John Kettler

This thread, methinks, very much needs to be put back on the track. Am not going to attempt to respond by individuals, so am going to address this by specific issues.

Yom Kippur War IADs effectiveness
 
IAF CAS losses were so severe vs Egypt for days that Israel terminated them altogether. They didn't resume until IDF tanks, which had crossed the Suez Canal, drove into the SAM zones and systematically shot up the SA-2/3/6 SAMs and dense AAA, of which the most notable AAA was the "airplane eater" ZSU-23/4. DEAD Israeli style. Against Syria, the story was much the same, but in both cases, Israeli CAS was effectively out of the war until the SAM problem was addressed, of which the pacing element (and eye waterer to defense types in the US and) was the lethality of the highly agile, mobile SA-6, a weapon against which the IAF had no ECM capability whatsoever. None. The SAMs were sufficiently deadly to force IAF planes to fly low, placing them in the deadly embrace of radar directed AAA, not to mention a plethora of SA-7s. The US provided Israel with as many as 40 F-4s and definitely 46 A-4s as replacements for terrible air losses. What's not generally known is that the US provided Israel with numerous complete tail end assemblies for A-4s. Why? The planes were eating SA-7s, but barely getting back home. Spare part planners never envisioned such a situation, so the IAF suffered major virtual attrition as a result. The IAF started the war with 440 combat planes and lost, depending on which numbers are used, 107-387, but I don't know offhand whether the US supplied additional planes over attrition during the resupply effort.
 
Given the above, I'm having real problems signing up for the "lessons of the Yom Kippur War." Likewise, I'm having similar problems with GW I. There were other factors at work other than those enumerated including: precision destruction of a key Iraqi air surveillance radar, the removal of which allowed the entry of the Stealth fighters and more visible friends. Inter alia, this resulted in the pinpoint destruction of the key Syrian AD HQ, spectacularly shown time and again on strike vid broadcast worldwide. Even in unbroken state, the IADS had very little capability vs Tomahawks which are, many don't realize, pretty stealthy in their own right, let alone when whizzing down the boulevard so low details on the weapons were clearly visible. This isn't the famous footage, but it gets the idea across.


 
The US went into GW I with not merely with superlative intel on Iraq's IADS, it went into battle with a direct conduit right into the IADS situation center, thanks to a physical hack into the fiber optic trunk line from the front, a hack put into place by a brilliant US SpecOps mission. Reportedly, the US was able to show, or not show, IADS HQ whatever it desired, but the hack is believed to have been used as a generator of enormous numbers of false targets. I firmly believe it's dangerous to draw sweeping conclusions without a fundamental understanding of what was going on to begin with. I recall the mighty MOD himself came out from Russia with his experts to figure exactly this out. One such insight was a demand for a weapon capable of downing a HARM attacking a defending SAM site. Pantsir, anyone? Tunguska itself has substantial capabilities vs things like GBU-15, LGBs, JDAM, JSOW and Tomahawks.
 
Now, let's look at the Vietnam War, shall we? It's fashionable to deride NVN's IADS as ineffective. This is based on another faulty premise. That premise is that the aggregate performance figures reflect how the national IADS performed historically throughout. Not the case. What you're seeing are the effects of a lot of really bad outcomes late in an otherwise impressive career.  When the US first ran into the SA-2, the SA-2 was killing 0.5 planes per engagement. 0.5! Indeed, there were several cases of two planes downed in one shot. What broke the back of the NVN IADS was a masterful CIA op called HA/BRINK or HABRINK. What was that? The CIA slipped people into Indonesia's SA-2 warehouses and obtained the relevant guidance link frequencies, allowing the US to pretty effectively jam the SA-2. Why Indonesia? The Indonesian SA-2s were identical to the NVN's SA-2s! Sure, evasive maneuvering, Wild Weasel, Iron Hand played their part, but HA/BRINK was what undid the IADs as far as SAM coverage. By late in the war, Linebacker II, jamming, better tactics, SEAD and other means had so degraded and cowed the SAMs that they were blind launching (no radar at all, optical direction only)  dozens of SAMs at once, and that's why the overall numbers look so bleak. That wasn't the case through much of the air war over NVN and the DMZ. We lost a family friend and his WSO to an SA-2 over the DMZ. It came out of the clouds below, so they had no chance to see the launch and evade. Boom!  Two wall entries on the Vietnam Memorial.
 
For a more informed view of Russian SAM operational effectiveness than what I've seen in this thread, please see Carlo Kopp's analysis here. Kopp has some scathing things to say about how the Arabs not only fundamentally disregarded a throughly thought out Russian doctrine, but did some things which would've been comedic had they not been so hurtful to the using force! Suggest interested parties also look at what specific threats the newer generation SAMs were designed to defeat, what their tactical-technical characteristics are and how that applies to the ability to detect, localize, engage and kill them. Makes rather sobering reading. A Serbian captain with his ancient SA-6 unit not only survived a major SEAD/DEAD campaign, but also cost the US the stunning loss of an F-117, damage to a second one and an F-16.
 
