Grisha

Zhukov was overrated. While vital in 1941 at both Leningrad and Moscow, Zhukov's command abilities were limited and even crude. Still, he was a man who would fight to the end and with great determination. And, more importantly for Stalin's sake, Zhukov was politically reliable.

Regarding production disparities between the Soviet Union & Germany, it is difficult to compare. The Soviet Union was built on a concept of intense centralization, whereas German industry was very heavily privatized. In fact, German industry had a fair amount of power in Nazi Germany, and used it at times to their advantage. German industry was loath to change its system of production, relying on the tried and true craftsman system. This system produced excellent equipment, but such equipment could be quite complex and could not be produced in great quantity. Basically, German industry was a big headache for the Third Reich, since it was like pulling teeth to get these entrenched businessmen to think differently. In the Soviet Union, the only goal of industry was to produce competent equipment that could be maintained with ease, and produced in great quantity. After the design bureaus had developed equipment that met the requirements of the government, the best were chosen for production. Due to the transfer of much of the Soviet Union's heavy industry the quality of that production fluctuated for many months. Part of the government's function was not only to choose the best designs, but also to monitor the production of those designs to make sure that the equipment was meeting their design specifications. This became especially important during the shift of industry to the Urals. This entire process of serial production evaluation never ended in the Soviet Union, and defects or poor performance in equipment was investigated immediately to discern the problem and find a solution. Also, I can state quite confidently that until late in the war, the amount of resources available for production to Germany was greater than that available to the Soviet Union, lend lease or otherwise.

Interesting to see how they will be used. Partisans in the Soviet Union were primarily used to gather intelligence, commit sabotage, or create diversionary activity. In 1944 during the Belorussian campaign they did take on a much more expanded role, functioning in many ways like forward detachments.

Anthony Quinn and John Lee Hooker also passed away recently Cya Jack, Walter, John and Anthony

Richard Cuccia, You posted this in the 'Worst Commander' thread: Are you kidding about Zhukov. I am no Russian or Communist lover by any means, but Zhukov is probably one of the absolute "best" commanders of WW2. At every place that he command, he won. In 1941, in initial German rush to Leningrad, Zhukov commanded at that city, stablized the front at the city, and saved that city from German capture, albeit at horrendous cost. Later in l941, Zhukov commanded at Moscow, saved the city from German capture, and, with the help of the Russian winter, he even counterattacked throwing the Germans back from Moscow's front door. Once again, he accomplished it at horrendous cost. This is certainly true. Zhukov was instrumental in both Leningrad and Moscow. His leadership was of great value during that year. In 1942, Zhukov commanded the defense of Stalingrad and the incredible Russian encirclement of the German 6th Army. This is incorrect. Zhukov did not command the defense of Stalingrad. At best, Zhukov's role at Stalingrad was limited to the initial planning of Uranus along with Vasilevsky who eventually took over the entire operation. This was because Zhukov was quite busy in preparation with Operation Mars, an operation he was working on in cooperation with Konev. And an operation that he failed in, with great loss of men and equipment. Granted, Hitler's stupidity contributed mightily to the German defeat, but, guess what - Zhukov won, of course with horrendous loss, but not a horrendous as Zhukov's prior two battles. During the rest of the war in old mother Russia, Zhukov continuted to win wherever he commanded. But actually, after Stalingrad, the Russians could hardly lose barring utter stupidity, which the Russians did not show. Notice that Zhukov and, for that matter, all Russian commanders lost battles and won battles at horrendous loss. Horrendous loss was almost a prerquisite for Russian battle in WW2. The Russians paid the major butcher bill to defeat the best army in WW2, the German. The western democracies of course contributed most of the materiale to defeat the Nazis. The Soviets could have still lost the war, had they not learned from their mistakes. The operational excellence displayed by such commanders as Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky and Vatutin, to name a few, was on par with any officer of similar rank in any army in the world at that time. The Soviet's development of maskirovka was instrumental in the success of their offensive operations from mid '43, on. And while the western allies contributed key materials and equipment that greatly facilitated Soviet success, it was Soviet production that was the backbone of their success.

