LongLeftFlank

Just got around to reading this one, cheers. Building a Big Beautiful Wall(c) to seal off insurgent strongholds is a tactic US forces used to good effect both in Sadr City and in the 2007 reduction of Ramadi's insurgent fortified Mulaab (Stadium) district. @Sgt.Squarehead, I am pretty sure this tactic was and is an important part of the "Crusher" formula for reducing Daesh strongholds in Mosul, both to prevent re-infiltration of cleared districts and to fight the VBIED menace. Unfortunately, occupying key terrain below Route Gold did not confer control of those areas to U.S. and Iraqi forces.... The warren of alleyways and small buildings provided routes for JAM fighters to infiltrate the area below Route Gold.... Operation Gold Wall, the effort to construct a wall along the length of Route Gold, was intended to deny JAM the ability to operate in Ishbiliya and Habbibiyah... In the 30 days of Operation Gold Wall, Colonel Hort’s soldiers emplaced some 3,000 12-ft tall, 9-ton T-Wall sections to create a 4.6-km barrier.... the wall, in effect, “became a magnet for every bad guy in Sadr City.” As JAM fighters attacked to stop completion of the wall, the surrounding area became a killing ground. JAM had few good options. If the wall were completed, it would curtail JAM’s access to the population and the market. JAM leaders depended on that access.... During this period, Abrams tanks and Bradley fi ghting vehicles were heavily engaged, firing 818 main-gun rounds and 12,091 25-mm rounds against JAM fighters and to detonate IEDs. Additionally, U.S. forces had to constantly adapt to JAM tactics. For example, JAM employed snipers to attempt to knock out the crane that was used to lift the T-Wall sections into place. U.S. forces responded by employing organic U.S. Army and SOF snipers in a countersniper campaign. As the battle wore on, JAM fighters showed up in ever-decreasing numbers as U.S. and Iraqi forces steadily wore them down.

Yeah, let's move along. Time will prove who is right and who is dead.

The Indonesian Defense minister just created a stir by claiming there are 1200 foreign jihadists in the Philippines. I find this non-credible, as local host groups would find that number extremely hard to provision. Also, by now a force of this size would certainly have declared an emirate in a sanctuary area, killing or driving out locals who didn't go along with the plan. There is no sign of any of this having occurred.

Not 'caused' of course, but paralysis and hand wringing because better a thousand terrorists go free than one fulminating blind sheik feel marginalized, or don't be beastly to the Wahabis it just creates more child killing nail bombers, are indulgences the West can't afford. And poorer societies can afford even less. This is all as clear as day to me, old friend, and I think you know better than to call me uneducated. I think we will never convince each other, so maybe best to move along.

Yes, it appears that quite a few non local scumbags have been trickling in down there. Good news is, they seem to be throwing their useless lives away in a futile Tet offensive / pogrom in Marawi, reinforcing to their fellow Muslims that they are bad news. Muslims are only 5% of the population here, and in this case are not outbreeding the Catholics. But in the meantime, there is no question they will strike in Manila. So I am mindful of where I linger these days. More broadly, I note a near total absence of reaction on my (mainly North American) FB feed to the latest outrages in the UK. Compassion fatigue, plus simply numbed by nonstop antiTrumping, I suppose. I suppose once the basement jihadis graduate to anthrax and poison gas (ISIS already using it) and body counts go into hundreds then maybe we will see some actual reaction again. It's only a matter of time. Eventually the West will see revival of sedition laws that allow (non-Hellfire) preemptive removal of agitators and organizers who create the actual terrorists. The mainstream Islamic world already does this (not always effectively, of course). Nonmilitant fundamentalists will suffer too, but will also need to learn to beware the company they keep. That is how things used to be in the pre-snowflake era.

What, you mean the TacAI of the penguin army leaves something to be desired?

Yes, the CMA Goat module has been overdue for some time. Otoh, these "just for a lark" programs also make it blindingly obvious that the underlying CM platform is sadly dated. And even to an 18 year CM loyalist like me, the universal wave-away of "sure, but just look at the crap zombie horde AIs, total pants damage modeling and static terrain" is starting to smell like a bit of a red herring. A 10 year old red herring, to be exact. IMHO the time is coming for BFC either to seek greener platforms, or else live off a dwindling player base buying incremental tweaks to their current offers. Risking the possibility that someone at one of the big houses finally does a passable formation command logic, and one day the old church empties out....

Of course, for the ultimate in "interesting" there is always Revenge of the Chickens!

Haha. CM memes! Love it!

Lol! "he have heart attack, then fall out of window on top of exploding bomb"?

