Who killed the tanks?

[Puff the Magic Dragon]

I found this stats in a book (T.L.Jentz, in US 'Panzertruppen', in Germany 'Die deutsche Panzertruppe). Maybe you find it interesting.

Allied tanks, destroyed from the landing til 3rd July. (the stats include number from the 17th SS, 2nd Pz, Lehr, 12th SS & 21th Pz division)

destroyed by

tanks : 227

StuG & selfprop. PAK : 61

PAK & FLAK : 105

Artillerie : 36

Infantry with hand held weapons : 108

I think this is for some reasons interesting.

It seems that the StG in CM are much effizienter then they were in reality. BTW, the text describes the the PzIV as much better than any StG and sp. AT, mostly because a)the turret and b)the higher mounted gun. So it seems 'silhouette' is not evrything we must know about the size of a tank.

Hand held weapons were as efficient as PAK. This would have been interesting for the discusion about infaantry vs tanks some days ago.

To bad, I should have made some stats about my experience in CM to compare it.

[ 01-10-2002: Message edited by: Puff the Magic Dragon ]</p>

[Kingfish]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>It seems that the StG in CM are much effizienter then they were in reality.<hr></blockquote>

Perhaps, but your missing a very important bit of information: The number of actual weapons systems that achieved those kills. Only by comapring the ratio of German tanks to SPs can you determine how effective they were.

IOW, If the German tank fleet outnumbered the Stugs by 4:1 then the Stugs were just as efficent as tanks, and cheaper to build and maintain to boot.

BTW, the 21st Panzer was a regular Heer formation, not SS.

[WWB]

Offhand, I would say there were relatively few StuGs in those formations. I think the panzer divisions should have had a company at most, while there should have been a battlaion with the 17th SS.

The main reason that the handheld AT weapons were so effective is the terrain. Bocage country is made for the panzerfaust.

WWB

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by wwb_99:

The main reason that the handheld AT weapons were so effective is the terrain. Bocage country is made for the panzerfaust.<hr></blockquote>

Conversely, this works against the humble PAK. At the distances involved, they would probably be spotted almost immediately after opening up, meaning everyone and their second cousin has a go at them. So if the crew is really brave they take one tank with them. If they have a lot of sense they leave without trying.

[willbell]

I would think the specifics of terrain would be so influencial as to render the comparisons unuseful.

William

[Puff the Magic Dragon]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Kingfish:

Perhaps, but your missing a very important bit of information: The number of actual weapons systems that achieved those kills. Only by comapring the ratio of German tanks to SPs can you determine how effective they were.

IOW, If the German tank fleet outnumbered the Stugs by 4:1 then the Stugs were just as efficent as tanks, and cheaper to build and maintain to boot.

BTW, the 21st Panzer was a regular Heer formation, not SS.<hr></blockquote>

I only said 'it seems' . You are right, and here are the stats (for all forces in the West, 10. Jun 1944)

Pz. III = 39

Pz.IV = 758

Pz.V = 655

Pz.VI = 102

StuG = 158

Beutepanzer: 179

[JasonC]

As I understand it, this is not a figure for all of Normandy but for the 5 named mobile divisions, right? Before even bothering to look at issues like how long each arm was engaged, against whom, whether under heavy attack or in a quite sector, etc, let's just start by looking at the number of weapon systems in the various categories the named divisions brought to the theater. All figures are from the Normandy OOB online.

Tanks - 679 (247 Panther, 432 Pz IV - ignoring 35 Somuas in 21st Panzer and a few short 75 command tanks, unused Tigers in Lehr, etc). Approximate tanks per claimed kill - 3.

StuG and SPAT - 165 (47 JgdPz, 68 StuG, 24 StuH, 26 Marder). Approximate SP guns per claimed kill - roughly 3, a bit better.

Towed PAK and heavy FLAK - 147 (24 88 PAK, 52 88 FLAK, 71 75mm PAK). Approximate towed DF guns per claimed kill - roughly 1.5.

Artillery - 222 (78 150mm, 144 105mm - some SP, many towed). Approximate indirect fire guns per claimed kill - 6.

Infantry Platoons - 297 (ignoring heavy weapons but counting pioneers and the infantry portion of recon battalions). Approximate infantry platoons per claimed kill - roughly 3, a bit better.

