Strykers Part II

[Neepster]

With regards to Strykers, I seem to recall about the time that these things were being "sold" to the world as Rummy's new "do it light, do it half a$$ed" military solution, that I did some calculations that determined that 12.7mm or 14.5mm AP MG rounds would turn the thing into swiss cheese. Not sure what the point of an "armored" carrier that can't turn MG rounds is. Not sure if anyone else has any different info on that...

Still don't see the point of Strykers even now and in the demo for CM:SF I have determined that while M1 Abrams tanks are thing to be reckoned with, Strikers might as well be called Zippos, since they light up so easily and often.

There may well be a use for Strykers in the US military, but if I have the option of being in an M1A2 or a Stryker, I will take an M1A2 any day of the millenium. Heck, only ~15 guys have died in M1A2s to date in Iraq, and only 5 of those were inside the vehicle...

[RMC]

Originally posted by Neepster:

With regards to Strykers, I seem to recall about the time that these things were being "sold" to the world as Rummy's new "do it light, do it half a$$ed" military solution, that I did some calculations that determined that 12.7mm or 14.5mm AP MG rounds would turn the thing into swiss cheese. Not sure what the point of an "armored" carrier that can't turn MG rounds is. Not sure if anyone else has any different info on that...

The Stryker wasn't Rummy's idea. It was Shinseki's. GEN Shinseki became Chief of Staff in the summer of 99 after the Kosovo Air Campaign. TF Hawk was huge embarassment for the Army. The proponents of air power were arguing that we didn't need land forces and people were buying it.

Shinseki believed that to make the Army more relevant we had to have something more substantial than the light forces and more deployable than the heavies. Shinseki started the Transformation mantra that was picked up by some of the pols campaigning in 2000.

I don't know what the actual ballistic performance of the armor on the production Strykers is, but protection against 14.5mm MG rounds was written in the requirements documents.

[JonS]

Who in their right mind would compare a MBT with an IFV?

[JasonC]

US heavy force personnel suffered a total of 9 KIA in the fight for Fallujah. Almost all the KIA were suffered by the Marines, who had 4 battalions in the fight, all of them medium at best and many of them fighting dismounted.

The heavy KIA were spread over the following causes.

2 Bradley crewmembers killed by RPG while inside their vehicle

3 Bradley infantry fighting dismounted, KIA by small arms

3 men in hummers killed by IEDs (1 an intel guy, the other 2 support guys in a second incident)

1 accidental death (a 1st Cav man run over)

This hardly fits the picture of acres of burning metal in Stalingrad revisited. The fight was as mean as you please for the Marines, do not get me wrong, but the supporting heavies got off lightly.

As for the 2nd ACR having already been slated for Strykers, I was well aware of it. But they got to do their whole first tour in humvees because the guys at the pentagon wanted to pretend armor is useless, and it isn't.

They were there in a relatively quiet period, though their AO heated up a bit toward the end - they were paired with heavy on several operations because of it. They suffered only 13 KIA in their tour, 5 of them non-combat. Essentially all the losses were taken from ambush while mounted - 3 by RPG, 2 by IED, 1 by small arms. Traffic was the cause of 3 of the non-combat losses, the rest scattered.

[Battlefront.com]

Neepster,

There may well be a use for Strykers in the US military, but if I have the option of being in an M1A2 or a Stryker, I will take an M1A2 any day of the millenium.

Wars are not won by tanks driving around blowing stuff up, so at some point you have to introduce infantry into the battle. So your comment is quite irrelevant. Kinda like saying "all ships in WWII should have been battleships"

Steve

[JasonC]

It was uparmoring the Strykers to meet the 14.5mm protection requirement that put them over the designed weight limit, and that plus the RPG cages stuff (the last for bulk not weight - has to be removed and reapplied etc) that makes it harder to actually lift them by C-130. They then failed to stop 14.5mm at close range in tests, though they are proof against 12.7 plain AP. I don't think they were tested against SLAP from either.

Shinseki was indeed the main promoter of the Stryker. He did not invent "transformation", however. The army planners had been designing "force XXI" since the 1992 drawdown, including the whole theme of up-comm-ing and up sensoring. A lot of that planning was perfectly sensible and retained in later programs, and formed the basis he drew from for the army's version of transformation.

