Strykers Part II

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by RT North Dakota:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The Germans reduced their Squad size several times throughout the war. This was the result of expansion and losses. IIRC the original platoon was 4 sections of 11 men, then 3 sections of 11 men, then 3 sections of 9 men, then 3 sections of 8 men for certain infantry formations. The last TO&E had 9 men from what I remember, but they didn't really get the chance to do it.

My point is that 9 men has been, for quite some time, seen as a good balance between firepower and boots. Lower has been seen by the US military, in particular, as undesirable. Going to 7 men standard seems to be too few and,

Let me help you out here.

1. Squad/Section size does not matter. How the squad is trained and commanded does.

2. Platoon and company size does matter. Far more important than Squad.

3. Dismounted Platoons should be between 24-36 - Ideally 30, based on current data.

4. Companies should be between 96 - 130, dependant on concept of ops and a few other factors. </font>

[The_Capt]

JasonC

Ok now we can try and get somewhere, although you went a little back to front on me.

so lets break it down a little.

A. "Iran or China." Large scale symmetrical warfare-esque engagements. Ok, I may even buy Iran if they do something silly (China is unlikely, the economic implications alone forestall that saber, let alone the thought of where a post-conflict that probably includes nukes would leave us). Ok Jason you get your large heavy armour and we go in and kick ass in Iran, teach em old school not to muck about with the west...then what? Years of occupation duty while we try to build a friendly power-base...oh and by the way large armour formations are great for killing other large formations and they can even pick off insurgents but they do not go a long way to swinging support your way. So we park our large formations except for a backstop reserve..and who gets the decade of trying smooth things out...ACRs...why of course because they were tailor made for the job. No the bulk will go into SOF and non-kinetic elements that try to stabilize and rebuild the country we just kicked apart.

B. "Ability to take out rogue states." Can you show me how we need more heavy formations for this? We have done it to Iraq and Afghanistan with very small and light forces compared to what the staff tables said we should have had. It was the mess after that is causing us pain. And as I noted before a tank is a player in a counter-insurgency but not the main actor.

C. "protracted guerilla warfare spreading from state sanctuaries, requiring the ability to take out entire state sanctuaries where politically possible, and the ability to defeat guerilla forces in protracted wars". Again we are talking a small war here and nothing in our recent or historical experience points to large heavy formations as the solution to these problems.

D. "direct conventional attack on smaller US allies by powerful states (e.g. Iran vs. an abandoned Iraq, or China vs. Taiwan, or Russia vs. Ukraine), after political fatigue has led to US withdrawals from regions or reductions in credible deterrence". Solid scenario for the future but why wouldn't we simply use our air power to destroy these elements on the ground or at sea and then go in a la Kosovo. And you haven't proven what a Stryker formation can and can't do against an older (possibly obsolete) heavy force anyway. Again tanks a requirement but not in the large numbers you propose.

E. "security and counter insurgency in genocidal conflict, largely in the periphery, featuring armies weaker than Iran down to weak guerillas (Serbia, Sudan, Somalia, Congo), requiring as a first line much better interface with auxiliaries and SF abilities, backed occasionally by US ground forces on security or counter insurgency missions." Not going to even bother with this one as large scale formation utility in messy intervension ops is pretty much obvious.

The only "steel fist" scenario that you have mentioned that supports your logic so far is an unlikely force on force scenario. There has been nothing in the last 15 yrs that supports your basic thesis that: "No, we have already reduced them far below the safety point. We need 2 additional active heavy divisions."

Full spectrum capability is definitely a reqr however when you can dominate any conflict in the opening phases with a combination of airpower and what you have already AND the follow phases do not need heavy formations where is your justification for these elements.

In short we already have escalation dominance with what we have for the most likely scenarios in which we are going to be employed. Now I am not suggesting that we go the other way and eliminate the heavies in favour of some all high speed low drag sexy medium-light force structure, sometime you are going to need to hit things with a fist but you are going to have to demonstrate failures in recent operations (and I am talking operational and strategic) that hinge on the fact we didn't have enough tanks.

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[RT North Dakota]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the learned comments about Stryker being merely an attempt to make light infantry less than completely useless, you aren't reading the thread. Plenty of people are campaigning against heavy as supposedly obsolete and presenting medium as "as heavy as anything ever needs to be"..

People may be campaigning, but I contend they've missed the point because they don't understand basic land warfare dynamics and/or have no working knowleagde of conducting operations.

Classic example, Enter the tracks v wheels argument, or people who talk about MEDIUM! - which is like buying grey paint instead of mixing black and white as and when required.

...interesting how the NVA could only successfully use tanks once all the TOW and SS-11 equipped helicopters had left Vietnam.

[The_Capt]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Actually, wars are quite reliably won by tanks driving around blowing things up, with modest all arms accompanyment and in recent years massive air power to be sure. But if you ignore your doctrinal axes to grind for a second and review the actual historical record, I believe you will find virtually every war won outright since WW I, was decided in that manner.

(Vietnam was won that way, to take a striking example. It was won in 1975 by a conventional armored blitzkrieg - protracted political stuff just set the table).

Very occasionally you will instead find states tiring of protracted wars withdrawing and accepting defeat without something like that happening, but you can really count those cases on one hand. You can also find any number of protracted infantry conflicts in the periphery than burn forever without decision.

Here is what you will not find anywhere - rapid decisive wars won by razzle dazzle and baffling the enemy with static on the command net - using infantry. Even medium infantry. In fact wars won by rapid maneuver are themselves rare and attrition victories are the rule - but air and armor are the drivers wherever it does happen. And the attrition ones are usually indecisive draws, unless and until one side smashes the other's air and armor and wins outright because of it.

Jason,

Well here we are back at the beginning, attrition versus manoeuvre. "The bayonet and spirit of the modern soldier shall carry the day."

Well you talk a good talk but your facts do not support. Wars are not being won by armour and air. The opening battles are and in some follow on tactical engagements but wars are and will and have be won by manoeuvre. Don't believe me..ok..lets look at a sample record...

WWII,

Won in the factories and population bases actually. Germans were simply out-produced and they failed miserably in the people battle-space of the countries they took. Here we did see attrition warfare in the simple fact that we could make more tanks, infantry, whatever than the other side. Most will point to WWII as the birthplace of manoeuvre but in fact above the operational level we were simply going with the WWI model of grinding an opponent down til they capitulate.

Korea,

Plenty of manoeuvre in the opening year+ on both sides, dug in slugfest into staring contest that continues to this day. Probably the closest example we have to attrition post WWII but strategic manoeuvre options boiled down to nukes and no one was going there. So we settled for a draw.

