chrisl

Something I've wondered about a bit is what those berm-enclosed spaces are for in the Ukrainian farm fields, like in the the picture that I left in the quote.  There was one near the battle of of the T, too.   They don't look like they're used as a divider between fields - the tree strips seem to serve that function. They look a bit like they could be seasonal reservoirs, but they don't have obvious inlets and outlets, or indications that they have variable water levels.  
They do break up lines of sight and make somewhat natural defensive positions in the open spaces.  
So does anybody know what they are/what they're called?

Something I've wondered about a bit is what those berm-enclosed spaces are for in the Ukrainian farm fields, like in the the picture that I left in the quote.  There was one near the battle of of the T, too.   They don't look like they're used as a divider between fields - the tree strips seem to serve that function. They look a bit like they could be seasonal reservoirs, but they don't have obvious inlets and outlets, or indications that they have variable water levels.  
They do break up lines of sight and make somewhat natural defensive positions in the open spaces.  
So does anybody know what they are/what they're called?

This has been a trend we have been seeing for some time - the growing asymmetry of the Ukrainian battle space.  This is just another example.  So this attack clearly demonstrates that Ukraine still has effective capability to deny airspace in depth.  I suspect that it also remains denied for them so at first glance this may look like no change.  However, Ukraine has been slowly armed with PGM stand off weapons - GLSDBs, Storm Shadow etc to add to the arsenal of HIMARs and self loitering munitions.  Ukraine is still patched into what is likely the largest and most ambitious C4ISR architecture in the history of warfare, output of which they are able to receive targeting packages in near real time.
So What?  Ukraines ability to conduct an effective deep strike campaign in support of ground operations has expanded and accelerated.  Even though they have to stand off 100kms or more, they can still pickle barrel HVTs on the RA side with what is looking like impunity.
For the RA….not so much.  Their C4ISR was never world class and they have had it mauled for months now and no one to lean on for replacements.  Their AirPower is denied but they do not have a lot of stand-off PGM left as they pissed it away on terror attacks.  So we are likely to see the Russia. Air Force lobbing dumber munitions from further back in an attempt to stop a UA ground offensive on the move.  This is not good news for the Russian war.
A lot of this lies on the feet of the Winter Offensive.  This was a strategy of putting out a fire with one’s face.  Beyond turning convicts and conscripts into fertilizer it left a lot of hit priced equipment exposed and it got hit.  They spent thousands on long range missiles on apartment buildings and shopping malls, and now when they need them they are short.  Their logistics is a mess.
A lot of people still buy into “Russian Will = steel” well they are definitely going to need it as it may be all they have left at this point.

Just another sign in a very long list - troop quality, “no ammo for Prig”/noted drops in RA indirect fire, falling ATGM stocks, and now faltering AD.  I am sure it will be blindingly obvious in hindsight - the RA is eroded and prime for operational collapse.  I suspect the UA has been slowly waging corrosive warfare all winter while everyone was watching Bakhmut.  Little bites and nibbles add up especially for stuff Russia cannot built back.
Given some of the force numbers being tossed around I am beginning to think we might actually see an offensive we recognize in the next while - which will no doubt make the tank nuts happy; however, just remember that it took months of precision deep strike shaping to allow for it.
I avoid predictions but I am confident we will at least have a decent chance of understanding what we are looking at when it happens.

It's hard to render airfields inoperable - all you need is a long flattish spot, and to do that all you need is a bulldozer or a bunch of conscripts with shovels and rakes.  For all the things the RA does wrong, one thing they've historically done well is make aircraft that aren't very picky about runway quality.
If you're bombing an airfield, you need to either hit the aircraft directly (or indirectly, as we saw in the airfield bombing that took a while to decide what actually happened on the ground), or hit the infrastructure that makes it more valuable than a bare flat spot: fuel storage tanks, fuel trucks, ammo dumps.  
IIRC, in the Syrian cruise missile attack, they were mostly targeting aircraft directly through hangar roofs or doors.  

It's hard to render airfields inoperable - all you need is a long flattish spot, and to do that all you need is a bulldozer or a bunch of conscripts with shovels and rakes.  For all the things the RA does wrong, one thing they've historically done well is make aircraft that aren't very picky about runway quality.
If you're bombing an airfield, you need to either hit the aircraft directly (or indirectly, as we saw in the airfield bombing that took a while to decide what actually happened on the ground), or hit the infrastructure that makes it more valuable than a bare flat spot: fuel storage tanks, fuel trucks, ammo dumps.  
IIRC, in the Syrian cruise missile attack, they were mostly targeting aircraft directly through hangar roofs or doors.  