The "go light" crew in the pentagon was largely a funding based marriage of convenience between army light (airborne, ranger, mountain, etc), Marines, and air force (looking to get airlift fully funded), who decided to beat up the heavy army as supposedly dinosaurs, as well as working to draw down the navy significantly. This was largely the buck passing game of trying to avoid a big part of the end of cold war hit, but it was married to the maneuverist mantra.

This pulled the army away from the solutions proposed by its own doctrinal commands and experimental work. It resulted in a significant lightening of the force. Shinseki was effectively meeting this outside (and from an army perspective, largely hostile - though the light crew inside favored much of it, too) coalition halfway.

When Rummy and his friends got a hold of it, it became the more extreme version that only things that fly need to be able to shoot, and anything on the ground just needs to be able to talk to them and tell them where stuff to blow up, is. Needless to say, this did not survive contact in its pure unadulterated form.

It did lead to lovely cases like the Anaconda situation of men pinned down by a single heavy MG with nothing more than a SAW themselves, trying to call in F-16 strikes on a pimple on the side of a mountain the size of K-2 to take out one machinegun. Remarkably unsuccessfully, I might add. (It went swimmingly enough with the Northern Alliance and the SF led northern front in Iraq II, to give credit where due, however).

It also led to incomprehension of Shinseki's estimated force needed to pacify Iraq and to lowballing it by a factor of 2 instead, on the theory that fewer men for longer would maximize political staying power. Not the brightest trade off ever made, that. Fundamentally it underestimated the role of time in the domestic frustration equation and the consequent need for decisiveness. Basically they thought if they kept losses low enough there would be no political opposition to speak of. Losses have stayed remarkably low, of course. But the rest hasn't quite gone according to plan.

As for the comment that we won't have to fight Iran because we suck at this, I think someone is forgetting that wars happen because there are two sides with entirely different estimates of their relative capabilities. You won't get out of fighting Iran by not fighting them now because you aren't prepared.

You will just get to fight them later. Or their proxies. Likely versions - Iraq holds enough to mostly get out, Dems pull the rest, Iran tries to take over with its internal proxies, doesn't quite manage it, supports them overtly expecting a tired US to let it. That might be vs. proxies inside Iraq plus sanctuary stuff, or might be outright with Iran. Alternative version, Iran and Israel nuclear exchange 10 years from now, US has to police aftermath.

Here is what won't happen - US decides it just doesn't want to bother with Iran, sun shines down, Bambi grazes by the river bank, daffodils sway in the breeze to gentle music, and Iran quietly just goes away on its own.

[JasonC]

Actually, wars are quite reliably won by tanks driving around blowing things up, with modest all arms accompanyment and in recent years massive air power to be sure. But if you ignore your doctrinal axes to grind for a second and review the actual historical record, I believe you will find virtually every war won outright since WW I, was decided in that manner.

(Vietnam was won that way, to take a striking example. It was won in 1975 by a conventional armored blitzkrieg - protracted political stuff just set the table).

Very occasionally you will instead find states tiring of protracted wars withdrawing and accepting defeat without something like that happening, but you can really count those cases on one hand. You can also find any number of protracted infantry conflicts in the periphery than burn forever without decision.

Here is what you will not find anywhere - rapid decisive wars won by razzle dazzle and baffling the enemy with static on the command net - using infantry. Even medium infantry. In fact wars won by rapid maneuver are themselves rare and attrition victories are the rule - but air and armor are the drivers wherever it does happen. And the attrition ones are usually indecisive draws, unless and until one side smashes the other's air and armor and wins outright because of it.

[Battlefront.com]

JasonC,

Actually, wars are quite reliably won by tanks driving around blowing things up, with modest all arms accompanyment and in recent years massive air power to be sure. But if you ignore your doctrinal axes to grind for a second and review the actual historical record, I believe you will find virtually every war won outright since WW I, was decided in that manner.

I would love to think you were yanking my chain, but you're obviously not. You really don't have any concept of combined arms warfare, do you? If your concept of warfare is right, why bother having infantry at all? Put everybody in tanks and get some planes in the air... that's all we'd need to win?!? Crazy talk I say!

US heavy force personnel suffered a total of 9 KIA in the fight for Fallujah. Almost all the KIA were suffered by the Marines, who had 4 battalions in the fight, all of them medium at best and many of them fighting dismounted.

