Grisha

Speaking of preparatory fire missions and the ability of setting up depleted units in CMBB. I was wondering, has anyone set up a test scenario in CMBO to determine what sort of casualties would occur from a massive bombardment of a fortified position? You know, deploy a company with AT assets in fortified positions, then hammer the position for, say, 15 turns with a wide assortment of heavy and rocket artillery? I think I'll try this tomorrow after work, maybe 2 tests, one rural setting, and the other, urban. [ 01-07-2002: Message edited by: Grisha ]</p>

I have to agree with Kip as well, Iron Chef Sakai. My interest in the Soviet military goes back to the early seventies when I started getting into wargames. Games like Russian Campaign, Drang Nach Osten, Red Star/White Star and Squad Leader set me on my present path, and now that the Soviet archives are mostly accessible, these are truly exciting times for military historians, professional and amateur alike. So, if we post concerns about a seemingly 'anal' aspect of the game, please bear with us - it's only because a computer-based tactical wargame like Combat Mission, using data from the Soviet archives, makes possible a game we never thought would happen.

The decision to arm the IS-II with a 122mm gun was based on its primary function - breakthrough against fortified infantry positions. While capable(and designed) to go toe to toe with heavy German armor, the consensus was that the IS-II would encounter infantry positions far more frequently than German panzers.

Kip, I don't doubt the times you stated for Soviet artillery response during Kursk. I'm just saying that once Soviet operations became offensive it created conditions very different from those at Kursk. On-call divisional artillery during Kursk was probably a lot faster in response than on-call artillery during the Belorussian campaign after the breakthrough phase. Up until the beginning of the exploitation phase, I'm sure response times were similar, if not better. But for a mobile group pushing ahead during exploitation it was probably a lot worse - if artillery was even available. I guess it really depends on whether it's a set piece battle, or a mobile action. Set piece assaults would have it all there, most likely where it was needed most. Mobile actions would be a different story, because once mobile groups pushed through the breach a lot of the artillery would be left behind.

double post [ 01-02-2002: Message edited by: Grisha ]</p>

Kip, I really doubt that anything above Divisional level artillery was available for on-call fire with the Soviets during exploitation. And even for divisional level, delay times would've probably been a little longer than German times, because it seems that the Soviets, even in 1945, were averse to using radio due to fears of counterbattery fire. Thus, most contact was still made by land lines. Now, the Soviets were pretty flexible with land lines, laying them right behind a front echelon's advance via artillery FOs, but many times those FOs had no maps, and were in reality more intelligence scouts than anything else. However, in a pinch they could call in artillery, and did, though it took a while to get it all triangulated. But, all is not lost, because one aspect of Soviet doctrine that did improve significantly was aviation, or ground-air liaison. Shturmoviks, Pe-2s and Tu-2s were available en masse and on-call during exploitation, and VVS liaison officers were assigned to forward units with radios to assist in directing air strikes against German targets. By 1944, the VVS rules the skies over any soviet schwerpunkt area. [ 01-02-2002: Message edited by: Grisha ]</p>

