Strykers Part II

[RT North Dakota]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Please don't tell me that a 105mm gun system clone is a replacement for MBTs - for example. It isn't. A S-tank might replace an M-1, but not that.

S-Tank can't fire on the move. If you want to talk about silly pipe dreams then the S-Tank was it.

You may want to google CV90120 to bring yourself up to speed on the current thinking.

[molotov_billy]

M1A3?

[FAI]

Originally posted by JasonC:

...

So pick those who want them to lose as the winners, including exiles and internal libs and also internal displaced leaders like Montazeri, and pick the RG group as the faction that loses, and no balancing. Means used - not a 5 year occupation but SF, arming populace, subsidies, agents, return of exiles currently in US, all of them with the USAF at their beck and call. Spend one year breaking all the RG toys and any of them that want to come out, active CI not security. Dismantle the nuke program in the same period.

Worst that happens is the RG tries to take the place back in a civil war, in which the USAF intervenes with impunity whenever they get large. Doesn't result in any nukes. Does result in no sanctuary, and reduced threat to all of Iran's clients around the region.

....

To say that some Iranians will ally with The Great Satan , organize themselves into a meaningful army, and start and fight a bloody and protracted civil war, so that their daughters can wear skimpier clothing in public, is too much of a stretch.

[Sgt Joch]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Joch - the army planners who know how to wage war do not want to eliminate heavy. But plenty of other people do - outside the army, lights within it, deployers in the other branches calculating logistics, contractors with replacement system money bags in their eyes, important friends of entrenched congressmen, etc.

That is why if you read the thread and its predecessor instead of an old press release, you will find men first saying "it just supplements heavy, we never meant to replace heavy" when talking to heavy advocates or replying to their criticisms, and then a few pages later they will creep to saying "tanks are dinosaurs", "we will never have to fight another major conventional war", etc.

All of it meant to insinuate that the stryker medium force loadout will end up as the top of a weight and armor chain, with heliborne lights and marines at or below that level, and everything meant to shoot, in the air. The funding rationale is "cut the shipping to move heavy stuff, and the heavy stuff, and fund all my stuff instead". The doctrine rationale is "maneuver razzle dazzle forever, huzzah". The careerist rationale is "men with jump wings get all the top jobs, clear out that heavy army brass overhang between me and the stars and CNN".

It isn't any way to plan a military. But it happens...

JasonC, this debate, as I am sure you know, as being going on since tanks were invented in WW1. In the 1920's and 30's, you had airpower theorists who were predicting that Air Power had rendered all land weapons, including tanks, obsolete. In the 1950's and 1960's, it was the nuclear bomb that was rendering conventional war, and Tanks, obsolete.

In the defence establishment, which includes serving officers, government officials, "Think tank" intellectuals and defence contractors, you have always had pro- and anti-armour advocates. I am sure that in the thousands of pages of documents which are produced each year on this subject, you can find ample justification for both the "tanks are dead" or the "tanks are here to stay" lobby.

The Shinseki/Rumsfeld era was not the first time (or the last) that the anti-armour lobby was in power and that the pro-armour lobby was laying low, yet Abrams were at the tip of the spear going into Baghdad.

I will believe that tanks are dead when the U.S. Army actually disbands its armour units and scraps its tanks.

[Blackhorse]

This has nothing to do with the STRYKER discussion, but it does have bearing on the nature of the posts that make up these threads. I offer this simply for readers to understand fallacies and the line of thinking that goes into debate/discussion, and quite possibly into this debate/discussion/whatever you want to call it.

From The Thinkers Guide to Fallacies: The Art of Mental Trickery and Manipulation

44 Foul Ways to Win an Argument

There are several in use throughout both threads.

Accuse him of sliding down a slippery slope (that leads to disaster)

Appeal to fear

Assume a posture of righteousness

Attack the person

Beg the question

Call for perfection

Create a false dilemma

Question your opponents conclusions

Create misgivings: Where there’s smoke there’s fire

Create a straw man

Deny or defend your inconsistencies

Demonize his side, sanitize yours

Evade questions

Ignore the evidence

Ignore the main point

Attack the evidence

Insist loudly on a minor point

Make (sweeping) glittering generalizations

Make much of any inconsistencies in your opponenets position

Make your opponent look ridiculous

Oversimplify the issue

Raise nothing but objections

Rewrite history

Shift the ground

Shift the burden of proof

Spin, spin, spin

Talk in vague generalities

Talk Double talk

Throw in a red herring

Alos from The Thinkers Guide to Fallacies: The Art of Mental Trickery and Manipulation (pp 5-6)

Uncritical Persons

The over-whelming preponderance of people have not freely decided what to believe, but, rather, have been socially conditioned (indoctrinated) into their beliefs. They are unreflective thinkers. Their minds are products of social and personal forces they neither understand, control, nor concern themselves with. Their personal beliefs are often based in prejudices. Their thinking is largely comprised of stereotypes, caricatures, oversimplifications, sweeping generalizations, illusions, delusions, rationalizations, false dilemmas, and begging questions. Their motivations are often traceable to irrational fears and attachments, personal vanity and envy, intellectual arrogance and simple mindedness. These constructs have become a part of their identity.

