Battle of Kursk- was it really a draw?

[Doug Beman]

It wasn't a "rout," in that German troops did not flee the battlefield, refuse to continue fighting, etc. Right up until Zitadelle was officially ended the German forces were hurling themselves against Soviet defenses. The withdrawal, even after the Soviets opened their own summer offensive, was orderly and did not leave irreplaceable equipment lying about, as the Germans did during their escape of the Falaise pocket, for example.

DjB

[CombinedArms]

I agree with a point raised earlier--the Battle of the Bulge analogy is very much to the point. In both cases, the armies of both sides suffered severe losses and ended up, after much heavy fighting, more or less on the original departure lines, BUT:

1. In both battles, the Germans staked all of their strategic reserves on achieving deep penetrations. They failed completely to achieve their strategic goals.

2. The Allies sustained losses they could more easily replace and retained the strategic initiative.

In the narrowest tactical terms, both battles might seem like draws--but a failed attack is not really a draw, it's a defeat, in both CM and real life.

In strategic terms, both were clear victories for the Allies. Perhaps the Bulge was a bigger victory, since total defeat for the Axis followed clearly and directly out of it. But then again, that battle was fought later in the war.

So, all in all, Kursk was a defeat, just as the battle of Gettysburg was a Confederate defeat.

[ May 07, 2002, 09:46 AM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Skipper]

> The withdrawal, even after the Soviets opened

> their own summer offensive, was orderly and did

> not leave irreplaceable equipment lying about

Actually, they did - and quite a lot.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Skipper:

> The withdrawal, even after the Soviets opened

> their own summer offensive, was orderly and did

> not leave irreplaceable equipment lying about

Actually, they did - and quite a lot.

Wasn't the initial penetration by Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army 26km in one or two days? In which case I guess the Germans did not get quite a bit of valuable material out. The same would probably go for the retreat from the Tomarovka salient. ISTR that part of the retreat (mostly on the eastern flank) was orderly, but certainly not all of it.

[Thantis]

Kursk was an operational offensive in the most limited sense. The size of the forces involved was substantial, but the overall conduct of the battle was almost entirely tactical in nature (with penetrations of less than 20 miles along a front of over 1000 miles - the whole of the Eastern Front).

If the Germans had launched their offensive earlier, they would still have taken losses (though not as heavy as the actual offensive), and of course one of the main reasons Hitler delayed the offensive was to collect more of the heavy armor (Panthers, Tigers, & Elephants) necessary to face off against the Russian tank forces.

Upon deeper analysis, the committment of the Panther in this battle (its first large scale use) was hampered by its EXTREMELY poor maintenance record with a majority of the tanks breaking down either before or during the battle.

Either way, the Germans would have lost a prohibitively large amount of armor in the battle, resulting in heavy Russian counterattacks, either in May or July. OKH's best bet would have been to withdraw from the two salients around Kursk, straighten the line, prepare defenses along the Dneiper River and prepare to meet the Russian Summer Offensive with organized and well-rested Panzer Divisions in reserve.

Of course, this kind of flexible defensive doctrine was never implemented - the result of Hitler's stand fast orders. Even without Kursk, the Germans would have hard pressed to prevent the crossing of the Dneiper in 1943 (though probably later than historically), and the Russian winter offensive would still have packed a hell of a punch in '43 - '44. AGC would still have gotten socked in June '44, with the armored savings that the Germans had saved from Kursk burned up in these other operations.

Even without Kursk, German doctrine guaranteed the Soviet steamroller would get to Berlin eventually (but maybe not before the A-Bomb takes out Berlin from the air).

[Roksovkiy]

The germans could have achieved a victory in the south.

The IISS Panzer Korps suffered small tank losses and even had more tanks available after prokhorovka.

The soviets had no reserves left in the south after, without shifting from other fronts. The 5th Guards tank army WAS the Steppe fronts armoured reserve and it was smashed on the 12th.

Army Group South's still had three panzer divisions in reserve that could have finised off the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the First Tank Army as Manstein wanted it would have had the same effect. Kursk in the south was actually very expensive for the Soviets

[Stormhouse]

Originally posted by Roksovkiy:

The germans could have achieved a victory in the south.

The IISS Panzer Korps suffered small tank losses and even had more tanks available after prokhorovka.