Vietnam...US out manoeuvred in an asymmetric conflict, out-manoeuvered by the USSR in logistical support to the North and out-manoeuvered in the people battlespace (both at home and abroad). The closing phases saw tanks rolling into Siagon but lets not confuse a snap shot with an entire war.

Afghanistan...substitute USSR into a Vietnam scenario same-same.

Any Arab-Isreal war. Classic manoeuvre warfare force on force, lots of tanks and air here...But...classic asymmetric manoeuvre in the latter "terror" phases that continues to this day.

The Cold War. An extension of WWII that saw attrition (in the form of the arms race) up to Star Wars. What broke the back of the Soviets is still open to debate but it probably was a combination of things, none of which involved tanks and heavy conventional forces grinding an opponent down.

Northern Ireland. This one actually supports your attrition philosophy but does so with medium and light forces. The IRA did not drop arms and enter parliment because of armour and superior airpower. They did so because the Brits hung on for over a century and very slowly smothered them, largely by intelligence and irregular means.

Finally you fail to see the risks inherent in your proposed methodology, you do so because you are failing to understand the nature of modern warfare. You are not alone in this, trust me but I have found academics steeped in 20th century military history are really having a tough time with the fact that the rules of the game have fundementally changed.

Tanks and air "blowing things up" are an evil we will need to unleash sparingly. The main reason is that our wars are less about defeating the will of a nation to fight but more about instilling in them a will to fight for themselves and by extention..us. Blowing up national infrastructure with disregard only means you have to rebuild it and it really doesn't make us any friends while you are doing it.

It works if we decide to move to a "drive in kill all the bad guys and leave" model but we do not do that becasue we recognize that it breeds instability. So we are stuck with the "war" now including stabilization and nation building. But unlike the clean seperations we saw in the big wars this is all happening while we are still fighting tactical-level resistance.

Now we have been here before and I know you will not change your tune but I would encourage you to really take a look at what we (I am talking western military) are really fighting. And the fact that the nature of warfare and manoeuvre have changed (or in reality spun back to 19th century constructs). We are back to small ****ty little wars that are decided one village at a time and will be won more through water wells than tanks.

Now if you really disagree and figure you have the answers...tell me right now how we are going to win in Afghanistan with heavy formations, tanks and air. If you can convince me this can be done, I pledge in front of the entire forum to put you in front of Canadian and ISAF senior leadership to pitch it.

[Sgt Joch]

I don't understand why these threads always become a Stryker vs. Armour thread.

Strykers and the Stryker Brigades were never designed as replacements for Armoured units, they are light mobile units which span the gap between light air mobile infantry and heavy armour division.

In a conventional war, I would see their role as being similar to the German light divisions in 39-41, i.e. exploiting a breakthrough to: 1) disrupt the enemy's rear area; 2) seize and hold key terrain, until the regular armour/infantry units could come up to do the heavy lifting.

Just imagine the damage the Germans could have inflicted in Barbarossa with a couple hundred Strykers road-lifting infantry units to wreak havoc in the Soviet rear.

Strykers and Armour would both have a role to play in a conventional war.

[JasonC]

The Capt - first on China and the like, wars between first rates result from either miscalculation, or reckless gambling behavior on the part of one national leadership. It is the former that is worrisome with China. The contingency is (1) declining US deterrence credibility through war weariness (2) political decisions parties and signaling that is emphatically against any additional foreign military entanglements (3) increasing Chinese confidence about getting away with support to anti-US proxies (4) sufficient numbers of other threats on the board that are not being handled to make it look unlikely that an even bigger one would be (5) a Chinese decision that the time is ripe to grab Taiwan once and for all.

I submit this is not a terribly remote contingency, and in fact is dead center of Chinese military planning, present overall strategy, etc. No they would not be looking for trade war - though they are notably building capabilities to handle one. But they might readily believe the US will stay out and let them get away with it. They might also be entirely correct about that. But it is a series ripe for a war of miscalculation (and over credibility fears) like Korea. And if they do get away with it, sequels involving China get far more likely, too.

Second, on the claim that we don't need extra heavy to deal now, I am told in the same thread that we cannot possible attack Iran because we can't do it. But in fact, 2 armored corps could take Iran in less than a month with minimal losses. 2 extra active heavies would make that a plannable contingency. It would also dramatically increase deterrence strength for both Iran and the other threats. Right now the threat states believe, rightly or wrongly, that the US is militarily incapable of handling another major conflict. Yes political cost is at the core of that, but force size and composition is also a factor.

Next as to what you would do after toppling the Iranian government, sure you could do years of security ops as in Iraq. But I submit you do not have to, and that our actions in Iraq include a mass of unforced errors that need not be duplicated.

I also point out that maneuver as decisive rather depends on being pushed a l'outrance, and sanctuary and limited war uses of it as a strategy, are hamstrung from the start. Easily half of the current opposition we face in Iraq originates from within Iran and is directed by the Iranian government. The estimate late last year was that 40,000 members of the Iraqi security apparatus are on the Iranian payroll.

The Brits secured India from its Afghan border for decades using a policy they frankly described as "butcher and bolt". Its core was actually the use of subsidies and local irregular auxiliaries, backed occasionally by reprisal raids by Brit-Indian forces. There is a massive Iranian exile community willing to set up a government from exile today. The mullahs are not the most popular bunch in human history.

Yes there would be an insurgency in Iran if we invaded it too, no it is not obvious the net enemy faced would be significantly more capable, and it is obvious the Iranian nuclear threat and the whole time on the enemy's side issue, would be gone. Frankly the reason why Iraq is dangerous is that it is preventing seriously addressing Iranian nukes, because in itself it is a diversionary proxy fight (by multiple layers of "hands").

Is heavy useless in counter insurgency? No. I agree in *security* ops, wheeled and lighter and lots of dismounts are better. In counter insurgency, SF and locals are the main thing, and then escalation. Which heavies and air provide. The distinction turns on whether you see counter insurgency as an offensive mission with relatively unrestricted ROEs, or as a hamstrung security matter. I regard the latter approach to protracted war as a mistake. It conceeds the initiative, unnecessarily.

In concrete terms, I mean you first pick (on political grounds, aiming at a viable end-state - not moralizing) a set of enemies to make miserable, and then you break everything they own. When the political goal is decision, it is not achieved by balancing. You balance forces you want to remain permanently in existence. When instead you want to create a local hegemon, you do not balance, you unbalance.