Such persons are focused on what immediately affects them. They see the world through ethnocentric and nationalistic eyes. They stereotype people. When their beliefs are questioned – however unjustified those beliefs may be – they feel personally attacked. When they feel threatened, they typically revert to infantile thinking and emotional counter attacks.

When their prejudices are questioned, they often feel offended and stereotype the questioner as “intolerant” and “prejudiced”. They rely on sweeping generalizations to support their beliefs. They resent being “corrected”, disagreed with, or criticized. They want to be re-enforced, flattered, and made to feel important. They want to be presented with a simple-minded, black and white, world. They have little or no understanding of nuances, fine distinctions, or subtle points.

They want to be told who is evil and who is good. They see themselves as “good.” They see their enemies as “evil”. They want all problems to admit to a simple solution and the solution to be one they are familiar with – for example, punishing those who are evil by use of force and violence. Visual images are much more powerful in their minds than abstract language. They are overly impressed by authority, power, and celebrity. They are eminently ready to be directed and controlled, as long as those doing the controlling flatter them and lead them to believe that their views are correct and insightful.

Skilled Manipulators (weak-sense critical thinkers)

There is a much smaller group of people who are skilled in the art of manipulation and control. These people are shrewdly focused on pursuing their own interest without respect to how that pursuit affects others. Though they share many characteristics of uncritical thinkers, they have qualities that separate them from uncritical persons. They have greater command of the rhetoric of persuasion. They are more sophisticated, more verbal, and generally have greater status. On average, they have more schooling and achieve more success than uncritical persons…

[James Bailey]

Originally posted by Blackhorse:

James,

Going back to log, I would venture that the SBCT sustainment is between the HBCT and BCT sustainment. The HBCTs use significant amounts of CL III,CL V, and CL IX($$) while the SBCT wll use less. On the low end of the spectrum will be the BCTs.

STRYKER-PSG :

Do you have any comments on how the logistics of a SBCT and its 300+ ICVs compare to other BCT types? I'm sure they go thru a lot of POL during a typical deployed day...

Thanks - great thread all around; enjoying all the comments a lot.

[Battlefront.com]

Good post Blackhorse! It's why I stopped reading this thread on Page 4 and won't respond to any more points. It is clear I am arguing with people that don't know what they are talking about and who refuse to listen to any opinions other than their own (which aren't necessarily completely invalid, but are at least misguided).

Steve

[Bigduke6]

Well, yes. If one wants rules for conducting discussions and exchanging differing points of view, the ancient Greeks have been available in public libraries for quite a while. So far, the Socratic dialectic is pretty much the standard, as is the Aristotelian process of identifying fact.

So, with all respect towards Blackhorse's often useful comments on Strykers (though I do disagree with some) I don't see that a laundry list of shoddy debating techniques known to mankind for thousands of years, adds much to this particular discussion.

I say, it's time for the classic approach, we need to drag out the scientific method and smash our way to the truth. I think James Baily's call for numbers is right on target. Alot of this stuff we are arguing about here, at least as far as Strykers go, can be quantified, provided we ask the right questions.

I'll take a first crack at it.

1. How much does it cost to field a Stryker brigade? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

2. How much does it cost to sustain a Stryker brigade in the field? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

3. How many C-130 sorties does it take to transport a Stryker brigade? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

4. How much cargo ship tonnage (or whatever ship transport capacity rating you want to use) does it take to move a Stryker brigade? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

5. Roughly, how many launchers/cannon/weapons platforms does a Stryker brigade have, that could take out a T-72 tank? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

6. Roughly, how many launchers/cannon/weapons platforms does a Stryker brigade have, that could take out a T-72 tank, if the opposition is capable of supressing blue infantry? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

7. What is the tonnage (or whatever unit of measure you want to use) of artillery and other indirect fires a Stryker brigade can develop in its support? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

8. How many infantrymen capable of clearing a building or a trench, can a Stryker brigade put on the ground? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

9. What is the on-road operational speed of a Stryker brigade? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

10. What is the off-road operational speed of a Stryker brigade, in favorable climate/terrain conditions? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

11. What is the off-road operational speed of a Stryker brigade, in unfavorable climate/terrain conditions? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

12. How much territory and/or hostile population (use whatever unit of measure you want) can a Stryker brigade reasonably control, in the face of an insurgency? "Light" infantry brigade? Heavy brigade?

There are other questions of course, but that's a start.

We have several people contributing to this thread who consider themselves subject area experts. Some are actual serving US Army personnel, others are good buddies with US Army personnel, and still others have - by their own admission - studied the US military a whole lot.

I say, great! Maybe one of them could give us the benefit of their knowledge. If we had even WAG answers to those questions, I bet we could get alot closer towards determining whether Styker brigades make sense or not.

Pity Steve is bailing out. This discussion is just getting interesting.

[StrykerPSG]

Big Duke, I promise I wasn't ignoring this thread, but as pointed out, the thread just became way too busy, albeint with some unique perspectives.

