chrisl

I can look at a map and say that Ukraine in NATO doesn't hurt Russia's strategic defense much at all.
Russia has 6500 nuclear weapons. It cannot be invaded. The reason NATO expansion happened is because recently liberated countries in Eastern Europe knew a: Russia would eventually want its hegemony back and b; there was no realistic scenario in which NATO would or could attack Russia. 
Russia's strategic problems have not been at all external. Its problems stem from a political culture that stunted development in favor of resource extraction, that drove its best and brightest overseas and that failed to address issues of mortality, demography and technological lag. In lieu of an actual development vision for Russia that would satisfy the needs of the Russian people, the regime elites utilized ressentiment to redirect their grievances. 

I don't think the fighter/bomber is any deader than the tank (and probably less), but it's subject to the same kind of conditions as the future of tanks.  The biggest is that it depends on asymmetry of technology and doctrine.  The jets and aerodynamics are pretty mature all around, but attack aircraft are part of a system, just like tanks are part of a system.  NATO/US don't just send fancy fighter/bombers off on their own - there are a ton of support systems, starting with the satellite ISR, then GlobalHawlks, and the various B707 based radar and command systems. E-3 for airborne monitoring and traffic control, the E-8 JSTARS to monitor things on the ground, EA-18s for SEAD, and so on.  They're all part of an interconnected system that makes it possible to reach out and touch someone with as little risk as possible to the guys driving them around.  Just like you can't just load up a bunch of M1 tanks on trains and ship them into Ukraine and expect them to be effective, you can't just drop off a bunch of F-35s (or F-15s, F-16s, or FA-18s, Typhoons, etc) without all the stuff that helps them do the things they do.  But if you have that whole set of toys and the doctrine to suppress the defenses around a volume of space, you can then use that space to deliver very high precision pain.

Which is exactly why reporting like this is so exasperating
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/09/ukraine-fighter-pilot-i-could-learn-to-fly-western-jet-within-three-months-vadym-voroshylov?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Other
He reminds me of that old joke: how would you know if there's a fighter pilot at the party you're at?

I don't think the fighter/bomber is any deader than the tank (and probably less), but it's subject to the same kind of conditions as the future of tanks.  The biggest is that it depends on asymmetry of technology and doctrine.  The jets and aerodynamics are pretty mature all around, but attack aircraft are part of a system, just like tanks are part of a system.  NATO/US don't just send fancy fighter/bombers off on their own - there are a ton of support systems, starting with the satellite ISR, then GlobalHawlks, and the various B707 based radar and command systems. E-3 for airborne monitoring and traffic control, the E-8 JSTARS to monitor things on the ground, EA-18s for SEAD, and so on.  They're all part of an interconnected system that makes it possible to reach out and touch someone with as little risk as possible to the guys driving them around.  Just like you can't just load up a bunch of M1 tanks on trains and ship them into Ukraine and expect them to be effective, you can't just drop off a bunch of F-35s (or F-15s, F-16s, or FA-18s, Typhoons, etc) without all the stuff that helps them do the things they do.  But if you have that whole set of toys and the doctrine to suppress the defenses around a volume of space, you can then use that space to deliver very high precision pain.

I don't think the fighter/bomber is any deader than the tank (and probably less), but it's subject to the same kind of conditions as the future of tanks.  The biggest is that it depends on asymmetry of technology and doctrine.  The jets and aerodynamics are pretty mature all around, but attack aircraft are part of a system, just like tanks are part of a system.  NATO/US don't just send fancy fighter/bombers off on their own - there are a ton of support systems, starting with the satellite ISR, then GlobalHawlks, and the various B707 based radar and command systems. E-3 for airborne monitoring and traffic control, the E-8 JSTARS to monitor things on the ground, EA-18s for SEAD, and so on.  They're all part of an interconnected system that makes it possible to reach out and touch someone with as little risk as possible to the guys driving them around.  Just like you can't just load up a bunch of M1 tanks on trains and ship them into Ukraine and expect them to be effective, you can't just drop off a bunch of F-35s (or F-15s, F-16s, or FA-18s, Typhoons, etc) without all the stuff that helps them do the things they do.  But if you have that whole set of toys and the doctrine to suppress the defenses around a volume of space, you can then use that space to deliver very high precision pain.

