Grisha

One thing to remember(along with western Allied intervention in 1917) is that the Poles tried their hand at taking a bunch of Russian territory during the Russian Civil War. The Communists never forgot that.

One thing to remember(along with western Allied intervention in 1917) is that the Poles tried their hand at taking a bunch of Russian territory during the Russian Civil War. The Communists never forgot that.

Wow, amazing how many thought it was 'B'! Cold War 1, Reality 0! In actuality it was more a) & c), than anything else. Having read both sides' story, I have to say that the Polish Home Government in London definitely had a political reason for signalling the uprising when it did, because it had no tactical sense to it at all. In fact, the Polish Home Army had no intention of seeking Soviet assistance, nor did it actively seek it(the Soviets did all of that). Having said that I can also say that Stalin lost no tears when the uprising failed. However, Rokossovsky's Front was in no position to give effective support, since it was at the end of its operational tether.

Wow, amazing how many thought it was 'B'! Cold War 1, Reality 0! In actuality it was more a) & c), than anything else. Having read both sides' story, I have to say that the Polish Home Government in London definitely had a political reason for signalling the uprising when it did, because it had no tactical sense to it at all. In fact, the Polish Home Army had no intention of seeking Soviet assistance, nor did it actively seek it(the Soviets did all of that). Having said that I can also say that Stalin lost no tears when the uprising failed. However, Rokossovsky's Front was in no position to give effective support, since it was at the end of its operational tether.

Looking forward to it, Steve.

Steve, Thanks for responding, and I really do hope you get to that paper. There is sense to what you say, but my impression is that the effects would be even more pronounced. We both agree that for the Soviets nighttime operations posed a chance at leveling the field of battle. This would tend to induce confidence in your average Soviet soldier who had already dealt with the daytime terror of the German Blitzkrieg. For the Germans, however, fighting at night reduces many of their offensive capabilities. Hence, most Germans would much prefer daylight for battle. This we both agree on as well. Now, compound this with the added condition that the Germans realize the Soviets see nighttime activities as advantageous and it could be reason enough for a further degradation on German capabilities from a psychological point of view(ie, morale) – "Hans, think about it. They have nothing to lose and everything to gain." In any case, I’m still going to buy the game. No way you can get me not too. In fact, I was truly bummed to see that in one preview the release date was set to SUMMER 2002. Bother! [ February 04, 2002, 03:21 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

So, I can understand this to mean that you read that paper, Steve?

Oh well, I had to try. Steve responded - rather obliquely, I might add("What do I need to do, Steve, send cash?") - to a similar query of mine in Michael Dorosh's thread, NOTES FROM THEATRES OF WAR ... Oh well - at least Jeff is my friend

I think that happens if you have an old version of Acrobat Reader(pre 5.0). I d/l'ed the pdf, then printed it out. Just right click and select 'Save Target As...', I believe.

You are talking about infiltrations, but what I'm talking about also covers reconnaissance in force, breakouts, and general night attacks, including fortified positions with minefields and tank traps. I really can't emphasize enough that you read this paper to understanding what I'm talking about.

Well, you've got me there. My theory is that it left the Russians/Soviets 'predisposed' to such things. I already know your distrust of arguments of 'national traits', so this one most likely won't fly with you as well In any event, my theories are unimportant, since the document makes a convincing case based on what actually happened, using both German and Soviet source material as well as others, and it's my hope that Steve gives this paper a read.

Sailor Malan, I actually posted the 'closer to nature' quote to just point out that unique nazi German perspective Actually, what Blumentritt attributed to racial tendencies was more the result of a long history of nighttime operations among the Russians. The Soviets were better than the Germans at night operations, because they had been doing it for quite some time - including Tsarist Russia times. It's a shame you can't read this document, since my few quotes do it no justice. I wonder if I could upload it to a page for you without incurring the wrath of my government. Anybody know???

Michael, I now remember one story in the document about an attack into a fortified town in Prussia, I think. It was an extremely tough nut to crack, so the Soviets planned a night attack. Since there were tank traps and mines engineers were first needed to clear a pass. They did this at night, and once a path was cleared, the engineers merely stood up, faced back at their own lines and pointed their flashlight back at them. This kept the Germans from seeing the light, and gave the tankers a clear line to follow through the defenses. Most Soviet tankers typically attacked at night with headlights on, because it caused a lot of confusion. Since the Soviets were also heavily practicing maskirovka by this time, I doubt the fortified town even knew of the impending attack.