As a longtime student of military history and a former defense professional, I deem it folly to expect the USAF to be able to so thoroughly control the skies that Russian CAS and similar can't operate. US AAA threat is risible, so there's no real dense AAG penalty for operating in the weeds to make it really hard vs both fighters and Patriot to engage it, and SU-25s have survived hits by things much worse than MANPADS. Russia's not going to sit idly by and let the US/NATO gin up its air power before striking, so the force ratios, for a time, at least, are not going to be pretty. Contrary to popular opinion, the AWACS supply is quite limited, and people need to remember that these vital birds can stay aloft only so long before they have to be replaced to keep a given area in coverage. The harder they're flown, the less reliable they become, and the worse the even more critical highly trained control crews perform. Tired radar operators miss things. That. of course, presumes the plane ever gets airborne to begin with, A single Russian sniper armed with, say, an OSV 12.7 mm rifle, could ruin NATO's day at places like Geilenkirchen, which when last seen, had a whole 5 E-3As. It's even worse with JSTARS, where there are but a handful of planes in total.
 
And this discussion is without taking into account Russian missile hard kill systems or jamming. Put it this way, for every long range sensor we deployed, the Russians deployed countermeasures. Jammers vs the E-3A, the TR-1's SAR, JSTARs. I used to have some SECRET diagrams of the E-3A radar display under jamming. Thanks to steerable antenna nulls, the system performed very well in the face of one or two jammers, but after that things progressively fell apart. It was entirely possible to jam the E-3A so effectively that entire (pizza slice wide) sectors were blind. Additionally, the more jamming energy received, the shorter detection range becomes, totally compromising the vast volumetric region a Sentry ordinarily controls. This allows even crude Stealth weapons a veritable free ride through the defenses.
 
If memory serves, the wartime scenario over West Germany envisioned only two E-3As up, covering the entire region. What happens if one doesn't show up, is shot down or is jammed so effectively it can't do its job? How many would likely be available to support ops in Ukraine, and how much coverage, even best case, would be lost just to keep things like S-300PMU and S-400 from simply devouring them? The Russians also have the Il-76 MAINSTAY, their Gen 2 AWACS. Nor, as a look at page 3, #46 in that thread will show, is that by any means the limits of what's going to be faced. The Russians are building a combined function aircraft able to handle everything but undersea warfare from an AWACS perspective. I'd argue that Russian force effectiveness will be greatly enhanced by even the vanilla MAINSTAY of the Cold War period, never mind what it's evolved into since. Patriot will assuredly be a key Spetsnaz target, and if it goes down, there's no way the Air Force can handle the flood which would ensue. SAMs are 24/7 systems, but planes, even with in-flight refueling, have to go home sooner or later. There is no in-flight replenishment of munitions, LRUs or crews. And who's to say that the planes keeping the Russians away in one place won't suddenly be retasked elsewhere, leaving the poor ground force commander in the denuded zone in a Heinz factory sized pickle?!
 
What are the MCRs (Mission Capable Rates) for the F-22A under high sortie conditions?  We already know the F-35 is compromised practically across the board when it comes to just about every combat metric, so why should MCR  or sortie generation rate be any better? It'll probably break a lot, not least because it'll be anything but a mature system. We know how those tend to be. As a mature system, the F-14 Tomcat was running ~65% MCR. This meant a two-carrier CVBG could use only one CVN on a given day for strike--because the other could do nothing but conduct FAD to keep both alive! Doubtless the numbers these days are better, bit I think they nicely illustrate the main issue. Complex things, and the F-35 is super complex and broken to start, are iffy at best to depend upon. The more you stress a complicated system, the faster it breaks, not necessarily in ways anticipated, either. Given this incredibly important issue, does it really make sense to make campaign success dependent on breaking the Russian Air Force via aerial combat, as seems to be the general expectation?
 
I don't have the latest numbers and all the tech specs for what I fervently hope are upgrades from what I knew of US capabilities, but I do know the overall situation should give serious pause to US/NATO planners, operations and combat personnel. There is a strong case to be made for a real integrated US tactical air defense a la Russe or similar. I close with a cautionary tale from my Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix days.
 
The FAD (Fleet Air Defense) Section Head vs His Boss, the Operations Analysis Department Manager.
 
My section head, Bill Knight, ran OPFOR--Tu-22M BACKFIRE & SOJs (Stand Off Jammers); his boss, Dave Spencer, had the FAD for a BLUFOR CVBG (carrier battle group). Site of battle? Navy tactical simulator in Monterey, California. Each side had its own war room, and there was a separate Control room where all was known. The stakes? A good bottle of wine and gloating rights on Monday. Event was part of a threat conference the weekend immediately before Monday.
 
OPFOR objective:
 
Penetrate FAD screen and launch long range Mach 3+ AS-4 KITCHEN ASCMs to hit and destroy CVNs (in the days before AEGIS was deployed)
 
BLUFOR objective
 
Use CAP and DLI (Deck Launched Interceptors) to destroy OPFOR before it can reach the missile release line.
 