The soviets had no reserves left in the south after, without shifting from other fronts. The 5th Guards tank army WAS the Steppe fronts armoured reserve and it was smashed on the 12th.

Army Group South's still had three panzer divisions in reserve that could have finised off the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the First Tank Army as Manstein wanted it would have had the same effect. Kursk in the south was actually very expensive for the Soviets

I think that does SS divisions would have been lost if the attack continued. The Russians counter attack in the south and north and would have surrounded does division. Even if there Elite division there tanks still need fuel and ammo to fight. The battle was suppose to be a surprise attack by the Germans but it wasn't. The Russian did everything to use this attack to there advantage. Basically this battle should have been called off.

[Zitadelle]

Originally posted by Roksovkiy:

The germans could have achieved a victory in the south....

I am curious what would have qualified as a "victory in the south?" What objectives would have had to been met for a victory; destruction of forces, control of a particular area? Help me understand....

By mid-July, the German advances in the southern section of the salient were slowing down to a complete halt. In Glantz's book _The Battle of Kursk_ he outlines how the SS Panzer Divisions were encountering stronger and stronger resistance and unable to find gaps in the Russian line.

They were unable to obtain a breakthrough, their troops were becoming more and more exhausted, and they were a long way from the initial objectives of the operation (the railway junctions outside Kursk); let alone meeting up with the forces in the North and achieving an encirclement of the Russian forces in the salient.

[Thantis]

Without Operation Husky (invasion of Sicily), Hitler may have continued the Zitadelle a few days longer. A few extra days and there may not have been enough reserves in AGS to prevent the Russian counteroffensive from rolling down to the Dneiper and into Kiev a few months early.

[Mikael]

Re: the situation in August 41.

I dug out Alan Clark's "Barbarossa", and here are some enlightening excerpts:

"Now followed an agonising period, two and a half weeks long, of interegnum. AGC, its leadership hamstrung, floundered on the brink of a tremendous opportunity, while opposite them, for nineteen perfect campaigning days, the Russians worked unmolested to rebuild their shattered front".

and later:

"For almost seventy miles along the Desna, (...) Timoshenko's defence can hardly be said to have existed at all."

"There was practically no artillery, and not a single tank in working order between Spas-Demiansk and Bryansk. The whole region was in anarchy."

Seventy miles arguably is a little narrow for a strategic offensive directed at Moscow but had the entire Army Group, after resting, worked at unhinging the Russian defenses along the Sozh or at Yelnia, it would have been easy to clear the way for a fullscale attack through the Roslavl gap. This would at least have been well within 2.PzGruppe's capabilities, had it not been diverted South. Besides, a large part of 3.PzGruppe's tank assets had been sent North to assist Leeb in assaulting Leningrad.

Or maybe is Clark's book a little outdated?

[JonS]

Andreas,

I've just been reading about the Yelnia bridgehead, and Guderian's role in the German defeat there in late July-August-early September '41.

Interesting battle. Also interesting is the way Guderian dodged and weaved after the war, successfully pinning all the blame on Hitler and coming up smelling of roses himself.

Regards

JonS

[Colonel Klink]

Hmm.. All this is making me hungry for some more Eastern Front Reading material (Not to metion CM:BB!!). I've only read Alan Clark's Barbarrosa, which I believe might be outdated, and Zhukov's Greatest Defeat by David Glantz (Excellent book, that one). Any of you guys got recommendations for me?

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Roksovkiy:

The germans could have achieved a victory in the south.

"To argue that Germany might have swung the balance during the summer of 1943, more than a successful conclusion for them of Zitadelle is required."

- Zetterling & Frankson, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis

The soviets had no reserves left in the south after, without shifting from other fronts.

"Even more ominous, if unbeknownst to the German command, on the night of 15 July, the 27th and 53rd Armies of General I.S.Konev's Steppe Front, accompanied by the fresh 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps(with almost 400 tanks), began closing into assembly areas around Oboian' and northeast of Prokhorovka, while lead elements of 47th Army closed up behind Shumilov's 7th Guards and Kriuchenkin's 69th Armies."

- Glantz, Battle of Kursk

[ May 07, 2002, 11:48 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[killmore]

Originally posted by Colonel Klink:

Any of you guys got recommendations for me?