Field artillery was roughly .5 effectiveness per weapon system vs. enemy tanks, and towed DF PAK and heavy FLAK was roughly 2x effectiveness per weapon system vs. enemy tanks. Infantry platoons, SP guns, and tanks were all about equally effective. Of course, they were also probably more likely to survive - especially the better tanks. The indirect artillery was probably more survivable still, being well off the front line.

The reason the stats still show the highest kills for the tanks is because the 4 armor divisions in the list had lots of tanks, far more of them than of the other types. The infantry score is high undoubtedly because of the tight terrain, yes, but also simply because there was a lot of it. That was doubtless true in other formation types as well, to an even higher degree.

It is also worth noting how low the absolute figures are. It is not like every tank sent destroyed even one enemy tank in the first month of Normandy fighting. Some did not arrive until relatively late, but that is not the main explanation, as the claims of the Panther battalion of 2 Pz reveal (engaged against the British in Epsom only in late June, and claiming ~50 kills on their peak day alone). The weapon systems could perform that well, but rarely saw action that intense.

A translation into tactical unit sizes may also be revealing. A tank company with 17 AFV on average accounted for 5 enemy tanks. A PzJgr company (SP) with 10-12 AFV on average accounted for 3-4 enemy tanks. A towed PAK or heavy FLAK battery of 4 guns accounted for 3 enemy tanks. An artillery battalion of 12 guns accounted for 2 tanks. An infantry battalion of 9 platoons (plus weapons, etc) accounted for 3 tanks. In a month of fighting, but sometimes seriously engaged for only a portion of it.

An infantry division, on that showing, might expect to account for 50 AFVs - half by its PAK alone. A panzer division might account for 100, half by tanks and armored SP guns. The role of the PAK becomes critical precisely in the leg infantry divisions, where the tanks are lacking. While artillery, Pz Jgrs including armored SP guns, and towed PAK and FLAK still contribute about 1/3-2/5 of the anti-tank strength of mobile divisions.

[ 01-10-2002: Message edited by: JasonC ]</p>

[Abn_Ranger87]

Interesting statistics of allied BDA, what about the axis losses? Other thing I'm wondering is how many of those German assetts mentioned actually were engaged. Maintenance losses and CAS most assuredly kept quite a few out of the fighting...

[Andreas]

Puff, you are not running around in a light-green Jersey suit, are you?

Inquiring minds want to know

[Bastables]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Puff the Magic Dragon:

I found this stats in a book (T.L.Jentz, in US 'Panzertruppen', in Germany 'Die deutsche Panzertruppe). Maybe you find it interesting.

Allied tanks, destroyed from the landing til 3rd July. (the stats include number from the 17th SS, 2nd Pz, Lehr, 12th SS & 21th Pz division)

destroyed by

tanks : 227

StuG & selfprop. PAK : 61

PAK & FLAK : 105

Artillerie : 36

Infantry with hand held weapons : 108

I think this is for some reasons interesting.

It seems that the StG in CM are much effizienter then they were in reality. BTW, the text describes the the PzIV as much better than any StG and sp. AT, mostly because a)the turret and b)the higher mounted gun. So it seems 'silhouette' is not evrything we must know about the size of a tank.

Hand held weapons were as efficient as PAK. This would have been interesting for the discusion about infaantry vs tanks some days ago.

To bad, I should have made some stats about my experience in CM to compare it.

[ 01-10-2002: Message edited by: Puff the Magic Dragon ]<hr></blockquote>

One should also realise that Panzertruppen being the author of reports contained within Panzertruppen vol 1 and 2 consistently denigrate the StuG's, s.lf and PanzerJager in favour of their Panzer's. Reports penned by Authors Panzer officer of OB West to the General inspector of the entire Panzer arm Guderian should give you an idea about the report and the authors slant. Also the report only deals with a slice of Panzer and StuG armed units. Information on kill 'claims' by 1st SS, 2 SS, 9th Panzer, 9th SS, 10th SS, and 116 Panzer are absent. Never mind the lack of information on kills made by s.lf (Marders and the Lorraine lash ups), StuGs, PaKs, Pazerfausts and Panzerschrecks (The weapons that Nahkampwaffen refers to) of the Infantry Divisions.

