LongLeftFlank

Re Mosul map: You're a better man than I, Gunga Din. Here, give this a spin while you go mad: As for the rest, the notion of polymath elite operators directing local forces is not the least bit new, as you know (see Rogers Rangers and their French equivalents, plus the enterprising agents of the various proto-colonial merchant Companies). It is of course the correct answer from a purely military COIN "find em and grind em" perspective, not to mention economical. But America's Best also wind up neck deep in day to day police brutality, extortion, arbitrary murder, sectarian and tribal vendettas, torture and other kinds of third world business as usual, including but not limited to: narcotics, chattel slavery, salary skimming, no-bid contracts, tax evasion and good old fashioned political corruption at all levels and touching most forms of commerce (ref. tribal vendettas). Changing political winds, unhappy accidents and a wired world will thus periodically expose them to, among other things: the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (a law written so broadly as to make pretty much any American deriving foreign source income convictable at will), possibly RICO as well, and of course the IRS, business being global. Plus the various mainly European human rights courts; and who knows what the Asians may come up with. Pandora, please pick up the white courtesy box....

WW2, probably doable. Middle East.... ummm.

This thread keeps wandering OT (not overly concerned about that), so this digital reconstruction of ancient Knossos is pretty cool.... Got me wondering about how one might map a playable urban battlespace in a labyrinthine premodern "Old Town" area: e.g. Mosul Old City, Algiers, any number of hill towns or favelas in Italy, Syria, Afghanistan. Start with steep hillsides and see how you go, at a guess. Outdoor stairways would be an interesting mod. One could probably do quite a bit of clever stuff with bridges as well.... Leave the AFVs at home entirely, due to the unreal gun elevations and narrow alleyways.

Alas, poor OP. I knew him well.... P.S. If once you pay the Danegeld, you will never be rid of the Dane.

Wow. Just read this thread at last, @MOS:96B2P, so now I understand what all the fuss was about. Glad Ramadi is still contributing to the far envelope of CM design!

For my long abandoned CMBN Dien Bien Phu opus, I accepted early on that a campaign would necessarily need to include a 'bigger picture' hex wargame to cue up and link the various scenarios. So the scenarios would all take place on les femmes bastiones. Most of the siege though, (while the outcome was determined at the commencement of the bombardment) was a whole bunch of this taking place at night.... Not riveting CM material; maybe one trench raid to give flavour... (for those unaware, I ultimately shelved the DBP project because of the engine's weak treatment of fortifications, which regrettably persists to this day in spite of a few minor improvements).

Yup, we few, we happy few, we CM mad scientists....

Great stuff MJK. The Japanese face mods mostly don't suit Malay races, so I tried a few mashups with mixed results....

Nicely done, although I am always disappointed when the narration isn't by Laurence Olivier. Any idea what video game or graphics engine they used to render the map?

The Army, Marines and police have been fighting Communist NPA, Moros and bandits pretty much continuously since independence. The Malay peoples are also warlike; you dont pick fights here unless you're ready to bleed. In general, Pinoys are great tinkerers and improvisers; it's part of that 'resilient' thing (although they find that label condescending). They aren't lazy per se, but their work is often sloppy when they don't have much interest in the outcome. I like to say that when SHTF and we honkies are all dead, Pinoys and Pinays will still be joking singing and fornicating.

Just noticed this: you can mod the CMSF2 Uncons to have uncovered faces? Cool! I thought texture swapping was no longer doable. All hail our @Mord scientist! Forward Soviet!

No, but we've had a thread (irregularly) discussing MOUT over at the legacy CMSF1 board, and I'm pretty sure some of the essays in this book are linked to online there. http://community.battlefront.com/topic/125155-mout-and-urban-counterinsurgency-and-cm/

CM3! IMHO, any further cash cow work on CM2 should be limited to crudely stitching together a couple of Families, notably: 1. CMBS + CMSF = CM ARMAGEDDON, so Russians can fight with or against NATO or Mideast or uncons with 2016+ kit. @MikeyD has the Turks. 2. CMFB + CMRT = CM GÖTTERDÄMERUNG, allowing 'sukinsyna' Patton to keep on fighting the goddam Russians. And Korea. And partisans (WWII Uncons). And the Armée de Terre, which has had no love from BFC since CMBO!

