Charlie Rock

US Army companies 1st bn able baker charlie dog (heavy weapons) 2nd bn easy fox george how (HW) 3rd bn Item King I think Lima Mike There is no Company J--it looks like an I and on the radio sounds like a K Nowadays the US Army dropped the whole idea and uses Alpha Bravo Charlie Delta While the USMC still uses the whole alphabet in their regiments

Aha. I stand corrected. Thx.

IIRC the German fallschirmjager today wear a green beret. They didn't in WWII. I think the beret has a badge on it which is similar to the metal fallschirmjager qualification badge of WWII, but minus the swastika. I think that there are acouple of other German formations that wear the green beret today---not positive. So technically they do now but didnt then

I think the original powder was the one that worked fine, and the IMR was the bad stuff. I surfed around and found a site that claimed there was a third version of the FG42 which would have been heavier and held up to the recoil better. I guess if only 7,000 were made of the first two variants then it might be safer to say the weapon was analogous to the P51, pre Rolls Royce engine or the Panther A with the kinks in the fuel lines. If it had reached STG44 numbers it might have ended up radically different looking. The war ended before the bugs came out. As was it tapped out at about 10-11 lbs. Which would explain that it shot semiautomatic OK, like a KAR98k or garand, but would have kicked all over the place vice a bren or BAR, which weighed twice as much to shoot the same round, moreor less. The later version of the M16 had a chromed chamber that helped, also. I think that the initial bullet spun very, very fast and was devastating when it tumbled. There was some absurd ruling that it was unstable at arctic like temps, so they changed the powder. I could be off. There is one design issue with the M16, though. Just about every gas operated weapon in the world (Garands, carbies, brens, FG42, BARS, M14s, STG44s, AKs, FNs, M60s , M240s, etc.) use what is called an operating rod. The gas from the bullet goes through a small hole near the end of the barrel, and pushes backward on the end of a rod. The rod is connected to the bolt and pulls the bolt backwards. For some peculiar reason M16s don't have operating rods. I don't know why. The gas goes back down a tube and pushes against a large piece of metal called the bolt carrier that wraps around the bolt. The problem is when the gas cools the powder collects in the chamber and all over the bolt and firing pin and parts rather then the tip of the rod. IIRC the jams with the early M16 required soldiers to carry cleaning rods taped to the side of the weapon. Which means the crud and powder probably caused the cartridge case to stick in the chamber. But I think you're right, it was the powder that did it, for the most part. There is talk that this new M8 rifle, built by H&K, will have an operating rod. That would be better.

What regularly works for me 80% of the time is the dismounted infantry assault with the tanks bounding along 100-200m to the rear. Tactically that is successful most of the time for me and if it doesent work its often due to bad execution and my own mistakes. Descent tactics for me are special situations, only--here are a few: I would recomend descent tactics if you are weak on halftracks or if the enemy has lots of light ATGs or ATRs so that following your tanks with halftracks is impractical. I have a mental image of a Kursk type of central front action with big maps and open sectors of fire and an OBJ a couple thousand meters down the road. You cant really follow the tanks with halftracks or they'll die, and you are compounding the problem by keeping the halftracks back (say 300-500m) so that they'll stay alive. Wastes time. The other problem is that when the grunts dismount they take a few turns to get up to the tanks. By the time you figure its dismount time if your tanks are getting harrassed by satchel charge teams it gets quite aggravating. As a minimum maybe a descent engineer squad in the trail tank of every platoon--I hate it when I'm in a minefield and the sapper is broken because his SPW is on fire 500 meters back. That's a bad day. HMGs and flamethrowers as a rule, usually. I fought a silly scenario lately where I dismounted a flamethrower off a sherman and had him run off to get shot. The MK IV shot my descent flamethrower and the sherm shot the Mark IV. Sort of like a flare dispenser on an airplane--launched a decoy Another reason I like descent tactics would be if you have a long, narrow sector map and the bad guys have mucho artillery. Your infantry move out and get hit by FA and are pinned. Tanks cant advance because there are bad guys in trenches with satchels and so forth. FOs are hidden so its hard to suppress them. Best to put the infantry on the tank and drive like hell. I would still look for a covered and concealed position--backside of a small hill or depression-- and dismount your troops, shake them out into a linear screen of formation--and attack out of that. Dont run over the bad guys like a herd of buffalo, though. Descent tactics also may work if depending on your scenario you need to try to get a jump on the bad guys in a time relationship. Like an ME, or a scenario where you think there will be enemy reserves and you want to secure a nice hull down position before the visiting team show up. Also, shortish scenarios with snow. Your grenadiers are nice and rested for a good day's work on the OBJ. Come to think of it, that's my favorite. I scout with fewer troops and pack the riders onto tanks when there's snow and I want my dismounts to still assault and advance with pep in their step.