That I couldn't say, but in the 1st period of the war the Soviets considered the shortage of colored rockets and other signal devices a chief problem wrt command & control. The document states that for these reasons Soviet night operations for at least the 1st period were more tactical in scope. [ February 03, 2002, 06:45 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Sailor Malan, Sorry, but I hadn't thought about it being a US military site. That may be the reason for it seeming to be down. The document is over 9Mb in any case. I have a T3 line at work, so it's not a problem to d/l The document states that since the time of the Ottoman Turks the Russian have shown a 'prediliction to night operations and considerable skill in conducting them'. It states that in WWI the Germans acknowledged that the war proved Russian night training was superior to their own. "General Guenthar Blumentritt, chief of staff of the 4th Army before Moscow in 1941 called the Russian 'night happy,' and noted that an excellent infantry division in the 4th Army was considered unreliable at night because it had suffered heavy losses to Soviet night attacks at Smolensk, and later at the Desna River, before the Moscow campaign got underway." There are two paragraphs that discuss how the Germans felt the Russians were much "closer to nature"(quote from Blumentritt) and generally conceded the ability of the Soviet soldier. There is mention of the use of night operations from operation Uranus to the Dnepr battles to the liberation of the Crimea to Bagration and Berlin. Reconnaissance in force were many times employed at night (4am) to initiate a major offensive, such as Bagration. During Bagration a Soviet Rifle division was surrounded by Germans and not even a tank corps could breakthrough German antitank defenses. A mass tank attack at night was therefore planned to extricate the rifle division. The attack, with headlights on, resulted in the destruction of 80 German tanks, and the capture of 60 guns and 1,200 German prisoners. I'm only touching on points here and there, since the document is roughly 40 pages long(not including appendix, notes, and bibliography). [ February 03, 2002, 06:40 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

To BTS, I really think you should consider some form of modelling the advantages the Soviets had at night. If you go to the Combat Studies Institute site, and read Paper No.6 by Maj. Sasso, it could be grounds for reconsidering this. Admittedly, during the first period of the war, Soviet night capabilities were mostly of a tactical nature, but the gist of it is that the Germans were actually very poor in nighttime combat capabilities from a psychological point of view - as would anyone who didn't seriously train for such a thing. The Soviets had nothing to lose and found night to be a combat equalizer against the Germans, which only increased their training and experience in nighttime operations. There are many Soviet operations that were done at night, including river crossings, and one Soviet source in the Sasso paper claims that 40% of Soviet operations from 1944 were at night. As for how something like this would be modelled, I'd say that it was mainly a psychological thing as far as combat is concerned. Nighttime would restrict all operations, but the big factor is psychological, since the night has a tendency to get under our collective skin, so to speak. At least initially, it wasn't so much that the Soviets were greatly improved at night, as it was that the Germans' performance from a morale basis degraded. C&C would still be limited for both sides, and visibility wouldn't change, but from a morale perspective, the Germans' should be reduced at night.

I feel I should elaborate a bit on the night combat issue. The Soviets first began night operations during Barbarossa when encircled Soviet units would attempt breakouts as an operation, ie with all their equipment. They were actually successful a number of times. These early operations showed the Soviets that night could be the equalizer they were looking for wrt German superiority in firepower and maneuver. From that point they began to build experience in night operations until by the last period of the war, Soviet were conducting major operations at night, including river crossings. A big reason for the Germans' nightime abilities late in the war can be found on the Russian front, because they had to address this seeming Soviet advantage.

Fact or fiction? </font>

It should be remembered that in 1941 the smart Soviet commander usually waited in ambush for the advancing Germans, and since so many Soviet commanders were following strict orders to attack, any commanders who did set up a proper ambush were often rewarded with many German losses. Rokossovky did so on 28 June 1941 along the Lutsk-Rovno Highway, repulsing 13th Panzer Division's advance after inflicting heavy losses. Katukov did the same on 11 October with his 4th Tank Brigade, ambushing elements of the 4th Panzer Division as it entered Mtsensk. 4th Panzer was forced to retreat and by the end of the battle 4th Panzer's tanks were largely destroyed. By T-34s. Katukov's brigade withdrew largely intact. It all depends on how they were used. T-34s may have had many deficiencies, but Russians are quite good at 'getting around any kinks in the system.' In any case, T-34s were not blind pillboxes, just not as 'fluid' in pure mechanized warfare as the German tanks. I'm posting this not so much in protest as to remind one of what the T-34 was capable of in the right hands, and under the right conditions. Certainly, give the T-34(and Soviets) their early war(or entire war depending on your bias) C3i and equipment penalties, but also make sure you understand how the Soviets got around these limitations and took advantage of what they could. Good Soviet commanders generally did, even in summer 1941. Make sure they can be replicated in CMBB. Please