[ 01-10-2002: Message edited by: Bastables ]</p>

[Affentitten]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Abn_Ranger87:

Interesting statistics of allied BDA, what about the axis losses? Other thing I'm wondering is how many of those German assetts mentioned actually were engaged. Maintenance losses and CAS most assuredly kept quite a few out of the fighting...<hr></blockquote>

Not to mention how many of them were blown apart before even getting a shot off by tac air, naval guns and the big carpet bombing raids like Cobra.

[Puff the Magic Dragon]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Andreas:

Puff, you are not running around in a light-green Jersey suit, are you?

Inquiring minds want to know <hr></blockquote>

No, I'm currently running around in high heels and fishnet stockings, but please don't tell anyone - especially not my girlfriend!

[ 01-10-2002: Message edited by: Puff the Magic Dragon ]</p>

[JasonC]

The German losses in the named divisions through the begining of July - using the closest dates for the unit returns, which are not all at the same time - are 204 total write offs (TWO), and 379 either TWO or under repair. I give both since the "claims" figure undoubtedly includes many tanks KOed on the field but recovered. Another minor correction factor is that those loss figures are for only about 92% of the German AFVs, because some divisions do not report their losses of Marders and StuGs consistently with their tank returns. It also excludes the French tanks used by the 21st Panzer.

Overall, that means ratio between kill claims and own side TWOs was around 1.4 (tanks plus SP guns), and the ratio between kill claims and own side vehicles moved out of operational status (not gross, day by day, but net over a month) was 0.7 - which is 1 over the previous. From which about all you can conclude is that tank losses ran somewhere between even with the Allies, and either side having a 3:2 edge in score (about). Claims errors, different rates of recoveries, and losses to non-combat causes - all of them on both sides, not just on one - prevent anything more definitive from being concluded from the figures. They are sufficient to disprove any claim that every tank the Germans lost accounted for 5 - or even for 3 - Allied ones. Most likely, the other arms killed whatever excess of tanks the Allies may have lost, while the AFV score alone was close to even. Including the other causes of loss, total claims from these divisions divided by AFVs moved to repair or TWO gives 1.4 times again. Very likely the realistic ratio of exchange for these formations in the first month of the Normandy fighting was around 3:2.

The details are - 17th SS lost 24 StuG, with no reports on their Marders, 12 SS lost 21 Panther and 44 Pz IV, plus 34 of each type under repair, 21st Pz lost 43 Pz IVs plus 2 under repair, with losses for their StuG/H, Marders, and French Somuas unreported, 2 Pz lost 20 Panthers and 2 Jagds, plus 18 and 2 more under repair, and 11 Pz IVs under repair, Lehr lost 23 Panther and 24 Pz IVs, 2 StuG or Jagd, plus 34 and 39 moved to repair status for the tanks, and 10 moved to repair status among the StuGs and Jagds.

As for the idea that lots of the German AFVs were Koed by the air force before arriving, it is demonstrably false. Lehr lost 5 tanks on its approach, and was about the most heavily bombed division (its SPW and truck losses were much higher). 2 Pz had a number of breakdowns on the approach march, but the vehicles were repaired for the most part. No more than 7 tanks failed to reach the front, and it is not clear any failed to do so. 21st Pz and 17th SS were already in the theater, practically. As for 12th SS, there is a discrepancy of 4 tanks in the reports on AFV trainloads, but it may merely reflect a staffer assuming a company means 17 tanks when only 13 were sent. The AFV losses of these divisions to air attack before reaching the theater, therefore, is on the order of 5-15 AFVs, out of more than 800 present and more than 200 total write offs in the first month. So sorry, no, it wasn't "all Goering's fault".

The basic reality is that the Allies sent enough AFVs to the theater to exchange them in a ratio of about 3 of theirs to 2 German, and still run the Germans out of tanks over the course of two months of attrition fighting. Once the German AFV strength in the field was low enough, the Allies then threw their remaining excess AFVs at the outnumbered defenders en masse and broke out. With 3/4 of their AFVs gone (and probably a large number of towed PAK neutralised too - though records are much spottier for towed guns than AFVs), the Germans lacked the anti-tank defense strength and ability to block breakthrough threats necessary to stop them.

