Kursk was an operational offensive in the most limited sense. The size of the forces involved was substantial, but the overall conduct of the battle was almost entirely tactical in nature (with penetrations of less than 20 miles along a front of over 1000 miles - the whole of the Eastern Front).
If the Germans had launched their offensive earlier, they would still have taken losses (though not as heavy as the actual offensive), and of course one of the main reasons Hitler delayed the offensive was to collect more of the heavy armor (Panthers, Tigers, & Elephants) necessary to face off against the Russian tank forces.
Upon deeper analysis, the committment of the Panther in this battle (its first large scale use) was hampered by its EXTREMELY poor maintenance record with a majority of the tanks breaking down either before or during the battle.
Either way, the Germans would have lost a prohibitively large amount of armor in the battle, resulting in heavy Russian counterattacks, either in May or July. OKH's best bet would have been to withdraw from the two salients around Kursk, straighten the line, prepare defenses along the Dneiper River and prepare to meet the Russian Summer Offensive with organized and well-rested Panzer Divisions in reserve.
Of course, this kind of flexible defensive doctrine was never implemented - the result of Hitler's stand fast orders. Even without Kursk, the Germans would have hard pressed to prevent the crossing of the Dneiper in 1943 (though probably later than historically), and the Russian winter offensive would still have packed a hell of a punch in '43 - '44. AGC would still have gotten socked in June '44, with the armored savings that the Germans had saved from Kursk burned up in these other operations.
Even without Kursk, German doctrine guaranteed the Soviet steamroller would get to Berlin eventually (but maybe not before the A-Bomb takes out Berlin from the air).