More evidence that you don't know nearly as much about this subject as you would like to beleive. This is from an article written before the battle was even over comparing Fallujah to Hue, considered one of the most crucial battles in Vietman:

In the three-week battle for Hue, 147 Marines were killed and 857 wounded. In the twin battles for Fallujah, more than 104 soldiers and Marines have been killed and more than 1,100 wounded in a battle that will continue to take lives, like the three Marines who encountered yet another pocket of fighters last week.

http://slate.com/id/2111432/

I had the official casualty count somewhere, but I don't have time to check. The total forces involved (for the US) was around 15,000 IIRC. That is about a 5% casualty rate, which doesn't sound like a lot unless you consider the attackers outnumbered the defenders something like 10:1 and had exponentially greater firepower, protection, freedom of action, air power, etc. In short, it was a very tough fight and it was won by grunts kicking in doors and supporting arms smashing specific pockets of resistance.

BTW, in a thread you were actively involved in I listed the losses for armored vehicles as of late 2005 or early 2006. 20 Abrams, 50 Bradleys, 20 Strykers, 20 M113s, and 250 Humvees, 500+ other vehicles:

Costs and losses

Also note that there are costs for the vehicles noted in the post just above the chart. You might want to write these down since you got them so very wrong in one of your other recent posts.

The top post on this page is quite relevant:

Keeping Strykers in perspective

Here is what you will not find anywhere - rapid decisive wars won by razzle dazzle and baffling the enemy with static on the command net - using infantry.

And you can find no battle where armor alone won victory. Certainly didn't work for the IDF a year ago this week, and they have some bitching tanks and very heavy IFVs.

Steve

[ August 14, 2007, 09:33 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

(Vietnam was won that way, to take a striking example. It was won in 1975 by a conventional armored blitzkrieg - protracted political stuff just set the table).

Doesn't this ignore the 10,000 days of combat before it - or is that part of the "protracted political stuff" that set the table? :confused:

[metalbrew]

Originally posted by Truppenfuhrung:

P.S.: As a quebecer I can tell you that life here would be much more better if USA would have won the war of 1812...

Sounds like an excellent opportunity to plug CM:1812.

[Battlefront.com]

Hehe... if it comes with a "seasons pass" to Unibroue's outlet store, you betcha!

Steve

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Bastables,

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />To repeat my self we have smaller sections for the very same reasons the Germans in the 1940s had small sections. We don't have enough warm bodies.

Interesting, but not surprising. This is why it is a VERY bad idea to look at a nation's military restructuring as an example to model without seeing the rationale behind it. Kinda like some of the morons in my town that complain that our taxes when up this year and the neighboring town's went down as if the tax rate told the whole story. What infrastructure is being maintained correctly in our town and not in the other? What long term economic opportunities are we spending money on and the other town is looking short term and not investing? So on and so forth. The tax rate, or the Squad headcount, in and of themselves mean nothing without a detailing of the context.

Many nations are having problems convincing people that they should join the military. A friend of mine is the S3 for the Belgian Para/Commandos and I've heard a lot about their recruiting problems over the years. That and funding cutbacks.

The Germans, as you correctly point out, had to ration their men and make up for it in firepower. Anybody playing a late war sceanrio in CMx2 games can see that. Going up against an intact 1944 Squad is tough going, but if it starts out short a few men or is hit with some mortars, it becomes rather easy to route or wipe out. At some point headcount makes the equation between firepower and the ability to use it sustainably tip in a negative direction.

Steve </font>

[Neepster]

So if Armor and Air don't win wars alone (or almost alone) how do you account for Desert Storm? Granted we had some dismounted infantry fighting, but most of it was mounted heavies and Bradleys rolling through and over the enemy.

I agree you always have to have infantry, but to reduce your Armored force to replace it with crappy things like Strykers is insanity. If Strykers are indeed a replacement for Humvees, then it is a step up and yay! But that is not what I heard they were being sold as... Last I heard they were being sold as a REPLACEMENT for the Abrams, which they certainly are not in any shape or form.

[Battlefront.com]

Neepster,

So if Armor and Air don't win wars alone (or almost alone) how do you account for Desert Storm?