Incidentally, some may be surprised by the evidence from my previous post showing that towed heavy PAK and FLAK outscored AFVs by about 2:1, system for system. The thing is, the tanks got their scores while also keeping 3/4 of them alive and a bit more than 1/2 of them operational. That was probably not true for the towed guns. From a campaign length point of view, towed AT may be a "breakaway" weapon category, with relatively strong AT ability up front, but less staying power than AFVs.

Say an AFV might score 1/3rd of a kill on average per month, with "half life" of two months, and thus average 1.33 before being KOed. An AT guns might average 2/3rds of a kill per month, but with most of them KOed in that month, leaving .67 lifetime. Thus the AT gun would have twice the score on a "kills per system per month" basis - but half as many on a "kills per system before dead" basis. With the difference being 4 times the life expectancy for the AFV. Those numbers are only meant to illustrate the principle.

I hope this interests some.

[ 01-10-2002: Message edited by: JasonC ]</p>

[Puff the Magic Dragon]

Hey folks, I'm no heretic! All stats count of course only for the specific units in this special time frame.

Beside that, no situation can be compared with another situation, because everything is unique in our universe :cool: , and a game can not be seriously compared with reality! I wonder why so many people try this - me included.

[ 01-10-2002: Message edited by: Puff the Magic Dragon ]</p>

[Warmaker]

Interesting post again, Jason C.

[edward_n_kelly]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Warmaker:

Interesting post again, Jason C.

"Uncommon valor was a common virtue"-Adm.Chester Nimitz of the Marines on Iwo Jima

"There's no such thing as overkill, just ensured victory"-Warmaker *shameless, self-quote*

<hr></blockquote>

Shouldn't that be "assured" victory ?

Edward

[Charlie Rock]

One thought or two on AT vs. armor.

The preferred doctrinal use for armor in the defense would be for the tanks to stay in reserve and counterattack to restore ground lost in a breakthrough. This did not often happen in practice as much as the German's would have liked. Carell, for one, remarks that as the line was strung out thin at times tanks were often sucked into an armor-pillbox type role.

That being said, a PAK crew would be less likely to be in reserve, but would more likely spend it's day in the front line, with an infantry battalion, whereas a tank would ideally have been off the line. STUGs would be a cross between th two.

My guess is that in daily 'wastage' an AT gun would have been far more likely to get hit by a random shell, or hit by the 105mm fired at the machine gunner who lit a cigarette and fired at the sniper who was next to the FO, etc.

I would also venture that while a tank is a tank is a tank, AT guns would probably have been drawn into defeating the probe or knocking out the "tank" which may have been part of a probe, recon in force, possibly more lightly armored, more likely a scout, while a panther crew probably would not have been committed to such a skirmish, for risk of drawing fire from spotter a/c and jabos.

I would argue that AT guns killed and died in lower numbers daily, more consistently, with the median closer to the mean (like the frontsoldaten they supported), while tank crews were drawn to counterattack the major battles, and their kills and losses came in spurts. AT guns would have hit the recon elements before the armor counterattacked, and probably shot up more armored cars, stuarts, etc. who, if they saw the panther or MK IV coming, would have backed off, but probably didn't back off in time from the bush the PAK 40 was hiding in.

Unless of course you were the poor slob with the AT gun in the path of Cobra or Goodwood, in which case, nice knowing you and yours. See ya.

That's my guess.

[JasonC]

The German armor was used in a reserve role - when committed to an attacked sector it was often moving into position ahead of attackers but still on the local defensive, sometimes locally counterattacking. Villars Bocage everybody knows about. Also E.g. The Germans threw in 2 full Pz divisions to stop Epsom, besides the one that was attacked - and borrowed the Panther battalion from a fourth. 17th SS early at Caretan, and Lehr later in July, counterattacked in the American sector. Goodwood involved not only AT guns and heavy FLAK, but also around 300 AFVs, most from 2 Pz divisions. Many of the losses to other divisions happened at different times, however. You see one division lose 25 this day, another lose 20 that day, etc. They also had reserve armor to attempt the same thing with Cobra - 116th Pz and 2 StuG brigades. And then Mortain, of course.

