poesel

Fixing problems by military intervention has not been in fashion here since WW2, and modern Europe is to a large degree designed in the USA.
A toothless Germany was just what you needed after the last big war. Now maybe you'd like the Germans to show a bit more fighting spirit, but that's been crushed out of them.
Europe is still terrified of its own shadow.

I find it incredible that people are so hard on Germany on the war thing. "Common, sell more Leopards Fritz, can't you see the opportunity !" It's like those people haven't studied WW2 all their lives and the scariest wound that war left to this country. A country that was painstakingly rebuilt brick by brick by the people left behind. And chose instead of planning to avenge the former rival to build a new relation that seemed like the logical bond. 

Putin wants to lock Russia in. Just turning off the pipelines allows a potential successor to offer a reversal. It's a bargaining chip to get Western support (that he's taking away from a potential successor, to be clear). 

Nobody likes how Scholz is handling this. That doesn't mean there aren't a lot of Germans who are just afraid of WW3. These people are very much in line with what Scholz is doing. 
Also, I'll say it for the umpteenth time: You can rightly criticise that the West as a whole is not willing to send tanks and IFVs. But as long as neither US nor UK nor any other western country with domestic tank development and production is willing to send their stuff it is rather hypocritical to single out Germany.

After the UA is done with the Russian army, I think we could station a girl scout troop on the border.

Long enough until the gas/coal/electricity bills land in European mailboxes and people will riot on the streets, demanding to take the sanctions back.
That's IMHO the plan. I fail to see any other use. I also fail to see it succeeding.

Really a good read. He describes the short and long term effects that the mobilizations has on the Russian people and culture. TL;DR: it's really bad.

If this is not a joke, that after the war we will know many cool stories about SOF deep raids.
Behind the soldiers the road sign with name of the city - Enerhodar
 

In Russia's case, Russia has to negotiate with Russia.  All other negotiation is on the battlefield.  And you are absolutely correct, it is not an entirely rational negotiation.  This is what makes things tense, we have an irrational nuclear power that is losing a war, badly.  I think we are depending on the rationality of the Russian people, which many do point out is problematic.
Do not get me wrong - no matter where we land on a map, Russia needs to lose this war and needs to know it lost the war.  We need it lose and we need it to know it has lost.  We also need it to return to a functional state within the global order (that we built) - tall order.
A lot of the heated debate we have had here is centered on the degree of that loss, and the conditions it will require to make it happen.  This is linked to the degree that Ukraine needs to win - there is what is just and right, and then there is what is politically acceptable/desirable...and those two things rarely line up perfectly.
I personally think that under Putin, Russia will not be able to negotiate out of this war.  It will need a fatal collapse.  The longer Putin remains in power the more stark that collapse will become.  Remove Putin and enough of his power base, and we may be back to more rational players.  However, in all of this we are largely at the mercy of the Russian people.  We can influence them, currently by killing a lot of their sons; however, we can only do so much.
So we get to another face of war...a violent negotiation that is almost always irrational at some level.

I haven't said that. I said that switching over the supply from Russian uranium rods to another supplier takes more time than switching over from Russian gas or oil. The former needs a lengthy certification process, while the latter just needs an adjustment in the process.
There is an oil processing plant in East Germany which was basically the end of a Russian oil pipeline. They will now be delivered from the West. They had to retool their process, but AFAIK that didn't take that long.
Russian made reactors use a hexagonal fuel rod design (IIRC) that is unique to them. You'll need to find another supplier who will make them, and they need to be certified. With nuclear fuel rods, a quite sensible precaution. No one is going to insure a plant without that.
Yes, and now it is practically 0% and still all predictions say that we will get over the winter.
Prices will stay high, no doubt. I haven't said otherwise. But we want to get rid (or let's say: 'use much less') of the stuff anyway. So although quite harsh in the short term, this is good in the long term. A very unpopular opinion, I'm sure.
I doubt that we will get back to pre-war prices at all. There's still global warming going on (which is the bigger crisis unless it's solved by nuclear winter) and this war is 'just' accelerating the necessary changes which we would have to do anyway.
That may sound a bit cynical with all the suffering evolved, but those are some of the consequences of this conflict IMHO.