It's hard to render airfields inoperable - all you need is a long flattish spot, and to do that all you need is a bulldozer or a bunch of conscripts with shovels and rakes.  For all the things the RA does wrong, one thing they've historically done well is make aircraft that aren't very picky about runway quality.
If you're bombing an airfield, you need to either hit the aircraft directly (or indirectly, as we saw in the airfield bombing that took a while to decide what actually happened on the ground), or hit the infrastructure that makes it more valuable than a bare flat spot: fuel storage tanks, fuel trucks, ammo dumps.  
IIRC, in the Syrian cruise missile attack, they were mostly targeting aircraft directly through hangar roofs or doors.  

Certainly hope so.  If we see another instance of a well executed, combined arms assault into the joints between forces then we definitely have something in the works. I'm sure we'll see something,  but personally I'll wait for it first. 
Many months ago I pondered the dangers of RUS suddenly attacking a ZSU force that was over-formatted into defence.  I obviously gave far too much credence to Russian offensive abilities above brigade level. 
Now,  it seems possible that the reverse is through - the Bakhmut assault forces might be postured too heavily into attack, with little rear tactical resilience or organization (both physical &  command) and its the ZSU that has the above-brigade capabilities. 
The Russian stupidity of making Bahkmut so important on the attack (enormously wasteful for little gain)  could cut a second time, on the defense. The built out defense lines elsewhere don't exist in as coherent a manner in Bahkmut. The morale loss of being driven back or surrounded inside a city they've spent so much to gain could be very damaging.
Putin might feel obligated to pour yet more men into defending his "gain",  providing a second round of attrition on the Ivans. 
Plus they destroyed so much cover. This isn't WW2,  fighting in ruins doesnt give the same protection  - modern weapons are far more destructive and accurate, and of course there's Drones. Once you've kettled a force,  why send in the crunchies? Just drone the ****ers into oblivion. They're not going anywhere. 
If this battle does shape up into ZSU local counteroffensive then,  as you suggested earlier,  we should probably look away and watch what else those clever Ukies are doing,  and where... 

We should have gone with a US naming convention and called it the M1.
Informally known as "Bloody Large Ordnance to Shoot at Targets Using Firecontrol of Unimaginable Precision", aka BLO-STUF-UP

So not to pile on and beat up.  I get the position, video after video of Russian saps getting blown up may seem excessive and masturbatory, and for some it is. However, every video gives off information. Some is just noise, or repetitive.  While others are gold and constitute key indicators which when confirmed by other observations can point to trends.  Trends lead to broader deductions and assessments - this is not a single “keyhole” it is thousands of them.  In most keyholes the milk maid is bathing, but then you start to notice the copy of Karl Marx next to the tub.
ISW and other OS intelligence analysts are doing exactly what professional military are doing.  Looking at all the “war porn” and pulling out trends and indicators that tell a larger story.  Oryx is not counting blow up vehicles because people get their jollies seeing blown up Russian tanks.  They are doing it because individual losses sum up to larger attrition trend which chart the course of a conflict.
This is micro-analysis and has pretty much set this group apart - or did, other groups have caught up.  Example: back in the early days of the war the majority of open source assessment (and frankly military as well) were expecting this war to take a predictable course.  A rapid overwhelming Russian invasion, shock and collapse of the UA, and a drawn out insurgency against a puppet Ukrainian political regime.  It was places like this forum where micro-observation first challenged a lot of macro assumptions.  We saw war porn, but it added up to something going very wrong for the RA.  In fact it pointed to something even more fundamental shifting in warfare itself.
This was not a one-shot deal.  Micro-analysis backed up be expertise has kept us well ahead of the pack in all phases of this war.  Phase II did not become a protracted set of urban sieges - the RA logistical losses and Ukrainian resistance demonstrated that.  Phase III did not see an RA “cauldron” despite their use of WW1 levels of massed fires.  Phase IV the UA counter offensive did shock us at its scope but one could see that this was indeed a collapse of the RA operationally on two fronts (one slow, one fast).  Phase V - Op Russian Leg Humping: was going nowhere - one need only follow the famous “battle of the T” to see why.  And we will use it for Phase VI to try and understand how the UA offensive is unfolding.
So while some may only see Russian sods getting blown up.   I see: poor basic field craft in poorly constructed trench lines which suggest basic training shortfalls.  No effective C-UAS counter measures on the RA side.    The evolution of drone warfare throughout.  The big fact that Russia has still not been able to create information denial (let alone control) in the battle space. HVT losses within the Russian operational system - C2 nodes, A2AD platforms, engineering and logistics.  Failures in RA C4ISR…the list goes on.  I do not see this through a single war porn keyhole, I see them through thousands of them.
Are these view’s skewed?  Definitely.  But the fact that we do not see thousand of videos of Russian UAS blowing off UA heads is telling in itself (does anyone think the Russian info sphere would show any restraint in this?).  Open source is “open”.  In the end it is about filtering noise and trying to hear signal - and again, this is exactly what ISW or any other public analysis platform is doing, along with professional military.  We are just doing it in house - this is how the sausage is made.  What bakes my noodle is that in my lifetime a large virtual collective is able to conduct this sort of work, and demonstrate accurate assessments (more than just a lucky once or twice) is game changing.  
In twenty years we will all be old, senile or dead. However an another group of young(ish) folks will do this for another war but they will likely have AI support (we have already seen it here in its infancy).  They will have access to even more raw information but will have a better ability to use it - they may very well be directly involved in the prosecution of the war and not just sitting in chairs on the sideline.  We are at the beginning of an age of Open Source Warfare - all those keyholes are “pixels” in reality.