Because we didn't finish the war, which is why we are there now. Desert Storm simply eliminated a whole bunch of stuff sitting out in the open. That is air and artillery's strength, it is a perfect scenario for heavy armor. If we had invaded the country and deposed Sadam as part of Desert Storm we would have probably wound up in a similar mess to the one we have now. Which is why Bush Sr. declined to topple the regime. For that you need infantry. Lots and lots of infantry. Far more than we have in theater now, which is why (as I mentioned before) there are guys being pulled out of armor and artillery and patrolling the streets on foot. You can not control a country with tanks and aircraft, so if you want to do more than plink hardware you have to go in with infantry. Thankfully Kosovo turned out OK with air power alone (plus the years of losses through war and isolation) because the ground component (TF Hawk) was an unmitigated disaster. Which is why the medium brigade concept came to the forefront.

I agree you always have to have infantry, but to reduce your Armored force to replace it with crappy things like Strykers is insanity.

Right, which is why they aren't a replacement, they are a compliment.

But that is not what I heard they were being sold as... Last I heard they were being sold as a REPLACEMENT for the Abrams, which they certainly are not in any shape or form.

You are horribly misinformed. The Army never had, never ever ever, said that they were a replacement. The armored guys panicked when they heard a new kid was about to come on the block and they started that rumor in the hopes of killing off a rival. One of our testers and posters to threads like this was a part of the hubris himself and can speak to it from first hand experience as a "treadhead" and then insider at the Pentagon (job description withheld, but it was directly related to the issues raised here).

Steve

[ August 14, 2007, 10:24 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Battlefront.com]

Dorosh,

I don't think this logic really stands up to much scrutiny. On paper the Commonwealth infantry section had 10 men by 1942, but in 1944 it was SOP to go into battle with a maximum of 6 men, partly due to LOBs (Left Out of Battle), partly due to battle casualties, but I think also due to the doctrine of artillery and the ascendancy of the LMG.

And the British were criticized by the Americans for being overly cautious, so yeah... I think my logic holds up just fine The Brits had to be cautious because they couldn't afford to take some of the idiotically high losses the US suffered in ill conceived late war battles, like Huertgen Forest. It was this battle that allowed the Germans so much success at the start of their Ardennes offensive. The US units were still licking their wounds. The difference is that they were largely brought back up to strength with raw recruits.

As for the Germans, their doctrine was the reverse of the CW - the LMG was the main killing instrument, so I think the number of riflemen in the squad may have been largely irrelevant also; the riflemen - armed with 5 shot bolt action Mausers - were there to support the MG. Manpower shortages don't seem to be a convincing "reason" for smaller squads when the British and Canadians (who admittedly were suffering infantry reinforcement shortages after Normandy) were fielding sections at 50 and 60% of establishment as a matter of course for doctrinal reasons.

The Germans reduced their Squad size several times throughout the war. This was the result of expansion and losses. IIRC the original platoon was 4 sections of 11 men, then 3 sections of 11 men, then 3 sections of 9 men, then 3 sections of 8 men for certain infantry formations. The last TO&E had 9 men from what I remember, but they didn't really get the chance to do it.

My point is that 9 men has been, for quite some time, seen as a good balance between firepower and boots. Lower has been seen by the US military, in particular, as undesirable. Going to 7 men standard seems to be too few and, if we can believe one poster here, it was done in the NZ Army simply because they couldn't find enough soldiers to fill their existing slots. So it became a choice between reducing headcount and keeping units or reducing units. Neither one of them is a choice of "going smaller because it makes for a better Squad". Which is why I asked the question of the Kiwis in the first place

Steve

[Bradley Dick]

I can attest to being pulled from an armored MOS and doing foot patrols inside cities.

[Bigduke6]

Steve,

All in all, IMO you have made better arguements in the past. There are some pretty big holes in your last post, I think.

Corruption surrounding a military project? I'm shocked at the news! Really shocked The corruption that took place during the Bradley's development was so bad that they made a movie about it. So I'm not sure what your point here is, other than to say that the US Taxpayer is constantly ripped off while certain politicians and officers get cushy corporate gigs in exchange for pulling the taxpayer's pants down. Happens all the time in all sectors of government spending. Katrian "disaster relief" is a great example.

Are you arguing that, since the acquisition process was clearly corrupt, as was the acquisition for most other major military purchases, the fielding the Stryker is a great idea?

Somehow, I doubt you are pushing the line that for a good weapon to get into the hands of the US troops, the acquisition process must be corrupt.