Here's the highlight reel: While the AFoP had access to enabling technologies and supporting arms such as indirect fire, close air support and armoured fighting vehicles, the battle was ultimately won by room-to-room, house-to-house fighting. No amount of firepower can substitute this intimate, discriminate, and precise application of force. Combat shooting, battlefield fitness, small team TTPs and battle craft are more important than any other skill. INGENIOUS AFP TACTICS Both the AFoP and the enemy used drones extensively. Both forces employed inexpensive, off-the-shelf varieties, as each side would prioritise shooting down one-another’s aerial surveillance assets. The AFoP used a rudimentary marking system to identify friendly UAVs. In Marawi the enemy used covered withdrawal routes, or ‘ratlines’ (holes dug through walls or floors, or concealed passageways through basements etc), to enable movement to and from battle positions, or to move to depth if a battle position was at risk of being overrun. When these were discovered, the AFoP would either have combat engineers collapse the tunnels on top of the enemy, or use smoke to flush the lines out. If using smoke, they would concurrently send a drone above the entrance, as they could often find the other end of the ratline by watching for the smoke escaping from the far end. [This expedient] mitigates risky and time-consuming subterranean, or ‘tunnel rat,’ clearances. Insurgent marksmen or sharpshooters engaging at short- to medium-ranges exacted a heavy toll on friendly forces and often imposed significant delay on manoeuvre. Most of the enemy sniper weapons utilised iron sights. Many snipers were local to the city. Their hides and firing positions were well planned, often using tall buildings to dominate all approaches. Enemy snipers utilized loophole shooting (often called ‘murder holes’) to a deadly effect. The insurgents would also utilize hostages as human shields. PMC scout snipers would enter counter-sniping battles with insurgent snipers across roads, city blocks and bridges with the average engagement distance being 150 to 200m. Often one team would act as a ‘tethered goat’ to draw enemy sniper fire, whilst a separate team waited in a concealed hide waiting to engage. The PMC normally work as pairs with mutual support from a regular infantry platoon, however at Marawi they deployed as a sniper platoon to support major clearance tasks. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some individuals personally killed dozens of insurgents, to the point where some were psychologically unfit to continue fighting. Marines of the PMC had little to no access to smoke grenades. This posed a significant problem for mobility, primarily due to the sniper threat down firelanes (streets and alleys in particular). To conduct crossings, the marines of MBLT10 would carry a long piece of fabric, the height of a marine. They attached one end of the fabric to one side of the obstacle, and had a runner sprint across the fire lane, trailing the sheet behind him. He would then tie it off, taut, to the other side of the obstacle. This then enabled the entire platoon team or combat team to cross with relative impunity, especially as the resource-poor enemy wouldn’t risk wasting ammunition by ‘drake-shooting’ at the sheet. For the AFoP, the most valuable equipment were related to individuals (body armour, load carriage equipment etc), personal protective equipment (helmets, ballistic eye protection and fire retardant clothing etc) and night fighting equipment, weapon ancillaries such as thermal sights and enhanced optics. HOUSE TO HOUSE During Marawi there was an extraordinary requirement for explosive breaching to support infantry platoon movement. IEDs were incorporated into rubble obstacles along AFoP Avenues of Approach (AoA), and covered with sniper fire in order to deny access without sustaining casualties. The AFoP response was to generate new AoAs through buildings. Many of the buildings within the city were constructed of thick, heavily reinforced concrete. As such, breaches were often required to be conducted in two stages; the first stage was an explosive breach to strip away concrete, leaving thick reinforcement bars to be reduced in a second stage. Hydraulic cutters were then used. In Marawi, structural integrity varied greatly from building to building. Where in one building a given charge type would produce a mouse hole, in another it could cause significant damage or completely level the structure. Charge selection was described as a dark art due to the unpredictable nature of the structures. In the classic ‘hugging the belt’ technique used by many insurgents, the enemy continually pushed forward [so AFP heavy weapons could not be used without putting friendlies at risk]. AFP Role 2 and Role 3 equivalent medical facilities were not accustomed to the very high volume of casualties during urban fighting—a significant number of which were non-battle injuries which rapidly became infected. COMBINED ARMS TACTICS The Marawi experience suggests that in such a contested, formidable and lethal environment, armour saves lives. Wherever possible, infantry platoons would advance with armour in intimate support; bounding forward to clear the way and allowing the AFV to move forward to a support by fire (SBF) position. Engineers would breach with armour in close support wherever possible, and the AFVs were also used to support casualty extraction. [But] even in undamaged areas, the narrow, labyrinthine streets found in most Indo-Pacific cities pose significant limitations for AFV employment. Particularly given the overwhelming destruction in Marawi, there was limited option to employ AFVs in many areas until bulldozers could clear corridors and fire positions for them. The enemy placed obstacles in streets, such as parked cars, rubble and of course IEDs. Combat engineers adopted a mounted clearance technique where an M113 would move to the FLOT and occupy an overwatch position. An up-armoured bulldozer and guide would then move up and clear a bound of 10 – 50 metres dependant on terrain. The bulldozer would then reverse out and allow the M113 to move forward into the newly cleared area and adopt overwatch for the next bound. This method was described as leap frogging. One Company from the 2nd Infantry Division employed over 10,000 mortar rounds in three months. The enemy became aware of the CAS schedule. Once they identified a CAS platform in the air [they hid] and, waited for the asset to retire and refuel. They employed dummy marker panels, smoke, and likely had the benefit of being able to monitor the air-to-ground communication being conducted over un-encrypted Motorola radios. The Filipino Gunners used their 105mm guns in a direct fire role to penetrate the thick concrete walls prevalent in Marawi, or used HMG .50 cal to ‘bore’ a point of entry. COMMAND AND CONTROL Because urban fighting was new to the AFoP, rapid operational tempo and simultaneous action were nearly impossible to achieve. For example, walking suppressive fire up, or across, a building in support of the break-in is much more effective than cutting fire completely. NIGHT FIGHTING The majority of forces were static at night, and would occupy urban defensive positions until dawn. Early warning devices would be improvised, by placing tins and cans on lines of string, or by shattering fluorescent globes on likely enemy approaches—the clanging of the tins, or the crunch of the broken glass, would compromise any would-be attacker. Filipino special forces and scout snipers with access to NFE were extremely effective when operating at night. They were able to cross obstacles considered risky during daylight and could conduct assaults on enemy positions to take advantage of the overwhelming overmatch in night fighting ability. They could then pathfind for conventional forces, who had little to no NFE, to secure new battle positions. Insurgents often spent much of the night taking drugs such as ‘shabu’ (methamphetamine).

