Jump to content
Battlefront is now Slitherine ×

LongLeftFlank

Members
  • Posts

    5,589
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    15

Everything posted by LongLeftFlank

  1. One Bouncing Betty mortar round into that field and... abattoir.
  2. Nice! As I one said, to get any more immersive you'd need to fire up some cheap briquettes, dog crap and diesel in a Hibachi next to you while playing.
  3. So in game terms entrenchments are *not* derived from vehicles then? Are you quite sure? They place a lot like vehicles. And they are spotted (easily), a lot like vehicles. Yes, there are differences (indestructibility), but if the root model is the same then the same bug can impact occupants....
  4. Yup, I now have about 300 photos of all the French emplacements at Eliane 2 (A1); a double row of 5' deep slit trenches and 2 man bunkers encircling the hill, with an underground command post up top (the one that got sapped by 304th dac cong)
  5. Like I said, slap me down if I'm wrong (I'm not a proud man lol) but I think that our beloved 'earth pimples' are just more of the same, basically an OT vehicle with a low-to-the-ground silhouette. BFC knew they needed a FoW replacement for the CMSF trenches/prefab mass graves for the WWII series, and this was the quickest hack. I have no doubt it's on the list for eventual improvement, no worries, but the infantry bailing out of them with a near miss is a little more urgent fix.
  6. Yes, the root cause seems clear enough to me (although it's also possible I am wrong): fortifications are immobile vehicles and their occupants are 'passengers'. Also explains why entrenched infantry are so much easier to spot in concealment terrain. So whatever 4.0 tweak BFC did to make crews more prone to bail when hit by heavy HE has also made infantry prone to bail out of perfectly good fortifications and rout pell mell for cover like a crew. Please fix or sumfink.... PS: good to hear from you. Been a while!
  7. Don't forget the right bank of the Vire: Le Carillon/La Meauffe and the poor bloody 137th Infantry (and KG Kentner). Someday I will get back to that one. I am still seeking for the regimental history. Looks like surviving copies are all in Kansas.
  8. Thanks John. For those not interested in the forensics of old film recovery the photos start at about 6 mins. No combat or battlefield shots, mostly rear area / Occupation duty. One AFV shot only, of a Renault in German markings.
  9. Interesting how facial hair has now fallen out of fashion among younger Iraqis. The 'Saddamstache' used to be pretty obligatory, with men who shaved being harassed as catamites.
  10. Thanks John, I read it some years ago. While not factually inaccurate, it is "first wave" GWOT history, heavily personality driven to sell copies. Our Heroes In Action hagiography. The 2003-2008 counterinsurgency in Ramadi was not won by SEAL snipers, although they performed very well, nor was it won by Col. Sean MacFarland, though he performed very well. We now have much better histories coming out that show what was really going down. Read back a few pages in this thread for more on that.
  11. Take those bastards alive, and about the last part to get chopped off is their heads....
  12. Agreed that would be even better, but at present there really isn't any (discernible) TacAI functionality at all for coordination between units (other than shared spotting?) My humble ideas were (loosely) based on TacAI / AI program mechanisms that already exist.
  13. :Also, while this article from a US CAT team operator in the Phils is a bit of a civil servant's whinge (wahh, they cut my wonderful program, and doom resulted), the below observation was interesting: https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/a-cultural-failure-u-s-special-operations-in-the-philippines-and-the-rise-of-the-islamic-state/ During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the roles of Special Forces and conventional forces practically reversed: Conventional became primarily responsible for the training and advising of Iraqi and Afghan security forces while Special Forces largely focused on finding and then either killing or capturing the enemy and its commanders. And this author is one of many .mil commentators noting that tour of duty rotations promote short term thinking, reinventing of wheels, and above all, loss of confidence of local clients in any US commitment, as newcomers feel free to slag on and discard the relationships and commitments of their predecessors. Not so different from corp life though, where 'exec track' MBA types toss away tribal knowledge and experience in vain bids to distinguish themselves by 'reinventing' their organizations in a short time.
  14. Yes, I agree that the behaviour of units ought to change based on their "alert" status. It also seems to me that it isn't as hard to put some of this into practice as we all assume. Sure, AI iz Hard. But It doesn't follow that we are powerless to improve unit behaviour or lessen the zombietrupping. "Dash" should be understood as "go directly there stat, don't stop to return fire or go to ground (unless you get hit). But units under "Advance" orders should definitely modify their doubletime pace based on incoming, preferably diverting to cover and then returning fire (but not simply dumping the order). Ideally, unpinned and unRattled units would detach an Assault team to flank and close as the base of fire (hopefully) suppresses the incoming. The flanking pathing reflex might be autoprogrammed in much the same way as panicked units 'bug out' to cover now. The teams seek cover out of sight, but towafd the flanks vs away from the enemy. Once there, they resume the prior AI order to Advance to the destination square, but at a Hunt or Slow pace, not running.
  15. Poured cement, especially with rebar, is a lot more blast resistant than cinderblock or even brick. Cinder doesn't stop bullets. For WWII settings, walls are mostly brick, or in older buildings, dressed stone. A bundle of grenades would probably be needed to blast a gap. Cement formworks would be less common, and associated with military, probably not civil construction.
  16. I saw two shooting stars last night / I wished on them / but they were only satellites / it's wrong to wish on space hardware / I wish I wish I wish you cared...
  17. A related discussion came up fairly recently though it doesn't furnish an answer to your specific query.
  18. Oh I love it too, many thanks for posting. And I have no doubt that local ingenuity, if not doctrine, occasionally allowed crosstalk between ground forces and aircraft. But as we also know, all these pubs and manuals are as much aspirational as factual. Kind of like the Patriot SCUD 100% kill stats in 1991; we really really needed to believe it was true. Entirely forgivable.
×
×
  • Create New...