The_Capt is right on about prepared defenses and how it was attacked. This is something that happened a lot in the Russian Front, so I wouldn't be surprised to see scenarios like this coming out when CM2 is out. As for boring, I disagree, because this is a prime example of combined arms action, especially for the attacker.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Viceroy: How do you rate Zhukov? I'm curious why no one on this thread has touted his name as a possible contender for best commander. I've seen his name on the worst commander thread which amazes me.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Zhukov as a general was above average. He had a tremendous temper at times, truly putting the fear of god into his subordinates. More than a few were removed from command when they did not meet his expectations. It goes without saying that Zhukov was not well liked among subordinates. His attack plans called for very powerful bold thrusts right up the middle, almost as if to show his opponent that it didn't matter where he was attacking, because he was going right through anyway. Before the effective use of maskirovka this usually meant heavy losses for Zhukov's units, which came to be a characteristic of his: crude use of his forces. If any word described Zhukov's attacks best it was, indeed, meatgrinder. Still, in 1941, Zhukov was quite instrumental in helping to keep it together. He was a person Stalin could rely on, since Zhukov was a staunch Party member and he was a fighter. His rough handling of troops was not of much concern during a time when hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were being encircled by the Germans. And Zhukov did get the job done. However, after this time other generals came up during the war who were much better then Zhukov. Vasilevsky was plainly superior to Zhukov at that level of command. He was even tempered, and very analytical in his approach to war. It was Vasilevsky who probably planned the majority of Uranus, even though much press seems to go to Zhukov. The fact is that Zhukov was busy planning Mars, which ended up being a bloodbath for the Soviets. At the Front level(equivalent to Army level in the Wehrmacht) commanders like Rokossovky, Vatutin, Chernyakovskiy, and Bagramyan were of excellent caliber. Even Konev was a good commander, though he was much like Zhukov in temperament, and was not well liked. Probably the best of the Front commanders was Rokossovsky. He was an excellent planner and was known for his compassion. Vatutin was much like Rokossovsky in these ways, but tended to be quite dynamic, like a horse chaffing at the bit. Vatutin was the youngest of the lot, but was killed in late '44 when his vehicle was ambushed by Ukrainian Nationalists while he was checking on his units' redeployments during a maskirovka operation. [ 06-27-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]

I'd say Rokossovsky or Vasilevsky. Rokossovsky's my favorite, but Vasilevsky had tremendous talent to command from a strategic level.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Cooper: Carlos Hathcock was on a hill at Duc Pho when he made a 2500 yard kill.He shot a member of the viet cong with a 50 caliber machine gun. the heavy bullet allows for accuracy well beyond 2000 yards. And the cyclic rate is also slow enough for single shots to be fired. He pioneered the use of this weapon as a sniper platform.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Actually, they were using .50 MGs as sniper weapons in Korea. Even put a scope on it.

I'd like to recreate a Soviet exploitation phase that was the result of a successful maskirovka/breakthrough operation. Also, I'd love to recreate the initial assault of the Vistula-Oder operation.

It's amazing to think of just how many operations could be made for CM2, starting with '41 and Smolensk, Kiev, Moscow, and Rostov. Then in '42 Kharkov, the Caucasus, Mars, and Stalingrad. '43, Kharkov, Kursk, kharkov again, the entire race to the Dnepr. '44, Korsun, Romania, the Baltic, Belorussian campaign, Lodz-Sandomierz. Finally, Vistula-Oder and Berlin. It's going to be something else

John, have you found any numbers for StuG deployments in the Russian Front? I'm not trying to make a point really. It's just that now you've got me going with this numbers thing, and I'm truly interested to see what StuG numbers were - for scenario purposes. I read somewhere that StuGs were used more and more frequently as the war progressed, since it was much easier to produce. Was it used mainly for infantry support, or did it also have an AT task as well?

Well, I actually side with John on this, since it's most likely that numbers would determine the frequency of engagements between said AFVs. Though it isn't theoretically valid to compare a PzV to a T-34(76 or 85), when one looks at the numbers of vehicles per given tank, it does become a valid point when considering actual engagement possibilities. This being the case, I'd want at least 3:1 odds numerically for my T-34s, and a nice jumping off point from good cover at no further than 500m to the Panthers