It will be a major effort to get the Ukrainians most of the way to high functioning armor units by late spring. We REALLY should have started the training six months ago. It is year or more out for them to go to war with a whole new air force. And that is if they can lean on NATO assets for a lot of the ISR. There are only two things that can wreck the Russian rail system all the way past Belgorod, Rostov on Don, and the Kerch Bridge. Those would be ATACMS, and the United States Air Force. I don't want the The_Capt's blood pressure to get so disturbed he starts whacking me on the knuckles. So why don't we start with a slightly less aggressive target set than the one I just mentioned for the ATACMS, and see if the Russians finally get the point. And those missiles could be ripping out of HIMARS launchers in a week, probably less. 

I don't think the fighter/bomber is any deader than the tank (and probably less), but it's subject to the same kind of conditions as the future of tanks.  The biggest is that it depends on asymmetry of technology and doctrine.  The jets and aerodynamics are pretty mature all around, but attack aircraft are part of a system, just like tanks are part of a system.  NATO/US don't just send fancy fighter/bombers off on their own - there are a ton of support systems, starting with the satellite ISR, then GlobalHawlks, and the various B707 based radar and command systems. E-3 for airborne monitoring and traffic control, the E-8 JSTARS to monitor things on the ground, EA-18s for SEAD, and so on.  They're all part of an interconnected system that makes it possible to reach out and touch someone with as little risk as possible to the guys driving them around.  Just like you can't just load up a bunch of M1 tanks on trains and ship them into Ukraine and expect them to be effective, you can't just drop off a bunch of F-35s (or F-15s, F-16s, or FA-18s, Typhoons, etc) without all the stuff that helps them do the things they do.  But if you have that whole set of toys and the doctrine to suppress the defenses around a volume of space, you can then use that space to deliver very high precision pain.

Well to sidestep all the yelling a bit, let’s talk about the deep well of Russian ability to suffer and endure….leading to victory.  I think this really concerns a lot of people and is central to the fear in engaging in a war of attrition with Russia.  The large historical examples point to the “fact” that “one cannot win a war of attrition against Russia”.
Well if Ukraine was invading Russia with intent to conquer them I would be onside.  Russia has demonstrated incredible resilience in historical existential wars…but this is not an existential war for Russia, it is discretionary.  Putin is working overtime trying to convince the Russian population that this war is indeed existential, and for him personally it is, but for the nation it is a harder sell.  In discretionary wars Russia, as has been noted, has not performed any better than anyone else.  They had their “Vietnam” in Afghanistan too which finally buckled under the weight of erosion of public sentiment.
So in trying to assess Russian Will you have to first recognize the war that they are in.  A discretionary war of intervention, or at least how it was sold at the beginning.  It is a preventative war designed to push NATO and western influence back.  Putin’s strat comm machine now has it framed as a direct confrontation with NATO - burning M1s and all - but how well that is selling remains a mystery.  I have zero doubt that intel communities are inside the Russian info sphere collecting data and trying to figure out where the Russian people stand on all this.  Given the mass exodus of some Russians it is clear that not everyone is buying it.
Now there is one party for which this war is existential and that would be Ukraine.  And the history of organized and well supported parties who are in an existential war versus a side that is in a discretionary war is something people may want to explore further.

Woot! #KillAllTheTrucks!

Unicorn hunt successfull: BMP-Terminator terminated.

Near Kreminna. According to a quick google search Russia owns ~ 10 of these in total, although Ive never seen more than 3 in Ukraine but they appear quite capable.
Some losses from Vuhledar:
 

Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and all the other Soviet republics beat Germany on the Eastern Front with Lend and Lease from the west. By itself Russia achieved zilch 0.000000000 nothing. Their leader was not even Russian but Georgian.

In a country full of criminals that will only be a temporary problem.

Looks like Wagner already chewed through all zeks willing to go fight in Ukraine. Also prison system is reportedly not happy to lose too many of its customers:
 

'Funny' thing is that many tactical battles I have seen footage of from this war (which is not a complete picture obviously) often sort of resemble a CM H2H battle between an experienced player and a (much)less experienced player. Usually Russian forces star in the latter. The most obvious one is advancing AFVs in complex terrain where the enemy has infantry with decent AT. Another one is (panic) area firing all around the place or mortars/artillery FFE being ordered against 'scout teams'.
The Russian player has now 'descent' into sending disposable units (drivers/etc) as 'recon by death' units, followed up by (in)direct fires. While potentially effective, usually not a sign of a battle going their way. 

We've read more about the 'wild' numbers from Poland before. Maybe they added a zero as a way to make a long nose to Russia? Anyway I'd refrain from placing bets on the 500 number. 