Admittedly I am not a bean counter by trade, but have some of the answers you ask. The ones I don't know about, I will gladly research and provide, without divulging much in the way of OPSEC. So, forgiveness asked in advance for a fragmented reply.

1. Cost of a Stryker BDE, HBCT and Light BDE?

Gotta get back to you on this one

2. Cost of sustainment in the field?

Refer to the above answer...

3. # of C130's to transport an SBCT?

1 x Stryker = 1 x C130G/H/J Plan on 18 stryker variants per company x 12 manuever companies per BDE= 216 sorties for Strykers alone, not counting FMTV's and HMMMV's.

Nothing in an HBCT transportable by C130 except the medic M113 track, HMMMV's and FMTV's.

4. Cargo ship tonnage for each BDE?

Have to research this one.

5. Launchers/cannons/weapons per SBCT?

9 x twin ATGM variants per BDE

2 x Javelin missles per truck x 14 trucks per Co x 12 manuever Co's per BDE= 336 potential missles. (Do not count the MEV,FSV,MCB or CV in javelin carrier count)

3 x AT4's x 14 x 12 = 504 potential launchers.

3 x 105mm MGS x 12 companies = 36 MGS

6. How many launchers available if Infantry are suppressed?

36 MGS's, though can make an arguement for the javelins fire and forget, so continous sighting not required once launched.

7. Tonnage of artillery in an SBCT? I am guessing you mean number of tubes available?

36 x 120mm per BDE. With MFCS, there is a 95% first round lethal hit(+/- 5m CEP).

12 x 81mm per BDE

18 x 60mm per BDE

18 x M198 Howitzers per BDE

8. How many infantrymen capable of clearing a building or trenchline in SBCT? You may laugh, but everyone, to include MGS, Mortar and FO crews must be certified to clear building.

11 man squads x 9 per company x 12= 1188. A conservative estimate because this doesn't count the weapons squad, mortars, BN scouts or command teams.

9. Operational road speed of SBCT?

Officially listed as 62mph, though not sure why, because we always did 65-70.

10. Off road operational speed, favorable terrain/climate for SBCT? 35-65mph, depending on terrain.

11. Off road operational speed, unfavorable terrain/climate? A bit tougher to answer, though our only limiting factor initially was inability to use the tire inflations system (CTIS) with the slat armor, though since overcome. Our only limiting issue is extreme mud that would also limit heavier tracked vehicles. However, equipped with a very good self recovery system.

12. How much territory can an SBCT reasonably control, in face of an insurgency? Well, lets take the initial entry BDE that went into Iraq. Our BN covered down on an Air Assaults BDE AO in Tal Afar. Each of the companies then relieved BN sized elements and were highly successful in maintaining situational awareness and control of the same amount of battle space the LBCT BN's controlled.

I know this is a bit one sided, SBCT to be exact, but as I tried to successfully tackle this challenge, found the research for the others to be a bit daunting. I am sure there are plenty of pro HBCT's and LBCT's that can bring info as well.

[average]

Blackhorse, excellent post in response to a rather unreasonable question.

I am suprised at the amount of organic firepower the brigade brings with it (compared with say Australian 1st Armoured Brigade which brings 12-18 M198s (think its currently 12), 12 81mm mortars without attachments), and that is really a heavy formation.

Also when you see the math for the distrubution of ATGMs, I would hate to think what it would be like trying to dislodge it from a firm defensive position and then given the speed and mobility of the entire force, try and fix and flank them.

So so much lovely combat power, all of it strategically and tatically mobile.

Hardly a speed bump on defensive operations for anything short of a couple of nato standard armoured brigades, even without factoring in the supporting arms the USA brings to any serious conflict.

Offensively useful as well.Also useful for operations other than war, stability ops all the good stuff.

I'd still like Jascon C to reply to my earlier post about the Syrker being a better IFV for the wars currently on foot than the Bradley.

[JasonC]

What major weapon systems does a heavy brigade have? Well that depends, because there are four of the things. Or 6 depending on how you count.

There are the original heavy forces of the cold war period. Then there is the smaller force XXI design. Then there are the miniscule planned modular brigades. The first two come in armor and mech varieties, but were mixed in divisions to give either a 5-4 or a 4-5 ratio of maneuver battalions, armor and mech infantry. Last there is the old style ACR, with the 3rd ACR the only currently slated to survive in the old configuration, and it too may be downsized.

The old standard was divisions of 3 brigades, each of 3 maneuver battalions (plus arty and helos), each of 4 maneuver companies. Plus a divisional recon troop using the cavalry mix of M1s and M3 Bradleys. The force XXI design reduced each battalion to 3 companies, dropping the AFVs or IFVs per battalion from 58 to 44.

The currently planned small brigades, on the other hand, have a recon battalion (with 3 scout companies) and just 2 manuever battalions, one armored and one mech effectively (cross teamed in practice), back on the 4 company size.

What does this mean in major weapon systems?

For the older two loads the division is the right unit to show, with a third of it corresponding to a brigade slice.