The thing is, the tanks did run out and long before the infantry did. German manpower losses before the breakout were only on the order of 20%, and the rated strength of the infantry battalions in the line ranged from 50-80% for most units (though some had been destroyed, of course). While the tanks had been reduced to 1/4 their initial strength - and were halved again in the immediate aftermath of Cobra, trying to stem the breakout or lost in the Mortain attempt. Without reserves of tanks, the Germans could not defeat the Allied armor divisions and the front collapsed. It was then that the infantry and towed guns became highly vunerable, as they could not get away from the Falaise battle, were chewed up by air and artillery along the roads, etc.

The tanks ran out not because they were more vunerable individually than infantrymen were, but because there just weren't enough of them, and especially because there were no replacements to speak of. Armor production had to go east in the summer of 1944, to shore up the collapsing northern half of the Russian front. The number of AFVs sent to the theater - while not enough to match the Allies - was large, larger than the force used in the Bulge for instance. And the tanks did get to the theater, despite Allied air.

But they only lasted two months in the heavy attrition fighting of Normandy. Not because they were always on the line (as though it were some failure of doctrine), but because the Allies were attacking over and over, and the tanks were constantly called upon to stop them, here or there.

They lost some every time, and half of the remainder went into the workshops. The remaining runners had ever harder duty to perform. The amount of reduction in operational AFV strength in the early engagements are striking - they rapidly fall to only 2/3-1/2 of their initial TOE operational.

Once there was a large pool of tanks under repair, a sort of local replacement stream was created - out of repair and back into operational status. Losses outran that stream, but more slowly than the initial drop, as long as the pool of out-of-service vehicles was still sizable. Many AFVs were off the line, but half of them weren't running. Eventually the total fleet has shrunk to inadequate levels and the Allies broke out. When they did so, the lines moved a long way and anything still under repair was lost, unable to escape from the Allied advance.

To maintain German AFV strength in Normandy would have required a stream of new tanks reaching the front, 1000 a month, straight from the factories. German AFV output in 1944 - their peak - averaged 1500 a month. If they only had to handle Normandy and Italy they could have sustained the loss rate. But the Russian front required far more, and could not possibly be fed with the leftovers of the appetite of the Normandy front. When Army Group Center collapsed, everything had to be sent east and still wasn't enough to keep the Russians from reaching Poland. And indeed, one might see the 2200 AFVs sent to Normandy as the force that wasn't in reserve behind AGC to stop Bagration.

[Redwolf]

The German histories I have complain heavily about the Panzer divisions kept in line where they were supposed to be replaced by infantry, which never happens. Then they got slowly attricted. Not more material or men than an infantry division in the same situation would, but more valuable material.

I would have to make a list of all Panzer divisions I have docu for, but between Epsom and Cobra I pretty sure I arrive at 50% armored battalions in inappropriate frontline duty over the Normandy front, not free to play reserve to check break-ins. Panzer Lehr was heavily attricted directly in or close behind the line in the air attacks before Cobra and the divisions in front of the British did nothing a well-equipped infantry division couldn't (except none was available).

Of course, as you say, on top of these problems were all the stupid attacks which manage to move armor concentrations against the Allies, but in useless or even very unhealty places.

[Charlie Rock]

Hmmmmm...

Agree with all your points save one, which would be

"it was then that the infantry and towed guns became highly vulnerable."

Welllll.............

We have 147 flak and AT guns, which knocked out 105 tanks.

We have 679 German tanks, which knocked out 227 tanks.

Assuming that on a day other than Cobra, Goodwood, major offensives, etc. 50% of the German tanks were in the line. That equals 340 in the line.

SO, how many AT guns are in the line? Even given that there would be an attempt to defend in depth, probably 90%. About 140. What do you do with an AT gun in reserve? Do you have prime movers maneuver AT guns into position to defeat a counterattack, or let the AT guns hold the line to allow tanks to maneuver? Not much choice there.

It goes without saying that a heck of a lot more than 50% of our rifle platoons are in the line.

While I agree the panzers were attritted down fast and furiously in Normandy, given the more-or-less static positions (positional rather than mobile defense) Allied tank qualitative inferiority, and Allied dominance in tube artillery, air power (by default) and naval gunfire (also by default), it would seem safe to bet that the AT guns that were in the line in fixed positions, especially those in infantry formations were bled out first.

To say that the AT guns miraculously survived the Allied artillery while the panzers were attritted down, only to be strafed and bombed in the Falaise retreat after we ran out of tanks, doesen't add up.