Execution: BLUFOR
 
BLUFOR radar detects jam strobes on expected threat axis and gleefully commits both CAP and available DLI to attack OPFOR. Once in range, and operating in HOJ (Home ON Jam) mode, salvos of Tomcat launched Phoenix missiles kill the jammers, clearing the radar scopes. Dave Spencer exults, thinking he has destroyed the attackers and won a crushing victory.
 
Execution: OPFOR
 
Bill Knight fully anticipates BLUFOR commander's battle plan and uses it to destroy him. OPFOR demonstrates with SOJs, getting exactly the response he anticipated, but sends the actual striking force, without SOJs, around to the back door, conducting completely unhindered AS-4 missile attacks. The SOJs and crews blown to bits? Regrettable losses necessary to fulfill OPFOR commander, Bill Knight's, operational intent.
 
Battle Resolution 
 
About the time Dave Spencer was celebrating his great victory, Control informed him  his triumphant Tomcats would begin ditching shortly. Seems both of his carriers had been sunk by Bill Knight, and no fixed airfield, or even another carrier, was anywhere to be had. This was the end. I have no idea what the wine was, how expensive and delectable, but the wine of victory was thoroughly savored by my section head, for he had wiped the floor with Dave, who possessed an awe inspiring Ph.D. in Military Operations Research, from Harvard, no less. Come Monday, though, his customary arrogance and aura of superiority were gone. He walked about head down, visibly depressed and like a man in a daze. He couldn't believe what had happened to him; so catastrophically at the (perceived) moment of victory.
 
Summing up, I believe the expectation that the US would almost immediately own the skies over Ukraine to be on the scale somewhere from delusional clear up to clinically insane. Such expectations seem to be predicated on a largely incompetent opponent who hasn't a prayer of prevailing vs western military might and training. Additionally, this seems to be predicated on the notion that Russian pilots are no better than Arab pilots and would be flying planes just about as capable relative to US combat aircraft. Does the US have some nice toys? Absolutely. But how many will actually be usable--and stay usable--over the course of the envisioned campaign? Is it reasonable to assume that other US foes are going to lie doggo so the US/NATO can fight Russia absent other military crises? I think not. And has anyone here bothered to look at the Russian approach to BVR aerial warfare in a very heavy jamming and rapidly maneuvering target environment? Once you have, consider this notional engagement, but with as many as 4 x AAMs targeted on each Raptor. This engagement presumes, too, that AWACS isn't attacked and downed or badly crippled. Nor does it recognize the existence of a technology called forward pass, in which missile shooters simply salvo missiles on command of aircraft whose far superior sensors allows guidance of those weapons even though the shooters can't see the target. All of a sudden those numerous not Stealth planes become a real threat, making the already enormous missile loads of Russian Stealth fighters many times larger than can be carried. 


 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

MikeyD,
 
Long ago, I was in sales, where I was taught to always, always first present the feature, then explain the benefit to the customer. You've told us what the feature is, but not the benefit. Survival! Your point about factoring in the consequences of having infantry (or even softskins) near an APS munition detonation is well made. Don't know whether  a live AFV's armor can now screen against bullets, allowing the infantry stacking we see in war footage and movies, but if it does, things could get altogether too exciting in an RPG from behind type situation. Might wipe out a whole squad, in fact. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Na Vaske,
 
Interesting to see a Russian playing as a Ukrainian. Your formidable Tank Serzhant Popova (extra points for use of patronymic) brings to mind this singularly apt classic Queen vid. Pay attention to the lyrics at 0:32, and you'll understand why.
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAf2S6ij2gk
 
Reiter,
 
The piece of art at the bottom of your #63 depicts, I believe, depicts Death, who's clearly German, playing away over the corpse of (shot by a German firing squad) British nurse Edith Cavell, indicated by both the nurse outfit and the draped British flag. Years ago, and I forget where, I got to see a bunch of WW I propaganda drawings. This one's pretty tame compared to those, such as the one of the bestial German soldier with a baby spitted on his bayonet. this was the result of lurid (false) stories emerging from Belgium.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

 

c3k,

What a marvelous piece of writing, for which full marks are awarded for using, in a single short narrative, "inchoate," "cravat," "au jus" and "tete a tete!" I do think, though, the "hand-basted veal ribs..." were unfair to mention, seeing as how mine aren't here yet. Somebody's got to do the QC, after all. Personally, I favor destructive testing--by my jaws.

Now, I believe you were going on a bit about some romp in the woods with PPShs?

sburke,

Brilliant ripostes! The image of Charles laughing in his brain jar was simply priceless.

Regards,

John Kettler

I don't speak Portuguese, by it's not close enough to Spanish I can muddle through to some degree. Though there are a few images which simply aren't right, this vid has more info than I've ever seen on the mine dogs. It's got the "how it works" placard, the mine dogs in a long column with their handlers, mine dogs in gas masks, even color movie footage apparently shot at Kursk, with the dog fully loaded and barely controllable by the soldier in his slit trench. No extra charge for the wrong front Yorkie in a GI helmet which appears several times in this tribute. The text talks about how many dogs served, how many died and their purported kill count.
 