Old AD - 317 M-1 tanks, 271 Bradleys, 54 155mm howitzers, 18 MLRS launchers, 40 attack helicopters.

Old Mech - as previous except 259 M-1 and 329 Bradley.

XXI AD - 247 M-1 tanks, 211 Bradleys, 54 155mm howitzers, 18 MLRS launchers, 16 scout and 24 attack helicopters

XXI Mech - as previous except 203 M-1 and 254 Bradley

Old pattern ACR - 123 M-1 tanks, 117 Bradley, 18 155mm howitzer, 24 scout and 16 attack helicopters.

Thirds of the previous have 240 major AFVs (ACR), through 196 (old, either) to 152 (XXI Mech) each. Plus 18 155mm, 6 MLRS and 13 helicopters.

A new brigade, on the other hand, has 58 M-1 tanks, 89 Bradleys total 147, 16 155mm howitzers, and 14 120mm mortars. No organic helos or MLRS.

Firepower? 58 to 123 M-1s, 70 to 117 TOW (launchers - twice that ready to fire, plus reloads). from Bradley, all fired from under armor. Every one of them dominates opponents, TOW via range (and sensors), M-1 via armor.

You can't suppress any of this firepower with artillery. (They also carry Javelins of course). The old ones also had MLRS with ICM to destroy entire square klicks at 20 km range, and Apaches (brigade slice 64 hellfire per sortie with over the horizon fire).

Compare 36 SP 105s under thin armor, all of them dominated by a BMP or T-72. The Stryker force puts all of its anti-armor firepower in the foot team AGTM basket. Implicitly, they are relying on the air force to eliminate major enemy threats with capital intensive arms, because an enemy with cooperating and intact artillery and armor would annihilate them.

Which may well work against weak opponents. What do we get in return? Lots of dismounts. Better gas mileage.

I am asked if the Stryker is a superior IFV for the fights we are likely to engage in. I think it is an APC not an IFV. It is superior in ease of administrative movement, in dismounts, in deployability weight, marginally in stealth. It is inferior in firepower, survivability, off road movement.

I see no reason to think the previous factors are more important than the second. The best I could say is against current weak opponents, none of the potential weakness of Stryker teams compared to heavy are likely to be significant, and they are therefore likely to do fine. I think we could have had their economy and deployability more cheaply with LAV-25s, with higher firepower. But since we have them we will use them, and for security ops against weak militias they will work fine.

I doubt we will get through the next generation fighting against only weak militias. But we will spend some time fighting weak militias over the next generation. I doubt extremely rapid deployability will be critical to most of our fights over the next generation. But we will once or twice need to deploy to a theater quickly.

I add one additional point about dismounts. I can definitely see a need for dismounts for combined arms and also for their stealth, working as designators for remote fires and the like. But it is much less clear to me what raw numbers of dismounted infantry are supposed to contribute.

I mean, in WWII there was definitely much to be said for it, because combat attrition was high, and infantry depth gave combat staying power. This isn't remotely the case these days. The attrition that matters is who doesn't re-up because indecisiveness leads to long deployments. An extra few M16s per vehicle contribute what, exactly?

[JasonC]

That addressed firepower. Now to some of the other questions.

A Stryker brigade costs $1.5 billion. That is the equipage cost. A light infantry brigade costs some tiny fraction of that; its real cost is the manpower and their salaries. Heavy brigades cost less than Stryker brigades but the same order of magnitude. We have more of the equipment for them than we can field, actually. The incremental costs comes from the new sensor capabilities (UAVs, upgraded comms and sitch awareness stuff for everybody, etc).

As for sustainment costs, they are lowest by far for a light infantry brigade. Moving them by chopper does cost something, moving them by road in wheeled unarmored vehicles is practically free, compared to the other unit types. If not shot at, that is. (Casualties are expensive in every metric). Stryker brigades cost less to operate in the field in POL terms, but have more manpower drawing salary. Their maintenance costs are running 5 times spec in practice, but are still under an old style heavy brigade. Same order of magnitude, though, unlike the light infantry which is truly cheap in running cost terms. (All are on a par in manpower expense, though).

A Stryker brigade realistically needs some heavy airlift to get its systems to the field. The MGS doesn't fly well unless you have C-17 or C-5 lift. The rest can all be fitted into a C-130 but are cheaper to send by ship, and can be sent in combat config by ship, instead of slat armor removed and remounted in theater etc.

A light brigade goes anywhere in a modest number of C-130 missions. Easily the most deployable.

A heavy brigade could in principle be airlifted by C-17s and C-5s, but it would take something like 100-200 sorties and cost $50 million. Instead it fits in a single 12-15 knot Ro-Ro ship, or for a bit more expense-wise on a single fast sealift ship (33 knots theoretical 25 knots average in practice).

Since these ships carry on the order of 90,000 tons, any of the brigades fits on one easily.

As for T-72 killing firepower, the heaviest heavy of brigade size is the old pattern ACR, and for it the answer is around 400 weapons. 500 if the ready TOW are counted and 600 if the javelin teams count per missile instead of per launcher. Of the smallest figure, about 1/3 are tank main guns, 1/3 ground ATGMs mostly under armor, and 1/3 airborne ATGMs from attack helos.