I haven't said that. I said that switching over the supply from Russian uranium rods to another supplier takes more time than switching over from Russian gas or oil. The former needs a lengthy certification process, while the latter just needs an adjustment in the process.
There is an oil processing plant in East Germany which was basically the end of a Russian oil pipeline. They will now be delivered from the West. They had to retool their process, but AFAIK that didn't take that long.
Russian made reactors use a hexagonal fuel rod design (IIRC) that is unique to them. You'll need to find another supplier who will make them, and they need to be certified. With nuclear fuel rods, a quite sensible precaution. No one is going to insure a plant without that.
Yes, and now it is practically 0% and still all predictions say that we will get over the winter.
Prices will stay high, no doubt. I haven't said otherwise. But we want to get rid (or let's say: 'use much less') of the stuff anyway. So although quite harsh in the short term, this is good in the long term. A very unpopular opinion, I'm sure.
I doubt that we will get back to pre-war prices at all. There's still global warming going on (which is the bigger crisis unless it's solved by nuclear winter) and this war is 'just' accelerating the necessary changes which we would have to do anyway.
That may sound a bit cynical with all the suffering evolved, but those are some of the consequences of this conflict IMHO.

This is the thing that angered me the most about the Russian attack on Ukraine. Ukraine, with very little help, was making the transition from a badly run country to a truly decent one. That is just about the hardest thing to do in the entirety of human history. Our utterly failed attempts to even get a good start on the process in the middle east being exhibit A. For Russia to try and abort that process is pretty much the greatest crime imaginable. 

So, my thesis is that the Russians are trying for a speed run of Japan's WWII strategy right now. Phase 1 was a replay of Pearl Harbor but aimed at Kiev - an attempt at a decisive victory that hinged on the opponent giving up. Phase 2 was the incremental march in the Donbas; a grinding attritional campaign that mirrors the fight in the Solomons. Phase 3 was the loss of strategic initiative and transition to static defense against an adversary who can attack on two axes; the Hollandia campaign and the Marianas campaign. All throughout, the quality of Japanese equipment and training faded while the quality of the USN improved. Japanese strategic thinking ossified to a policy of inflicting suffering while dying.
If we think of war as communication, it took the annihilation of the IJN, the undersea blockade, the firebombings *and* two nuclear weapons to break through to the one person we had to communicate our resolve to. When Hirohito decided for surrender, the war ended (though this was a close run thing).
I think what no one has identified in Ukraine yet is how to communicate to the Russian equivalent of Hirohito that our resolve is such that the war should end on terms unfavorable to the Russians. We also aren't sure that there is a decision maker in Russia who could end the war. If Putin signaled surrender, would it stick? The Ukrainians don't have signaling tools equivalent to what the Allies had either, which is tricky.

I don't think is reasonable to compare nation building in Afghanistan / Iraq to Ukraine.
In the middle east at every level of society from the bottom to top their was always be going significant resistance or ambivalence due to either self-interest, ignorance or flat out cultural aversion to change. And it doesn't matter how hard you try as soon as you use airpower to a significant degree there is mistakes. The longer troops are on the ground more mistakes. Lots of mistakes over a long period of time slowly but surely adds up to looking like you simply don't care - fail. Cultural change isn't especially fast and to suggest that Iraq / Afghanistan are only 60?! or so years away from organically morphing into modern democracies so lets fight a war and do it in 20 is ludicrous. 
The Ukrainians on the other hand were already clearly starting to walk the walk to be a functioning part of the Western world which is probably not an insignificant reason they were invaded in the first place. I have not even bothered checking Zelensky's Ukrainian popularity but Western leaders trust them enough to give them stupendous amounts of weapons and an indeterminable look at our Intel capabilities. There is a clear and obvious enemy to be beaten. Partisan style warfare after major hostilities seems unlikely unless of course criminal gangs being criminals count as freedom fighters. Ukraine will have their own trouble with corruption and waste when the war finishes but their start point prior to invasion isn't anything remotely like Afghanistan/Iraq.