IMHO, if 1/2 the tanks were in reserve, than a significant portion of their 227 kills were achieved following counterattacks. By definition they were inflicted against enemy attacks, which would mean a higher proportion of panzer kills would be against enemy main battle tanks: shermans, cromwells, etc.

Therefore a higher percentage of AT kills would be against the sorts of vehicles that you run up against before the dashing counterattackers show up on the battlefield. Recon assets, point vehicles, armored cars, and lightweight stuff. Stuarts, M8s, armored cars.

Same-same infantry.

So while AT guns had 1.5 kills/gun and tanks had 3 kills/tank I would rate the tanks as more than twice as effective, based on the types of "tanks" they engaged.

[Determinant]

How can we be sure that any contemporary claims for kills are reliable?

A unit diary might be accurate about its own losses (Joachen either returns his Mk IV to the assembly area or he doesn't) but I would always be suspicious about claimed kills.

It's the same old story - Look at the air war over Kosovo in '99 - NATO claimed to have destroyed 100s of AFVs - they actually found less than 20 KO'd vehicles on the ground.

Seems to me a bit pointless to extrapolate from statistics if the numbers are wrong...

[JasonC]

Charlie Rock raises an interesting question, but first two clarifications. He said "while AT guns had 1.5 kills/gun and tanks had 3 kills/tank". But that has the "divided by" sign on the wrong side. It was about 1/3rd of a kill per tank and 2/3rds per AT gun in the first month, not the reverse. Second, when I said the towed guns and infantry took their heaviest losses after the breakout, I was thinking primarily of the tube artillery, not the direct fire AT guns (PAK and heavy FLAK).

Since much of it was horse drawn, and there were shortages of all kinds of vehicles, and those vehicles (horses, wagons, soft-skinned trucks) were far more vunerable to air attack when forced to move over crowded roads in daylight, very little tube artillery made it out of the Falaise pocket. And artillery strengths had run 50-70% of TOE in many formations before the breakout, while tank strength was already down to 25% or less. Similarly, the total personnel losses before the breakout had been around 120K out of 850K sent to the theater, while twice that was lost in the breakout and as much again was bottled up in the western fortresses and reduced there. So mostly my point was that the field army in the west as a whole died (or was captured) after the breakout, not before it - while the armor died before the breakout, not after it.

Another thing to keep in mind is that the figures given, including the ratio of tanks present to PAK present, are only for half the mobile divisions. There were five others like the ones listed, and over twice as many as both combined, worth of infantry divisions. Which latter had no tanks of course, though they had a few Marders and StuGs, and about as many towed PAK as the mobile divisions.

Not more each, incidentally - as "poor cousins" the non-mobile Heer formations rarely had all they were supposed to. Mobile divisions would generally have towed (and motorized) replacements for any shortfall in AFVs, while "short" infantry divisions just didn't have anything. Most divisions had 30-40 towed PAK or heavy FLAK, whether mobile or not. That still means there were about twice as many PAK in total in the infantry divisions, because there were twice as many of them.

With the infantry arm, the losses are a mixed story. Some units lost their front line rifle strength and remained burned out shells, or were destroyed outright (e.g. in Cherbourg), or had remnants consolidated with other KGs. Other infantry divisions reached the front rather late, some being committed only after the breakout, when it became clear e.g. guarding the Holland coast was irrelevant when France was about to be lost. Some got a trickle of replacements, or were pulled off the line to act as cadres when their front line rifle strength could be replaced.

As for the question of the fate of the direct fire guns, the PAK and heavy FLAK in particular, I mostly agree with you that its life expectancy was far below even that of the tanks. That was the point of my "breakaway weapon" explanation. That a PAK could account for 2/3rds of an enemy AFV in the first month, twice what a tank accounted for, and still be less effective over its combat lifetime, if the tank lived long enough (though only marginally so at the rate the tanks died in Normandy).

But the data on the subject are quite spotty, making it hard to test your hunch about arty getting them all rapidly, and my theory about how tanks might have made up in longevity what they lacked in specific, rapid lethality - on the figures given. It is not obvious either notion is correct. The problem is two-fold - first, there are very few reports of combat losses of towed guns, and when they do occur it is not clear whether replacements have been received in the meantime.