For the smallest of the heavy formations, the new modular HBCT as planned, the answer is more like 200, or 275 if ready TOW are counted, 360 if Javelin teams are counted per missile. So the new brigade is only 50-60% of the firepower of the old pattern ACR. It is still greater firepower than a Stryker brigade, however.

(I note in passing that per missile counting drastically understates the firepower of the gun systems, since obviously those will fire many many times, not once each. In other words it is weighting missiles by rounds and guns by tubes).

As for a light brigade, it can take as many Javelins as a Stryker brigade if it wants, but at present TOE is underpowered in AT terms (under 100 launchers, no direct gun systems). They expect to be supported by attack helos, though those will be under a separate aviation brigade structure.

If suppressed by artillery fire, the heavy brigade loses essentially none of its anti-armor firepower, the Stryker brigade losses nearly all of its, and the light brigade all of its. In addition, the heavy's systems dominate BMPs and T-72s, while the Stryker systems do not. (T-72 vs. MGS, the edge is to the T-72; and AT5+ on BMPs outrange Javelins).

The Stryker force expects to engage successfully anyway using (1) stealth to employ its Javelins effectively (2) over the horizon fires from smart 120 mortars or designation for other firepower arms or (3) calling for air or attack helo support.

These are plausible methods against a weak opponent or in a prepared defensive stance. Against an enemy with modern sensors, counter-battery radars, longer range artillery (than mortars I mean), plenty of stinger quality manpads, good artillery-armor cooperation, and main battle tanks in battalion strength or more, it would not work. Basically you can beat the poorly equipped enemies but not the top end ones.

The artillery firepower of the old pattern heavy force was higher than that of the Stryker force, but that of the new modular heavy brigade is not. The old force had MLRS, now that has been consigned to a separate artillery (ok, "fires") brigade that would deploy with an entire corps structure, only. There is little to choose between the new modular heavy and Stryker brigades in throwweight, slight edge to the latter, since it has more mortars. On the other hand, its howitzers are towed not armored and SP, so it is much more vulnerable to counterbattery fire, and relies on 120mm mortars for shooting and scooting missions. Which is fine but means limited range compared to tube arty, and therefore limited counterbattery outgoing, as well.

The light brigades have less throw weight than either and an even larger counterbattery vulnerability problem. Overall, the heavy brigade can fight opponents with CB radars and long range guns with improved munitions (ICM or homing), the others can support against weaker opponents effectively. But are implicitly relying on the air force to neutralize enemy artillery before they seriously engage.

For clearing trenches or buildings, the Stryker and light brigades have twice the dismount manpower of a heavy brigade. Heavy doctrine is to clear a building with 120mm HE and a trench by burying the inhabitants alive, if they can't simply be shot.

The on road speed of a Stryker brigade, in practice, is civilian highway traffic speeds, on the order of 65 mph for long trips and more like 35 mph around town. For heavies they can do 45 mph along roads but in practice go more like 35, and a similar speed around town. Lights fly by chopper if both endpoints are safe, making 150 mph, and use road bound light trucks otherwise,with similar speeds to Strykers.

Of road, the lights again fly ignoring terrain if both ends are safe, and otherwise have quite low speed, 15 mph tops using light trucks, some of which will bog, or 3-5 mph dismounted. Strykers off road can do 20 mph but some will bog. Heavies routinely do 25 mph and do not bog, and will do 35 mph if the terrain is flat etc. All are favorables. In mud the wheeled vehicles will bog if they leave roads. A few of the heavies might, but most will move fine at 15-25 mph.

On controlling pop or area in an insurgency, I don't see that we actually control the areas we patrol, at the unit densities we are using. Any of them can move over a large AO and concentrate rapidly against a weak and dispersed enemy who cannot challenge their movements. The lights are the only ones whose admin movements can seriously be challenged.

The Stryker brigade is somewhat better at patroling simply because it has a larger number of armored vehicles per brigade than a heavy brigade, and that is the relevant asset (unarmored invite attack rather than stopping them). Stryker and light have more dismounts, to the extent those are needed for local liason and manning roadblocks and defensive perimeters etc.

Fine questions BTW. Sorry the expense and movement descriptions aren't more numerical.

[RT North Dakota]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Firepower? 58 to 123 M-1s, 70 to 117 TOW (launchers - twice that ready to fire, plus reloads). from Bradley, all fired from under armor. Every one of them dominates opponents, TOW via range (and sensors), M-1 via armor.

You can't suppress any of this firepower with artillery. (They also carry Javelins of course). ?

Allow me to correct some aspects of the above arguments and I cite the above example, as merely one point, as one of many simplistcally presented arguments.

1. TOW cannot be effectively dismounted, so you loose any ability to leverage the terrain advantage that that systems like Javelin give you. Plus, what's TOW's min range versus Jav min range? How many TOW reloads can you store in A1 Echelon compared to Javelin re-loads - how many rounds per pallet etc.