My point is, clear-headed thinking about military need was not driving the decision to create Stryker Brigades.

I say, this muddled and often wishful thinking about military need, along with a corrupt acquisition process, makes it hard to find grounds to support the arguement the Stryker is a good tool, better than alternatives available for actual wars, or even probable ones.

My definition of good is "meaningfully helps win the war, not at the expense of a better tool that will get the same result more efficiently."

Your argue that although graft and corruption are bound up in the Stryker fielding process, that has little bearing on the probable usefulness of the vehicle, as most major weapons programs are bound up with graft and corruption.

That is not such a strong position to argue from. The military has fielded plenty of lemons, pink elephants, and boondoggles in its time.

The question is, whether the Stryker is one of them.

It's not quite that bad yet, but it is getting there. Look at the number of Bradleys and Abrams that were knocked out during Fallujah II. I have the numbers somewhere, but I think it was close to 20 Abrams and 80 Bradleys, though I don't know how many of them were put back into sevice after a few million bucks in repairs.

So here's a question for you, which would have been of better use in Fallujah, a clear case of intense, fairly conventional warfare? Bradleys or Strykers?

What? Based on what facts? All the ones I have seen indicate the exact opposite, and I am sure I've been paying a lot more attention to the details than you have so I'm guessing if either one of us is missing some info it probably isn't me

There is no comparision between the cost of fielding a Stryker Brigade and a Heavy Brigade. No comparision on the logistics tail, deployability, ability to redeploy in theater, put boots on the ground, etc., etc., etc. That is why SBCT was created! HBCT has a lot of headaches, IBCT has too light a hand.

And also, there is no comparision between the firepower, survivability, and mobility of a heavy brigade and a Stryker Brigade.

I assert: Reduced logistic tail is not a big advantage in the wars present and future the US is likely to fight.

I say: Sacrificing combat capacity for reduced logistical tail, therefore, is a dumb idea.

In case of a proper national emergency and wartime mobilization of the economy, the US can deal with increased cost with ease. It is not as if the US does not have the money, or the manufacturing capacity to produce the parts, buy the fuel, or train and field the people needed to man the logistical tail.

The only conceivable advantage reduced logistical tail could give is in a conflict which could be brought to a successful conclusion - i.e., won - by a cheaper, less capable force.

That conflict certainly is not in Iraq or Afghanistan right now. I do not see a potential conflict in the future that Strykers can win. True, the people in charge of the US defense acquisition process for the last decade or so have tried to sell the public on the idea that it is possible to make major military interventions abroad, without the need of mobilizing the economy, using light forces and smart munitions.

Sure, that idea definately gives the US the capacity to enter a war. But win it? Nah, I don't see that.

If you do, then let's hear it. Name me a scenario where Stryker brigades supported by air and zippy clever air-land operations can do the job better (less friendly casualties, faster and more decisive victory) than -

- A heavy force

- A medium force using updated M-113 rather than Stryker

The sop people supporting the Stryker often come up with is "well, Strykers will do a great job screening the flanks and operating where the threat isn't so intense."

That is badly flawed reasoning. This is why:

1. A heavy force can do the same job better. It is more mobile and hits harder when if finds something.

2. If your goal is speed and mobility, a light infantry force using air trasnport can cover ground factors faster, and doesn't have to worry about terrain at all.

3. The friggen' Stryker is on wheels. Wheels are not as good as tracks for most off-road movement. If the goal is to field a force that can drive cross-country in most places the US is likely to fight, what possible sense does it make to field Strykers, which will have problems moving off road in any place where the ground is hilly, or rain happens more or less often.

As a historical lesson, consider the WW2 Eastern Front, where the Germans realized that their spiffy wheel-based transport had terrible problems staying mobile in a country with crappy roads and weather.

I think it is a dumb idea to sink alot of money in wheeled armored transport, when tracked armored transport is available for less money, and has more firepower to boot.

4. If you want more "boots on the ground" then Strykers are not a solution. Infantrymen are the solution. Infantrymen get to theater on airplanes, not inside Strykers.

Within theater if you want to move them somewhere where there is going to be shooting, the rational decision would be to load them into tracked APCs that have lots of cross-country ability and carry plenty heavy weapons. If you want to send them where there is not going to be much shooting, use helicopters or airplanes.

As to how well-read I am on modern military doctrine, or not, you are welcome to your opinion.