"The German army entered WW II with a total number of 2,769,534 Kar 98k. Another 7,540,059 were delivered to the army 925,984 were delivered to the Luftwaffe, 191,250 to the navy and 62,600 to the SS (the SS received another 235,000 rifles, mainly Mauser-types, from their own production) G 41: 122,907 were made well into 1944 7,000 FG 42 of all variants MP 43 and MP 44 / Sturmgewehr was 425,977 MP 38 and MP 40 combined was 908,317."

Emar-- Sorry if I was rude on my reply. Did not intend to come across as a flamer. My apologies for that. As for the rest of this thread: The bolt and operating rod assembly for the M-60 was copied directly from the FG42. If you look at field stripped models of both they look the same. Placing the buttstock in line with the bolt reduces climb--it was not a characteristic of the M1 or BAR, but was a characteristic of the FG42, MG42, MG34, STG 44. And all current US weapons. It is a good idea. No, all weapons are not flawed. All weapons have short comings, strengths, and weaknesses. If a weapon like the BAR is heavy, that is not a flaw. If a weapon has shortcomings so severe it prevents it from serving as it was designed to, then it has a flaw. The M16 in 1965 jammed so much it could be characterized this way. The M1 rifle had an odd magazine concept but that did not prevent it from doing what it was built for. The MG-34 was finely tuned and tough to maintain and keep clean but these facts did not keep it from performing as designed. If you design a weapon that is supposed to be selective fire but the bullet selection and weapon size are such a severe combination that auto fire is impractical, then it is not selective fire and you spent a lot of effort toward something that it cant do. You could argue this was true of the M14, if you like. In the case of the FG42, a semiauto rifle existed as an alternative--the GW41/43. Since at the end of the day this did little more then that then it was an odd choice in a firearm. The German industry produced a lot of creative ideas that helped the post war US R&D community--didnt help the Germans win the war. A lot of last minute creative producing wonder weapons in small lots-STGs, V2s, Type XXI subs, ME262s, etc. The johnson was actually a pretty good weapon-was it so good that retooilng the factories to build the Johnson offset the 3-4 months the factories were down? To wit, are 40000 Johnsons in 1942 better then 70000 M1s and BARs? These are the sorts of questions you ask when running a war. The GW41/43 was a more or less copy of the Garand. At some point someone- don't know who - said let's bite the bullet and copy the M1 the Americans use and dump the Kar98k. SO it was not so much the Germans decided not to use a semiauto rifle, they more accurately decided not to, then changed their minds. Since the M1 was built in 1936 it would have done the Germans well to have thought of this in 1940, say. That would not have seen a really inspire choice but was afar-reaching one. A squad with 9 M1 equivalents, an MP40, and an MG34 would have been quite the uber landser squad in 1941. While the STG44 was a creative leap that few designers made, the GW41/43 was a derivative copy, albeit a solid one-of the M1- it seems odd to me to field a 1200 rpm squad LMG and complain about ammo expenditure by riflemen. The basic load for an American rifleman vice a German probably were pretty close--I think about 80 rounds. That is true of many armies and many weapons. Cant focus on everything as a priority. The Panther, for example, came off the drawing board relatively quickly. Sharfschutze--thanks for the charming story. I have been to Iraq and will go back in a few months. You're not even remotely funny.