Switching over to the Russian experience in Grozny (RAND RR1602 paper linked above): The very nature of urban operations creates complexities that demand rapid, low-level decisionmaking in both offensive and defensive operations. Perhaps the ultimate expression of this was in the first battle for Grozny, when Chechen rebels used small hunter-killer teams dispersed in ambush sites that restricted and canalized Russian maneuver. They took a heavy toll on Russian armor. Local support for the well-understood plan for the defense of Grozny was key, as it made it difficult for the Russians to mass forces or fires.... The Chechen force had two months to prepare the city and they constructed a number of ambush points. The rebels had two defense lines, with the least-skilled personnel in the front. Snipers occupied roofs and upper floors of buildings, controlling distant approaches to specific intersections. They attempted to draw the Russians out into the street.... Snipers also could be found in trenches and under concrete slabs that covered basements. These slabs could be raised with car jacks when Russian forces approached, provide ambush firing positions, and then drop back down. The attacking Russian force struggled to discern what was merely rubble and what was a kill zone. . . The Chechens used the trenches to move between houses and as sniper positions. As the Russian force focused on the tops of buildings or on windows, they were often attacked from the trenches, a sort of attack by misdirection. The Chechens stated that in the city they did not use body armor because it slowed them down, or tracers, which revealed their positions too precisely. . . . Finally, the impressive mobility of the Chechen force included escape routes from firing positions, interconnected firing positions and again the sewer network to move about the city. Reportedly a computer in Grozny kept track of everyone in the city and other areas of Chechnya who reported in by radio. Russian forces especially feared the nighttime, when the Chechens would move against and reclaim abandoned positions. The Chechen force allegedly used chlorine and ammonia bombs, set oil wells on fire to obscure fields of vision and rigged entire building complexes with explosives.... The Chechens boarded up all first-story windows and doors, making it impossible to simply walk into a building. While trying to climb ladders or knock in doorways, Russian soldiers became targets for Chechen snipers positioned on upper floors. Reportedly the Chechens were divided into 25-man groups that were subdivided into three smaller groups of eight each that tried to stay close to the Russian force (again, “hugging” the Russian force as during the 1995 battle to minimize the Russian artillery effort) **** In their organization for combat [second battle], the Russians had learned lessons from both their own World War II experience and from their enemy. They set up attack (“storm”) groups of 30 to 50 men and broke these groups into even smaller teams of a handful of men each. These smaller teams might include soldiers armed with an RPG, an automatic rifle, and a sniper rifle, and include two additional men armed with automatic weapons. Other storm group components included soldiers armed with Shmel flamethrowers, artillery and aviation forward observers, sappers, and reconnaissance personnel. Combat in Grozny revealed the elevation limitations of tank and infantry fighting vehicle weapons in dealing with targets at ground level (e.g., basement windows) or from upper floors of multistory buildings. The Russians used air defense gun systems that could hyper-elevate in Grozny (i.e., ZSU-23-4s and 2S6s), but they were thin-skinned and vulnerable and became the target of choice for Chechen hunter-killer teams. The Soviets and then the Russians began fielding “hyperelevating, rapid-firing, medium-caliber weapons with explosive ammunition for medium-armored vehicles—rather than modifying tanks.... When tanks were brought into the city, they were there to follow and support the storm detachments rather than to lead. Armored vehicles moved through the city surrounded by the dismounted infantry of the attack group. The vehicles could thus effectively engage enemy snipers and automatic riflemen in the buildings that the attack troops could not reach, while being protected by the infantry.... ... the federal forces relied heavily on fuel-air explosives and tactical missiles (SCUD and SCARAB).... these assets were used to attack fighters hiding in basements. Such fire strikes were designed for maximum psychological pressure—to demonstrate the hopelessness of further resistance against a foe that could strike with impunity....

As with the Bohol attack, it seems like a half assed desperation move by the Maute brothers. Seems the intent, besides publicity, was to provoke an overreaction by the Army that would re-radicalize the other militias. It doesn't seem to be working; most Muslims here don't feel oppressed day to day (just poor), and don't feel a pressing need to convert or kill their equally poor infidel neighbours. They won't inform on their radicals for fear of retaliation, but otoh they aren't sending their sons to volunteer, in spite of rumours about poor folks enlisting for a 10000 pesos a month and a bag of rice.