2. Comparing M2 orbats to Stryker merely confirms someone doesn't understand the (poorly executed) concept behind Stryker. Stryker units are INFANTRY - and ACR, Armoured Infantry and Tank units are exactly what it says on the box. Stryker is merely the poor product of what Infantry Writers, Thinkers and Scientists, have been trying to do for 40 years.

3. Can't be suppressed by artillery? Really. Maybe not totally destroyed but they sure as hell can be suppressed. Ever seen what 152mm fragmments do to tracks, aerials, optics etc? Ever fancy driving a tracked vehicle through an artillery surface laid minefield. At least Stryker needs to hit two before becoming a mobility kill.

[RT North Dakota]

Originally posted by JasonC:

T.

As for T-72 killing firepower, the heaviest heavy of brigade size is the old pattern ACR, and for it the answer is around 400 weapons. 500 if the ready TOW are counted and 600 if the javelin teams count per missile instead of per launcher. Of the smallest figure, about 1/3 are tank main guns, 1/3 ground ATGMs mostly under armor, and 1/3 airborne ATGMs from attack helos. etc etc

l.

So what? This is the type of comparsion the highly discredited Lanchester equations would use. It is utterly meaningless, because it assumes a formation uses a 100% of it's combat power all at once, where as in reality most are only using 5-20% at any one time. Held rounds are not part of the re-supply!!

Plus this is not an accurate basis for comparison since other elements of combat power are not factored in. Based in this data a force developer would merely add more of the appropriate systems. Add one MBT to every MBT platoon/troop etc.

I can have 100% more held rounds than a comparable formation, but if I can only get 1 combat team into action, then it's how quickly I can re-supply that combat team that counts!!

CMO/BB/AK shows this very well, when at the end of a battle you have some tanks, who have fired all their rounds and some that have fired none. Plus some of the knocked out vehicles still had 100% of their rounds. - also note how only a few of the vehicles/systems did most of the damage.

EDIT : - On a more constructive note, if anyone wants to know how to do real force development comparisons, I can show you how, but I do not have time now.

[JasonC]

Congratulations, RT, you just won the award for the lamest argument in an entire conversation spanning 16 forum pages across two threads. Huzzah.

First, I was answering a question posed by a previous poster, who thought the number of major weapon systems of various capabilities was kinda relevant when assessing the combat power of various unit designs. Because, well, it is.

The argument that the number of major weapon systems does not matter because only 5-20% of them are used at any one time has an interesting collorary - we only need 20 tanks all told to fight all of our wars. Yippee! Problems all solved. No wait... 20% of 400 to 600 is... No wait, there has to be some way in which having 10-15 times the survivable firepower isn't important, there just has to be.

Mech infantry have Javelins. There is nothing magically Styker-ee about them. Stryker just means relying on them almost exclusively. Mech have M-1 tanks and TOW missiles and Javelins fired by dismounts. Stryker have Javelins fired by dismounts, and modest number of mobile 105s.

Minimum range is not a problem for TOWs. One, it isn't that far, two, stuff you need one for dies before it gets that close, three, that close a 25mm will run anybody's day, anyway.

As for suppression, pretending there is any comparison between the suppression that will be suffered by a unit in M-1s and Brads and M109s under conventional artillery fire, and what will be suffered by dismounted Javelin teams and towed M198s, is absurd. The latter might not be annihilated, especially if they hide in their APCs. But they are not going to be up and firing.

It may still work in practice against weak enemies, as I said, if the air force neutralizes enemy arty and armor before they have to engage. Or if the enemy never had such equipment to begin with, or can't coordinate its use tactically etc.

But if you want to see the vulnerability, give the Syrians armor force Republican Guards with 2/3rds T-72s and 1/3rd late model BMPs, and then support them with 2 120mm modules (reactive) and 3 modules of MRLs (planned). And put them up against 3 grenade launcher and 9 50 cal Strykers with 3 MGS for support.

Now, do the same fight but the US side gets 8 M-1s and 8 Bradleys, with 4 Javelin teams too, plus 155mm support with ICM.

Might the AI still manage to lose the first? If it can't use the arty, sure. If the Syrians can coordinate the time they expose their tanks to the time the rockets land, then they can slice through the medium force easily. But the heavy is a brick wall.

This is obvious, it should be readily admitted. One then argues that other arms can take care of it, or that sure there is a role for heavy and that is why it should be, is being, and will be kept. Instead we get spin. Why do you suppose that is?

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Omenowl]

I was against the stryker when it was presented as a replacement for the MBTs. However, in its current incarnation it is a supplement rather than a replacement.

The stryker fills in a gap that has been sorely missing. We already have an IFV that works well, but it is a lousy APC. Instead of focusing on it replacing the bradley think of it as replacing the M113.

[average]

Jason, you have the most unreal, screwed up sort of ideas about combat operations out of anyone posting in this thread.

Don't you get that the SCBT isn't a HCBT ? Accordingly its not the same, nor is it given the same taskings, and for most things other than high intensity warfare the SCBT is better in most respects (ie low intensity warfare like Iraq, weak milita based opponents).