If you are better-informed than I am, then it should be easy for you to reject my arguements.

I am just stunned and amazed at how difficult this concept is for some people. When I first heard of a medium brigade my first reaction was "damn straight, it is ABOUT TIME!". The need is so glaringly obvious. Also glaringly obvious is that it can't do everything all the time and every time. Therefore, we still need light and heavy brigades. In fact, I think we need even more light brigades, which is what the Army is doing (converting Armored and Artillery units into light infantry battalions).

You are confusing fielding a wheeled armored personnel carrier, with fielding quantities of infantrymen. You seem to have accepted the Pentagon line that there is no way to field more infantry without increasing the number of Styker brigades.

You also seem to be assuming that, if the US military accepts a doctrine or a weapons system, that inevitably makes that route the most rational choice. I wonder how you square this with you concession that, usually, the acquisition process for most weapons systems is corrupt.

Me, I don't buy the Pentagon song and dance, not for a minute. Not without evidence.

I say, you want more infantry, pay for them, train them, put them in airplanes, and fly them to theater. Strykers have little to do with that policy. As I see it the only way they affect it is by absorbing money that might be spent on more infantry, or more transport aircraft.

If you are worried about roadside bombs and lots of ambushes then move your infantry within theater by helicopter and airplane.

And if you are silly enough to believe that against an opponent using partisan tactics the solution is "patrols" of armored vehicles carrying US infantry looking to get ambushed so they can find something to shoot at, then for Heaven's sake give that infantry serious armor and firepower?

You want to get them killed? Those poor doggies need tanks, artillery, aircraft with smart munitions - all weapons requiring logistical tail supposedly not necessary for Stryker forces.

So sure, Strykers have a smaller logisitical tail. But if you want to keep the troopies alive then you have to support them with all sorts of, uh, support weapons - and there is your big fat logistical tail right back again.

Seems to me, being able speed hundreds of kilometers saving a bit of change on fuel and spare parts isn't a critical combat advantage. As far as that goes, if you are actually fighting, you are moving at the pace of a walk hopefully ready to blast the Bejeezus out of whatever ambushes your infantry.

JasonC's concept of needing them for Iran is flawed since we'd be fools to do a ground attack against them. The US sucks at occupation. If it is going to create a failed state through military actions, better to not be there on the ground as it fails. At the very least it is cheaper than spending a trillion Dollars (not quite there yet in Iraq) and getting about the same result.

If you are arguing here for spending taxpayer money in support of rational US military policy, I can't see how you can, in effectively the same breath, say the Stryker makes sense. It is a second-class choice in a conventional shooting war, and it cannot win a partisan war.

If you can find me a vehicle that is a perfect fit for all situation all the time every time... let us all know.

Steve, Steve, Steve. Please don't change the subject. The question is not whether there is an ideal combat out there. The lack of a perfect solution in a real world, is not an ipso factor solid arguement for buying Stryker brigades.

The question is, is there any conflict out there, actual or potential, in which the infantry trasport vehicle Stryker can help win, that a Bradley, M-113, or helicopter cannot do better?

Let us know.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Are you arguing that, since the acquisition process was clearly corrupt, as was the acquisition for most other major military purchases, the fielding the Stryker is a great idea?

No, I think he's arguing that it was no more corrupt than any other, and despite the shortcomings of the Bradley project some people are now talking about it as the second best thing ever after pubs with topless waitresses. So it's a moot point.

[average]

So Bigduke asks the question, what conflict can a IFV Stryker do better than a M2, M113 or a helicopter.

Iraq, Afghanistan. The wars we are fighting.

The wars we aren't winning.

3rd ID, Heavy Div, Baghdad 2003. They stayed with the platforms while the law and order situation got out of control and broke contact with civilian friendly large calibre automatic weapons fire. IT didn't win hearts and minds. 4th ID,heavy div, notorious for ****ing up their first tour. H & I fires from 155mm is not part of COIN ops as practised by western armies. It is according to 4ID. Show them who is boss.

On the other hand the 101st seemed to have got it right.

As for the Marines in Fallujah, they didn't go looking for that fight, and they did the hard yards in that conflict. They did well to keep the casualtity rate down to 10% in their rifle plts. If it had been heavy div dismounts, they would have suffered as badly, probably worse, the marines are better light infantry then most of the army formations.