Nothing to lie about, I'm just pointing out the durability of the West is much higher than we think, the ability of our populations to pinhole issues is very useful, the return on investment is quite good, and the energy realignment had to happen anyway, and who said 10 years and a nuclear war? I'm just pointing out a year of war where the U.S nor NATO isn't putting boots on the ground or suffering any deaths, while Ukraine is shouldering the dead is actually a good deal (as morbid as it sounds), and if Ukraine wants to secure the security of their sealanes without relying wholly on the West in the future, it might well be a good idea to spend some time taking back Crimea and for the West to give the thumbs up and a pat on the back to see how it goes. 
As for the Suwałki Gap, I'm just pointing out that was a very real scenario with all sorts of repercussions and scenarios for NATO to figure out, and last time I checked it has always been the position of NATO that every member will defend the other, and unlike CSTO, it has teeth. Wouldn't it be fair to say those plans envisioned a much more longer war with such high costs and loss of life? 

About the mobilization: since it has (nearly) no military use, it must be symbolic. To what purpose? To buy time, probably. But what for? What does get better for Russia if time passes?
Only thing I could come up is winter and the need to heat. I guess that is (still) the hope of the Kremlin, that gas prices will cause public unrest and force some governments to change their stance towards Russia.
Speaking for my own country, gas prices indeed are the number one topic here. My own advance payments for gas and electricity have tripled, for some they have quintupled and some won't be able to pay that. But apart from the extreme left & right parties, no one wants to call off support for Ukraine. The discussion is mostly about how the state needs to help those in need.
IMHO, that issue will be settled by the time the first new conscripts arrive at the front line. I don't think this ploy will work out as Russia thought.

Sorry, but this is wrong. Oil is no problem at all. Gas will (mostly) be done by the end of next year. Nuclear might really take longer because the uranium rods need to be certified. You cannot just switch the supplier. AFAIK, this takes quite some time.
Excluded is of course Hungary...
That's the power of capitalism. If something is expensive, someone will make (more of) it until it is cheap. Getting from here to there might be bumpy, though.
The EU will pay for that in the long run, no doubt. There will be endless grumbling and moaning, but in the end we will all be better off.

Sorry, but this is wrong. Oil is no problem at all. Gas will (mostly) be done by the end of next year. Nuclear might really take longer because the uranium rods need to be certified. You cannot just switch the supplier. AFAIK, this takes quite some time.
Excluded is of course Hungary...
That's the power of capitalism. If something is expensive, someone will make (more of) it until it is cheap. Getting from here to there might be bumpy, though.
The EU will pay for that in the long run, no doubt. There will be endless grumbling and moaning, but in the end we will all be better off.

Sorry, but this is wrong. Oil is no problem at all. Gas will (mostly) be done by the end of next year. Nuclear might really take longer because the uranium rods need to be certified. You cannot just switch the supplier. AFAIK, this takes quite some time.
Excluded is of course Hungary...
That's the power of capitalism. If something is expensive, someone will make (more of) it until it is cheap. Getting from here to there might be bumpy, though.
The EU will pay for that in the long run, no doubt. There will be endless grumbling and moaning, but in the end we will all be better off.

Sorry, but this is wrong. Oil is no problem at all. Gas will (mostly) be done by the end of next year. Nuclear might really take longer because the uranium rods need to be certified. You cannot just switch the supplier. AFAIK, this takes quite some time.
Excluded is of course Hungary...
That's the power of capitalism. If something is expensive, someone will make (more of) it until it is cheap. Getting from here to there might be bumpy, though.
The EU will pay for that in the long run, no doubt. There will be endless grumbling and moaning, but in the end we will all be better off.