We have been running Iraq as a security op aimed at national reconciliation through balancing. It might temporarily stand-up a government with broad support, though it does not appear to be doing so. (See current "support" levels of the government). Equally likely (at least), it seems to me, is just leads parties to jockey for advantage in the real fight they expect to occur, after we get tired of it all and leave. From their perspective, we refused to pick a winner and left them to have the real war to decide who rules Iraq, after we leave. Not having a winner is an option the Iranians have taken off the table (as long as we leave them alone, at least) - they will win if nobody else does.

In short, the mistaken missions of a badly run war are not a sound basis for deciding the force mix. We do not want to duplicate Iraq the occupation; it is not a success. Tailoring the force to do Iraq the occupation and nothing else, is tailoring the force to lose.

Such a force tailoring would incidentally have decent periphery stabilization capabilities, but those are what would probably actually be used. (Consider e.g. a Dem president; going to duplicate the Iraq experience and expect it to be all better because we have newer rides?)

Can Stryker mediums beat old heavy stuff by making use of US air? Probably. But see above in re Marine losses. You bring armor or you pay blood. If you have M-1s at the tip of the spear, 50,000 potential threat MBTs are scrap iron. They are not all scrap iron if you have no M-1s.

General Clausewitzean robustness also argues for keeping the heavy fist. Manpads will proliferate. Combined arms will always beat relying on a single arm to remain invincible indefinitely - which, sure, also recommends having other force types beyond heavy. We have 7 brigades of Stryker stuff planned, we have lots of light in the active army (mostly heliborne) and guard (trucked or now it appears, mine-resistent security vehicles), we have the entire Marine corps. We do not lack for any of those capabilities and we aren't going to. We do lack the whole army size and trained up heavies, to hit Iran with 4 ADEs if we need to.

Joint chiefs guy on last night noted that 90% of current training is directed at security and counterinsurgency, and the men are not getting training cycle time even for that, up to spec. He said it is critical to getting back to balance, that a portion of the force and a portion of time for all of the force, return to high intensity warfare training. Or we will bleed out the skills for it.

That way lies sorrow. Top missions in the escalation chain are key missions, and cannot in the long run be sacrificed to the lower. (Same is true in the air re F-22, and sea re sea control by SSNs, etc). It is overconfidence to think we can get away with that. We can't, the threat board is actually quite full and getting significantly worse.

[JasonC]

Sgt Joch - don't tell me, tell the folks explaining that there really isn't any need for tracks or for specifically heavy tanks in the modern world, that ATGMs are about to make heavy armor obsolete anyway, that anything a Brad can do a Stryker can do better, that medium plus air can beat anything we will actually face and costs less, that we will never have to fight a serious military again anyway. Sure they are lousy arguments. So wade in and shoot them down, don't pretend it is silly of me to call people on them.

[Sgt Joch]

JasonC,

my comments were adressed partly to both sides. As I see it, there is a role for both.

Canada is a good example. A few years ago, DoD in its wisdom decided to scrap all our Leo MBTs and replace them with an exclusively Styker/Lav force. Now, based partly on the lessons of Afghanistan, DoD is scrambling to find new Leopard MBTs to buy/lease and ship to Canadian troops.

Tanks for the Lesson: Leopards, too, for Canada

[ August 15, 2007, 09:51 AM: Message edited by: Sgt.Joch ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Sgt.Joch:

JasonC,

my comments were adressed partly to both sides. As I see it, there is a role for both.

Canada is a good example. A few years ago, DoD in its wisdom decided to scrap all our Leo MBTs and replace them with an exclusively Styker/Lav force. Now, based partly on the lessons of Afghanistan, DoD is scrambling to find new Leopard MBTs to buy/lease and ship to Canadian troops.

Tanks for the Lesson: Leopards, too, for Canada

DoD????? We really are the 51st state????

[The_Capt]

Jason,

Well perhaps we are coming to a common ground. I fully agree that the mailed fist will be a reqr in the future. I would be very much against any idea to remove capability in favour of an idea.

However, I think forces need to be balanced to meet the most likely threats. A land based war with China is possible but I would argue not probable...time will tell. Iran is a possibility but one would have to sit down to do the force ratios before anyone could say whether or not we "could" do it. The popular and political will to do so, particularly in light of Iraq make this less and less certain.

My point is that you cannot divorce the opening bell from the entire fight. In a force on force fight tanks are a must. But if your aim is make a friend after you beat up his boss then blood may have to be paid in the opening round to ensure that even more is not shed when you are cleaning up the place.

So where does this leave us. Well to my mind the Stryker concept of a very fast moving force that has information and air supremacy on its side is a viable construct. Does it entirely replace tanks..no but it sure as hell can enhance em. You are going to need tanks to do dirty work at least until kinteic energy-shielding is invented.

But I would argue that in the future the tanks will be the supporting arm and the medium-light stuff the supported more and more in small wars we engage in. Tanks will enable breakout and manoeuvre by cracking the shell. Strykers, or son-of and air power will finish the job of that first round.

Then after the "big crash", the balance will shift to see non-kinetic elements shift to the supported role with security supporting. In these phases tanks serve as a very good backstop not unlike arty.

[JasonC]

Capt - wars need not be decided at all. See Sri Lanka, or Iran-Iraq, or Korea. Wars that are decided are a fraction of the total, maybe three quarters maybe half. Plenty of wars burn for years with no clear winner, or settle nothing, or end in a status quo near ante.

Most wars that are decided are decided by attrition. Especially the big ones. Even when maneuver plays an operational role in some major phases or the final phases, usually attrition processes, operating directly on forces in the field or indirectly on political will or means of mobilization (economic and political), usual set the table. It is a rare war that is decided at all, without a long attrition phase. Of course there are also wars of attrition that are never decided. But attrition is frequently decisive.

There are a small number of wars that are decided quickly by maneuver warfare methods. Meaning, the losing force is momentarily dislocated and rendered ineffective, and that proves decisive on its own. This can include political decisions to end the war, and can be for limited objectives - usually is, actually.

In most wars, on the other hand, maneuver methods figure prominently enough at the operational level, including frequently the opening stages. But the edge gained by momentary dislocation proves indecisive and the war continues, typically transitioning to attrition processes. Which may decide it the same way as the maneuver stages, or reverse the early outcome, or burn on for ages without decision. This is in fact the rule or typical case when maneuver warfare *strategies* are attempted.

Notice, I have yet to mention the word "armor". All of the above were true before armor existed and are still true.

But the very small subset of decisive short maneuver-success wars, in modern times, have virtually all depended on a lopsided victory in the capital intensive means, armor for ground, sometimes air or air-sea. 6 day war, for example. You can find air-driven cases where light infantry was used, when it is lopsided enough - Panama e.g. Or cases where ground win followed automatically on air-sea win - Falklands e.g.

Armor is not wedded to rapid maneuverist victory attempts. Its clear operational capabilities seduced any number of theorists to that strategic view, but that strategic view is unsound, without armor being unsound.

Armor or slightly generalized, capital intensive warfare, is sound because (1) it allows such occasional cheap maneuverist wins as actually occur, though that isn't many (2) it attrites very efficiently, paying money instead of blood but exacting its price from the enemy in both 3) it tends to break one way or the other and so makes wars much more decisive than they otherwise typically would be and (4) its allows operational maneuver as a multiplier, toward all of the above.

The other very successful form of warfare in recent times has been protracted war by infantry forces, using guerilla principles and denial of battle, targeting political and economic sources of enemy power.

Adam reasonably asks why such warfare has tended to be infantry dominated. Partially it is because this "move" acts as a counter to capital intensive war on the part of those with less capital available. Just as important, the political means used are focused on what produces riflemen - which is not capital but political opinion. Naturally with the usual feedback - "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun".

That infantry warfare has been successful employing attritionist, protracted war strategies, is an empirical fact rather than a matter of first principles. It is relatively easy to see why they are correlated, however. Suppose you succeed in causing momentary dislocation to an enemy with a largely infantry force, but he retains significant political means of mobilization and significant, still intact armed forces (just momentarily dislocated ones). He usually has the ability to refuse the temporary verdict and continue the war.

This is sometimes the case after a capital-intensive win, too, but then usually reflects deliberate political restraint on the capital-intensive winner's part. Because objectively he could usually blow away the resisters (by hypothesis, temporarly dislocated and seriously out-armed). If he is willing to so and politically able, etc, that is likely to decide the war. (Notice, there is an asymmetry here that is *not* caused by the means employed, but by different norms of warfare and moral restraints).

Please keep firmly separated, the ideas of decisiveness vs indecisiveness - which is not simply about who wins but whether there is a winner at all - vs. e.g. statemate, or any resolution at all e.g. burn forever like Sri Lanka or something) - from the ideas of attrition vs. maneuver - either of which can be decisive or not, and independently can be successful or not - and from the idea of armor or capital intensive war vs. infantry dominated war. The second two can differ by side within the same conflict.

My claim earlier that attracted you attention, apparently, is directed at those who claim we can readily win wars quickly and cheaply if we will only adopt maneuver warfare as our strategy, who as it happens are also currently advocating a lighter force structure, as supposedly better adapted to this.

And my point is that they are wrong on multiple levels - wars are frequently long and indecisive and no, one can't just choose them not to be, attrition decides more wars than maneuver not because maneuver is not tried, but because its successes are usually quite limited and not decisive, and then further, that when you get past those twin problems, it is usually because one side was dramatically heavier than its opponent or dramatically more successful with its heavy arms, and emphatically not because it was light enough to run around them.

Let's make a really light army that can win rapidly and cheaply through maneuver-ee decision, in other words, is hopeless, on all current and past evidence. If you want to aim at that goal you need to be much heavier than the enemy, you need to bury him in capital. And that goal itself, isn't as sound as an attrition-ready broad combat power, because attrition happens more often than not. That attrition happens reflects the enemy's choices in the matter, his readily available counters, not own-side doctrinal or force-design limits.

[Sgt Joch]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Sgt.Joch:

JasonC,

my comments were adressed partly to both sides. As I see it, there is a role for both.

Canada is a good example. A few years ago, DoD in its wisdom decided to scrap all our Leo MBTs and replace them with an exclusively Styker/Lav force. Now, based partly on the lessons of Afghanistan, DoD is scrambling to find new Leopard MBTs to buy/lease and ship to Canadian troops.

Tanks for the Lesson: Leopards, too, for Canada

DoD????? We really are the 51st state???? </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Not to cover up your point though - oh, and don't forget to mention the costly upgrade they did on our Leo I turrets - a year or so before deciding to mothball the fleet in favour of all-wheels, as you describe. And now they find that the upgraded Leo Is are still needed, so instead of putting them on museum pedestals, they send them to Afghanistan, where they find they are difficult to operate without air conditioning.

It is hard to predict where and when stuff will be needed, so I don't blame DND for not having a crystal ball, but the Leos have been very costly, first to upgrade, then to ditch, then to send, then to replace because they're not optimally suited to that particular environment.

[JasonC]

The Capt - I don't disagree much with your last, except on 3 points.

One, I think the most useful tactics against protracted warfare attempts are SF plus local auxiliaries, in which heavy and air as your "artillery" are key supports yes, but in which most of the front line infantry fighting can be borne by those with a better political stake in the outcome. Is there still a role for security ops, yes, and APCs are good at that. Is there still a role for classic counter-insurgency, yes, and helo'ed light is good at some of that, so it heavy in my opinion.

I think we do poorly here largely for political-tactical reasons, in other words, and I doubt force structure adaptation is critical for it. By political-tactical, I mean picking friends and enemies, I mean ROEs, I mean the viability of the political end states we aim at, I mean our underemphasis on decisiveness and our overemphasis on today's press cycle. In force use terms I mean not enough SF and contractors and agents, not enough subsidy and local alliances, and too much Carolina boys puttering around in jeeps getting shot at.

Two, I disgree with the comment about Iran, not in the short run (because I agree, at present national will in the matter or anything like it is shot), but because I don't think it will be left to our free choice. It won't go away.

We will avoid the fight now only to fight a different version of it later, in militarily worse circumstances (as for the future political circumstances, we know essentially nothing). We need the capability, we do not design the force for what we *want* to do tomorrow, but what we may be *forced* to do anytime in the next ten years.

Three, I don't buy the ROE and sensitivity rap against heavy early on. I don't think medium would fight the early phase more discriminately, it would just have the call the air force for 2000 lbs more often, when the heavy boys would blow stuff away on their own. Remember in that phase we are talking about taking out enemy stand up forces. Medium are not going to do that with surgical rifle shots; won't work and leads to higher own side losses. They have the air force chain and they will yank it.

But even if they did, I deny it is better to be more discriminate in the early stages. Political opposition to the 100 hours was nil, inside and outside Iraq. It was widely popular. Those uninterested in the war simply deserted and were safe. A ton of bad guys got it, whom it would have been arbitrarily more expensive to get later.

For the Iraqis too. We do them no favors leaving men out for years to plant car bombs targeted at them as more vulnerable. In other words, decisiveness is more important than we pretend it is, and discrimination makes us feel better and ducks a scandal seeking press, perhaps, but does much less for the people we are actually supposedly sparing. We aren't sparing them, they are still at war.

I believe in fact that poor ROE choices are one of the critical failings in Iraq right now. Not as critical as a panglossian political end-state that refuses to pick sides and create an outright winner, but a close second. A third is all the time wasted on security with an inadequate force, and the focus on self protection, for so long, vs. aggressive counter-insurgency against a chosen target set. Kinda depends on the previous, though. (See also auxiliaries, SF, sanctuary for Iran, etc - failings we paid enough for once before that we should know better).

[The_Capt]

Originally posted by Sgt.Joch:

JasonC,

my comments were adressed partly to both sides. As I see it, there is a role for both.

Canada is a good example. A few years ago, DoD in its wisdom decided to scrap all our Leo MBTs and replace them with an exclusively Styker/Lav force. Now, based partly on the lessons of Afghanistan, DoD is scrambling to find new Leopard MBTs to buy/lease and ship to Canadian troops.

Tanks for the Lesson: Leopards, too, for Canada

I was waiting for someone to mention this one. This is internal CF bull**** pure and simple.

Without drifting into classified stuff, we went into Khandahar with rose coloured glasses (even in the face of advice from our own SOF guys who had been on the ground there for years in the great Bin Laden hunt). We sent a LAV BG into a counter-insurgency and then sent it into a gun fight in the Panjuwe Valley against dug in bad-guys.

Whether or not this was a good idea will be a matter for the history books as it pissed off a lot of locals and brought as home a lot of coffins, which eroded support at home ("Hey Al, this doesn't look like 'reconstruction'). The gain was we showed the TB that the blue helmet myth was bull**** and we can still dish it out in spades.

Unfortunately when the SOF guys said..."you are going to need tanks because if you go into that valley you are going to be doing combined arms in built up areas."

The powers that be disagreed and tanks were left at home. This had nothing to do with manoeuvre-vs-attrition or LAV-bad-tanks-good but the basic rule that infantry in a street fight need direct fire support. Now this could be an armoured D-7 with a WWII era breaching gun on it but we still had Leo's in stock so we shipped them off, where to this day they are being employed as a big mobile gun that can reach out and touch anyone who holds out a little too long.

An MGS could be doing what the Leo's are doing in theatre mainly because the ranges of engagment are such that RPG and direct fire are ineffective. IEDs are another story but it is in fact worse if we lose a Leo to an IED (which will probably happen sooner or later) as oppose to an MGS because: "Al, them tanks are suppose to be invincible...how come those skinny fellas wearing hat-towels blew one up?!"

Regardless the BG on the ground now had the direct fire support it desperately needed, tanks were there so we used em. The armoured corp jumped on this one hard and screamed " You see we told you so..see...see?!", which is hardly an objective analysis but you know we may well get dragged into a shooting war like Iraq where those big bastards will come in handy so ok lets keep our tanks.

Then the green eyed monster came to roost, that and bald-ass opportunism.

"Hmm the AF got new planes....the arty got new guns...hey maybe we can get some gravy out of this little war". And the Leo II initiative was born. Number of Leo I's killed due to less armour..zero. Number of troops dead because the Leo I's gun was too small...zero. The number of Taliban tanks engaged...zero.

So we convinced our political masters, who by now just wanted this thing to go away, that the Leo II, with greater gun range and air conditioning (cause a G8 nation could never figure out how to reto-fit a Leo I) is going force the bad guys to come out with their hands up.

What we didn't tell them is that this 62 ton monster will probably trash every bridge and culvert in theatre..the 120mm is actually less suited to what we are doing than the old 105 and we could just as easily keep the Leo 1 for what we expect to do into 2020.

But nothing opens the wallet like a shootin war and here we are, sending a MBT designed to kill other tanks in Europe into SW Asia to blast the few TB dumb enough not to run away. Oh and now we are really in trouble if one gets knocked.

Anyway...nothing to see here...move along...

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Michael Dorosh]

The_Capt - Perception of the war in Afghanistan s faulty on many levels. I think it is ridiculous that the fallen soldiers in Afghanistan are commemorated annually on Peacekeeper's Day - since they're fighting a GD war - and the head of the Peacekeeper's Association, Colonel Ethell, is on the news last weekend complaining that the memorial wall in Calgary is running out of room because of the death rate among Canadian servicemen. Well guess what Colonel Don, those names shouldn't be on that wall to begin with...

http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=d5a83429-aee9-44f7-9f2c-53e9cbad8478&k=59589

[The_Capt]

Jason,

Gonna let the first two go because I actually agree with the first one and we are doing a lot wrong right now wrt the aftermath.

As to Iran, it really isn't about Iran but the idea we may have to face a large conventional force on force scenario in the future against an opponent with lots 'o' old stuff, in this history of the last 20 yrs support this scenario as likely but I am still not entirely sold that more heavy tank formations will be reqr or can we do the job with a heavy-medium mix.

You mistake my point on the ROE issue. I have no doubt a medium force will be blasting with abandon along its axis of advance but here is where the manoeuvre aspect comes into play. If we knock an opponent off balance, crack his outershell with a hammer and then stab him with a rapier we will be doing a lot less damage than clubbing him to death with the hammer.

These are really Strategic and Operational ROEs vice tactical ones. I am a strong proponent that using a mix of manoeuvre and attrition, along with like forces will get you where you are going faster, doing less damage and make the aftermath job easier.

[The_Capt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

The_Capt - Perception of the war in Afghanistan s faulty on many levels. I think it is ridiculous that the fallen soldiers in Afghanistan are commemorated annually on Peacekeeper's Day - since they're fighting a GD war - and the head of the Peacekeeper's Association, Colonel Ethell, is on the news last weekend complaining that the memorial wall in Calgary is running out of room because of the death rate among Canadian servicemen. Well guess what Colonel Don, those names shouldn't be on that wall to begin with...

http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=d5a83429-aee9-44f7-9f2c-53e9cbad8478&k=59589

Hey Michael,

The scary reality is that our nations armed services are in a state of war but our nation is not. This is never a good thing but here we are. We sold the blue helmet thing to try and get away from the Airborne/Somalia thing and now we are living it. It is getting better in that Canadians are beginning to realize this is very different but with that is "How the hell did we get ourselves into this?!". Hell O'Conner just got benched over this thing.

[Michael Dorosh]

I don't know if he got benched so much as General Hillier pulled his sweater up over his head in the locker room...Brigadier General O'Connor isn't the first soldier to have been perceived as substandard as MND - McNaughton comes to mind. I never knew what to make of O'Connor in any event. I don't think General Hillier did either; General O'Connor often didn't give the impression of someone in touch with military realities, but one could never tell if he was saying things because or real ignorance, or if he was simply toeing some political line, which would be a reality of his post. I think McKay was a more inspired choice of replacement than Prentice, though.

That we are at war and the nation is not is a constant theme during the "current events" talks and Q&A sessions we get from the Brigade commander, Area deputy commander, and our own CO. That said, I still had a letter published in the local newspaper opposing the yellow ribbon decals being used on civic vehicles. I'd rather see tangible support/acknowledgement that we are fighting a war than simple platitudes. Luckily the current government knows that. I see we got our first C17 this week. Your comments about the Leo 2s were interesting. I can see how spending can go too far. There was such a tempest in a teapot about brown/green uniforms back in 2001, and then real concerns about the Iltis, that I suppose one is scared to do anything less than the maximum now.

[thewood]

That's not just a Canadian issue. The US is really not on a war footing back home either.

[M1A1TC]

Originally posted by Sgt.Joch:

I don't understand why these threads always become a Stryker vs. Armour thread.

Strykers and the Stryker Brigades were never designed as replacements for Armoured units, they are light mobile units which span the gap between light air mobile infantry and heavy armour division.

Strykers and Armour would both have a role to play in a conventional war.

Well, I dont agree with your opinion. As soon as I found out that Strykers were coming, I started reading in Army Times and various other official publications that Armor was going away, decreasing in size. For example, my own Armor unit was disbanded and we became ADA, and later MPs.

When you bring in vehicle like Stryker, other combat vehicle specialties like M1A1 Abrams crew member suffer

[Sgt Joch]

Slightly off-topic, but as anyone else seen this email by a Canadian LAV commander in Afghanistan? it sure sounds like a "war" to me:

Battle of Panjawai and Beyond

Hey everybody! First off I apologize for the length of this email, as it contains two weeks worth of Afghanistan fun. I am doing well and brutally honest I have enjoyed this last couple of weeks. Seven years of training culminating in 14 action packed days. At first I wasn’t going to write a lot of detail about what happened, because some people might find it upsetting. However, when I got back to Kandahar Air Field (KAF) and read the deplorable media coverage that the largest operation Canadians have been involved in since Korea, I really felt I had to write it all down, to give you all (and hopefully everyone you talk to back in Canada) an appreciation for what we are really doing here in this “state of armed conflict” (lawyers say we can’t use the word “war”, I don’t know what the difference is except for it being far more politically correct.)

We received word while down at our Forward Operating Base (FOB) that we were going to be part of a full out three day (HA HA) Battle Group operation. This was going to be the largest operation Canada had undertaken since the Korean War. When we arrived back in KAF for orders we found out that we were rolling for Pashmul in the Panjawai District of Kandahar province. That was hard for my crew to hear, as that was the same town where Nichola had died and where Bombadier. Chris Gauthier (a signaler in the party before I arrived) had been injured in an ambush. Participating in this attack were A, B and C Company (Coy.) Groups, both troops of artillery from A Battery, an Engineer squadron, two Companies of Afghan National Army (plus all of their attached American Embedded Training Teams – ETT), as well as a huge lineup of American and British Fixed and Rotary wing aircraft. Additionally, we had elements of the 2/87 US Infantry and 3 Para from the UK conducting blocks to prevent the enemy from escaping. From an Artillery perspective beyond the two gun troops (each equipped with 2 x 155mm Howitzers and 4 x 81mm mortars) we had three Forward Observation Officers (FOO) and their parties as well as the Battery Commander and his party going in on the attack.

On the night of the 7th around 2200 hrs local C Company Group (with yours truly attached as their FOO) rolled for Pashmul. As we arrived closer to the objective area we saw the women and children pouring out of the town… not a good sign. We pushed on and about 3 km from our intended Line of Departure to start the operation we were ambushed by Taliban fighters. At around 0030hrs I had my head out of the turret crew commanding my LAV with my night vision monocular on. Two RPG rounds thundered into the ground about 75m from my LAV. For about half a second I stared at them and thought, “huh, so that’s what an RPG looks like.” The sound of AK 7.62mm fire cracking all around the convoy snapped me back to reality and I quickly got down in the turret and we immediately began scanning for the enemy. They were on both sides of us adding to the “fog of war”. We eventually figured out where all of our friendlies were, and where to begin engaging. We let off about 20 rounds of Frangible 25mm from our cannon at guys about a 100m away before we got a major jam in our link ejection chute. We went to our 7.62 coax machine gun and fired one round before it too jammed!! Boy was I pissed off. I went to jump up on the pintol mounted machine gun but as I stuck my head out of the LAV I realized the bad guys were still shooting at us and that the Canadian Engineers were firing High Explosive Incendiary 25mm rounds from their cannon right over our front deck. I quickly popped back down realizing that was probably one of the stupider ideas I have ever had in my life J Eventually after much cursing and beating the crap out of the link ejection chute with any blunt instrument we could find in the turret, we were back in the game. The first Troops in Contact (TIC) lasted about two hours. The radio nets were busier than I had ever heard before and we realized that A and B Coys. as well as Reconnaissance Platoon had all been hit simultaneously, showing a degree of coordination not seen before in Afghanistan. The feeling amongst the Company was that was probably it, as the enemy usually just conducted hit and run attacks. Boy, were we wrong! We continued to roll towards our Line of Departure and not five minutes later as we rolled around a corner, I saw B Coy. on our left flank get hit with a volley of about 20 RPGs all bursting in the air over the LAVs. It was an unreal scene to describe. There was no doubt now that we were in a big fight.

We pushed into the town following the Company Commander behind the lead Platoon. This was not LAV friendly country. The entire area was covered in Grape fields, which due to the way they grow them are not passable to LAVs, and acres of Marijuana fields which due to irrigation caused the LAVs to get stuck. The streets were lined with mud compounds and mud walls just barely wide enough to get our cars through. After traveling about 300m our lead platoon came under attack from a grape drying hut in the middle of what can only be described as an urban built up area. The Company Commander then issued a quick set of frag orders and I was about to participate in my first ever Company attack. He signaled for me to dismount and follow him. It was an uncomfortable feeling dismounting from the turret, as the only way out is through the top of the turret. I was standing probably 15 feet high in the air with friendly and hostile rounds snapping and cracking in the air everywhere. Needless to say I got down quick. I went to the back of my LAV and banged on the door to signal we were dismounting. As the Master Bombardier opened the door he went pale as we were only 20m from where they had previously been ambushed and where Nich had died. Regardless, we soldiered on. We grabbed our radios and followed the Company Commander. We went into a compound that was actually the same one Howie Nelson had dropped a 1,000lb bomb on after the attack in May. We went up to a second story ledge on a mud wall, and the Company Commander pointed out a compound and said “can you hit that?” I lased the building and found out it was only 89m away. Back in Canada we never bring Artillery in much closer than a 1000m, so you can imagine what I was thinking. I sat down and did the math (those of you who know my mathematical skills are probably cringing right now!). I looked at him and said that in theory and mathematically we would be okay where we were, but I made him move one of the other Platoons back 150m. A funny story as I was doing the math, an American ETT Captain working with the ANA looked down at me and said “There are no ANA forward of us” I responded “Roger”, to which he said “good” fired three rounds and said “Got him”. I then realized that he had asked me a question and had not stated a fact (for some reason everyone seems to think that the FOO magically knows where all the friendlies are). Through all the gunfire I had missed the infliction in his voice. I looked at him and said, “Hey, I have no idea where your ANA are, you’re supposed to look after them!” Luckily it wasn’t a friendly he had shot at.

We started the Fire Mission with the first round landing about 350m from my position. The noise of Artillery whistling that close and exploding was almost deafening, the FOO course sure hadn’t prepared me for this! Master Bombardier and I debated the correction for a second and eventually agreed upon a Drop 200m, mostly because we needed to get rounds on that compound ASAP as we were taking heavy fire. The round came in and landed a bit left of the compound. We lased the impact and found out it was 105m from us. We gave a small correction and went into Fire For Effect with 50% Ground Burst and 50% Air Burst. The rounds came in 85m from us, right on the compound. Truly I did not appreciate the sheer frightening and awe-inspiring nature of proximity (the air burst rounds). I then had the worst moment of my military career as one of the Sections began shouting “Check Fire, Check Fire!” on the net, followed quickly by their Platoon Commander saying they had casualties and to prepare for a 9 Line (air medical evacuation request). It turned out the two events were unrelated but for a while I thought I had injured or even worse killed a Canadian. In actuality the Section that called Check Firing was actually the furthest of anyone in the Company from the shells and had panicked (which led to a lot of ribbing and jokes from their buddies afterwards who had all been closer). The 9 Line was for an ANA soldier who had been struck 5 minutes before. However unfortunate, I was definitely relieved to here all that.

Day one carried on with several more small skirmishes and me moving from compound to compound to set up Observation Posts (OPs), from which I could support the Company’s movement. I never thought that in my career I would literally be kicking in doors and leading a three man stack, clearing room after room to get to my OPs.

We ended the day, which had seen us in contact for 12 straight hours, by sleeping beside our vehicle in full battle rattle for about an hour with sand fleas biting us. They are the single most ignorant and annoying bug ever. The next morning started off with what seemed like a benign task. We were to clear the grape fields to the south of our objective area. Intelligence said there was nobody there and this would only take us a couple of hours. About an hour into the clearing operation we came under contact from a heavily fortified compound. Unfortunately we had a young fellow killed early in the engagement when the infantry tried to storm the compound. They met fierce resistance, far greater than expected. (I didn’t know the young soldier personally, but do recall thinking how fearless he was a week earlier when I saw him running around the Brit compound with a Portuguese flag right after England had lost in the World Cup. I was impressed by his peers and friends and how professionally they carried on after his death.) After the attempted storming of the compound, the Company Commander came to me and said “right, we tried that the old fashioned way, now I want you to level that compound.” As I was coming up with a plan for how I would do this, we had a call sign I had never heard before check in. It was Mobway 51. Ends up he was a Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle armed with a hellfire missile. I don’t know how he knew we needed help or what frequency we were using, and frankly I don’t care, he was a blessing. When the Company Commander asked me what the safety distance for a hellfire was I literally had to go to the reference manual I carry (J Fires Manual) because I had never seen one before and had no idea what it actually could do. I told him the safety distance was 100m. To which he asked how far we were from the compound – the laser said 82m. We debated the ballistic strength of the mud wall beside us and in the end he decided to risk it. Nothing like seeing an entire Company in the fetal position pressed up against a mud wall! The hellfire came in and it was the loudest thing I have ever heard. Three distinct noises: the missile firing, it coming over our heads and the boom. For about 30 seconds we couldn’t see anything but a cloud of dust. Then when the dust settled the Platoons started hooting and hollering. The compound barely even looked the same. (At this point our embedded journalist Christie Blanchford from the Globe and Mail had enough and left us, can’t blame her I guess.) The Company again tried to clear the compound but still met resistance. So we lobbed in 18 artillery shells 82m from us (even closer than the day before) and then brought in two Apache Attack Helicopters. On the second rocket attack (I actually have video of this) the pilot hit the target with his first rocket and the second one went long and landed just on the other side of the mud wall from us. It engulfed us in rocket exhaust, but thankfully no one was hurt. When the hellfire had gone off it had started a small building in the compound on fire and suddenly we started getting secondary explosions off of a weapons cache that was in it. Everything started exploding around us, and the two guys that had not listened to me to press up against the wall got hit with shrapnel, both in the legs. One was the Company Commander’s Signaler, a crazy Newf who was cracking jokes even with shrapnel in his leg. The medic dealt with him and I went over to the American ETT Captain who was only a few feet from me and began doing first aid on him. He looked liked he was going into shock, until his American Sergeant came up behind me and said “**** Sir, that’s barely worth wearing a Purple Heart for!” I was surprised how much first aid I actually remembered, and the only difficult part was trying to cut off his pant leg because American combats are designed not to tear, making them particularly difficult to cut! In the end we took the compound and captured a high level Taliban leader who was found by the infantry hiding in a sewage culvert, begging for the shelling to stop. As well, we found a major weapons cache, which the engineers took great delight in blowing up. Unfortunately the assault had cost us one killed, two wounded, a Section commander had blown his knee throwing a grenade and four guys had gone down to extreme heat exhaustion. We found out though that this was a Taliban and Al Qaeda hot bed and that they had been reinforced by Chechen and Tajik fighters (which I guess means we really got a chance to take on Al Qaeda and not just the Taliban).

Day three was uneventful for C Coy. and we prepared to go back to our FOB. Which would have been good because I had come down with a cold… not what I needed in combat (umm, I mean state of armed conflict!) Unfortunately that was not to be. A British Company from 3 Para had been isolated and surrounded by Taliban in the Helmand Province in the Sangin District Center. They were running out of food and were down to boiling river water. They had tried to air drop supplies but they ended up landing in a Taliban stronghold (thank you air force). C Coy. was tasked to conduct an immediate emergency resupply with our LAVs. We headed off to what can only be described as the Wild West. The Company (B Coy) of the Paras that was holding the District Center had lost four soldiers there and was being attacked 3 to 5 times a day. We rolled in there after a long and painful road move across the desert. When we arrived in Sangin the locals began throwing rocks and anything they could at us, this was not a friendly place. We pushed into the District Center, and during the last few hundred meters we began receiving mortar fire. They never taught me on my LAV Crew Commander course how to command a vehicle with all the hatches closed using periscopes in an urban environment. I truly did it by sense of touch, meaning as we hit the wall to the left I would tell the driver to turn a little right!! We resupplied the Brits and unfortunately it turned dark and we couldn’t get out of there, so we had to spend the night. We were attacked with small arms RPGs and mortars three times that night, I still can’t believe that the Brits have spent over a month living there under those conditions. They are a proud unit and they were grateful but embarrassed that we had to come save the day. And as good Canadians we didn’t let them hear the end of being rescued by a bunch of colonials!!

We left Sangin again thinking we were headed home. We made it about 40km before we were called back to reinforce the District Center and help secure a helicopter landing site. As we sat there we received orders that we were now cut to the control of 3 Para for their upcoming operation north of Sangin. This was turning out to be the longest three day operation ever!!! Enroute we were engaged by an 82mm mortar from across a valley. I engaged them with our artillery, it felt a lot more like shooting in Shilo as they were 2.8km away as opposed to the 100m or less my previous engagements had been. We went round for round with them in what Rob, the Troop Commander firing the guns for us, called an indirect fire duel. In the end he said the score was Andrew 1 Taliban O and there is no worry of that mortar ever firing again. We rode all through the night (with my LAV on a flat tire) and arrived right as the Paras Air Assaulted onto the objective with Chinook helicopters. There were helicopters everywhere. It was a hot landing zone and they took intense fire until we arrived with LAVs, and the enemy ran away. It was a different operation as we were used to a lot more intimate support tanks to shoot the Paras in. It was impressive to watch them though, they are unbelievable soldiers.

We left the operation about 25 hours later (still3 going on no sleep) and thought that for sure we were now done this “three day op”. But as we were withdrawing to secure the landing zone for the Brits (under fire from 107mm rockets and 82mm mortars) we received Frag orders to conduct a sensitive sight exploitation where the Division had just dropped two 1000lbs bombs. Good old C Coy. leading the charge again!

We drove to the sight and saw nothing but women and children fleeing the town. I thought, “here we go again.” Luckily this time I found a good position for observation with my LAV and did not have to go in on the attack. The Company quickly came under attack from what was later estimated as 100+ fighters. For about 15 minutes we lost communications with the Company Commander and a whole Section of infantry as they were basically overrun. The Section had last been seen going into a ditch that was subsequently hit with a volley of about 15 RPGs; I thought we had lost them all. I had Brit Apaches check in and they did an absolutely brilliant job at repelling the enemy. The only problem was I couldn’t understand a word the pilot was saying because of his accent! Luckily I had the Brit Liaison Officer riding in the back of my LAV. I ended up using him (a Major) as a very highly paid interpreter to help me out. After about an hour long fight the Company broke contact (but lived up to the nickname the soldiers had given us, “Contact C”) and we leveled several compounds with artillery. Somehow we escaped without a scratch, truly amazing.

We were again ordered back to the Sangin District Center with 3 Para and spent the next few days fighting with the Paras. For four days I did not get a chance to take off my Frag vest, helmet or change my socks, etc. We were attacked 2-3 times a day, and always repelled them decisively. I also discovered during this period that exchanging rations with the Brits is a really bad idea. Not only were they stuck in this miserable place but their food was absolutely horrible!

After saying our good byes to our Brit comrades (the enemy learnt their lesson and finally stopped attacking the place), we again prepared to go back home. Alas, it was not to be again. We were ordered South to take back to towns that the Taliban had just taken. Luckily this time after 11 straight days in contact, C Coy. was the Battle Group reserve. We headed to the British Provincial Reconstruction team (PRT). We rolled into the town to the strangest arrival yet. This was coalition country. The locals (unlike Kandahar and even more so in Sangin) were excited and happy to see us. We had kids offering us candy and water instead of begging. There were no Burkhas. The women were in colorful gowns with their faces exposed. The town was booming with shops everywhere and industry flourishing. We went to the PRT and it didn’t even seem real. I took off my helmet, Flak vest and I had a shower and changed my clothes for the first time in two weeks. I ate a huge fresh meal (until my stomach hurt), and then went and sat on the edge of a water fountain in garden and watched a beach volleyball game between the Brits and Estonians. I laughed as I had supper and watched the BBC (British Broadcasting Company) which was reporting that we had taken back the towns, but H Hour was still 2 hours away, so much for the element of surprise. After what we had been through it was hard to believe this place was in the same country. I slept that night (still on the ground beside my LAV because they did not have enough rooms) better than I think I have before in my life. The next couple of days were quiet for us as they did not need to commit us as the reserve. On day 14 of our 3 day op we conducted the 10 hour road move back to KAF, literally limping back as our cars were so beat up (mine was in the best shape in the entire Company and we had a broken differential … again).

Things look like they will be quieter for us now, and I will be home soon. Sad news from the home front, our little Yorkie, Howitzer, was in an accident the other day and didn’t make it. It won’t be the same going home without him, he truly was one of our kids (furkids!). We had three great years with him though and my only regret is that I wasn’t there to comfort Julianne who has been through so much lately. But she has some great friends their who have looked after her. To those of you who have been with her through this and the events of the last few months, I am forever indebted to you.

There are more stories I could tell of these last two weeks but this email has become long enough as it is and if I did that I would have no war stories (I mean state of armed conflict stories) to tell you when I get home. I will end by saying that I have truly enjoyed this experience. Combat is the ultimate test of an officer, and on several occasions I did things that I didn’t know I was capable of. I am so proud of my crew and the entire Company Group, we soldiered hard and long and showed the enemy that messing with Canadians is a really bad idea. We accomplished something in the last two weeks that Canadian soldiers have not done since Korea. The Afghan Government, elected by the Afghans, requested our assistance and we were able to help. We were the equal, if not superior of our allies in everything we did. I hope that I gave you all an appreciation of what these young brave men and women are doing over here, and even if the media can’t find the time or effort to report what we are doing and the difference we are making, hopefully you can pass it on. I will see all of you real soon. I hope all is well with all of you, and please keep the emails coming, I read every one and enjoy hearing from you, even if I cannot respond individually.

Take Care

Andrew

[The_Capt]

Sgt Joch,

This was actually by a FO in the BG but spells it out pretty clearly. Went to school with Nicky Grimshaw actually. Pretty intense and Medusa was no cake-walk either.