Those kind of measurements are *really* hard to do from a balloon with any fidelity because there are a lot of outside forces acting on the balloon and it's hard to maintain an inertial environment somewhere inside.  Local gravity measurements are tricky to do in a stable lab subbasement with good isolation.  

This was unconfirmed rumors. Since weekend Russians multiplied own efforts to cut off Bakhmut from main supply routes Sloviansk - Bakhmut on the north and Kostintynivka - Bakhmut on the south. Except Wagners convicts, they also attacked with Wagner "core" and with VDV troops, so they could advance significanly along canal from Klishchiivka to Ivanivske and now are heavyly assault approaches to the Kostainntynivka - Bakhmut road. 
Today's twitters are reporting about endless heavy arty and MLRS barraages from both sides in that area. Unlike in previous days, reportedly UKR arty is working continuosly and hard. Either ammunition was delivered in time, or now they use "emergency strore" due to lack of ammo. Mass usage of bomblet-copters in Bakhmut is not of good life - but because of critical lack of artillery. One guy wrote in twitter - their battery has a long queue from units, which requested Excalibur strike or even "several shots at mother...ckers".
93rd mech.brigade was returned to Bakhmut week ago or some more - their time of R&R was shortened, because situation became worse. Their drone recon unit "Seneca" returned there so far through a 7-10 days, after the brigade was moved out - troops critically needed eyes in the sky. Many eyes. Despite on Bakhmut direction there are many drone teams are operating (except drones inside frontline units), their number anyway insufficient to cover all enemy movements on so wide front.   

for convenient comparison, here's the NYT report on the same battle: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html
and the wikipedia summary: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khasham
Massed precision + high quality C4ISR beats mass.

Those kind of measurements are *really* hard to do from a balloon with any fidelity because there are a lot of outside forces acting on the balloon and it's hard to maintain an inertial environment somewhere inside.  Local gravity measurements are tricky to do in a stable lab subbasement with good isolation.  

it is George Santos.  😎

I'd have thought that either publicly available data or satellite orbital anomalies would give you much better precision than a balloon. And more importantly, much better precision than is needed for any practical military application -the effect of gravitational variation on projectiles is going to be dwarfed by the day to day variations in atmospheric drag due to changing weather conditions.

Ok, ok.  Hey look the Balloon Week was a lot of laughs, and frankly I think we should all be very proud that not a single 'boobs joke' was fired off.  But I think the issue is kinda moved on.  I suspect we will hear something more on this once the SSE is done and the US can make political/diplomatic hay over this thing and China has to wipe egg off its face.
FWIW, I have been hearing about gravitational variation since the 90s.  Some guys were trying to figure out how to find boomers (the subs, not my mother) in the Pacific using this.  Not saying it is not a thing, and maybe we will have to scramble to fill the strategic "Balloon Gap" ( @sburke don't you dare!), but personally I am not going to lose sleep over whatever this was until we get more information.

Those kind of measurements are *really* hard to do from a balloon with any fidelity because there are a lot of outside forces acting on the balloon and it's hard to maintain an inertial environment somewhere inside.  Local gravity measurements are tricky to do in a stable lab subbasement with good isolation.  

This article (as always…”if legit”) is loaded with hints and signals, and is based on pretty recent action by what we’re supposed to be the best troops the RA had left.  Main takeaway on a first pass:
Heavy attrition is having an effect on the RA - see BMDs
The RA is clearly not employing Mission Command - which is not a deal breaker IF you have a C4ISR architecture where one is set up for Detailed Command.
The RA’s C4ISR is largely obsolete for this war, and is rendering their mass disjointed and uncoordinated.
The combined arms being employed are straight out of Soviet doctrine, complete with echelons but nowhere near the mass require.
As suspected air power is absent and disconnected.
Artillery doctrine is straight out of WW2 - and I mean literally.  Rigid timetables and indiscriminate rigid fire plans.
So what?  Well based on this small vignette combined with a lot of corroborating observations the RA is a military trapped between two times.  It is built for modern warfare on paper, but is connected for 20th century warfare.  It does not have the levels of mass of the 20th century, nor does it have the C4ISR needed to make lower mass effective.
Their opponent is built almost the exact opposite.  The UA has far better alignment between mass, C4ISR and fires.

Might as well throw in 30 years of brain drain, too.  I know a lot of really good engineers and scientists from the former USSR.  And they all work in the west now.