While I loved SL it did have the Soviet 'magnetic AT mine'. I have no idea where that came from - probably the result of the 70's Soviet info gap Anyway, weapons breakdown in the Red Army was more a function of the overall production scheme than any inherent inferiority in the weapons systems themselves. One could expect the years 1941 and 1942 to be characteristic of poor equipment in some areas. This was the result of hastely relocated production centers from western Russia to the Urals, followed by equally hasty resumption of these factories. It took awhile before the relocated factories were stabilized and smooth running. By 1943, most Soviet production was back to pre-war standards. And contrary to 'western' belief, Soviet equipment was quite 'robust'. [ January 31, 2002, 08:32 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

I agree with Steve on this(and Kip). What really defined the difference between Soviet and German units was war experience, training and tactical doctrine. The Soviets had some very advanced ideas on mechanized warfare, but the purges of '37-39 made not only a shell of the officer corps, but also made this doctrine very unpopular for strictly political reasons. Thus, in summer 1941, Soviet small unit officers did not possess the training for proper maneuver combat, nor if they did would the average officer have been able to apply it in practice. The fact of the matter is that after the Winter War and then the fall of France the Soviet government uttered a collective "uh oh," and immediately re-started a crash program for a mechanized force. When the Germans attacked this program was just getting underway. Any effects from it were negligible in summer of '41, and it wasn't until the STAVKA instituted the War Experience Committee that effective means of combat were collected and published in annual combat regulations(I think it was started late in 1941, possibly fall/winter). So, inexperience within the Red Army in the first period of the war was across the board, from small units to General Staff. Of course there were bright spots like Katukov or Rokossovsky, but your average Soviet Army officer was out of his depth in summer of 1941. Even if we as a player may actually possess a better understanding of tactics than your average Soviet small units commander in 1941, there will still be the inexperienced of those subordinated under your command. In essence, the best you should be able to do is as good as a 'Katukov' or a 'Rokossovsky'. On the flip-side, by 1944 the Soviets strongly encouraged and promoted commanders who showed initiative and decisiveness(actually, there were officers like this during Operation Uranus, but the combination of leaders with highly effective troops didn't really 'blossom' until 1944), giving them wide freedom of action. This decentralization of command could have tragic consequences within a centralized army, since support was usually slow to respond, but it could also have tremendous payoffs in securing critical objectives. Also, informal groups were being tailored to address specific enemy units/emplacements, so that loss of life was minimized. What this would amount to is units with high experience. So, by 1944 one could expect to play a Soviet force that contained very well trained and experienced troops. [ January 30, 2002, 03:11 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

ftp://160.149.109.31/carl/sasso.pdf Great paper from the Combat Studies Institute at CARL regarding the Soviet's expertise in night operations in WWII. ftp://160.149.109.31/carl/house.pdf Decided to also link this massive doc(235pages). It's a paper studying the development of combined arms warfare in the world during the 20th century. House has co-authored a number of publications with Glantz.

Interesting thread. I was under the impression that all Soviet tanks were primarily vehicles meant to engage infantry positions and emplacements. Certainly, the IS-2 was a response to the Tigers and Panthers, but antitank was a secondary function for it. Even the T-34 was designed within operational specifications rather than tactical concerns. It just so happens that the T-34 was better than anything else in 1941. As for the IS-2 main gun, I was also under the impression that overall the 100mm cannon was a better weapon than the 122mm when it came to a purely antitank role. The 122mm was chosen because it could fulfill both the antitank and antipersonnel role within acceptable specifications.

I'm hoping the Soviet helmets don't have their side edge made straight ala US Army style. Hope BTS keeps that portion that somewhat covered the ears.

Okay, did a late war Soviet assault artillery prep type mission on a German infantry company. Had roughly a regiment of artillery(155mm gun & 4.2in. mortar) hitting a default-size map. Germans also had 2 wood MG bunkers, a concrete MG pillbox, and 2 AT guns. All were in foxholes and hiding. I spent 10 turns barraging the place off of 3 TRP's with some shifting of fire to saturate the entire defensive line. In one scenario the Germans were in woods, in another they were in brush with conifers to the rear. In either case, it didn't matter. Losses were horrendous - in one scenario, of the German company only 17 men were still effective, the concrete pillbox was abandoned and one wood bunker took a direct hit, destroying it. This was pretty much the norm too. It was grim watching it all happen. I involuntarily groaned as I watched German squads break and make a run for it, then take a direct hit from 155mm. Frankly, I think I'll have to wait for CMBB to test average losses, since trenches are better protection from artillery than foxholes. At least I'm hoping so.