Finally, how often has the US army gone blitzkrieg since 1945 ? 91 and 2003 ? How many conflicts since 1945 ?

As to winning wars, well maybe, but you havent seen the US stretched yet or having to bail out an allied nation.

Look at the success of the USMC and their force structure. They are expiditionary. If Australia ever gets into a blue, well they better not call me up anymore, but it will be MEU that charges to the rescue, not a heavy division.

Let me illustrate thus:-

The King Tiger was a superior tank, so long as you didn't have to travel more than 25km, had ready access to resupply, and the terrain was flat, firm and open.

In the same vein, its not point having toys if they don't get to the fight. You fight with what you can deploy. Better a LAV then walking. It gives you mobility, protection and firepower. Not as much, but then you don't need as much unless your fighting the 3rd Shock Army circa 1985.

As to A-stan. US army doesn't have enough light infantry to put boots on the ground. Heliborne assaults haven't worked out that well. Tracks don't cope with A-stan particularly well, and they are doing milage they are not designed for. Considering the dispersion it would be interesting trying to operate and maintain a heavy brigade in Southern Afghanistan. Lavs seems to work though. Beats Helos that can't operate in some parts of the country because of manpads, or bradleys that can't get there, or buckets that have less armament, protection and mobility than a LAV.

I think all of you M113 Bucket chaps need to work with M113's for a bit. Nothing like sitting in back of the bucket, internal temp is about 55-60 degrees on a bad day, dismounts have no idea whats going on, and you know that the armour will melt if an RPG-7V so much as looks at it and the spall lining won't stop HMG AP rounds. Then you have the suspension. Also try not to go around corners too quickly, it will roll over.

[Bigduke6]

Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Are you arguing that, since the acquisition process was clearly corrupt, as was the acquisition for most other major military purchases, the fielding the Stryker is a great idea?

No, I think he's arguing that it was no more corrupt than any other, and despite the shortcomings of the Bradley project some people are now talking about it as the second best thing ever after pubs with topless waitresses. So it's a moot point. </font>

[Sergei]

Originally posted by average:

Finally, how often has the US army gone blitzkrieg since 1945 ? 91 and 2003 ? How many conflicts since 1945 ?

Don't forget 1950-53.

[average]

Static defensive ops in complex terrain typified most of Korea between 51-53, and Pushan was a static defense. Inchon was USMC, the breakout wasn't classic blitzkreig, it was a pursuit.

[RT North Dakota]

Sorry, I must be missing something, but where on earth did this myth about the Ligth v Heavy debate come from. It's garbage. No serious 3-5 Star HQ is or ever has had an argument about light versus heavy as regards Stryker.

Stryker only had one aim and that was to give light infantry formations (Brigades) more combat power and viable protected mobility. It's not a Shinseki, Rumsfeld "anti-heavy force" conspiracy. It was a very good idea, very badly actioned and given some poor equipment. What is more the officers tasked with making it happen clearly did not understand the concept. I can say I do because I have been personally briefed by the project office concerned.

The Stryker Brigades are NOT Post Cold War, OOTW or COIN inventions. They were and are an attempt to make light infantry viable instead of utterly useless. NOTE how the UK Royal Marines have done the same thing, for a tiny amount of money and very successfully, with ATV-P - BvS-10

BE AWARE: A lot of the Anti-Stryker websites and so called reports are written by people who DO NOT understand the issues - and lack the basic data to make the judgements. If you think the M-113 was or is an alternative to Stryker, then I suggest you do not understand the problem people were tryng to solve, or the data that informed those descisions.

[RT North Dakota]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The Germans reduced their Squad size several times throughout the war. This was the result of expansion and losses. IIRC the original platoon was 4 sections of 11 men, then 3 sections of 11 men, then 3 sections of 9 men, then 3 sections of 8 men for certain infantry formations. The last TO&E had 9 men from what I remember, but they didn't really get the chance to do it.

My point is that 9 men has been, for quite some time, seen as a good balance between firepower and boots. Lower has been seen by the US military, in particular, as undesirable. Going to 7 men standard seems to be too few and,

Let me help you out here.

1. Squad/Section size does not matter. How the squad is trained and commanded does.

2. Platoon and company size does matter. Far more important than Squad.

3. Dismounted Platoons should be between 24-36 - Ideally 30, based on current data.

4. Companies should be between 96 - 130, dependant on concept of ops and a few other factors.

[JasonC]

Your loss figures for US armored vehicles were for the whole theater through 2006, not for the battle of Fallujah.