 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

MikeyD,

Good things to know. May I suggest a simple first order test? Look at the in-game US 76mm Sherman gun performance vs Panther. If the Russian 85mm is outperforming the 76mm, then the data for the 85mm are wrong. Russian firing tests at NIBT Poligon clearly established the 76mm as having better penetration than the 85mm had. Firing tests vs a King Tiger showed quite substantial differences!

http://english.battlefield.ru/was-the-tiger-really-king.html

"10. American 76 mm armor-piercing projectiles penetrated the "Tiger-B" tank's side plates at ranges 1.5 to 2 times greater the domestic 85 mm armor-piercing projectiles."

Topic change

Since you're here, would you or someone else please provide the link posting guidance I requested on January 21st of this year? The whole issue makes me twitchy, following an Infraction awhile back. Nor am I the only one in this boat. Thanks!

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=113229

Regards,

John Kettler

Apocal,

CNN doesn't know a tank from an SPG. Those are 122mm 2S1s. The wheeled AFVs are BTR-80s. Mi-24 HIND helos. Hard to say for sure, but estimate F model with twin 30mm cannon and AT-6 SPIRAL ATGMs.

I went through multiple versions of the paragraph you quote, but I couldn't find a clear way to express my core concept. That was: If the perceived reality of an event, as seen from your POV, lies in social media, then where're the excited-outraged posts from Russians--made during the force buildup before Russia moved against Ukraine? Those are what I didn't see. Thank you for the images you did provide.

sburke,

Thank you for taking the wisecracks elsewhere.

agusto,

Thank you for your courtesy, and I had zero idea it was a serious question, still less you're one of my readers. I will say this, and you're welcome to query me further on my site. Russia has some very exotic aerospace equipment of its own.

Regards,

John Kettler

Well, apparently Apple has a macro issue with conflict. Period. On this basis, to resolve a burning one, I propose that Apple be forced to have two virtual calculators in not only the Mac OS/iOS, but in all apps employing such calculating functions. Clearly, it's discriminatory, ethnically insensitive and possibly racist of Apple to exclude RPN (Reverse Polish Notation), right?

Regards,

John Kettler

Tanknut Dave has a very good page on the T-84 Oplot, a term I now understand to mean "bulwark." This page goes into tremendous, glorious grog detail (manufacturer's sheet?) on the tank, to include the thermal sights (don't understand the magnification stuff at all; makes no sense--NFOV is 1/3 mag of WFOV), other visionics, signature reduction measures of which I knew effectively nothing, even how many grenades and AKS cartridges are carried. Part of this page is a mini tutorial on the nits and grits of the ammo carousel and its specific operating parameters. There is a full discussion of the CM suite on the tank, too, including the duration of the aerosol screen once deployed. Don't plan on staying long. Lasts all of a minute. The ballistic protection section seems impressive, but it's much easier to claim the ability to survive various threats and something else altogether to actually deliver on the claims. Vid of an Oplot on the Poligon is pretty cool. Amazing how little can be seen of it when running through the brush.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler
 
 

Michael Emrys,

Tut! Tut! this is obviously an incorrect understanding of "speed bump." The cognoscenti here understand the true meaning of the term is "whatever's in the way of the ISU-122."
Whether Elvis winds up becoming one is presently an open question!

All,

Appreciate the comments from several here on optimal movement methods for armor. Had always used Hunt myself for final stages of movement in imminent contact situation, but I now know this approach, while seemingly appropriate, has real and potentially casualty intensive issues. I've faced this tank distraction problem clear back to CMBO. I'm trying to fight the armor war, but the AI sees infantry, loses its mind, goes after the infantry and ignores the enemy tank, which then kills me.

Regards,

John Kettler

76mm,

Not so. The Lend Lease Act was a legitimately passed and signed into effect law. It was intended to supply war materiel, not production means. It was intended to supply the fruits of science and technology, not the know-how underpinning them. Hopkins deliberately intervened in situation after situation and forced well-informed military authorities and civilian enterprises to hand over exactly those things. Hopkins stretched Lend Lease beyond all recognition, allowing Russia access to technology areas in which Russia had no real base; allowing Russia to conduct large scale military-industrial espionage (Major Jordan caught some particularly egregious examples but was overruled and forced to let them through) with impunity. In a very real sense, Hopkins helped create the Russian military-technical-manufacturing infrastructure which bedeviled us during the Cold War. This isn't to say the Russians weren't very sharp and ingenious in their own right, but life is so much easier when someone else has done the work already and you can capitalize on it. The Bell case saved Russia an estimated three years of development time and avoided any number of wrong radar engineering paths as well, over and above the huge ruble outlay which would've otherwise been required.

Clearly we disagree and will almost certainly continue to do so. I've made a strong case. You won't budge an inch. I'm still concerned Steve may opt to lock this thread. I therefore suggest we return to the issue of the Lend Lease AFV and their employment by the Russians.

