russia actually want from this war? That's complex as hell, as it includes their original reasons for invasion.
What do Ukraine want? That's within their gift to articulate, understand and work to achieve. If they can achieve those goals through means other than direct warfare, they'd be stupid not to.
Retaking Kherson is, unless you live there, irrelevant. The political implications of retaking Kherson however.. that's massive. If that causes Putin to lose face, leading to his removal by Russians in positions of power, that shifts the dynamics of the war but goes beyond that: It may lead to an end to the war.
If the will of Ukraine is to have safe governance across the whole country then knowing what lets them impose that will on those that would thwart them (Russia and the separatists in Donbass) accelerates achieving their goal. Politics AND war both contribute towards that.
(Sadly I too can't, you won't be surprised to find, articulate the appropriate metric for scoring war.)

It goes back to the business principle of "if you can't measure it, you can't manage it" (or the engineering version "if you can't measure it, you can't control it").  The problem that people too often run into without realizing it is grabbing something that they can measure and managing/controlling around that without regard for whether it's even a proxy for the thing you're trying to control, let alone the thing you're trying to control.  I see it happen plenty of times in engineering situations where people should know better.
Counting bodies is much more quantifiable than evaluating success in the implementation of political/social objectives and evaluators of progress (who aren't necessarily the military, they may be politicians or the press) often fall back on that at the expense of viewing strategic goals.  A big part of why this thread has been so interesting is that there's a lot of inspection into the quantitative strategic impact of low level tactical events.  Popular press might say "Russia is pasting region X of Ukraine with artillery for days", while the analysis here will look at whether Russia can continue that for long enough to meaningfully take objectives, and what objectives might be achievable with the estimated long term resources.
edit: And there are all sorts of tools sold in the engineering and business world for "quantitatively" evaluating customer goals or selection of systems when there are multiple stakeholders who all have different goals/metrics/things they care about.  As quantitative tools they're all 100% garbage because they're readily gameable by anybody who's ever played games.  But they aren't actually useless - the value comes in making people consciously game them to get the result they want so they have to think about what criteria they actually care about.  But they're ultimately qualitative, not quantitative.

As an absolute statement, that is wrong. If that were true, 'Unternehmen Barbarossa' was the best plan ever - it killed a lot of enemies.
You state these things as if they are always true. But they are only sometimes true. Measures must be evaluated in context.

Who needs Switchblade 300?
 

You know that I treat information overload seriously and with all these names of settlements flying around it is difficult to understand what is happening. I am trying a new format - with a map. Because everything is better with a map! It does not contain any new information. Just put existing data on the Deep state map (Red and yellow dots are fire - red up to 6h, yellow up to 48h)

 
Tell me if I need to adjust something (tried to crop it but then you do not see bigger picture where it is happening).

The right thing to do in this context would have been to evaluate the Soviet resources and then to stay at home.
But I see that we won't agree, and I will leave it at that.