Taking all that's been said, and placing it into the CMBB environment would probably result in two situations: Large to massive indirect artillery support, but on a preplanned basis. Delay times are not an issue, since it's all preplanned. Small indirect artillery support, comprising mostly of 82mm or 120mm mortar, with maybe a 76mm gun battery thrown in. It could be either planned, or on-call with delays being comparable to German times.Simply put, Corps level artillery, and up(152mm+), was never really used as on-call by the Soviets in WWII, so having FO's for this purpose is unrealistic.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Cauldron: That is rubbish.... Artillary has to be repositioned, i guess because the Soviets had SO MUCH OF IT this probably took about 5 times as long as the Germans The Soviets continued loosing in the so called 3rd period of the war because they continued to feed units into killig zones or in the case of AFV's had nowhere near the C & C of german units ethier tacitcaly or esp strategically. The WHOLE reason the Kursk salient existed at ALL was German strategic thinking ( in this case Von Manstein). The effectiveness of artillary ( Soviet) is unquestioned or at least its abundance. As stated by Henrici " Soviet artillary was both abundant and powerful." end of story \<hr></blockquote> Not quite, Cauldron. Though I won't 'grace' your response as one only fit for the trash bin, I will say your answer is a bit narrow. Many Soviet casualties during the 3rd period of the war(incidently, a Soviet/Russian term used to delineate the different phases of the war - Kip posts the dates they roughly represent up above) resulted from a lack of firepower during crucial phases of their offensive operations. For example, an unexpected German strongpoint prevents exploiting Soviet forces from cutting off a German retreat route. The lack of appreciable artillery from division or higher that can be made available in a timely manner forces these Soviet units to assault the German position with little or no indirect artillery support, resulting in higher casualties. And while direct fire support in the form of tanks or assault guns could help, there is nothing quite like artillery to saturate an area. So, yes, the Soviets possessed tremendous artillery assets, but they were mainly limited to the breakthrough, and immediate exploitation phases of an offensive operation. Once exploitation was underway one couldn't expect more than divisional level artillery, and more often than not regimental artillery was as much as you got, ie 120mm mortars.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>However, when it comes to the “diminished artillery effectiveness after the breakthrough phase” I have a slightly different spin on things to others. In my view, the reason for this diminished effectiveness, regarding artillery, was that the post-breakthrough phases on the Eastern Front tended to involve advances of 20km, 30km or even 50km in just a few days. Advances only seen on in NEW during the last week of August and first weeks of September 44. With such rapid advances moving forward the artillery and all the FO related command and control will have been challenging. In such situations, more often than not, there will not have been Army level FO/CM spotter type artillery support. However, “if” there were such support, as sometimes will have been the case, then the same SOP will have been used. The Soviets will have either had a regiment of, say, 122mm howitzers, in place with ammo and communications set up to support a FO or not. If they did, then the usual Standard Operating Procedures will have been used. It follows from this that the delay times will have been the same as usual. In my view, very similar to those of the Germans. - Kip<hr></blockquote> I agree, and again, this would have been previously implemented as part of the Army/Front plan. It'll be neat making scenarios of engagements with elements of forward detachments - offensive ad hoc units that were well balanced with firepower and speed. I think what people tend to believe is that Soviet formations tended to keep everything centralized, making for terrible flexibility. In the 1st period of the war this was definitely true, but not because of Soviet military doctrine. The real reason was due to a military leadership that was inexperienced, resulting in an inability to implement proper Soviet doctrine and procedure. By the 2nd period of the war, this was changing rapidly, and by the 3rd period Soviet doctrine was being implemented properly. The fact is, what was really centralized was the planning process, which made decisions as to who and where the major effort was to be established. These decisions based on comprehensive reconnaissance/intelligence reports and knowledge of their subunit commanders' capabilities. Combined with very effective use of deception during the deployment phase, most decisions were well made, and the result was that in the end - at the tactical level the units that needed the most support had it. On the other hand, all the planning in the world can't predict when and where defensive strongpoints will arise during exploitation, nor what degree of resistance will be encountered. And as exploitation further develops, the amount of engagements encountered multiplies. This requires a truly flexible response from support assets, something Soviet doctine was weak at due to centralization of uncommitted assets.

Kip, I like your fire plan idea, and generally agree with you. The Soviets got around the 'initiative/flexibility' issue by very intensive pre-planning, starting from Front level down to small units. Due to very good reconnaissance work, and comprehensive contingency planning, a form of 'predetermined flexibilty'(boy, now there's an oxymoron) emerged within the confines of the overall operation. However, it should also be noted that this sort of thing didn't come to fruition until mid-1943, and that after Kursk, the majority of Soviet operations were offensive in nature, resulting in diminshed artillery effectiveness after the breakthrough phase. It could even be said that Soviet losses remained high in the 3rd period of the war due to this very limitation: lack of responsive, flexible artillery during mobile operations. Maybe, it might be an idea to do away with Soviet spotters for artillery at 152mm and higher, and replace them with a 'fireplan' setup, since from Corps level artillery up, most fire missions were part of an overall plan.

From what I've read about Soviet offensive artillery practices, a lot of the fire plan was laid out from extensive reconnaissance - both land and air. Targets were generally enemy artillery and C3i positions. Soviet artillery was most effective from the initial breakthrough phase, when most enemy positions could be considered static and identified. Once into the exploitation phase, Soviet forces tended to rely mainly on regimental/brigade artillery assets, and/or any self-propelled direct fire artillery. In fact, the jack-of-all-trades gun for most rifle units was the 45mm AT gun, since it fired an HE round too. Personally, what I think would be cool is to have Soviet TRP's by gun bore. This way you could set it up so that a corps/army level 152mm FO with, say, 3 152mm TRP's would have the same cost as a German 150mm FO. Make sure that TRP's bring Soviet delay times down to German On-call times, and you have a rough fire plan. To be frank, I'm actually going to be looking to the SU-76/122/152(or even towed guns) for most artillery needs in the majority of Soviet non-assault scenarios played. And, regimental 120mm mortar fire. 82mm mortars at battalion level are fine, but 120mm's have just the right 'punch'. [ 12-30-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]</p>

Am really looking forward to Matrix Games' Battleline. It's going to be a WWII operational game somewhat on the scale of HPS's Panzer Campaign series, but set in a 'WEGO' format, and complete with a map/scenario editor.