The weapon was flawed. It had a flaw. In this case it had "A big flaw". The big flaw made this a nasty weapon to work with, and its contempraries were better. In any military that had rational resource allocation--as opposed to a politically powerful little bloc that does its own thing--this weapon would not have got off the ground. It had lots of neat little accessories and aftermarket add ons: Rakish pistol grip? check. Side mounted magazine?OK. You can shoot it two inches lower to the ground--lefties have a harder time reloading it though. Optical sight? Bona fide good idea. Also seen on the G41/43, and some variants of the STG44. Bipod. Good idea if you are on the defense late in the war. A trained shooter doesent need one, but, OK. Now. Physics time. There were a multitude of submachineguns firing pistol ammunition that were made for relatively light weight. Good firepower up to 100 meters. You get what you pay for, but its a simple tactical issue. If you wanted a full power 7.92mm battle rifle, the G41/43 had a smaller 10 round magazine and was heavily influenced by the M1 garand. Harder to reload but manageable. Had a scope. Just as good on semi. If you wanted a selective fire weapon, pick the STG44. 2/3 the bullet mass., and generally speaking, the kinetic energy. Automatic fire and good accuracy and stopping power out to 300 meters. If you wanted selective fire with a full power cartridge start on the low end with a BAR or preferably the Bren. The FG42 is too short. The unburned powder that did not completely burn up in the short barrel burned up AFTER the bullet had left the barrel. The light weight of the weapon meant on full auto it was inaccurate. This is not a minor argument. If the FG42 was effective then you must explain to me why the Bren and BAR were so much heavier to do the same thing. EIther one is too heavy or the other was too light. The fired the same bullet on selctive fire, off a bipod. Your choice. So. The blast and flash resulted in significant spotting problems. These weapons were easy to spot and see--look at JasonC tactics articles for the tactical present you give an attacker when the defender is 'spotted' vice 'sound contact'. Oh yeah, at night you will go blind when the flash goes off in your face. Also, because it was so light, it was hard to control on auto. Too much recoil. SO you shot it on semi only if you wanted to hit people as opposed to scare them. So if you really really want the automatic capability go with a STG 44 or MG42. Or copy the bren. If you can live without it and want semiauto only go with the G41/43--keep the scope and live longer as the propellent burns up completely in the longer barrel. It was reliable? As opposed to what? The unreliable STG44? The unreliable G41/43? It would reliably get you killed beacuse it reliably gives your position away. It has been said before--to fix this weapon you would have to adopt the STG44 kurz cartridge--then you would have a STG44 with 10 less rounds, a scope, and bipod. Why duplicate the effort? The US started to replicate this with a side mounted magazine fed auto rifle--called the Johnson. Then they decided they were duplicating the effort and got rid of it. Net value added was not worth the industrial sideshow that resulted. Part of the problem was that the fallschirmjager had an inflexible attitude toward lower power cartridges, as a result of bad experiences getting sniped by New Zealanders at Crete. The idea of getting sniped and outranged did not appeal to them. But buying a little fullauto rifle with an overpowered cartridge is like a 2 inch saturday night special with a 44 magnum round. It sounds good on paper. has a few drawbacks. That's the legacy of this weapon. Looked good on paper.

Go to Amazon.com and click on the button for "search inside this book" then "browse back cover" for German Automatic Weapons of World War II by Robert Bruce There is an image there that illustrates nicely the significant flash of shooting the 7.92 cartridge out of the shortened barrel. ]http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/1861262698/ref=sib_rdr_zmin/102-4815803-3211302?p=S03V&j=1#reader-page

The FG42 was a fundamentally flawed battle rifle and was a step backward. What the pictures dont show you is how short the weapon was. The Germans tried to overrule the laws of physics and hold onto the full power cartridge. The recoil, muzzle blast, and muzzle flash was significant, and on automatic fire it was much harder then the M14 or FAL (which were impractical in their own right unless in semiauto) The lightest automatic weapons that could accurately be fired with full .30 /7.62 ammo successfully were the BAR and Bren, at slightly under 20 lbs. If you fire an M14 offhand on auto the 3rd round will be about 20 degres up into the sky, unless you are a bodybuilder. It is sheer physics. Among selective fire gas weapons, Bren (1934ish)and BAR (1918) were successful, but heavy M1 carbine(1940) in the M2 version qualifies, but only because the cartridge was anemic. Low recoil and low stopping power FG42 (1942) was too small to absorb the recoil successfully. STG44 (1944) successful because it used a cartridge with about 30-40% less muzzle energy then auto rifles.