The reason to worry about the second of those is sometimes the (spotty) PAK strength reports for a given unit move in either direction, or show only tiny drops after periods of heavy fighting. Some of these may reflect cross attachments, when a PAK unit switches from formation A to B, "laterally". Some may reflect new arrivals - replacement guns or attachments of higher level units from the rear. Some may genuinely represent long-lived PAK formations (e.g. in some cases on the US sector, it is plausible the fighting was infantry heavy). It might also be remarked that AT guns are not called upon to deliver local counterattacks, while AFVs often were and those often failed.

There is some evidence for the breakaway view especially for the regimental guns (as opposed to divisional). You see things like an anecdotal gun loss report that exactly equals the guns in both infantry regiments of one division, right after a heavy British attack (leIG, sIG, and PAK from 14th companies). But in other cases, you see a division that has been in action for a while reporting 60% AT strength or listing most of its PAK by number, remaining.

It is possible the usual practice with the Pz Jgrs was to put the divisional formation on the MLR, which tended to be rather deep in German practice (to avoid the worst effects of Allied arty - often the site of the "back" or local reserve formation), while the forward infantry positions were somewhat ahead of it (including regimental guns, perhaps). It may be that the cases of reports of high numbers of PAK after a while in action mostly reflect cases where the MLR was not penetrated, with the unit backing up over and over after losing its outpost and forward zones. I am speaking of the infantry formations - which aren't covered in the figures given initially, of course.

As for the replacement idea, the info to support it is spotty. The Germans were producing 1500 heavy PAK per month, as many as AFVs - and towed indirect fire systems, and light FLAK for army use - 1500 of each per month. We know that virtually all the new armor during the Normandy fight went east. Probably most of the towed guns did too, but it is possible a third or so of the new production did not. Which would make a serious difference.

A replacement stream is more important with a short life expectancy, break-away weapon than with a long lived one, though obviously useful to both. A division might spend 2/3rds of its time without significant numbers of heavy PAK, after losing them rapidly during the heaviest attacks, and still have strong AT defense when it is really needed (the next heavy attack) - provided it is getting some sort of replacement stream. But the truth is I haven't seen enough data to know whether the replacement guess has anything to do with it.

Another issue with the tanks, however, that doesn't arise for the PAK and tends to increase their longevity while reducing their specific lethality (in the first month I mean), is maintenance and recovery issues. Simple towed guns don't break down on road marches; tanks do. When half the tanks are in the shop, they aren't going to kill anything at the front - but they aren't going to be finished off either. Again, a smashed PAK is not worth trying to repair, while a damaged tank often is. And will sometimes be kept just to cannabilize its parts, even if the prospects of getting it running again are dim.

Some units seem more reluctant than others to totally write off any AFVs, too. You see some units that use the "long term repair" category practically to mean "destroyed" - as long as the hulk is in friendly hands. For example, consider the case of the 10th SS, which fought with the 102 Tiger battalion attached, in place of its missing Panther battalion.

It brought 122 tanks to the theater - 45 Tiger Is and 77 Pz IVs and StuG (split about evenly, each two companies of the its lone organic Panzer battalion). It listed only 3 Tigers as total write offs by the end of July. But by the time of Goodwood, only 10 Tigers, 12 Pz IVs, and 6 StuGs were actually in combat, running. There were more than 60 listed as "under repair" and 10 more listed as "enroute". But the division never had more than 40 runners on any subsequent date.

As for the idea that the armor divisions were doing things "any infantry division could have done", I hardly think so. Infantry divisions would not have stopped the Brits on the 13th - that took Tigers. Infantry would not have stopped Epsom - that took nearly 500 medium tanks. Infantry alone would not have stopped Charnwood or Goodwood - both required hundreds of German tanks to halt. It was in the serious attacks that most of the German tanks were lost - or in the failed counterattack attempts.

The Brits were not sitting on their duffs in "static" fighting (whatever that means - the front moved, though slowly, the whole time). They were launching powerful offensives every ten days, which often lasted several days. And the Germans did keep reserves and shift their armor despite this. 2 Pz had a frontage assigned in the American sector, but could still lend its Panther battalion to stop Epsom. Lehr switched from the British sector to the US one to deliver a (failed) counterattack. 116th Pz was in reserve the entire time until the breakout itself, and was run over trying to stop it (along with 2 StuG brigades). The KGs lent for the Mortain attempt - assembled in just a few days - came from all along the front, including the British sector. This flexibility is what you would expect from most of the tanks being in back deployments (on the MLR or in lagger) in sectors not under immediate attack.