I think Jason's problem is he has never got himself any time in service. Hence he deeply doesn't get that an extra rifleman is not just another M16 and that a 5 man rifle section is a lot less useful than a 7 man rifle section (once you factor in someone injured/understrength to start with in the first place).

You also don't understand that you have to compare the SCBT with infantry units, not armour. The SCBT does have a lot of firepower. Incidentally, just so you know, the M198 and the M109 fire the same shell, and unless you've got counter battery, the M198 does everything just as well or better than the M109 and can be airlifted and towed into spots the M109 can't be.

He also deeply doesn't get how hard it is to nail dismounts in depth with cover using tanks, and assumes your going to be fighting in nothing more than a a long skirmish line, and your aim is to attrit the enemies heavy formations rather than bypass them.

You keep coming back to troops in Strykers might die if they hit a fanatical first line armoured unit in the open by themsleves.

This is assuming only the SCBT is on hand, and assuming that SCBT has been sent to confront a first line opponent by itself.

Assuming the enemy armour is prepared to go combat ineffective afterwards, and the US commander was determined to stand his ground and fight in place, then maybe it could crunch an isolated Styker Co.

What is actually going to happen ? None of the above.

For what its designed to fight by itself, the SCBT has a lot of firepower. Lot more than light infantry, lot more than most motorized formations as well.

It is not designed to fight the Soviet Shock Guards formations in Germany in 1989. You think everything with wheels in the US Army should be designed for high intensity conflict against an equal or superior foe.

That's nonsense, and taking the heavy party pieces to Iraq and using 25mm as a contact breaker has cost more american lives through second and third order effects than it has saved.

[FAI]

I think Jason's problem is he has never got himself any time in service.

He did, artillery, IIRC. Will that make him more convincing to you?

[RT North Dakota]

WOW! This is surreal.

1. You made the statement, that you "can't suppress any of this with artillery." I merely told you that was incorrect. Ever seen a Regimental Fire Mission?

2. Yes I know Javelin is not a Stryker system. I merely compared the two systems - not the formations - since you clearly demonstrated you nothing about the tactical fundementals of employing anti-armour systems

3. Minimun range of TOW doesn't matter? Got any actual experience of wrtiting anti-armour plans.

4. The fact that only 5-20 % of a formation is normally engaged at anyone time, is a matter empircal opertional analysis! If you have different data, slap it up - I'll conceede up to 30% using some figures I have seen - BUT _ my point, which you seem not to get, is that it is utterly non-senscal to catalogue major weapons systems, without context. I can show you a formation with 100% more major systems, but if they are in an immobile light infantry formation, with poor logistics, it's useless.

5. SCBT = Infantry. HBCT = Armour. What do you have against making infantry more capable?

I judge people by what they write/say/know. I don't care if you have ever served or not. I know plenty of excellent civilian force developers and analysts. You problem is that while you can "train set" all the equipment, I would question and challenge your grasp of operational art, tactics and force development.

[ August 21, 2007, 12:23 AM: Message edited by: RT North Dakota ]

[RT North Dakota]

Originally posted by JasonC:

But if you want to see the vulnerability, give the Syrians armor force Republican Guards with 2/3rds T-72s and 1/3rd late model BMPs, and then support them with 2 120mm modules (reactive) and 3 modules of MRLs (planned). And put them up against 3 grenade launcher and 9 50 cal Strykers with 3 MGS for support.

Now, do the same fight but the US side gets 8 M-1s and 8 Bradleys, with 4 Javelin teams too, plus 155mm support with ICM.

That's just poor methodology, and sloppy reasoning. You constructed the force balance around the answer you want to get. You know very well that other scenarios would not give such a clear cut answer and that there are a whole raft of factors not supported by the simulation. A real simulation experiment would run the across a range of doctrines, situtions, threats and terrains, as well as tracking resources and effects. If you had any proffessional background in this area, you might know that.

[JasonC]

Adam - a fine question. We are probably spoiled rotten by the one sided fights we've had for the past 20 years. The losing side finds modern combat attriting enough. But one sees that (at least at a tactical level) modern combat has a strong tendency to be knife edged, with the winning side winning fairly cleanly and the losing side wiped out.

This was uncommon in WW II. In WW II, it was a normal experience for a US AD to lose combat capability because its 3 battalions of armored infantry had sustained too high casualties, even though the rest of the formation was still potentially effective. In hindsight the armor infantry ratio was too high for the era, and the German ratio of 2 infantry per armor battalion was more useful than the US ratio of 1 to 1, over the longer term.

The 1 to 1 ratio worked tactically, but faster infantry wastage than tank wastage meant a TOE of 2 to 1 would spend more of its combat life around that level, than a TOE of 1 to 1 did. 1 to 1 started at a useful ratio and kept falling, thus spending much of the time below that level. 2 to 1 started perhaps too high, but was handled by forming separate KGs with different tasking or keeping a reserve - and as the ratio of effectives remaining fell, could stay at tactically useful ratios longer.

(In practice the US cross attached extra infantry to deal with this at times, but the units cross attached had less experience as a coordinated unit and doctrinal differences etc).