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1: Grisha I'm glad you brought that up, as concerning numbers it's realy date dependant on when the PzKpfw IV was more 'common' Ie, up till the end mid - late 1944, the PzKpfw IV was the most 'common' German tank, Ie, as of 31.05.44 their were 603 PzKpfw IV's & 313 PzKpfw V's deployed on the Eastren Front, but by 15.09.44 their were 610 PzKpfw IV's & 728 PzKpfw V's deployed on the Eastren Front. Panther totals from then on remained around 700 + and were even with, slightly less, or more then PzKpfw IV numbers. The last disparity in numbers was on 15.03.45 with 1,239 PzKpfw IV & 762 PzKpfw V. So basicly their was just as good a chance as running into a Panther as their was a PzKpfw IV. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Interesting numbers, John, and I don't doubt their validity either. Would you happen to know the general numbers for the StuG in the Russian Front?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mr. Johnson-<THC>-: I think what would be better is too have 1 to 3 diffrent vaules for armor quality and evey time you buy a tank the CM engine roles a 3 sided die and gives your tank say 100%, 95%, or 85%. Just like the Tungesten rounds and ammo loadouts. Realisticly these values for armor quality were subject to real world problems. A bad mix of hard metals, an idiot running the mold, bombing. And maybe the tank factory in Lenigrad turned out decent armor, the factory in Stalingrad made crappy armor, and the ones near Gorky were top notch and got priority for the good steels and had the best trained engineers in Russia. But thats would require massive amounts of research.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Actually, Mr. Johnson, it would be far more accurate to depict such a variable scale as being dependent on year, not factory. The relocation of Soviet heavy industry had much more to do with variable serial production quality than any one particular factory, per se. 1942 was probably the worse year for serial production. Of course, getting hard data in sufficient quantities to validify this will be a problem.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1: As to comparing it to the IS-2 why would we? encounters between the IS-2 & German tanks were a rarity, the IS-2 was not employed as a tank vs tank, tank it was employed as a special breakthru wpn operateing similar to Tiger Abt's except it's mission wasn't ant armor orientated. The Panther's most common foe was the T-34. TYhe Panther was designated a medium tank & employed as such unlike it's predecesor the Tiger that operated as an Heavy tank & was employed as such.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> But then, John, why are we comparing a Panther to a T-34 when the most common German tank was either a PzIV, or a StuG? Of course, this isn't my thread, but just taking your logic a step further. Besides, there was no Soviet doctrine or design that was intentionally formed around the tank vs. tank idea. There was only exploitation and breakthrough

Interesting that we're comparing a lighter tank to a heavier tank. The PzV was a 'medium' tank in name only. Okay, so maybe it was lighter than a PzVI, but then a Tiger is really just a moving bunker Actually, the comparison should be the PzV and the IS-2, since these tanks were of very similar weight. The T-34 should be limited to the PzIV for comparison really.

Zaloga's Red Army Handbook has everything you'd want wrt squad orgs. It also includes armor too.

was the commencement of Operation Barbarossa. June 22,1941. Salute to those millions who died in the struggle against Nazism.

When it comes to simulations, physics models are much better than tables. Tables are too limiting, since the data are usually not discrete enough, and the more conditions that need to be accounted for the more tables that are needed. With physics equations this is done away with provided there are variables to account for all significant factors. Equations create a much better curve of results than tables could ever hope to. That being said, it must also be acknowledged that without data tables it would be extremely difficult to come up with reliable, accurate equations. So, while tables make poor simulations, they are the core foundation of a good simulation, being the 'pattern' or 'imprint' for equations. So, the only way optics could be placed into this game is if shot data can be found that includes such things as optic_magnification, lighting_factor, multiple_optics, etc. Otherwise, you're doing nothing else but 'fudging' data. I don't envy BTS this task, and I wish rexford a lot of luck on assisting with this. You're going to need a good shovel. But, I sincerely hope you can find the data needed, because it really would be great to first quantify, then produce a mathematical expression for such a factor as optics wrt shot accuracy. And just sifting through data like that would be a lot of fun IMHO

Wellington here.

Geier, No offense, but Chuikov & Zhukov were two different people. Chuikov was the famous General of the army that held Stalingrad, 62nd Army. Zhukov was the famous Marshal, best known for his actions in 1941, both at Leningrad and Moscow.

Jeff, Interesting post. So, in WWII tank gunners had only hi-magnification? That must've been rough when sweeping across the landscape for targets. You'd probably want really tight gunner-commander teams.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>rexford said: 1500m accuracy by T34 suggests decent sights, doesn't it? That was 1942. Could T34 sights have deteriorated as war progressed, or have varied from one factory to another or one shipment to another. Maybe. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> 1942 would have been the worst year for production quality, since most of Soviet heavy industry had just gotten settled beyond the Urals, and were most likely trying to get enough workers to man the line as well as get them skilled enough to be reliable. 1943, on, would have seen a much better level of quality in Soviet equipment, since most of the problems in 1942 would've had a year to iron out.

Will Soviet antitank grenades be modelled, such as the RPG-43?