I specifically said the battle was largely carried by the Marines, who took almost all the KIA and many time the WIA as KIA. Marines are medium force load-out, not heavy. I also pointed out that they fought most of the battle as lights, dismounted. 2 heavy battalions, army mech, supported the Marines in Fallujah, and they lost exactly 9 KIA, all of 2 of them in Bradleys while mounted and 3 while dismounted from them.

The relatively high losses in Fallujah were a direct consequence of choosing to clear the place with infantry and not to use heavies on the one hand, and firepower on the other. It can hardly be said that it left the place standing (plenty of air firepower was used before it was over, that being a form the Marines rely on doctrinally), but was clearly an attempt to trade US blood for Iraqi civilian causalties.

One can argue the merits of that choice, but not the military realities involved - using mediums (mostly as lights) for it resulted in large friendly losses, using heavies would not have, and to the extent they *were* used, did not.

This was a specific refutation of prior posters' claims that heavy took huge losses in Fallujah or was unsuited to or incapable of it. Both Iraq and prior Israeli experience continue to show that heavy can do MOUT and takes lighter losses doing so. Yes those lighter losses are the result of superior firepower and less restricted ROEs. That this is seen as an argument against heavies is perverse - it is an argument in favor of less restrictive ROEs.

It is quite dubious that the indecisiveness and higher own-side casualties that result from highly restrictive ROEs are in any way helpful in the long run, including politically. Because people hate indecisiveness and the protracted war that results (all sides, all costs, all groups), far more than the admitted downside of momentary uses of firepower.

One poster said 155s in MOUT are unacceptable, but Fallujah used large aircraft bombs. By all means be precise. But fighting without firepower is a recipe for indecisive and thereby protracted fighting, not a cleaner win.

As for the next smear, since I explicitly said armor has proven effective with all arms support, it is a straw man to pretend I never mentioned combined arms. Armor in the driver seat with other arms sufficient to support it, is what armor (or heavy) means. Armor in that sense certainly includes IFVs, as well as SP arty, attack helos, etc. Armor as a minor utility supporting fundamentally infantry forces, or not used at all, are the contrary forms "medium" for the former and in APCs, and "light" for the latter and heliborne, trucked, or leg.

To Mike, the point is that through the end of 1974, ARVN was still in control of the country, the SVN government was in place, etc. Internal insurgency methods failed to dislodge it - they did succeed in convincing the US to withdraw forces. (Though air was left and in 1972 sufficed to stop a weaker cross border attempt).

Of course protracted war works, especially with the right political context. But even that supposedly paradigmatic case, was not actually won by NVN until they smashed ARVN in open conventional war using large columns of armor. Which (1) was far more decisive than what preceded it and (2) took far less time.

From NVNs perspective, the achieved purposed of the protracted war phase was to politically remove the heavy US force (including air) blocking its ability to conquer SVN with armor. When the US had the longer suit in capital intensive means, the NVA used protracted war; as soon as they had the advantage in that regard, they abandoned protracted war as costly and indecisive, and escalated to conventional blitzkrieg.

As for the learned comments about Stryker being merely an attempt to make light infantry less than completely useless, you aren't reading the thread. Plenty of people are campaigning against heavy as supposedly obsolete and presenting medium as "as heavy as anything ever needs to be".

Yes this is a bad idea. That it is a bad idea does not mean it is not being argued. You can even detect a progression - early it is all just more armor than light, and as soon as the heavy advocacy trails off a little, tanks are pointless and we will never need them again.

As for the M113 alternative, I agree LAV-25s would have been preferable. I know why the 113 is advocated instead, though. It was the initial internal army recommendation for medium right at the start of the force XXI planning. It continues to be advocated by track vs. wheeled advocates and those fixated on the ways the Stryker was supposedly superior to Brads(liftable, large squad, etc).

I would not seriously recommend using them in 2007, but in 1992 it was a perfectly sensible idea, compared to humvees. And LAVs a perfectly sensible alternative thereafter. There is of course a contractor driven tendency to design a new perfect solution instead of using anything off the shelf. (The $12 billion mine resistent vehicle announcement being the latest of those).