1) (Little pro Soviet in my opinion) "Barbarossa The Russian-German conflict, 1941-1945" Alan Clark

2) (Strongly pro-german in my opinion) "The Russo-German War 1941-1945" Albert Seaton - I didn't like it it but it made some good points like poor Soviet performance at sea. If my memory is correct it spent like 20 pages talking about abuse of German civilians but only mentioned slaughter of 18 million of Soviet civilians. (and 6 million Poles)

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mikael:

Re: the situation in August 41.

I dug out Alan Clark's "Barbarossa", and here are some enlightening excerpts:

"Now followed an agonising period, two and a half weeks long, of interegnum. AGC, its leadership hamstrung, floundered on the brink of a tremendous opportunity, while opposite them, for nineteen perfect campaigning days, the Russians worked unmolested to rebuild their shattered front".

and later:

"For almost seventy miles along the Desna, (...) Timoshenko's defence can hardly be said to have existed at all."

"There was practically no artillery, and not a single tank in working order between Spas-Demiansk and Bryansk. The whole region was in anarchy."

Seventy miles arguably is a little narrow for a strategic offensive directed at Moscow but had the entire Army Group, after resting, worked at unhinging the Russian defenses along the Sozh or at Yelnia, it would have been easy to clear the way for a fullscale attack through the Roslavl gap. This would at least have been well within 2.PzGruppe's capabilities, had it not been diverted South. Besides, a large part of 3.PzGruppe's tank assets had been sent North to assist Leeb in assaulting Leningrad.

Or maybe is Clark's book a little outdated?

Probably the latter. The German Panzer forces were equally exhausted (lack of spares, engine replacements etc.) and their infantry was busy 'mopping up' the encircled Soviet forces. They may have been able to launch the Panzergruppen into the void, but without infantry support and only tenuous supply lines there was little point in doing that. Armour does not hold ground, and is no use in the reduction of an encirclement.

Blitzkrieg as a concept died at Yelnia. Unfortunately for the Germans, it took them until after Stalingrad to realise that.

Jon, what are you reading on this?

[TSword]

The Battle of Kursk in it's Entirity (End Aug. 1943) was a disastrous defeat for the german army, no doubt.

However on the tactical level the 4th Tank army under Hoth performed very well and breached the 3 defensive lines and forced Vatutin to commit ALL his reserves and even use Steppe-Front reserves.

The so called tankbattle at Prokhorovka (12 July IIRC) was far from being a russian victory (they lost 400 tanks of around 800 commited vs. much much less on the german side), instead Detachment Kempf and the SS-PzKorps advanced further until 17. July 1943 almost encircling and destroying a russian army between them.

The 4th PzArmy could have been more succesful if they would have had more infantry to be used for flank security which actually had to be done by the precious tankdivisions which of course took much impetus out of the attack.

In the North Model's 9nd Army was to weak to have any hope to breach the russian defenses, although there were some successes due to faulty russian tactics (To early and piecemeal commitment of 2 TA at second day, being severly mauled by the germans).

If the germans would have known the real strength of the opposing enemy they certainly would not have attacked.(Hitler was indecisive himself for a long time, then his "feeling" said to him that the operation would succeed.......)

Russ: ca. 3'000'000 men (Including Steppe-Front and Stawka reserves), 6000 tanks.

German: 900'000 men, 2600 tanks only 1 or 2 divisions as reserves.

At 12. July the russians launched their offensive in the Orel sector. Model in regrouping his army checked the russian spearhead which had breached through the german lines severly decimating the enemy tankforce and enable a more or less orderly retreat of the slow moving troops behind Orel (Using the tactic of scorched earth, taking all civilians, animals and food with them).

(Later the Brianks Offensive pushed the germans even further back.)

The russians again had problems to react to flank treats, committed forces uncoordinated and piecemeal.

According to russian-military they lost 500'000 men in the Orel-Salient Operation.

In the South the russians first made a deception attack around Belgorod (IIRC correctly) and then striked at 4th army sector with their reserves which still were plenty (Losses could be filled up quite quickly). They achieved quite an "easy" breakthrough and advanced quick toward Charkov.