Wow, terrific and rich content here, cheers mate! I am underwater in work for the time being, but this is red meat for a MOUT campaign series!

I just got a spare hour and used this to 'curve' the St Lo-Cherbourg rail line a bit on my Carillon Nose master map. It looks ugly but tactically it matters, since historically a German PaK40 was emplaced at the St Gilles RN3 crossing, commanding both railbed and road. Google map la Meauffe and you'll see the curves instantly.

I am aware that l'humour Anglaise is generally as with Frenchmen as la cuisine Anglaise. But, you know... "Fetchez la vache!" https://youtu.be/YV0LGMGuLN0

Yes, the old sophomoric joke about the "well-greased Achaeans". And "the spear struck him in the place where death comes most painfully to pitiful mortals.... And his hand clutched the earth / and the darkness came before his eyes."

Terrific thread and great post, cheers. Probably a function of me getting old and cranky, but if you want historical erudition you should have seen some of the Forum discussions from the CM1 Golden Age of the early 2000s. I didn't grow up on a farm and didn't take up hunting until adulthood, so backpacking as yet undeveloped rural Asia came as quite an eye opener to me. Specifically seeing chickens and pigs screaming in anguish as their throats were cut and their lives bled away. Modern methods of slaughter are more humane (we hope), but Asians claim the surge of chemicals in extended death throes tenderizes the meat. So there's that.... But thou shalt not kill is also an ancient ethos.

Good question. In meeting engagements and ambushes that would certainly be the case, but then the various OODA routines still kick in as the CO gets reports and if he can, scans the emerging situation from a hilltop. For all of which you can find no better sources than Bil and ArmGen as noted. But at present in the game, he has nearly unlimited ability to telepath his orders to all subunits, giving them and their supporting units an ability to reorient, recommit and re-coordinate that would be the envy of a modern day SEAL detachment. In RL, that's the job of reserves or reinforcements. The units who are already committed probably can't be asked to change much beyond 'cease advancing and form a perimeter', unless they can withdraw to safety and reform for a bit (probably 30 minutes minimum for non-Elite troops, especially if they've taken casualties?). Again, let's not pound the strawman of order limits and then say there's no underlying problem. Is there a more elegant option to limit this Borg C3I for those desiring more realistic FoW? and streamline the micro burden while we're at it?