Regards,

John Kettler

pnzrldr,
 
In a QB for which I have the Save, I observed a complete Kill Chain occur in four (4) seconds. NO LOS from anyone but my tank, which had zero LOS until it Hunted forward and cleared terrain mask and foliage LOS block. While moving, buttoned, it saw a T-90AM at what I subsequently determined to be a range of 654 meters, lased and fired. First shot kill. Veteran vs Veteran. T-90AM got no shot off at all. I know our guys are super well trained, but to me, that seems ridiculously fast, even with SABOT up the spout. And I'm not sure I believe that, either. I'd think AMP would be the default round. Would very much appreciate your thoughts on this. Original post is on CMBS Tech Support.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

weapon2010,

I just got back from seeing it, and it was vastly better than I dared hope. Where, oh where did they get all that lovely nasty looking armor, including all the ruined tanks as the film begins? Tremendous atmosphere throughout. Could practically smell it, too. On balance, the best armor movie I've seen to date to date, and that's despite the a) stupid stuff and the martial insanity aka ridiculous intervehicle spacings necessary to get all the tanks in the platoon in frame while line abreast or even road column.

Whoever did the vehicle and set decoration did, pardon the expression, a bang up job. Man, were those tanks grubby and banged up! Loved how the log protection got chewed up by MG fire and then blown away to a large degree on the right side of the tank, also the shot up paint work from MG fire. Think someone missed an opportunity to frang tank exteriors and men alike when the artillery fire crashed into the square proper. German ATG gunnery (more war toys) needed major work, but JasonC will be along to tell us this is typical, not just for the Germans, but for all ATGs during the war. Unfortunately for JasonC, American performance was at pretty much modern levels. This may suffice to upset the entire universe!

I think the comparison to "Das Boot" is apt, for it's got that same walls closing in feel; that same disgusting interior. Okay. Much worse. Having been inside an M4A4 only a year ago or so, I have a fairly good sense of the interior space of a Sherman, and whereas the one I was in was pristine and white, Fury more nearly resembled a dark particularly vile low ceilinged, misshapen cubicle interlaced with obstructing and sharp metal. Did look pretty roomy in there, but then the shop in "Pawn Stars" is tiny and doesn't look it, either, on that show.

Nearly ralphed when the FNG had to remove pieces of his predecessor, especially the shocking half a face. Belton Cooper's men should've done that, but they're in 3AD, not 2AD. Looked in vain for a hole in the armor plate to accompany the bow MG operator's corpse. Loved the worn, dirty, greasy tank uniforms. If you can call them that. Only two pair of these in the entire crew.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/M4_crew,_Fort_Knox,_WWII.jpg

Some might think ordering a clerk typist to a tank made no sense, but by then, complete trained tank crews were very uncommon, and many tanks had long operated short crewed. The phenomenal Another Bridge, Another Town is the account of a 19 y.o. guy who had a whole two weeks of gunnery training and no breaking in period before winding up as gunner in practically the lead tank of a 3 AD major attack in Germany, so broadly comparable to Belton Cooper's talking about vanilla infantry drafted into tank crews right off the battlefield and flung into battle following only a few hours of training--with disastrous results. At least the FNG got a veteran crew, the "old" guys who spent two years working up before deploying to war, starting in North Africa. By WW II standards, and harder to assess because several of the men looked like 40 miles of bad road, these guys shown were old. Loved the scene with the small ineffectual 90 day (not so wonder) trying to command hard-bitten combat vets, especially in his spiffy unbesmirched unform and no whiskered cheeks. And if the /Hispanic-American/Mexican ("Don't speak Mexican in my tank." Priceless) in his top hat seemed rather "Kelly's Heroes," you might wish to look at this wartime pic. There are some great pics in the overall series, but please ignore the several shots of TDs and even an LVT some dolts called tanks!

http://life.time.com/history/fury-reality-of-tank-warfare-wwii-photos/#11

I thought the shooting the POW after the battle was clearly ended well before was gratuitous, not at all typical and highly illegal. Shooting enemy immediately after surrender in a battle where they fought until it was hopeless and had killed men from the attacking force? Certainly happened. On both sides. I grok the blooding of the FNG, from a plot aspect, but sheesh! Contrariwise, I thought the depiction of suppression effects and of the Landser prairie dogging from foxholes and trenches was cool, albeit messy. The MG-42 sound was pretty disturbing and was in vivid contrast to the other MGs. Liked the depiction of how little could be seen from the buttoned up tank and of the marginally head up American TCs in the tank battle. non Wardaddy TC casualties seemed credible, but methinks he should've died quickly, if not instantly, from multiple chest hits. Again, not as good a story. Full points for the escape hatch, use of crew personal weapons, StG-44, grenades and such. Thought the MG setup on the turret of Fury was notable. Film certainly depicted the shredding effects of Ma Deuce impacts well. Impressive weapon handling by that sniper. Nothing moved during reloading but the bolt.