Plus, often the announcements are deliberately at least two weeks behind the actual pace of events.

That is why I said Prig.  have you seen Princess bride - there is more than one reason I suggested Wallace Shawn.  🤣

no way! I hope everyone in this village is a hardcore anarchist to this day.

You can learn enough to operate a small excavator enough to dig a trench in about 5 minutes of "training" and with about an hour of practice.  Ask me how I know.  
If you're driving backward leaving the trench behind you it would be pretty straightforward (or zigbackward?) to make a zigzag trench.
edit: and when we rented a dingo (basically a walk-behind bobcat) with a brushwolf and I was going at the giant blackberry vines with the cutter as vertical as I could go and sweeping down (like you'd do for zombies) it reminded me of a designer note that was either in the old SL notes or in The General or something "I want to use my flail tank to overrun the infantry with the flails!"

You can learn enough to operate a small excavator enough to dig a trench in about 5 minutes of "training" and with about an hour of practice.  Ask me how I know.  
If you're driving backward leaving the trench behind you it would be pretty straightforward (or zigbackward?) to make a zigzag trench.
edit: and when we rented a dingo (basically a walk-behind bobcat) with a brushwolf and I was going at the giant blackberry vines with the cutter as vertical as I could go and sweeping down (like you'd do for zombies) it reminded me of a designer note that was either in the old SL notes or in The General or something "I want to use my flail tank to overrun the infantry with the flails!"

You can learn enough to operate a small excavator enough to dig a trench in about 5 minutes of "training" and with about an hour of practice.  Ask me how I know.  
If you're driving backward leaving the trench behind you it would be pretty straightforward (or zigbackward?) to make a zigzag trench.
edit: and when we rented a dingo (basically a walk-behind bobcat) with a brushwolf and I was going at the giant blackberry vines with the cutter as vertical as I could go and sweeping down (like you'd do for zombies) it reminded me of a designer note that was either in the old SL notes or in The General or something "I want to use my flail tank to overrun the infantry with the flails!"

The other lesson from this video is that the quality of your grenade toss is a life and death issues in trench warfare. The Ukrainian soldier had one or two good throws, and one truly great one. The Russians throwing was uniformly horrible, and... well, they are good zeds now.
I have seen a few of the six shot grenade launchers in videos from Ukraine, it seems to me like we ought to send a couple of thousand more.

Some time ago I worked with a company that was going to get stuff manufactured in India.  It was moderately high precision machining and polishing and then some processes that are also moderate precision for anybody in the semiconductor industry, but a major stretch for people outside that world.  It was stuff that I could go to multiple companies in the US for each process and get competitive bids that I could count on them being able to deliver.  The work was going to India because it was an international project where each country that was putting in money expected to spend most of it in their own country.  So this process went to India.
The only way they could do it there was like the old robber barons - the owner of the company that was doing it had to basically provide everything to the people doing the work: new facility, machines, education, transportation, on down to clothes and shoes.  They did make some nice prototypes, but I dropped off the project after that and later it sounded like they were struggling with reliable manufacturing.  It was probably very labor intensive and craft-style production, which makes repeatability tough, where in the US most of it would be been done in shops where a couple people would be running 5 or 6 heavily automated machines at a time.
China went through all that many decades earlier with manufacturing and tech production.  A lot of it is still robber baron style (Foxconn City), but the scale of it has become enormous and for a lot of things you can outsource the whole process, from engineering through production and even shipping.  India is nowhere near that yet, as far as I can tell.  