"Going through the door works, but if you can take the corner of the building off with a Bradley, tank, or truck, you established a breach in a direction the occupants just aren't oriented in." [harder to do with walled courtyards] **** "We almost learned the hard way that routine becomes deadly. In early 2007, the threat changed inside the target house. The enemy learned not to fight directly. Instead, they would rig the entire house to blow. For a time, we mastered the art of battle drill six. We lived by the mantra that "slow is smooth and smooth is fast." My teams could flow through a town seamlessly. During clearance operations in the DRV, I chose an abandoned home to strong point. To date, we had cleared over 400 homes. Given the location and vantage point, it was key terrain. The location seemed ideal. It was all too inviting. Unfortunately, the enemy identified it as well. After we secured the house, I had a platoon inside establishing our defense and a platoon outside consolidating. Still something felt odd about the house. In the past 48 hours, we had lost 4 paratroopers to a suicide bomber and discovered an EFP production facility. An alert NCO continued to search discovering a wire hidden under a rug leading to a hidden basement. Inside the basement, the receiver flashed connected to over 1000lbs of explosives. Thankfully, the det cord was flawed. I would have lost at least 15 soldiers. Another unit was not so lucky and lost 10 soldiers. Afterwards, we adopted the crawl approach to clearing. There is no golden egg with TTPs in sustained COIN. BD6 is not a thing of the past. The key is to be erratic, innovative, and decisive. Sometimes you storm the house; sometimes you call TPTs for surrender; sometimes you blow the house up. As long as you are anything but predictable. We mastered a similar TTP for driving- always change the tempo. Sometimes we bounded; sometimes we sped; sometimes we crawled. " **** " Those TTPs are designed to limit loss of life of non-combatants while RAPIDLY securing a target. The lives of the assaulting element come a distant second to the above mentioned factors. Now take your deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Is there ANYTHING in ANY house that you ever stepped foot into that is worth dying over? Short of the answer "an American Hostage", your answer should be negative."

Some very good discussion on the divergence between MOUT theory and practice in these links: 1. Here's what the vets say.... http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/archive/index.php/t-2089.html An overemphasis on training for close quarter combat (CQC), or close quarter battle (CQB), in recent years has resulted in its overuse in combat, often in situations where more appropriate options exist. Platoon by platoon, the Army is learning the hard way how hazardous it is to fight room to room against a well prepared and often suicidal opponent. We can no longer afford to learn the lesson individually. The whole stack concept is for barricaded subjects in a controlled area and in which the bad guys are contained. It doesn't appear that we have that luxury very often in Iraq.... we must not become enamored with SWAT TTPs that are designed to handle a particular threat, and one which we certainly would not encounter in a high-intensity environment. Our "secure a foothold" rehearsals had squads stacked up in neat lines, preparing to make entry from the street or alleyway. "What are you going to do when you have a machine gun aimed in on a principle direction of fire down the street?" ... infantry squads/platoons quickly learned to first identify enemy positions and then moved to isolate/overwatch while calling in tanks, air, D-9s, CAAT, LAR, Bradleys, etc. to reduce before Marines moved into clear. It's in the latter clearing process that CQB skills should be emphasized and employed. ... using on-line tactics makes the enemy's job easy and falls right into his preferred strategy: attrit U.S. forces at range and then fall back through pre-made tunnels, jumping from roof-to-roof or over gates, etc as U.S. forces close and then to continue this pattern until you run out of room, at which point you execute your pre-determined E&E plan and live to fight another day.... Ackerman's experiences demonstrate the validity of urban night infiltration tactics as his platoon successfully infiltrated roughly 300 meters behind enemy lines and proceeded to wreak havoc on the enemy at first light when the enemy attempted to expolit what they perceived to be our predictable on-line attack preference shortly after the sun comes up in the morning. 2. For contrast, here's the FM theory, with lots of diagrams, including a paragraph on S2's favourite, Breaching.... http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_01-9_karagosian.htm The best way to enter, ROE permitting, is to make our own hole through the wall. Next best is a window, doors being least preferred. If the friendly and enemy-held buildings are adjoining, "mouseholing" with demolitions is preferable. Otherwise, AT4s, LAWs or other munitions should be used from the safety of our own building, rather than going out into the open to emplace explosives by hand. An effective technique, and one used by Chechens in Grozny in 1994, is to task-organize "rocket teams" under an NCO. Using pair or volley technique, a breach can be rapidly made and provide the enemy the least time in advance as a warning. Hollow-charge weapons in general are not designed to breach walls and one may not be enough. High explosive warheads (such as those in the AT8, SMAW, and Carl Gustav) have better ability to breach masonry. Main gun rounds from tanks are very effective. Our casualties in the assault itself will be proportional to the intensity of enemy fire, its accuracy, and how long our assault teams are exposed to enemy fire. Suppressive fire and smoke together minimize the intensity and accuracy of enemy fire. The breaching fundamentals SOSR (Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce) will assist us here. Smoke grenades draw fire; at a minimum, we can expect the enemy to shoot blindly into the smoke cloud. Speed of movement and breaching minimize exposure times. Assault teams must move fast and stay dispersed. If possible, do not stack outside the entry point. Get inside as quickly as possible. I hope this is interesting.