While it made for great visuals not to shoot until they were past insanely close, I would've opened fire with everything I had while the German column was still well down the road four abreast and practically atop each other. Got dark so dramatically, so suddenly it was as though we entered a time warp, skipping dusk altogether.

I came out of the theater wired on adrenaline and feeling a bit like I did after being depth charged in "Das Boot." The effects were pronounced enough that deciding where to go for dinner with my brother afterward was tough, and the menu seemed daunting. Repeatedly had to consciously remember to breathe during the film. Intense.

Shall doubtless have more later when I've had to time to settle down and integrate the experience, but now, am off to keep reading what everyone else felt and thought. It may be a good thing so much time has elapsed since SPR came out, as far as WW II vets go, for this film would certainly have resurrected the nightmares and reactivated long dormant PTSD.

Regards,

John Kettler

Gunhappy42,

Points taken. As for casualties inflicted, two things apply. The SEALs don't spray and pray. They deliver precisely aimed fire, typically no more than two rounds per target. The only time you're likely to see anything like the ammo expenditures you take as normal would be in an ambush delivered by the SEALs or when breaking contact. Nor did I say that the SEALs were using ordinary weapons. They've got some remarkable highly advanced conventional weapons and as well as other toys which you'd expect to find in military SF. It's absolutely true that SEALs can and do whistle up things like AC-130s (which don't always operate in permissive environments and didn't from their inception) and even B-52s, but there are also things like the Night Stalkers' MH-60 DAP (the choice for a hot extract) they bring to the party which can deliver absolutely awesome firepower in their support, in far from benign conditions, too. Insiders characterize the firepower it can deliver as "unsurvivable." Here's why.



Misuse of such units has been a big problem. SpecOps should augment conventional forces, not the other way round, but this became a big enough deal magazine articles were written about it.

SpecOps are rapiers, where regular forces are more like warhammers and battleaxes.

Regards,

John Kettler

pnzrldr,
 
In a QB for which I have the Save, I observed a complete Kill Chain occur in four (4) seconds. NO LOS from anyone but my tank, which had zero LOS until it Hunted forward and cleared terrain mask and foliage LOS block. While moving, buttoned, it saw a T-90AM at what I subsequently determined to be a range of 654 meters, lased and fired. First shot kill. Veteran vs Veteran. T-90AM got no shot off at all. I know our guys are super well trained, but to me, that seems ridiculously fast, even with SABOT up the spout. And I'm not sure I believe that, either. I'd think AMP would be the default round. Would very much appreciate your thoughts on this. Original post is on CMBS Tech Support.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

pnzrldr,
 
In a QB for which I have the Save, I observed a complete Kill Chain occur in four (4) seconds. NO LOS from anyone but my tank, which had zero LOS until it Hunted forward and cleared terrain mask and foliage LOS block. While moving, buttoned, it saw a T-90AM at what I subsequently determined to be a range of 654 meters, lased and fired. First shot kill. Veteran vs Veteran. T-90AM got no shot off at all. I know our guys are super well trained, but to me, that seems ridiculously fast, even with SABOT up the spout. And I'm not sure I believe that, either. I'd think AMP would be the default round. Would very much appreciate your thoughts on this. Original post is on CMBS Tech Support.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

MOS:96B2P,

Mine was a quick and dirty analysis based on a Google Map (not satellite view) of the primary routes coming into Ukraine, coupled with a few knowns and some informed speculation. Am not generally used to thinking militarily at such a high level, but a major route of advance can't, and to my mind won't, be ignored.

Let's look for a minute at past Russian invasion practices, starting with Czechoslovakia.

Per Suvorov/Rezun, who was there (see The Liberators, p. 168), the Russians not only ruthlessly pushed broken vehicles off the road and down the steep mountainside, but in order to get there faster, they deliberately did the same thing to one vehicle category after another, including their commo vans--with the TOP SECRET crypto gear in them and undemolished. Have separate confirmation of Suvorov's account. It was speed, speed and more speed to get into Czechoslovakia before things there came totally unhinged, before the Czechoslovakian Army, deliberately run into the ground via live fire exercises and subsequent maintenance (things like tank-sidelining "mandatory" battery removal), could regroup and offer some sort of resistance; before NATO might decide to intervene. That contingency was planned for and explicit ROE's were issued. Russian objective was to make sure Russia occupied more of Czechoslovakia than NATO did, then let the diplomats sort it out. Key parts of that invasion came via a dusty narrow road running through unforgiving terrain between Russia and Czechoslovakia. This axis of attack started in the Carpathian Front.

In Afghanistan, the invasion also had to pass a critical chokepoint, the Salang Tunnel in the Salang Pass. So great was the traffic to get into Afghanistan that pics exist of a line of military vehicles which are bumper to bumper as far as the eye can see in the shot. Later, the Muj wreaked havoc in the Salang Tunnel, blowing up several POL tankers and turning the inside of the place into a blackened charnel house.

And what do we find in the Georgia War? Another chokepoint. The Roki Tunnel. The Russians seized the tunnel, just as they did in Afghanistan, but the Georgians had aircraft and fought back, bombing the tunnel several times. They hurt the Russians but couldn't stop the flow.