Just to elaborate some more, a Ukraine restored to the full 1991 borders, is much more economically stronger than 2014. One, the industrial nexuses in the Donbas are completely unlocked, and again, whatever the damage done to it, we have plenty of examples of devastated regions being restored, and of course, the Marshall Plan is the clear argument for it being possible. 
Two, the Black Sea offshore Natural Gas and Oil production is locked off now and for the foreseeable future if Crimea is retained by Russia. Ukraine takes it, and Europe can happily invest and utilize it, the Donbas energy production as well. Furthermore, the loss of Sevastopol as a seaport, and military base will hamstring any future Russian projection of power. 
Plus, let's be clear, a Ukraine in NATO with Crimea, is much more useful to NATO and the West than Ukraine with Crimea still in Russian hands. 
There is tons of incentive for Ukraine to go all the way, but I think the West is actually more than fine with Ukraine going all the way, for all the reasons i laid out, it would be the most substantial victory for Western influence since....i suppose the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe? Probably greater than that tbh. 
The worry has always been a stalemate, where Europe cannot normalize relations with Russia and Ukraine still a basketcase. Ukraine achieving the full restoration of her 1991 borders would be devastating for opponents of the West and a absolutely clear signal that the West remains on top.
Also, as seen in recent U.S moves towards Armenia, if NATO (minus Turkey) had Crimea, and Ukraine in NATO....well, it would be a lot more easier for U.S projection of power into the Caucasus no? Oh sure, the U.S could use Romania or such but I think Ukraine would be absolutely fine with that arrangement in Crimea i think. 

Maybe that helps to keep you from conscription?
 
 