Flamingknives--thank you. Here it is: SLA MArshall, 1950-51 THE MAINSTAY Under the conditions of the average infantry fight in Korea, the BAR, even more than the machine gun, provides the fire base around which the action of other infantry weapons builds up and the force expresses itself unitedly. It is not alone the case that analysis of company operations warrants this appre- ciation of the weapon; the men also make this estimate of its effectiveness; they state frankly that it is the mainspring of their action, and that wherever the BAR moves and fires, it gives fresh impulse to the rifle line. Appreciation of the BAR within Eighth Army therefore reaffirms experience with the same weapon in World War II operations both in the Pacific and in Europe. What makes this reaction all the more noteworthy is that there has been a markedly higher incidence of failure by the BAR in Korean operations than in World War II fighting, for reasons which will be explained later. Even so, there is no diminishing of general infantry confidence in the effectiveness of the automatic rifle. It is still considered “indispensable” and troops shudder at any suggestion that it might ultimately be replaced by some other weapon. They cannot imagine having to get along without it. The reason that the BAR is rated as the mainstay of the fire base is because of the greatly modifying influence of the Korean terrain upon the utility of the machine gun. The CCF are good machine gunners; they are more expert in their employment of this weapon than in all else; they are persistent; their guns are of every type under the sun; even so, they have the knack of keeping them going; in the attack, they bring the gun in very close; but they are good at concealment behind brush, thicket, and rock ledge, and therefore the close-in target remains very elusive. The record contains many examples of CCF machine guns bearing on our positions at 30-40 yards range and continuing unseen. To counter this fire with one of our own machine guns usually necessitates bringing it far forward, with consequent sudden death, either in transit or soon after placement. Our MG crews are far more obvious in moving and in setting up. The BAR, which is a lesser target and usually has as its operator an individual who combines boldness with a requisite stealth, is therefore the main counteragent. BAR fire is also the chief depressant of sniper fire delivered from ranges which are too close in for the mortars and too far out for the grenade. One man with a BAR, if he is the right man, will have a stronger neutralizing effect upon a local sniper-infested area than the’ random fire of five or six riflemen. Almost invariably, BAR men are exemplary in their conservation of ammunition. They do not have nervous fingers; they sustain fire only when the situation truly demands it. Why this is so is something of a mystery; it is recorded here as fact because the BAR record in Korea is one of consistently strong performance by the operators. On defense, the machine gun will usually be sited to cover a draw, the gentlest hill facing, or some other avenue of approach which seems particularly favorable to the enemy purpose. Because, as the attack develops, the threat from that quarter will continue more or less constant, even though the enemy does not initially take advantage of it, the employment of the machine gun is more or less rigid. But under attack, the defensive dispositions seldom remain static; the lines contract and expand as the pressure changes; men and weapons are shifted as an excess of danger threatens from a new point. The BAR is the pivotal weapon in this eddying of the tactical situation. Should the rifle line begin to bend at one point, the BARS are sent there to stabilize it. If the machine gun, stopping the enemy frontally, is threatened by flankers circling toward it over dead ground, BAR fire is used to cover the corners and save the gun. During the mop-up, it is the main weapon for neutralizing foxholes; when, on defense, strong out-posting is required, the BAR is also given that assignment. EFFECT OF RECONDITIONING Concerning the new BAR, fresh from the factory, there is no problem. Practically without exception, this weapon has met with full success every test which the inclement weather of Korea and the dust and grime of the countryside have imposed upon it. The record is unmarred by any major entry of cold-weather failures. When, during the November battle, it became evident that locking and misfires in the BAR were occurring at such a rate as to raise the question as to what had gone wrong with the weapon, the circumstances were investigated. Particularly in one battalion - the 2nd of the 38th Infantry Regiment - there had been so many failures by the BAR in the fighting along the Chongchon River and near Kunu-ri that the commander and his men all said that it no longer had their confidence. (No other unit held to this extreme view, though others had experienced some BAR failures.) Much of the trouble seemed to be centered in a weakness in the recoil spring, though because of complications due to seeming frost-lock it was not always possible to determine theseat of the difficulty. The check-up revealed that almost without exception, the BARS which had gone out of action were old weapons, reconditioned by Ordnance in Japan. The old springs, it was reported, had been cleaned but not replaced. Also, according to staff information supplied from Tokyo, the inspection system (native Japanese) during the initial phase of the weapons-reconditioning program had been technically inadequate and generally weak, with the probable consequence that some of the rebuilt weapons had not been adequately tested. In the circumstances, it was impossible to determine whether the 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry (a remarkably staunch fighting unit and one of the few that spoke favorably of the carbine) had chanced to receive a disproportionate number of reconditioned weapons, and that this accounted for its bad experience. Very few of its BARS had survived the battle and the retreat through the fire gantlet south of Kunu-ri, though the men remembered quite well when and where the BARS had failed them. Also, the ordnance records had been lost. So there was no way of checking through on this significant detail. Elsewhere, though the record was occasionally spotty, the rate of failure was not such that the troops felt any real distress because of it or tended to sell the BAR short. However, the spot check revealed that almost invariably where the weapon had failed, it was a reconditioned BAR. As troops got further along into the cold weather campaigning, there were fewer and fewer complaints of this character. On the whole, therefore, the BAR in Korea merits a clean bill. Under conditions of even greater difficulty, the prestige of the weapon is not less than during World War II, and its tactical employment is more greatly varied. AUGMENTATION In the view of the great majority of infantry troops and commanders in Korea, the fighting strength of the infantry company would be greatly increased by doubling the number of BARS, while reducing the number of Ml carriers proportionately. This could be done without adding an upsetting burden to the company load. The final argument for the change is that it would make more perfect the balancing of offensive-defensive strength within the infantry company. [ December 12, 2003, 10:56 AM: Message edited by: Charlie Rock ]