History shows the Russians can and will go where it's officially impossible for them to go. In Op Bagration, they built corduroy roads through swamps. In August Storm, they brought their armor over the impassable Great Kinghan Mountains into Manchuria. Loza talks about this at IRemember.ru and in his books.

What to us is at best a trail is to them a road, an attitude helped by living in a nation most of whose major roads were rammed dirt! I used to hammer my colleagues about this at Hughes when analyzing any offensive scenario involving Russian, Warsaw Pact or patterned that way forces. It's all about achieving surprise, and masses of armor coming out of the swamp definitely accomplish that goal.

I have no idea what the road network looks like in terms of secondary, tertiary even quaternary routes, but rest assured, they do. And have long thought about it. Spetsnaz, Airborne and Air Assault units will make every effort (die trying) to take and secure tunnels, bridges, defiles, ferries, fords, etc., in advance of the invasion force proper. The same is probably even more true with rail, for that's how things really move there. True during WW II and true now. Working in their favor is that, unlike the Russia-Poland transition at the border, the Ukraine rail network has the same gauge as the Russian rail network. This facilitates rapid movement and removes a high leverage target, the striking of which would really hurt. It wouldn't surprise me at all to receive one or more reports of key rail nodes suddenly occupied by swarms of detraining passengers, who aren't, with guns.

If I had the maps to hand and a few other facts, starting with the Russian OOB and what unit's where, I could draw some more conclusions, but "invading Ukraine in the east" isn't adequate. Period.

Ukraine Combat Forces

Ukraine currently has no overall Commander of Ground Forces. Ouch. The prior one was ousted by the now ousted president.

Ukraine has what appear to me to be highly credible weaponry, with ~2300 T-64 of which ~700 are B and BV models, 271 T-80UDs and some 1300 T-72s in storage. Figure ~1000 BMP-1, 1400 BMP-2; ~1400 BTR-70, ~460 BTR-80 and some 2300 MTLB. Roughly 30 Mi-8 and 40 Mi-24 are the real combat helos, plus 19 honking Mi-26s (0 troops of 44,000 pounds of cargo).

Artillery's scary. For the Russians. 450 BM-21, 76 BM-27 , 100 BM-30 (BM-27 and BM-30 (deep strike weapons with modern munitions, to include SFW), 638 2S1s, 501 2S3s, rounded out by 24 deep strike 2S5s and 24 Msta S. 433 D-20s as well.

ATGMs are AT-4,5,13 and 14. AT-14 is the dread Kornet, the homeland version!

Air defense makes what Georgia had look like a nonevent, with everything from SA-18 MANPADS to SA-12 long range SAM, and in the middle lie the SA-11, like the one that ate the BACKFIRE C over Georgia, and the very scary SA-15 thrust vectoring SAM. Were I the Russians, I'd be worried. 30 ZSU-23/4 and unknown numbers of 2S6.

The above were yanked out of this list.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Ground_Forces#cite_note-gs-32

Ukraine Air Force

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Air_Force

Could really use the Tu-22Ms scrapped for lack of money! 16 combat ready Su-27, 48 total. 80 Mig-29, 100 in reserve. 36 Su-24M operational, 24 recce Su-24. 36 Su-25 ready, 48 total. Oh! 28 active Mi-8/17 and 48 Mi-24. 39 L-39 trainers, which can carry ordnance.

Not enough time to go into the other factors, but the Ukraine theoretically could put up a significant fight.

Ukraine Map Server

(Screams for want of Ukraine Area Handbook--would have roads and rail networks))

http://www.infoukes.com/ua-maps/

Decent Ukraine relief map, but no elevations, no cities, no roads and no rails. Gah!

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/67/Ukraine_relief_location_map.jpg

CIA was a bust, but NYT helps a bit.

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/02/27/world/europe/ukraine-divisions-crimea.html

In looking at the Russian military district map, the exercise alerts (exercises through March 3) went to the Western and Central MD. "Look this way!" Perfect distraction for a strike westwards from Southern MD! Ukraine does have a fair force on its eastern side. See inset map in top link.

92nd Guards Mechanized Brigade (Ukraine) is unit closest to eastern border. I don't read Russian, but the Russian Wiki is extensive compared to the mostly useless English version.

http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/92-я_отдельная_механизированная_бригада_(Украина)

The Google Map really needs multiple layers, like my local rapid transit map. This one shows the main routes, from which it's clear Kharkov's critical, being the junction of three major routes. Likewise, Poltava is critical to any drive west, since it has a fork for a highway doing exactly that. That route's significance is based on a take the whole country model.

https://www.google.com/maps/@48.5141904,33.1384364,712947m/data=!3m1!1e3

Am going to stop now. Hope this helps.

Regards,

John Kettler

Bud_B,
 
Good thread.
 