If one expects slow continual wastage of 10-20 infantrymen per battalion per day, then a US heavy formation is understaffed in dismount infantry terms. Within a month (weeks really) it would become combat ineffective through loss of combined arms, unless replacements can be fed in etc. That sort of slow continual loss was normal in WW II, but has not been in the fights we have had in the last generation. But it is worth keeping in mind, since the conditions that led to it might conceivably recur sometime.

[James Bailey]

The SBCT's 155mm gun is a huge upgrade from the old infantry bde's 105mm. That advantage represents the most important firepower difference. Survivability is the biggest upgrade the Stryker offers over the normal infantry bde's humvee gun trucks. Overall, SBCT seems like a huge step forward for infantry forces. The key question that remains for me is deployability and logistical sustainability of these units. We have touched on both these topics briefly, but I don't think anyone has presented a conclusive answer. But then again, perhaps no one at the Pentagon even knowns!?!

[JasonC]

average - actually, I can compare SBCTs to anything I want, including HBCTs, or German motorized infantry divisions, or Napoleonic cavalry if I want to. Moreover, if you read the entire thread you will notice the actual dispute is over the question of whether medium in one form or another can or should replace heavy, or merely supplement it. And more immediately, a prior poster directly asked for the comparisons between heavy, Stryker, and light brigades and specified the metrics on which he wanted them compared.

It is ridiculous to object to such comparisons or to regard them as somehow "unfair" or missing some point. Such comparisons are clearly valid and valuable in their own right. We have all three. Obviously we need to understand what each is good at, or not good at.

Moreover, there are possible results of such a comparison that would imply that we need another type or can do without one of them. If e.g. all shared some weakness, we might need another. Or if e.g. one type dominates another, in the sense of exceeding it on all metrics, then the dominated type might not be needed.

As for the beautiful teaching moment where you tell me what 155mm howitzers are called in towed and SP variety, coals to Newcastle. It again shows the amazing arrogance of the whole crew; they simply cannot conceive of informed criticism.

Yes it is nice to be able to move 198s by air. I've been in or by both under short rounds and I can tell you which is less suppressed by counterbattery. If you have to hit enemy arty, the SP is far superior. Takes fire better, repositions close to the front to extend reach better, gets out of dodge better, reacts to CB radar counters better, etc.

As I already stated, the medium load-out implicitly assumes that friendly air will have already dealt with enemy artillery, or that he never had any. Which may work against weak opponents (I think it is about the fourth time I've granted that), but won't against high end ones. (Air will not rapidly neutralize enemy arty if the enemy has thousands of stinger quality manpads e.g.).

You also argue against pure straw men. I have not stacked decks with outlandish possible scenarios or assumed guys are in the open. Enemy force types and doctrine routinely expect to suppress a position to be attacked with MRL fire and then to follow the barrage hard with concentrated MBTs. If medium can't handle that threat, then that is a reason to restrict the missions and opponents medium is given or asked to face, and to have heavy for it instead.

As I said, this is obvious. So why isn't it admitted readily as obvious? Why is it any harder to concede than it was for me to concede medium can work against weak enemies or when air deals with the capital intensive threat, or that APCs are useful in security ops?

Incidentally, I am also still waiting for the concession that heavy works fine in MOUT, since it did (defying predictions that dismount numbers were essential for it and heavy would flat fail at it), and instead I get nonsense about overuse of 25mm supposedly being disasterous as public relations or something. Which is utter poppycock. (If the ROEs are ridiculous, use the coax more, end of silly objection).

We did need the same abilities to fight 1989 style Russians in both Iraq wars, and we would in a war with Iran or Syria, or North Korea, or China over Taiwan, etc. And we had them, and they worked as advertized by the heavy guys, in fact considerably better. And for some unfathomable reason, it is pulling freaking teeth to get anyone to admit it. Why do you suppose that is?

[JasonC]

This is to RT's last, I will get to the other before it after.

First, ispe dixit fallacy. An analysis is not made any less valid or important by your slanging it. The forces are entirely realistic, as that the threat force is enemy doctrine and actual weapon mix in both the Syria scenario simulated by CMSF and lots of others (Iran, North Korea, etc). The friendly side forces are also entirely realistic company sized slices of the heavy and Strkyer teams.

When attacked by an enemy heavy battalion that has armor artillery cooperation to suppress dismounted ATGMs, a heavy company readily defeats the threat from its own resources and the medium company if left to its own resources will be annihilated. This is not only a valid analysis, it is the basis of assigning realistic tactical missions to either sort of BCT.

If an enemy heavy division plus is attacking with arty alive and coordinated, a theater commander should not read a sales brochure about the slice and dice ginsu knife utility of the SBCT and recreate Task Force Smith, he should just put up a HBCT and blow away the attacking force. Realistic assessments of the robust (dependable) actual capabilities (not promises in sales literature) of his subformations is the operational commander's first requirement.

As I have said n times, this could easily be conceded as obvious, and one could then argue that air can remove that threat or that security missions are more needed this instant or what have you. Instead it is not conceded, it is resented and resisted, and we get spin. Why do you suppose that is?