All war is negotiation and sacrifice - all war is negotiation with sacrifice.
So Putin dropped the 'mobilization' boogey man, kinda.  And of course threatened nuclear war without saying it...oh my.
Well I think Phase 2-3 of this war were positioning for endgame - Russia's point "Imma gonna take the Donbas, cause that was what I wanted all along...well that plus Kherson and everything I did not lose in Phase I".  And Ukraine's counter-point "No you are not."  This could have gone on for some time longer but clearly things are coming to a head in Moscow.
So I think this is endgame.  What does a soft-mobilization/slightly-louder-threat-of-nuclear-war-based-on-bizarro -annexation-internal-legalities-that-no-one-else-is-going-to-recognize-for-a-century, really tell us?
- Well first it tells us that Russia is desperate. Putin and the gang are opening themselves up to significant political exposure here.  You average Russian may, or may not, have actually supported this war but they all had the luxury of staying out of it - changing that is a major shift.  We are already hearing rumblings in opposition, who knows how far that will go; however, we do know that Putin would not have pulled on this lever if Russia was winning.  This is a pretty clear sign of losses and the impact it is having on his war machine.
- Next, this is not an escalation, it is desperation.  This is an attempt to preserve military capability in the field and re-assert a status quo, not raise enough forces to re-take Kyiv.  In short, whatever the UA is doing, it is working very well.
- Russia is clearly on the defensive, and likely will stay there until this is over.  Throwing 300,000 conscripts in any variation is not going to create offensive military capability - unable to create positive decision, so at best negative and null (i.e. denial).  This signals a shift into a strategy of exhaustion, annihilation for the Russians has left the building.  This puts Russia a couple rungs above an insurgency as far as military strategy goes.  They are going to try and dig in an hold on to what they have until the other side gets tired.
-  We could be heading towards a nuclear decision point.  The battlefield use of nuclear weapons has always been a grey area in warfare.  It is an escalation but the West and USSR went around and around on whether one could have a limited nuclear war.  I suspect that Putin might be thinking about testing the norms around this by declaring all the territory they have taken as "mother Russia" - we freakin knew that Russian doctrine and law were useless to refer to because autocrats just move the goalposts.  So I suspect the redline is the Crimea, and maybe somewhere in the LNR/DPR.  If the UA push that far, we might actually see Putin try to go that way - I say "try" because he 1) might already be removed from power by then, or 2) someone will put a bullet in his dome before they drag Russia into a doomsday scenario.  If one does go off well it won't be the end of days, tactical nuclear weapons can effect a couple grid squares and were designed for heavy armor concentrations at Fulda - this war is far to spread out.  We will likely lose our minds in the West and the response will be key to what happens next. I suspect conventional escalation or other options to send a strong signal to Russia that they will be the first country in history to lose a strategic nuclear war.  Regardless, if Russia employs a nuclear weapon, we are off the map, beyond the Cuban Missile crisis; however, I also still think this actually happening is a long shot.  For those in Europe and NA, I would not start getting too excited until strange looking Patriot systems start being deployed around major urban areas and/or in the Canadian north.
  So the biggest question on the table is - "what does endgame look like?"  This is in the weird political space as militarily Ukraine has demonstrated that given time they can likely retake everything back to the pre-2014 border - the question is do they want to?  Do they need to?  Putting emotions to one side - I suspect the West will be putting a lot of incentives for Ukraine to push to 2014 borders and then stop.  Why?  Well some possible reasons:
- DNR and LNR are burned out wrecks with large sections of the population that clearly do not want to be Ukrainian, so let em go.  Ukraine gains nothing but a couple Northern Ireland scenarios if they re-occupy, that and a massive reconstruction bill.  Walk away and wish them luck with their sugar daddy.
- Crimea.  Here we could see "neutral and open" tossed around a lot more.  Without Sevastopol Russia is pretty much cut out of the Black Sea, and if they are out of the Black Sea they are out of the Med.  If Russia is going to go nuclear, it will be over Crimea...and to this guy over in NA, it is not worth it.
- Ok, so that is the unthinkable "bad", what is the carrot?  Fast tracked entry in NATO - this entire bullsh#t goes away if Ukraine has Article 5 to lean on, because that is simply too big to fail for the West.  Hell Ukraine is already armed better than most NATO nations, with NATO STANAG equipment.  Their training is US/UK standard and I have no doubt we have already built most of their ISR infrastructure.  Ukraine in NATO next week is a clear win for the west. 
Next, entry into the EU.  Bureaucratic nightmare that it is, this would cement Ukraine into Europe economically and set them up for post-war success.
Last, a reconstruction plan to rival Marshal.  The West commits hundreds of billions to turn Ukraine into a shining example of what our money can do as a counter-point to China's game these last 15 years or so.
As to Russia?  Well it made its bed. Sanctions stay in place until 1) reparation deal is cut and in motion, 2) war crimes of all sorts are investigated and prosecuted and 3) Putin regime is gone enough that we can pretend whoever replaces it is clean...or clean enough. If Russia refuses any of the above, well enjoy being a Chinese satellite with a Cold War Soviet standard of living and we will see you again in 30 years - we will risk manage Russia, we are good at that in the West.
So What War?  Well UA will likely focus on taking bights out of Donbas just to ensure 300,000 Russian conscripts don't feel left out.  They will re-take Kherson and push south over the Dnipro up to the Crimean border.  And Melitopol, cut that stupid land bridge and box the Russians and their cronies back to where they were before this nonsense started.
Anyway, crazy days and keep your head up because it might get crazier.
 

I can say that since the beginning of the war, I have several times applied to the Venkomat with a desire to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. To which I was told that people with military experience and perfect health were required (I have a chronic disease). In pro-Russian publics, the hysteria was successfully dispersed about the fact that men of military age are grabbed on the streets and taken into the army, but this is nonsense. I travel from Irpin to Kyiv almost every day and often go through checks at the checkpoint, and I have never seen anyone handed summons to the military registration and enlistment office.

Afraid as in the sense of 'unlikely to happen, but if it would be very bad'.
Any (hypothetical!) ethnic cleansing inside Ukraine would very seriously damage the image of Ukraine. That would be the worst long term political damage that could happen.
You didn't listen. The West forced Ukraine to this war. So Ukraine (as the puppet of the West) has already declared it.
Tssk, comrade come on. It's easy to understand.