Manstein again in an emergency brought the SS-PzKorps (what was remaining), they managed to check the russian spearheads west of Charkov (Charkov was taken by the russians). The strength of the SS-PzKorps was around 30 tanks operational for each division, so the germans had no option left but to retreat to the Dnjepr, even more so the russians attacked along almost the whole length of the front. The losses of the russians on this axis (around 150'000 IIRC) were much lower then those in the Orel, because they managed to break through the first german line quite fast.

Kursk was a major error of the german side and hotly disputed in the german military before it's launch. It took the russians were they were strongest in static defense, a mobile counteroffensive in retrospect would have been much much more promising.

Greets

Daniel

[ May 08, 2002, 07:24 AM: Message edited by: TSword ]

[Zitadelle]

Originally posted by Colonel Klink:

Hmm.. All this is making me hungry for some more Eastern Front Reading material (Not to metion CM:BB!!) [sp!]. I've only read Alan Clark's Barbarrosa, which I believe might be outdated, and Zhukov's Greatest Defeat by David Glantz (Excellent book, that one). Any of you guys got recommendations for me?

If you are in for a long read, I would recommend John Erickson's two volume set _Road to Stalingrad_ and _Road to Berlin_. While reading them- especially the first one- it is advantageous to have a good map of the western USSR at your side as he gets into talking about individual towns and it let's you follow the battle.

I can also recommend both Glantz books: _Battle of Kursk_ and _Stumbling Collossus_. The latter gives a good account of the status of the Soviet army in mid-1941.

Also, Bidermann's _In Deadly Combat_ is a well written book giving the memoirs of a German infantryman. And, unlike Sager's _Forgotten Soldier_, there is not much argument about it actually taking place.

This is a start, and these days you can go on and on. Finally, the Eastern Front is getting the appropriate attention it deserves [editorial comment- (and even in the United States with Ambrose paraphrasing everyone...)].

[TSword]

Zitadelle,

What would have qualified a success in the South ?

Well 4th Army and Kempf would additionally have to do the work previously intdended for 9th army also.

Main objective of Kursk was:

To lure the russian op-reserves into battle AFTER they breached through the defensive line, and destroy them in mobile battle, in doing so preventing a russian attack. (Preemptive strike).

Secondary objective to shorten the frontline

In retrospect it is clear that 4 th army never had any chance to achieve those goals alone. Although they steadily advanced there were still several armies waiting for them to be destroyed which was clearly beyond their capacity atleast in the kind of fight they had to do.

Much more promising would have been some deception attacks during July, while waiting for the russian main blows (Orel-axis, Charkov-axis), then showing nerves of steel not to commit the panzer-reserves to early and counterstrike once the enemy is fully committed in depth from the flanks. Or in short a repeat of 1st and 2nd Charkov battle. Most probably they would have succeeded or atleast severly weakenend the thrust.

Reasons:

In the 1st, 2nd Charkov-battle, the Orel-salient battle and the Kursk-battles the russians, though their ability steadily improved, still showed many shortcomings in conduct of massed mobile strikes in the attack or counterstrikes which costed them enourmous losses.

On the other side, the deep defences, the stubborn nature of the russian soldier in the defense, massed artillery, lot of reserves clearly showed the russians as master of static defense. They maximized it with many defense lines in depth.

The germans choosed the worst and hammered their few precious panzerdivisions against an immense defensive wall, while they could have inflict much more damage in choosing the mobile fight in the counter where they were clearly superior and they could have attacked the (already weakenend, stretched) enemies elite-forces without first breaching 3 defensive lines.

It was the old disease of overconvidence (after the succesful Charkov battle) which led to the choosing of a Preemptive strike, convinced their amored forces breaching every defense. Well they did but what for ? To engage the enemies fresh reserves already depleted and tired ? What arrogant stupid son of bitches...

Greets

Daniel

[Zitadelle]

TSword-

Interesting analysis of the battle, and how the Germans could have pulled it off; you actually gave me something to think about. I was looking at how the Germans could have won the battle following the battle plan that they followed. The simple truth is they could not.

You, on the other hand, presented an overall different approach to the battle- resting with the Kharkov battles as a viable approach. The Germans could have initiated minor attacks on both flanks of the salient, and been mindful of a Russian counterattack. Therafter, they could have fought an active defensive battle following with an encirclement once the Russian committed/expended themselves on the German defenses. I think your idea has merit, and could have worked. To borrow a cliche- you thought outside the box.