Some time ago I worked with a company that was going to get stuff manufactured in India.  It was moderately high precision machining and polishing and then some processes that are also moderate precision for anybody in the semiconductor industry, but a major stretch for people outside that world.  It was stuff that I could go to multiple companies in the US for each process and get competitive bids that I could count on them being able to deliver.  The work was going to India because it was an international project where each country that was putting in money expected to spend most of it in their own country.  So this process went to India.
The only way they could do it there was like the old robber barons - the owner of the company that was doing it had to basically provide everything to the people doing the work: new facility, machines, education, transportation, on down to clothes and shoes.  They did make some nice prototypes, but I dropped off the project after that and later it sounded like they were struggling with reliable manufacturing.  It was probably very labor intensive and craft-style production, which makes repeatability tough, where in the US most of it would be been done in shops where a couple people would be running 5 or 6 heavily automated machines at a time.
China went through all that many decades earlier with manufacturing and tech production.  A lot of it is still robber baron style (Foxconn City), but the scale of it has become enormous and for a lot of things you can outsource the whole process, from engineering through production and even shipping.  India is nowhere near that yet, as far as I can tell.  

Some time ago I worked with a company that was going to get stuff manufactured in India.  It was moderately high precision machining and polishing and then some processes that are also moderate precision for anybody in the semiconductor industry, but a major stretch for people outside that world.  It was stuff that I could go to multiple companies in the US for each process and get competitive bids that I could count on them being able to deliver.  The work was going to India because it was an international project where each country that was putting in money expected to spend most of it in their own country.  So this process went to India.
The only way they could do it there was like the old robber barons - the owner of the company that was doing it had to basically provide everything to the people doing the work: new facility, machines, education, transportation, on down to clothes and shoes.  They did make some nice prototypes, but I dropped off the project after that and later it sounded like they were struggling with reliable manufacturing.  It was probably very labor intensive and craft-style production, which makes repeatability tough, where in the US most of it would be been done in shops where a couple people would be running 5 or 6 heavily automated machines at a time.
China went through all that many decades earlier with manufacturing and tech production.  A lot of it is still robber baron style (Foxconn City), but the scale of it has become enormous and for a lot of things you can outsource the whole process, from engineering through production and even shipping.  India is nowhere near that yet, as far as I can tell.  

Sure, ultimately it will be decided by politicians, probably mostly within Russia on when they decide they've had enough.  But a lot of bombs going in the direction of their forces in Ukraine can help them come to a better decision faster. The dollar value of stuff that the US is sending to Ukraine is small on the scale of the defense budget, and a lot of it was paid for long ago. For the US MIC it's a chance to clear out the old storage and sell new blingy stuff to both stockpile and test in Ukraine.
And unless Xi decides he absolutely has to have Taiwan, China comes out ahead of India.

The Russian annual military budget is equal to about one year of Lockheed revenue.  And Lockheed is just one of many large companies in the western MIC.
Before, and running up to the war, the counterargument was always "but the Russian salaries are lower, so they have much greater purchasing power".  Between the corruption and the poor quality (and often quantity) of equipment and maintenance, I think we've seen that that's not a very good counter. If you're talking only ballistic artillery shells and tank chassis there might be some validity (but the corruption really cuts into that), but if you're talking about combat effectiveness, there's a lot that no number of rubles can buy for Russia.

The Russian annual military budget is equal to about one year of Lockheed revenue.  And Lockheed is just one of many large companies in the western MIC.
Before, and running up to the war, the counterargument was always "but the Russian salaries are lower, so they have much greater purchasing power".  Between the corruption and the poor quality (and often quantity) of equipment and maintenance, I think we've seen that that's not a very good counter. If you're talking only ballistic artillery shells and tank chassis there might be some validity (but the corruption really cuts into that), but if you're talking about combat effectiveness, there's a lot that no number of rubles can buy for Russia.

The Russian annual military budget is equal to about one year of Lockheed revenue.  And Lockheed is just one of many large companies in the western MIC.
Before, and running up to the war, the counterargument was always "but the Russian salaries are lower, so they have much greater purchasing power".  Between the corruption and the poor quality (and often quantity) of equipment and maintenance, I think we've seen that that's not a very good counter. If you're talking only ballistic artillery shells and tank chassis there might be some validity (but the corruption really cuts into that), but if you're talking about combat effectiveness, there's a lot that no number of rubles can buy for Russia.

what was it that RU general said in WW2 when Stalin wanted to take back Crimea?  I think it was along the lines of "why?  It's a giant prison camp for German 17th army where they have to feed themselves"