The Panzer divisions did suffer from being in the line so long, but it wasn't the tanks that bore the brunt of that suffering. It was their inadequate infantry, especially in the Heer formations. They had only 4 infantry battalions apiece, plus one engineer and about 1/2 a battalion worth of infantry in the divisional recon battalion. Since some of the engineers were always needed for engineering, perhaps 5 battalions were available for infantry fighting. The SS formations were a bit better off, with 7, by the same accounting of the extras. When they first arrived those would be enough, but lose a battalion's worth in each of 2-3 consecutive attacks, and try to hold off a full Allied infantry division of 10 battalions afterwards, and that starts getting hard.

As for the other fellow's skepticism about claims vs. realities as revealed by the other side's accounting for its own losses, it is a fair theoretical point, but not all that serious on the numbers given here. The usual finding is that kill claims are anywhere between accurate and overstated by a factor of two, for ground combatants only (air overstates in far more dramatic fashion). There is probably some overstatement in the German claims, but less than that amount.

Total German claims for the whole Normandy fight, US and UK and all German arms, are 3750 AFVs (by a different source than the one this partial June data came from). They lost at least 2200 themselves. US losses from US figures seem to have been slightly under 1000, but around that figure. UK losses were almost certainly higher than US - they lost ~500 AFVs in Goodwood alone, for example - but probably not enough higher to justify the German claim figure.

I'd estimate Allied AFV losses for the whole fight at 2500-3000, with UK losses running 3:2 or 2:1 as high as the Americans (who only committed their main armor divisions during the breakout itself). Which would put the German claims at "overstated by 25-50%", and the ratio of AFV losses between the two sides (Allied vs. German) at 1.1-1.3 favor the Germans. The discrepancy between the Allied losses and the overstated German claims may reflect Allied tank recoveries. That is, more battlefield KOs than total write offs, because of more recoveries than write offs due to breakdowns alone. Or it may partially reflect that, and partially duplicate "overkill" claims for the same dead AFVs.

Good issues, all.

[JPS]

Very interesting analysis - bump!

[Redwolf]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the idea that the armor divisions were doing things "any infantry division could have done", I hardly think so. Infantry divisions would not have stopped the Brits on the 13th - that took Tigers. Infantry would not have stopped Epsom - that took nearly 500 medium tanks. Infantry alone would not have stopped Charnwood or Goodwood - both required hundreds of German tanks to halt. It was in the serious attacks that most of the German tanks were lost - or in the failed counterattack attempts.

The Brits were not sitting on their duffs in "static" fighting (whatever that means - the front moved, though slowly, the whole time). They were launching powerful offensives every ten days, which often lasted several days. And the Germans did keep reserves and shift their armor despite this. 2 Pz had a frontage assigned in the American sector, but could still lend its Panther battalion to stop Epsom. Lehr switched from the British sector to the US one to deliver a (failed) counterattack. 116th Pz was in reserve the entire time until the breakout itself, and was run over trying to stop it (along with 2 StuG brigades). The KGs lent for the Mortain attempt - assembled in just a few days - came from all along the front, including the British sector. This flexibility is what you would expect from most of the tanks being in back deployments (on the MLR or in lagger) in sectors not under immediate attack.

<hr></blockquote>

This isn't really contrary to what I said. I was speaking about the panzer divisions in front of the British. The units you quote were in the Western area, except for Lehr which had changing roles and deployments.

I don't doubt that it took the tanks of these divisions to halt the British advance. However they were committed out of the frontline and they couldn't have been committed anywhere else. Did they stay in doctrinal distance (whatever that is) behind infantry defenders, they would have had more freedom, would have faced an opponent already weakend(*) and they wouldn't have had the small continuous losses as a result of direct frontline duty in "lull" (which is to a large part probing). This is what the commanders of these divisions complained about.

(*)In the usual case the attacking formations would have had too few infantry after the first defense line (as you pointed out in so many threads), in this case it is irrelevant since the British already started the offensive with an extreme tank/infantry rate.

[ 01-13-2002: Message edited by: redwolf ]</p>