Fantastic! Thanks

Spasibo!

Jason, in the Bring out your dead thread you wrote a reply on how a combined arms attack would be done over open ground. The one thing you didn't address was defensive indirect fire, or 'how do you stop all those guys crawling in the grass from getting slaughtered by artillery before they ever get close enough to lob grenades?' I actually agree with your assessment, but would like to know how this would be dealt with. The best I can think of is to use smoke for cover, and keep the grass crawlers widely spaced and moving albeit slowly from the crawl. I remember a similar situation like this in one game, and all I did was keep them crawling(though they were in cover - trees) and use whatever smoke I had for cover. I did take losses but it seemed that the continuous movement frustrated the overall enemy barrage. Eventually the barrages ended, and it was business as usual. If there's a better way to do this, I'd like to know.

Aw, what the hell. 43.

That's sensational, Wild Bill! Congratulations!!

It's available on www.abebooks.com. Type the title "War of the Century". Author is Rees. $22.

This game has never been too long, but a long time ago Jeff Duquette and I once played GDW's Road to the Rhine from something like 8pm until 4pm the next day - nonstop It got to the point where we would do our moves, then go under the table, wake up the other, and trade places. Man, those were the days, eh, Jeff? [ 11-13-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]</p>

Great news! Thanks for the update

Thanks, Jason. Wasn't thinking straight. And I do have Glantz' The Pursuit of Deep Battle, which addresses this all rather nicely, including many maps of division/army/front deployment for both attack/defense throughout the war. You gave me the kick in the head to access those memory banks again machineman, Yes, Rokossovsky was arguably the Soviet Union's best Front commander in WWII. What really strikes me about his memoir is his continuous concern for his staff. It appears that his relationship with his staff was of great importance, to the point of almost being familiar. He speaks with great admiration for Chernyakhovsky, another great commander: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> He was a fine commander, young, educated, cheerful - altogether a remarkable man and very popular with the troops. Such things are readily apparent. When an officer comes up to his Army Commander and delivers his report with cheerful confidence, this is the commander's achievement.<hr></blockquote>

Another interesting pasage in the chapter is when Rokossovsky compares the two pincer movements, Orel in the north, and Belgorod in the south. Rokossovsky commanded the Central Front which was tasked with defending the Orel pincer, while the Voronezh Front, commanded by Vatutin, was to defend against the Belgorod pincer. Here is what Rokossovsky had to say about the discrepancy between the two assaults, in which the northern group only advanced as far as 6-12km, whereas the southern group advanced up to 35km: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> We had got along without the GHQ Reserve, managing with our own forces. Some memoir writers and historians attribute this to the fact that the enemy's northern group, facing us, had been much weaker than the southern group, which had attacked Vatutin's troops. However, the difference between the two groups had not been all that great: the southern group had been superior to the northern by two panzer divisions, but inferior by three infantry divisions. Obviously, the reason lies elsewhere; namely, the Central Front had deployed its forces better, concentrating them on the most threatened sector, and the enemy had been unable to overcome such a concentration of forces and material. The Voronezh Front had taken a different approach to the defence problem, spreading its forces almost uniformly over the whole frontage. That, as I see it, was why the enemy, striking as he did against us, on a narrow sector, succeeded in penetrating comparatively deeply, so that substantial forces from GHQ Reserve were needed to bring him to a halt. <hr></blockquote>

Am reading Rokossovsky's memoir, A Soldier's Duty, and on the Chapter entitled The End of the "Citadel" he describes the fortifications, which were begun in April '43, and largely completed by June. The amount of stuff in those defensive lines is immpressive. Average artillery density in his sector(Orel region) was 35 tubes per kilometer with more than 10 of those being antitank guns. That's more than one AT gun and two other artillery guns per 100m. Imagine the hell that must've been.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>"Nations included are the Soviet Union, Germany, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Poland, and Partisans." Charles Moylan's quote on which nationalities would be represented in CM2, from the GameSpot interview<hr></blockquote>

I'm sure someone has given thought to this already, but in an operational level setup for CM there should be the occasion when roving aircraft attack ground units on the march. For example, in CMBO there should be great occasion for a German column on the march in daylight to suddenly come under attack from USAAF aircraft. Is it possible to merely have one side setup, then base the opposing side with nothing but aircraft?