Just because the Germans had the armor strength that they had, does not mean that they had to fully deploy it offensively. Using their armor to blunt a Russian counterattack (in respond to initial probes) would have played to the advantage of their available armor. The Elefant definitely would have proved itself in the defensive role, and the Tiger as well (as the Germans eventually realized...).

This approach would be interesting to model- all one needs is an old copy of the Grisby's PC game _War in Russia_, or one of the old Campaign series table-top wargames (cannot remember the name of those monsters...).

One last thought, have you read any sources that would back up your theory? If so, I would be interesting in reviewing the material.

[TSword]

Zitadelle,

Of course it's not only born in my mind, instead it was hotly disputed in the german military according to Glantz (Forehand- or Backhand-strike)

Greets

Daniel

[Herr Oberst]

For an excellent read, try (I'm on my second reading right now):

Decision in the Ukraine by George M. Nipe, Jr. ISBN 0-921991-35-5. $40.00(US) / $56.00 (CDN). Hard cover, 9"x6", 400 pages, 75 photographs and 29 maps and orders of battle.

For the first time in English, the full story of the crucial battles on the Mius River by the 6. Armee and the successful counterattack spearheaded by the II SS-Panzer-Korps, consisting of "Das Reich" and "Totenkopf". Also covered in detail are the offensives after Kursk. The author uses many primary sources and conveys the action in vivid detail.

I plan to try and create some of these battles in CM:BB. Now if anyone (hint hint) has some good detailed maps of the area (you know, high resolution enough to generate maps, topo's would be an incredible find), or knows of a source, please wing an Email my way.

[TSword]

Herr Oberst,

Can only agree Nipe's books are marvellous in their detail for the german actions. But the reader needs maps, preferably 1: 1'000'000 or smaller to fully follow and comprehend the actions, otherwise one is completely lost.

Sadly there are no books in same detail for the russian side to my knowing.

Ah, and Herr Oberst, would you be so kind to send me the maps too (danielh@active.ch) ????

Greets

Daniel

[ May 08, 2002, 11:35 AM: Message edited by: TSword ]

[kipanderson]

Hi,

Maps.

The Library of Congress has a number of series of German WW2 maps. Go to the L of C website and email the map collection. Ask if they have maps, something along the lines of, WW2 German topographical maps, “Heer Truppenkart 1:50,000” and you will get a very helpful reply. The British Library also has them.

It turns out that German topographical maps of the western Soviet Union, based in turn on the Soviet maps, are very good and very similar to modern topographical maps.

Someone in the 19th century and early 20th century put a huge amount of man hours into mapping Russia.

All the best,

Kip.

PS. In fact the Russians have a bit of a thing about maps. The worlds finest maps of many countries, China for example, are Russian/Soviet military maps. All available over the net, at a price.

[WWB]

I will confirm that they have nearly the entire southern shoulder of the Kursk battlefield. It is in the german 1:50000 series, and is quite nice.

WWB

PS: Kip, FYI, many of the german maps at the LOC are actually printed on the backs of Russian maps. And I looked at both sides, and it is clear that the German maps are the russian maps with latinized characters and teutonized names.

[ May 08, 2002, 01:15 PM: Message edited by: wwb_99 ]

[L.Tankersley]

Originally posted by wwb_99:

PS: Kip, FYI, many of the german maps at the LOC are actually printed on the backs of Russian maps. And I looked at both sides, and it is clear that the German maps are the russian maps with latinized characters and teutonized names.

Those Germans, gamey bastards.

I had a few minutes to kill at someone's house the other night and flipped through a book called "The Moscow Option" -- can't remember the author's name. It's an "alternate history" book that postulates Hitler being injured in a plane crash in '41 and temporarily in a coma, allowing the army to press on to capture Moscow instead of being sidetracked at Kiev. It's not a novel, it's really a history book written about the history of a war that might have been. The author's introduction says he tried to construct a plausible "could-have-happened" scenario in which the Axis was victorious in WWII. Seemed interesting, but I didn't really have time to do much more than skim. Anybody out there read this?