Baneman,
 
I didn't know you couldn't stack minefields in CMx2. Verily that sucketh! We could do that in CMx1, and given the numerous waltzes by the opponent through the minefields at only single density in CMBO and such, though expensive in QBs, it was pretty much a tactical necessity to stack them. 
 
Everyone,
 
While we're on mines, and now that we've got all the goodness of 3.11, did we ever get Daisy chain mines back into the game? They most definitely belong there, as set forth by me quite some time back. 2013, to be specific, and we had them in CMx1, starting with CMBO.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

slysniper,
 
In one the four vids, forget which one, that ChrisND did showing off the APS, he rolled a platoon of T-90AMs into hull defilade position dead front of a pretty exposed, full frontal aspect, Abrams platoon on a low hill. Range? 750 meters. The T-90s saw the Abrams force first and opened fire. Several US tanks died outright, while others were badly hurt. The Russian force never came under fire, I believe. Sure opened my eyes!
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

slysniper,
 
In one the four vids, forget which one, that ChrisND did showing off the APS, he rolled a platoon of T-90AMs into hull defilade position dead front of a pretty exposed, full frontal aspect, Abrams platoon on a low hill. Range? 750 meters. The T-90s saw the Abrams force first and opened fire. Several US tanks died outright, while others were badly hurt. The Russian force never came under fire, I believe. Sure opened my eyes!
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Michael Emrys,

You are correct. We're not charging for our kibitzing!

All,

On a more serious note, I agreee that Elvis is in trouble. Trouble compounded by what seem like German grade microtactics. Turns out, though, that they actually did such things. You can see them to some extent in that OT-34 commander's memoirs I linked to in the Eastern Literature thread, but online readable segments of Panzer Destroyer reveal such matters in greater detail, back when that author commanded a KV-1 platoon. "Yuri! Antitank gun under tree by the fence. Destroy it." "Sergei, enemy tank emerging from behind the barn. Wait until he exposes his flank, then shoot." That kind of thing. (Now, I really want that book)!

Having said the above, these forces had everyone in the same area attacking, with the tanks clearly visible to each other. What they weren't doing was operating on multiple axes in symphonic level coordination. This is where Bil kills the opposition (insert Carly Simon song from Bond movie; other was inadvertent pun). In a word, he orchestrates combat power in ways a modern commander would envy, but war isn't like that. Certainly not then.

Am not at all sure how to do it, but I believe BFC needs to introduce Clausewitzian friction into some gamers' Swiss chronometer precise combat. I know CMx1 used Fuzzy Logic to represent all sorts of things in the game. If Fuzzy Logic's not in this game, maybe it needs to be. Otherwise Mentat/super brain Bil and others like him are likely to sweep all before them, simply because their ability to plan and execute far exceeds historical reality and capability. If, as Steve's publicy stated, CM is all about realism, seems there's a rather unrealistic element to the game which, methinks, needs looking into.

Regards,

John Kettler

I was doing some research when I fell into the endless diversion to be found in a sidebar. Turns out this was a lot more than a diversion. More like a mind expander. I took the test as soon as I came across it and found it demanding, forcing me to search the dim recesses of memory to resurrect words encountered, in some cases, decades ago. Some were easy, some required serious efforts at recall, while some I attacked via logical exclusion. I managed to get 20/21, was undone by a word I'd never seen before, but had I not worked as hard as I did, it would've been far less than that. Try it for yourself.
 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/inspired/1241586-test-your-knowledge-how-many-of-these-words-do-you-know/
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler
 
 

Lee McLaughlin,
 
If you like, you can play part of the Petsamo-Kirkenes Strategic Operation, where you can have
 
(Fair Use)
 
General Meretskov also personally requested a fifth armoured unit from STAVKA, voicing the opinion that this should include a regiment of heavy KV-1 tanks to break through the German defensive positions. STAVKA approved the request and assigned: 

• 73 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment 
 o 21 KV-1 tanks 

to the Karelian Front.
 
The above is taken from a first rate two part military analysis reported here.
 
(Breaks away to check some more)
 
Regret to inform you you're screwed. The KV-1s listed are KV-85s, as described in James Gebhardt's The Petsamo-Kirkenes Strategic Operation, p. 20. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

BFC and/or playtesters,

If every bullet is accurately tracked, why is it that workhorse .30/7.62 and 7.92mm fire can't own goal friendlies? "Friendly fire isn't," and I see no good reason why amicide is possible with larger calibers and HE, but not with the far more plentiful rifle/SMG/Kurz and pistol rounds.

Regards,

John Kettler

Ranger33,
 
Your reply cracked me up, yet makes a lot of sense, too. Wonder how Random can be fixed at the force selection logic level. What I got is awkward and potentially deadly, whereas your force makes sense, but the opposition's doesn't. That's not the same, because I'm talking about a hink in own force selection. So far, I've yet to encounter any Russian defenders. Attack scenario, which presumably explains why I have not merely a nasty main force, but heavy fire support, too. Why I'm schlepping a Company HQ into battle when there's no Infantry Company. One of my Abrams is the Tank Battalion CO's, who's evidently leading from the front.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler