Strykers Part II

[Battlefront.com]

The_Capt,

Problem with Quebec is that none of the bridges or overpasses will take an M1...

Not a problem. If we tell them that we really just want to attack Ottawa, and need to pass through, they'd probably build us 8 lane bridges capable of handling a battalion of M1s concurrently. And if we told them we would make French the official language for the rest of the Canadian provinces, they'd probably fill up the Abrams with gas at no charge. This is the kind of creative thinking that I would bring to the office of President if I am elected in 2008!

That and the fact that they will sneer at your outrageous accents and chortle in that franco way while muttering in french. Then they will serve you bad wine and sub-grade maple syrup. Then they will constantly complain about you while demanding more and more money to pay for their positively socialist lifestyle.

Very true. But have you seen the women of Quebec? I already suffer the insults, bad wine, and sub-par maple syrup to be able to sip a beer served by one of their beauties, so I don't see a problem with my plan.

After a few years of that you will all be aching for an IED...trust me.

Who said we would occupy Canada? I just said we'd go in there and ruin the currency. I never said anything about staying!

Steve, what is your size (insert obligatory penis joke here..ha ha)?

7044 jacket, 7034 trousers optimal. Any size welcomed

BTW, do you know a MAJ Campbell by chance? He was at Tora Bora and is out in Calgary (I think) somewhere now.

Steve

[The_Capt]

Steve,

Gotta watch those french women...outstanding to look at..damn near kill you in the sack. But once they get their meathooks in...again aching for an IED.

Campbell, name sounds familiar..Mark Campbell? Been awhile since I served in the West. Probably would recognize him but we weren't drinkin buddies...well then again we could have been as visual ID was never a sure thing with some of those guys either.

Tora Bora would but him with the 3rd Bn PPCLI.

[Battlefront.com]

The_Capt,

I wouldn't know about the sack thing, but it wouldn't surprise me. And having watched a hot bartender from Montreal have "an argument" with her boyfriend at 4am (which caused him to take her car and ram it into a wall... that was fun!) I think I'll stick with my Pommie offspring wife

You have it right. Mark Campbell, PPCLI. Bn CO IIRC. Now he is off west somewhere doing something that keeps him far too busy. Great guy.

Steve

[Grumbling Grognard]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Quick comment about the IDF Achzarit. First, we must remember that this is akin to a Bradley, not a Stryker. It is heavy and it has all the logistics problems that such a tracked vehicle has. However, when you're talking about a very small country that will only ever use its forces from its home turf and likely never drive more than a few miles a year, the logistics end of things doesn't really matter much. Neither does the weight. When a country has a very lmiited scope of use, such as the IDF, all sorts of options are availble. If the US was only interested in attacking Canada and Mexico's border areas, this would be a viable option for the US as well

Steve

Well of course you make valid points, but have missed my point entirely.

My point is that the LAV-Stryker, et al are designed from the start with several things in mind (which you mention or allude to) such as strategic mobility, ease of maintenance, procurement cost, etc… Then, way down on the list is the item that is the #1 item on the design requirements for the Achzarit (and this “class” of vehicles): crew survivability. It might also be worth a mention that this vehicle also has a series of requirements with special emphasis toward mine/IED/RPG resistance/survivability (something the IDF has decades of experience with I think we can all agree on).

Honestly, with a bit of ‘good’ planning I have yet to be convinced the US could not fund damn near anything it wanted, anywhere on the planet, in terms of vehicular transport for our troops...if it really wanted to of course. Life is all about priorities (tens of billions for 'another' S&L bailout and regional “pork” but not a dime for new/more resistant AFVs or air transport!?!)

[Battlefront.com]

Grumbling Grognard,

Then, way down on the list is the item that is the #1 item on the design requirements for the Achzarit (and this “class” of vehicles): crew survivability.

Who said it was way down the list? I'd say it was near top of the list. The hull of the Stryker was designed to better survive a blast from underneath than other US vehicles and it has shown its ability to survive IEDs and RPGs very well indeed. Plus, the best way to ensure crew survivability is to not be a large, loud, and relatively slow target. When a Bradley comes down a street the enemy knows about it well in advance, not so with the Stryker. So don't short change the impact of non-armor related features on survivability.

The problem is one of tradeoffs. As you well know it is impossible to have only "the best" features in one vehicle. Therefore, designing a vehicle is a process of give and take. The King Tiger had awesome armament and defenses, but it had horrible mechanical reliability, fairly poor mobility due to weight, and was pretty slow. The Hellcat was damned fast, was reliable, and had a good gun. But someone with a pointed stick could knock it out if given enough of a chance.

The Stryker can not be immune to these practical forces. The better defended and armed, the heavier it becomes. The heavier it becomes the more problems with mechanical reliability and fuel economy. It's really pretty straight forward. Also, as weight increases wheels become less viable and therefore tracks become the only alternative. Once you go with tracks you're now talking about something that is inherently more complex, less fuel efficient, and more vulnerable to mobility kills. So on and so forth.

So while I agree that the US could fund anything it wants to, it doesn't mean that it could develop something that breaks this age old problem of compromising certain things in order to obtain certain other things. Oh, and not to mention doing that within a few years! FCS is consuming billions of Dollars and its value is quite questionable since it is quite long term and almost nothing the Army does long term ever works out.

Steve

[ August 11, 2007, 10:58 AM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Bradley Dick]

Alot of defense design is hampered by contractor limitations.

Take the javelin for example. The Javelin's actual maximum effective range is well over 3000 meters. The Javelin's targeting system was specifically designed to not be useful past 3000 meters. Why ? Because, this is the word straight from the company team, it would make too many AT weapon systems obsolete. This would end contracts and piss off a fair amount of defense contracting agencies.

[ August 11, 2007, 11:59 AM: Message edited by: Bradley Dick ]

[Grumbling Grognard]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

(RE: crew survivability) Who said it was way down the list?

I did. And from its design it is obvious that at least a half dozen other things were much higher. Of course nobody will ever admit that in the defense industry let along the military or congressional offices...

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The problem is one of tradeoffs. As you well know it is impossible to have only "the best" features in one vehicle...

Steve

Sorry, it is not even close to being that simple (IMO of course, can't state that too many times it seems).

But, to cut my response short: when it comes to present day "police actions" and "low intensity conflicts" against "unconventional forces" I will defer to the IDF that has had DECADES more experience than any 'two' other nations on the planet (LONG before any US defense contractor, Army procur. or congressional official that is for sure).

Also consider that the IDF will not touch a Bradley “out of the box” and flat out refused the first Bradley that the army just LOVED (I think someone lost his career over that one in the end...didn't they even make a real bad movie about that as well?)

Bottom line on that is that the list of required modifications for IDF acceptance for a Bradley even today is as long as your arm (software for the Brad was designed/developed in part right up the road and they use a lot of subcontractors – all I will say on that issue). Then also consider that the IDF would not even consider the LAV, Stryker or its ilk as a serious, mainline APC and (IMO) would not even take “upgraded” Bradleys today (as is planned, I think) if not for the MASSIVE government subsidies we have been throwing at them (for decades) in the form of free/reduced price American weapons (all well documented if you read the congressional reports).

[ August 11, 2007, 06:31 PM: Message edited by: Grumbling Grognard ]

[Battlefront.com]

The IDF is a special case, as I've said. They have basically one primary type of ops to worry about. That is close to home, urban, arid warfare. They don't have to worry about rapid deployments half way around the world, there is no need to be bothered by fuel consumption, logistics tails are always in established bases, logistics lines are always short, they will NEVER be called upon to do peace keeping missions, they will NEVER have to be sent to bail out an ally, etc. etc. Therefore, they have the luxury of tailoring EVERYTHING to their very, very narrow set of needs.

The US and European nations have no such luxury. They have to be ready to rock and roll pretty much anywhere on the face of the earth and to do so for a variety of reasons in a variety of different circumstances. Trying to compare the IDF to the US Army is, therefore, a non-starter from the get go. The two are completely different and, in more ways than not, completely opposite.

So I'll say it again... tradeoffs are required. Period.

I'll also remind you that despite the IDF having decades more experience, they completely fumbled the ball when attacking Hezbollah last summer. Badly, in fact. And not all of the blame can be directed at the horrid political leadership. The problems the IDF experienced go deeper than that. Reliance on heavy armor has been cited as one of the issues.

I'll also point out that CM:SF shows that no matter what you have for armor, the bad guys can field something that will take it out. We're in a new era of anti-armor warfare and it is making even the heaviest AFVs look like big, expensive coffins.

Steve

[JonS]

Blackhorse, in the previous thread:

... I don't know anything about the organization of the NZ LAVIII infantry ..., would you do a quick side by side comparison with the US STRYKER infantry comparing the numbers of dismounted infantry at pn, coy, and Bn levels?

Blackhorse,

I haven't forgotten this request. I'm still trying to get accurate, current information, and will hopefully have something next week. Part of the problem is that our doctrine pams aren't promulgated as widely and freely as yours, and secondly the grunts are still in the process of figuring out how they are going to use the LAVs and what their unit orgs will be.

However, _very_ quickly and dirtily:

* Rifleman dismounts in an NZLAV Pn: ~25

* Rifleman dismounts in an NZLAV Coy (3 pns): ~80

* Rifleman dismounts in an NZLAV Bn (4 rifle coys): ~330

That ignores all the spt wpns and units.

[ August 13, 2007, 08:51 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Battlefront.com]

JonS,

Well, I know what you mean about trying to get answers about something that is flux

To compare numbers, a Stryker Platoon has 37 organic dismounts. This includes the 7 man Weapons Squad (2xMMG). Can you clarify if there are Support Weapons with the NZLAV Platoon, or if ~25 dismounts is the full number? I am presuming that 25 is it, which would make the NZLAV Platoon have the same dismount footprint as a US Bradley Mech Infantry Platoon.

I forget what the dismount count is for a Stryker Battalion. But just counting up the 9 Rifle Platoons (i.e. no HQ, weapons, etc units) the count for a Battalion is 333.

Steve

[JonS]

3 x 7 man sections, plus pn HQ = ~25 men per pn. Section weapons are Steyr (cf M-16), Steyr 203 (cf M-16 203), and C9 (cf M-249). I don't _think_ there's anything heavier, apart from LAWs and the like. Then again, the pn does have 4 x 25mm cannons and 8 x 7.62mm MGs in the LAV turrets

Four companys with 12 pns means about the same number of dismounts at bn-level, albeit smaller pns. Perhaps slightly heavier, depending on how you count the weapons section in the US pn org.

AFAIK the bn has a Spt Coy with an HMG Pn (50-cals), Mtr Pn (81mm), AT Pn (Javelin), SFMG Pn (GPMGs with tripods), and some other bits and bobs.

[JasonC]

Well well, the ad copy says "no it isn't about replacing heavies, of course heavies are best at the heavy missions, medium will just supplement that". Then you listen to what the statements creep to about half an hour later, and it is right back to the old "tanks are obsolete" bilgewater the pentagon geniuses were peddling when they put everyone in humvees.

Meanwhile on the front page at the end of last week, we see the army plans to spend another $12 billion on mine resistent vehicles - and I don't mean Strykers. After the nearly $10 billion spent on a few brigades of the mediums.

May I dial back a bit on the time clock? Let's recall for those who weren't there at the time the process that led to the 2nd ACR getting Strykered.

As long ago as the 70s, army ACRs had the best combat doctrine in the world. They proved it worked in GW1, when a single ACR ran over a Warsaw Pact style tank corps in a matter of hours without so much as getting its hair mussed. The brilliant conclusion - we don't need any of that.

Early on in that crisis, the 82nd had been sent to Saudi and was hanging out demonstrating resolve, but everyone knew if actually attacked they didn't have a chance of stopping anything. Wasn't enough air in theater yet. It was Task Force Smith stuff, but brazened out. The army thought that wasn't so good an idea and that next time the bad guys might not be so obliging, so it'd be nice to be able to send something to theater fast that could actually stop a tank army, or at least slow it down while the air force went to work.

Wasn't a crazy idea. And since ACRs had the doctrine for it - from being the screening force on the central front all through the cold war - and had recently proved their combat ability - it was a natural idea to use an ACR.

Now, the full old style thing was hard to get to theater fast. So they did three things - they asked Rand to look at the problem, they asked the air force what the C-17 would be able to do, and they asked the ACR guys how they'd redesign to be more deployable but *without* sacrificing the ability to clobber an onrushing tank army if they had to. This was behaving like rational professionals.

Rand said "spend $7 billion on fast sealift". It would double the 33 knot fast sealift ships and keep some in operation (instead of semi-mothballed on 4 day stand-by), it'd up the ro-ro force, and it'd pay to preposition stocked for a full armored corps and ready lift at Diego, US east, and US west coasts. No theater basing needed, no reliance on Europe, no issues of diplomatic permissions. And Rand pointed out how much cheaper this was than a pure airlift solution, in vivid detail - each fast sealift ship can get to any theater in the world in less than 6 days with 90,000 tons of equipment, etc.

Incidentally, this all supported a plan that would put a brigade anywhere in a couple of days, a full division equivalent, medium and heavy as well as light, in one week, and 5 divisions including a full heavy corps anywhere in the world in one month. We actually fight for years, but this is supposed to be too slow?

As for the air force, they promised that C-17s would be able to land on 6000 more runways than the C-5, that they'd readily take an M-1 (what they were designed for), and that they were going to buy at least 120 of the things and probably 200. Obviously it is expensive to fly whole corps to theater, not the point. The point was the nation was going to make a massive investment in specifically heavy airlift, to be able to move the heaviest army equipment anywhere in the world in a day, with enough lift to move a brigade worth at least. Meanwhile, of course they still had over a thousand C-130s.

The army guys said keep the single battalion of M-1s and let that be the only really heavy part flown to theater on C-17s. They said keep 36 choppers in the regiment. But to make it more air transportable, replace the Brads in the bulk of the regiment with 2 battalions of modernized M113s, one of them entirely equipped with improved TOW vehicles (ITV), the other infantry carriers with remote weapon systems. These would all fit in C-130s. The extra troop capacity of the APC versions (up to 11 men) would allow the total dismount force to remain about the same, and the ITVs would retain most of the TOW firepower of the Bradley fleet. 120mm mortar versions would provide fire support. We had all the vehicles, modernization was cheap. Oh, and they also called for adding borg comms and the best sensors to this, and the rest of the entire heavy force.

The boys at the pentagon took one look at this plan, rolled their eyes, declared that armor was pointless in the modern world and ships antediluvian, and scraped it. They nixed the fast sealift, funded the C-17 (to the tune of $50 billion - their unit cost by the end matched that of the B-2 bomber) - and told the ACR to get out of their armor entirely and into humvees. Eventually, they promised, they'd come up with some sort of medium gun system, but in the meantime hummers with TOW would be the sole anti tank weapon. 2/3rds of the force would be in trucks with 50 cal main armament. The helos were to be paired back to 24 scout choppers.

And the point of flying this "rat patrol" to theater in the first 96 hours was supposed to be? Well, that way the army could have another light force just like the 82nd, that drove around on the ground in unarmored vehicles, instead of flying around in unarmored blackhawks.

The 2nd ACR dutifully played dune buggy for a while. Speed was protection. Razzle and dazzle and maneuver prayer would solve all problems. It was the force for the 21st century.

The 2nd ACR did a tour in Iraq so armed. Did OK considering - it has always been a well staffed outfit. As soon as they got back, though, they put them in Strykers. Hummers obviously just aren't enough armor.

Meanwhile, we bought 158 C-17s that can land on oh, only about 1000 extra airfields world wide (compared to the C-5 I mean), cost $50 billion original unit cost, and $350,000 per flight to theater (I kid you not). But we had to ditch armor to save gas, right. We did not buy the fast sealift. But the navy is considering some new catamarans that might even go 40 knots instead of 33, and will only cost I don't know, maybe about $10 to 20 billion by the time anybody sees one in action.

And then we find we have to buy mine resistent vehicles for another $12 billion.

Somebody desperately wants armor to be irrelevant, but it isn't. A lot of somebodies would appear to enjoy spending lots of money on new solutions. It would appear that things that fly are especially favored, and that anything that costs under $10 billion or uses any existing equipment or capability, is dead on arrival.

A few more pieces of unfinished business from the older thread. Someone said that nobody could have predicted the insurgency. It is kinda inconvenient that lots of people actually did. I did. (I was in fact considered a wild eyed optimist because I also predicted the initial ground war would be fast and decisive, including the dreaded urban fighting - but that we'd be sniped at and car bombed for years afterward). John Mearsheimer did. Colin Powell did. A number of generals did.

Heck, the poster boy for Strykers himself called for twice the occupation force that was actually sent, and planned to use it the way Petraeus is using the smaller surge force now - four years ago. Even had political support for it. But that was old thinking, and old is never right, only new thoughts are double-good thoughts...

As for Fallujah being Stalingrad, it wasn't. We took 3-4 times the hit we needed to because of overly restrictive rules of engagement, but we won without the issue ever being the slightest in doubt in less than a week. And I assure you that Stalingrad was not like that.

The point was raised in a previous to claim that infantry is essential in urban fighting. Another poster claimed that razzling and dazzling is more important and armor can't do it because it is too heavy and slow and I don't know, doesn't eat its wheaties or something. Meanwhile in the real war the most success razzle of them all was the "thunder run" in which a single heavy battalion team captured "the Stalingrad on the Tigris" in a day.

Meanwhile, when Petraeus got all dazzlie with his Apaches he put all of them in the shop with rotor hits in less than four hours. As ACR doctrine knew forever, they work best sniping at the FEBA and then are invaluable, but not hopping deep - but old thoughts are never right, and new are always double-plus-good.

I also really enjoyed the comment about ground war with Iran being unlikely because the only way to deal with it is air. First, the enemy has a say in such matters. Second, it is really very rich to first remove any ground option by neutering the force and grinding it and any political willingness to fight to bits in a failing indecisive war, and then plead the resulting incapacity to wage war as a reason not to have to be prepared for one.

I also like the defense of the 50 cal on the thesis that the 25mm is always too much for every target. Hint, it is called the coaxial.

It is the mindless ideological thinking that has to go. Strykers now that we have them already can stay and be used as light mech screening security etc, no problem. Campaigns to eliminate heavy are campaigns to eliminate our ability to fight and win the nation's wars.

[RT North Dakota]

The Stryker is NOT a good vehicle. It has numerous and serious limitations, and the idea of a Stryker Brigade is not good either. It was poorly thought trhough by men ill-informed as to current operational realities.

Having said that, it's OK for Iraq, but falls far short of what you actually need to successfully enable light infantry. The seating system is almost criminally stupid. Take the M151 RWS off the Stryker and you have a very marginal vehicle.

There are better cheaper vehicles and better cheaper ways to do business.

...and CMSF might model the alternatives??

If you liked the "Cruel Woman" Ascharitz, then look out for the Namer.

[The_Capt]

Jason,

Wow, you are like the Dan Brown of military analysts. I seriously do not know where to start...but I guess we have been here before.

Rather than enter a heated debate on each of your points I will instead try and focus the discussion.

Your very last sentence. Plse, if you will, tell us you theories on the nature of our nations future wars.

I ask because a whole lot of people are wrestling with this one and no one has a clear idea of what they may look like. We are grasping some very probable elements but before you go on pining about the glory days of heavy formations or the evils of a medium-light concept you really need to figure out that last sentence.

I for one am a strong believer in balance and the capabilities of the Stryker concept combined with that of the heavy formations. They are complimentary to my mind, not competing. What is the proper force balance? Can we reduce our numbers of large heavy formations? What is the role of Stryker or like elements? All of these questions boil down to what exactly are we going to be doing in the next 50 yrs.

[RT North Dakota]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As long ago as the 70s, army ACRs had the best combat doctrine in the world. They proved it worked in GW1, when a single ACR ran over a Warsaw Pact style tank corps in a matter of hours without so much as getting its hair mussed.

Do you mean the so called Battle of 73E, when Doug Mcgregors boys crashed into an ill-prepared and ill equipped Iraqi tank brigade?

Not exactly a seering endorsement of the ACR doctrine, IMO, but I can see where you are going. I think anyone with an Ops Analysis background would pick a fight based on less.

[JasonC]

"What is the proper force balance?"

Escalation dominance. Full spectrum capability, but under that as the single vital issue. ROEs move to the capability and not the reverse.

This is standard Clausewitz. You prepare for the worst, with robust all around combat power, not expecting any plan to survive contact.

Yes we also need other contingency-specific capabilities, and several varieties of them. These are secondary and combined should be a focus for half the force or less. A quarter to a third would in fact by the classic "staff solution", I am making a concession to the strong contrary tendency in today's military.

"Can we reduce our numbers of large heavy formations?"

No, we have already reduced them far below the safety point. We need 2 additional active heavy divisions. These can be configured to be deployable as brigades, not the point - although the full corps with trimmings remains the war winning force. They should all be up commo'ed and up-sensored, too.

"What is the role of Stryker or like elements?"

Security contingencies. In more heated conflicts, screening operations on long flanks, attrition depth clearing some built up areas (using dismount manpower I mean), and again security in the areas cleared.

The Marines already provide a deployable medium force mix with many similar capabilities. They bring tanks and rely on airborne firepower to a larger extent, both of which are sound. They also know that sealift matters to get heavy enough stuff to theater and to sustain heavy commitments, in equipment manpower and time.

Special forces are also critical. Much more so than the bulk of the light force they are the cultural center of, though some of those are needed for contingent capabilities, too. Special forces, intel and sensor tech, smarter use of auxiliaries and locals, and much more realistic ROEs are the primary methods needed for guerilla fighting.

"what exactly are we going to be doing"

You are going to war with Iran. You may avoid war with China if you are ready for one, you invite one if you are not or if you lose other wars. There will be additional state sponsors of unconventional warfare that will act as sanctuaries and financiers, and the weaponry available to them will get vastly more sophisticated than AKs and RPGs over the next generation.

The threats are,in rough order of seriousness crossed with likelihood, (1) unconventionally delivered nuclear weapons provided by rogue states, requiring the ability to take out entire rogue states (2) protracted guerilla warfare spreading from state sanctuaries, requiring the ability to take out entire state sanctuaries where politically possible, and the ability to defeat guerilla forces in protracted wars (3) direct conventional attack on smaller US allies by powerful states (e.g. Iran vs. an abandoned Iraq, or China vs. Taiwan, or Russia vs. Ukraine), after political fatigue has led to US withdrawals from regions or reductions in credible deterrence (4) security and counter insurgency in genocidal conflict, largely in the periphery, featuring armies weaker than Iran down to weak guerillas (Serbia, Sudan, Somalia, Congo), requiring as a first line much better interface with auxiliaries and SF abilities, backed occasionally by US ground forces on security or counter insurgency missions.

Threat technologies that will proliferate include manpads, advanced ATGMs, smart rocket artillery and mortar rounds with terminal homing, mines and IEDs and car bombs, scoped full caliber rifles rather than carbines, advanced rather than primitive rocket launchers (eventually with homing) - for the ground guys.

Also nuclear weapons with unconventional delivery, advanced surface to surface anti-ship missiles, quiet diesel-electric subs, naval mines, EMP threat from nuclear missiles, large numbers of recent-advanced Russian fighters with modern AAMs, cyberwar and attacks on civilian economic and infrastructure targets by infiltrated means - for the rest of the force.

It is a scandal that the intelligence community gave us no coup options in Iraq, and that we have none in Iran, nor any realistic internal political options there. It is a scandal that the army cannot provide a ground warfare option that would remove the Iranian government in less than three months with verified destruction of its nuclear program, on the ground and permanently. It is a scandal that our overall deterrence has weakened to the point that outright defiance by third rate powers goes unchecked. It is a scandal that first rate powers support them diplomatically and militarily without the slightest consequence. It is a scandal that we have not won a guerilla war against a very weak enemy in Iraq after four years and half a trillion dollars, and that we are still policing Afghanistan. And it is a scandal that Iran is going to get nuclear weapons while we debate what car to drive around Anbar.

[JasonC]

RT - no that is one incident in what I am talking about. I am talking about overrunning elements of 4 divisions and destroying 160 main battle tanks and 260 other armored vehicles with a total cost of 7 KIA and 19 WIA. Just little things, you know, like that...

[James Bailey]

Originally posted by JasonC:

"What is the proper force balance?"

Escalation dominance. Full spectrum capability, but under that as the single vital issue. ROEs move to the capability and not the reverse.

Isn't this the exact role Stryker is built around - a meat-ier 'light force' on the escalation dominance chain? It allows our infantry to get there faster, with more punch than our previous capabilities, and survive longer against the light enemy without adding all the logistical burdens of a full heavy force.

[Bigduke6]

Indeed. Why does the US field Strykers?

Well, the doctrinal answer has been made clear in this thread and the previous one: the Stryker gives the military an intermediate step between the 82nd Airborne, and a real armored force. Logisitically a Stryker force reqires a little less supply, although I doubt the need for a few less C-130s or a single cargo ship will ever influence whether the Pentagon decides to send a Stryker force somewhere.

There are those who say the Stryker is the Army's way of getting into the small intervention business, because they've figured out the major wars against proper opponents are few and far between, and so the Army needs an infantry vehicle to make it capable of doing Marine missions. And there are certainly some grounds to that.

Then there are the graft and corruption arguements, and IMHO there are grounds for those arguements too.

http://www.militarycorruption.com/stryker.htm

http://www.militarycorruption.com/soundoff2.htm

As far as I am concerned, there is very little a Stryker force can do, that a US Army heavy force, or a US Marine landing force, cannot do better, more cheaply. The first article I linked is particularly damning when it compares the cost of upgrading the M-113 - which has tracks and so is inherently a far better cross-country vehicle than the Stryker - to the Stryker.

The very idea of a a "meatier light force" is a contradiction in terms. Either you have the firepower and the armor and defense and targeting systems, or you don't. Firepower, armor,

defense, and targeting systems cost money and weight. There is no slick, tricky, sleight-of-hand way to get around those realities.

It might be that the Strykers are in one way before there time in that, before too very long, advanced ATGM capable of top attack or otherwise defeating the best US armor is going to be in the hands of potential US opponents. Russia and China already have the technology, and at present rates of development and distribution it is possible in the next five or ten years ATGM will make heavy armor simply obsolete against most probable US opponents.

It's been promised for years and the Holy Grail has never been found, but technology marches on and right now it seems like armor-attacking technologies are advancing a whole lot faster than armor technologies. So maybe it could happen.

If it does, and if in fact that paradigm of cheapening anti-armor technologies is accurate, then in five or ten years the Stryker will the be best possible main-line infantry vehicle, as anything heavier will be ATGM bait.

But even then, it will be hard to argue a Stryker is the most efficient way to cart infantrymen around places where there's artillery falling, or the enemy doesn't happen to have ATGM in quantity.

[RMC]

Originally posted by JasonC:

May I dial back a bit on the time clock? Let's recall for those who weren't there at the time the process that led to the 2nd ACR getting Strykered.

...

The 2nd ACR did a tour in Iraq so armed. Did OK considering - it has always been a well staffed outfit. As soon as they got back, though, they put them in Strykers. Hummers obviously just aren't enough armor.

As interesting as your version of the history of 2 ACR is, I feel compelled to point out at this point that the conversion to Strykers was planned well before we invaded Iraq. I know because I worked on it. The Interim Cav Regiment was a modified Stryker brigade design that increased the number of MGS from 24 to 96. I am not sure what they eventually ended up with since I've been out of that game for a while. But I can definitively say that the ICR concept predated the invasion of Iraq by several years. Stating that the 2nd ACR was put in Strykers based on Iraq experience is just flat out wrong.

[Battlefront.com]

BigDuke6,

Corruption surrounding a military project? I'm shocked at the news! Really shocked The corruption that took place during the Bradley's development was so bad that they made a movie about it. So I'm not sure what your point here is, other than to say that the US Taxpayer is constantly ripped off while certain politicians and officers get cushy corporate gigs in exchange for pulling the taxpayer's pants down. Happens all the time in all sectors of government spending. Katrian "disaster relief" is a great example.

It might be that the Strykers are in one way before there time in that, before too very long, advanced ATGM capable of top attack or otherwise defeating the best US armor is going to be in the hands of potential US opponents. Russia and China already have the technology, and at present rates of development and distribution it is possible in the next five or ten years ATGM will make heavy armor simply obsolete against most probable US opponents.

It's not quite that bad yet, but it is getting there. Look at the number of Bradleys and Abrams that were knocked out during Fallujah II. I have the numbers somewhere, but I think it was close to 20 Abrams and 80 Bradleys, though I don't know how many of them were put back into sevice after a few million bucks in repairs.

As far as I am concerned, there is very little a Stryker force can do, that a US Army heavy force, or a US Marine landing force, cannot do better, more cheaply.

What? Based on what facts? All the ones I have seen indicate the exact opposite, and I am sure I've been paying a lot more attention to the details than you have so I'm guessing if either one of us is missing some info it probably isn't me

There is no comparision between the cost of fielding a Stryker Brigade and a Heavy Brigade. No comparision on the logistics tail, deployability, ability to redeploy in theater, put boots on the ground, etc., etc., etc. That is why SBCT was created! HBCT has a lot of headaches, IBCT has too light a hand.

I am just stunned and amazed at how difficult this concept is for some people. When I first heard of a medium brigade my first reaction was "damn straight, it is ABOUT TIME!". The need is so glaringly obvious. Also glaringly obvious is that it can't do everything all the time and every time. Therefore, we still need light and heavy brigades. In fact, I think we need even more light brigades, which is what the Army is doing (converting Armored and Artillery units into light infantry battalions).

JasonC's concept of needing them for Iran is flawed since we'd be fools to do a ground attack against them. The US sucks at occupation. If it is going to create a failed state through military actions, better to not be there on the ground as it fails. At the very least it is cheaper than spending a trillion Dollars (not quite there yet in Iraq) and getting about the same result.

But even then, it will be hard to argue a Stryker is the most efficient way to cart infantrymen around places where there's artillery falling, or the enemy doesn't happen to have ATGM in quantity.

If you can find me a vehicle that is a perfect fit for all situation all the time every time... let us all know

Steve

[Truppenfuhrung]

P.S.: As a quebecer I can tell you that life here would be much more better if USA would have won the war of 1812...

[thewood]

We did win...You do drive on the right don't you?

[Truppenfuhrung]

Originally posted by thewood:

We did win...You do drive on the right don't you?

We drive on the right but we are governed on the left

[ August 14, 2007, 05:51 PM: Message edited by: Truppenfuhrung ]

[thewood]

That's fine, as long as you and Dorosh keep learning American, we'll be happy.