Come on, you know perfectly well @IanL actually *is* a cat. Bomber jackets and tattoos ruin the night camouflage, and the disconcerting effect of those green eyes glittering at you out of the laundry room.... But can we start a GoFundMe campaign for Ian to put 'Defender of the Faith' below his handle? Excess proceeds go to a twofer of Nut Brown or Keiths. Or premium kibble....

Apologies, Ian. But you do have a (not unearned) rep as 'Board Defender of the Faith'. Consider my ribbing strictly good natured and I shall go there no more. Back on topic, yeah I hear you on unintended consequences of bloody hacks. But in my view, the future (it's all about the future) needs to streamline the micro clickfest and bring the commander's chair back into primacy. It's a part (only 1 part) of why CM hasn't pierced the DoD training market. Consider those great tactical videos and blogs by Armchair General and @Bil Hardenberger laying out the OODA loops for command and control. All that careful observation, scouting and planning is focused on understanding where and when to commit your main effort(s), with reserves held back. Secondarily (think Rommel) it is to mislead and lure the enemy into committing at the wrong places and times. Once committed, it is an extreme rarity that a subunit in combat can and will alter its course to pursue a new plan not in the original orders or its training manuals, except for limited goals of self preservation or immediate opportunity. Not saying it goes to ground in place and freezes. A committed and engaged force can seldom be its own reserve.... Anyway, that's where I am going with this line of discussion. Command rationing is an (imperfect) means to that end.

Self-preservation / final protective fire is noted, and there might be ways to allow for that. 1. But having an omniscient hive mind able to coordinate all actions of all subleaders, going well beyond 'sensible' to rally and redirect an entire battalion plus armour on a dime under fire in a night action to me is *less* realism, not more. Way less. 2. I also don't see full control as a virtue. Most of us grew up playing ASL, where a turn in a battalion scale game could burn an entire day of youthful nerddom. I don't personally have time and patience for that now. I love CM granularity, and while it's fun to step into the sergeant's pixelboots now and then, I'd actually prefer just to view a war movie of most of that action, not fiddle with micro, squad after squad, each turn. 3. Fewer clicks, less mandatory micro, more of a chess playing command focus (I'd also like world peace and don't expect that either). I mean, this is a battalion scale game right? ... There may be better ways to get at all that than rationing orders, and I'm happy to hear them. 4. Nirvana would be to be able to set a plan, then designate phase lines and approximate routes at no lower than platoon level. Then hit start and watch it unfold / all hell break loose, making only minor adjustments. Scouts move out front, squads detect and follow cover terrain or gullies, or else spread out in skirmish lines. On contact, units seek cover and return fire, then send out a flanking element. That's the future (CM3). Imho.

In prior discussions of this idea, a standard rejoinder has been that the chaos of war is already baked into the In Command logic: you can issue as many orders as you like, but can never be sure how soon guys out of command (and Shaken) will respond, if at all. Fair point of course, but 1. I never feel like out of command delay is significant enough. Morale and troop quality seems far more weighty. (And let's face it, 'my dudes don't do what I tell them! WTF!?' really ticks off FPS gamers) 2. At present, formations already in battle can change plans/course en bloc *far* too quickly to react to unexpected developments, and with far too much cohesion. Even a unit in full command shouldn't be able to swarm onto a sector counterattack instantly, especially in forest or bocage, or at night. .. In fact, night actions should be by default: as soon as plan A goes to heck there is NO prospect of plan B. Get your men out of the meat grinder... 2. Putting the move limit in would restrict that kind of reactivity to high quality, good order formations only, and even they couldn't go all at once. 3. Overall, it would streamline play and add back a command 'chess' element to the game. You must focus your limited micro/command allotment on the schwerpunkt, and also make the most of your few dependable elite leaders and Sgt. Rocks. The less important sectors are left to stagnate until they can be given attention and new orders. Btw, I also believe that in an WW2 infantry game, armour support should always be out of Command by default. Directing it, even in close proximity, should be akin to calling artillery....