https://newrepublic.com/article/116199/fallujah-veteran-asks-if-it-was-worth-it Before I can scream at Dan, he tells me the artillery is coming from our Regimental Headquarters far outside the city. And he says, calmly, “I’m headed to the roof to get it shifted off you.” I throw the handset back at Nick. I feel forty-six sets of eyes on me. There is a strange quiet. We’re pressed shoulder to shoulder and I can hear all of us breathing. It’s as if the insurgents and us all anxiously await the next artillery salvo to land. Far away, I hear a single gun shot, an insignificant pop. After it, all hell breaks loose again, as if sound and time were trying to divorce one another. We press into the wall but our ears don’t hurt, no dust consumes us. I poke my head up. About a hundred meters away, the artillery impacts land among the insurgents’ positions. I grab the radio. “Nice shooting!” I tell Dan. A different voice meets mine. “Get a Corpsman to the high-rise!”

There's a huge amount of detail rich info being published now about the wars of the last 15 years, especially Iraq 2003-2009

Well, that certainly spoils the moment.

My own 5.0 wishlist intersects with that; I'd like scenario designers able to set and run AI plans for both sides (a CM "war movie"), with the human player(s) able to interrupt and redirect the programmed plan for a subset (or maybe all) of the units. It doesn't seem wildly impossible to do using the current engine architecture. ....But some prim English mathematicians would suffice. That naughty librarian thing, dontcherknow, but with headphones... And long pointy sticks. Yes, we must have sticks. ... Oh, I'm terribly sorry, what were you saying again?

Hmm, the lads at Bletchley are running a tad short of German naval codes to crack. Quick, send them some more prim but pretty Cambridge mathematics undergraduates in tight fitting wool uniforms!

Word is born! Word to your mother! And other RunDMCisms. (Yes, hiphop is over 30 years old)

3-5 Marines relief operation from Gov Center. Details in the paper....

Here is the COYOTE operation in Fallujah, OB and ops map. Just need to establish whether the battlespace is more residential (2 story) or built up.

Great battle maps in the RAND paper. Here's Mogadishu:

Brother Erwin, this is for you! In his book 'Out of the Mountains' [2013], David Kilcullen outlines several scenarios in which conflicts could require military action: • Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or noncombatant evacuation operations . . . that escalate into conflict. • When governments are giving long-term assistance (sending military advisors, special operations forces, law enforcement support, or civilian development aid) to cities that are experiencing conflict . . . [and] foreign advisors [are] being kidnapped, held for ransom, or used as bargaining chips in local conflicts, and . . . special operations forces [are] having to go in and rescue them. • Peacekeeping or peace enforcement. . . . Even where policymakers’ intent is to resolve a conflict, monitor a truce, or police a cease-fire, putting peacekeepers into an urban conflict zone amounts to laying out an attractive array of targets for terrorist groups, local insurgents, street gangs, organized crime, or just commercial kidnapping networks, and this can force peacekeepers into combat at short notice. • In conventional state-on-state war. . . . more or less hypothetical cases of war with China, North Korea, or Iran—involve urbanized terrain, coastal cities, and constricted littoral sea space. • Increasingly dense networks of connectivity among cities and populations across the planet, expeditionary operations (where the military goes overseas to fight) may bring retaliatory attacks in home territory—most probably, again, in major cities—that will draw public safety organizations and military forces into lethal situations in urban areas. There have been several instances where members of immigrant communities engaged in attacks against Western cities— either ordered or indirectly inspired by nonstate armed groups in their countries of origin. . . . an increasing threat that we might call “diaspora retaliation." Hmm, anyone up for a Medium sized Diaspora Retaliation PBEM?

Now for our reading pleasure comes a new 217 page (2017) RAND study: "Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army" http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1602/RAND_RR1602.pdf RAND conducted a historical analysis of the ways in which militaries have deployed light and mechanized infantry during close urban combat.... in urban warfare, the local drivers of conflict, the tactical firing positions of urban dwellings, the will of the civilian population, or the neighborhood itself, can become the Army force’s greatest ally or worst foe. Case studies include: Mogadishu, Grozny, Fallujah, Sadr City and Baghdad.