I don't have my copy around, but one of the best references on the subject came from Infantry Weapons and Usage by SLA Marshall, written about the Korean campaign. A couple of advantages that are not immediately self-evident is that at squad level one of the more experienced /reliable soldiers would be assigned the BAR. BARS tended to get in the fight more often--recall that Marshall was aproponent of the theory that 80% of riflemen don't shoot in combat, etc. If you had one or two BARs in your squad it became important as to who was manning them. In a static position or rapid moving action it was fairly simple to maneuver the BARs within the squad formation; they tended to be employed more frequently in small unit actions then the average riflemen. While you shouldn't get your tactics from Hollywood, the bit in Saving Private Ryan when the BAR gunner sprints up to a roof top to shoot up a flak piece is a good advantage of this--the mobility of a one man weapon was seen as a big advantage in fluid situations. Another characteristic of Brens and BARS is that they were often fired in (gasp) semiautomatic; even on low rate of fire the M1918A2 could be fired on semi. Unlike the MG42, you could fire a bren or BAR on semi or tap it off on low rate and the Germans could not locate it among the lee- enfields or M1s, as the case may be. The theory went that once you fired aimed shots, area fire style, at the machine gun and pinned those guys then maneuvering was relatively easy. Unless you had good reason to BAR gunners knew that if you fired a burst you could be mistaken for an M1919 and be treated accordingly. If you have 240 rounds in a bandolier you could shoot off your ammo in a couple of minutes, in a pinch. Te heavy weapon with bipod could suppress quite well on rapid semi, and I suspect you lived longer if you did that. In English's On Infantry there was a piece somewhere that the Germans tended to phase out some of their MG42's in a few predominantly MP44 equipped squads and platoons, late war. If mobility is the goal the idea of rifle-equipped infantry relying less on their LMGs is not a US-specific concept.

I am not referring to camouflage clothing or paint. The Germans were better at noise and light discipline in daylight, use of foliage attached to tanks, remaining stationary in daylight, and use of terrain, examples include reverse slope defenses to stay hidden. Fieldcraft: INTERVIEWER: Were there things that the Germans did during these particular operations that you haven’t mentioned already that stuck with you? Are there some things they did that led you to adopt some of your philosophies on defense? GEN DEPUY: I was impressed with several things. First, I was impressed with the positions that the German infantry soldiers constructed. I was impressed with the skill and the care that they took in finding positions which had cover and natural concealment. They were almost impossible to see and yet, they afforded fields of fires exactly where they needed them in order to stop us. In other words, their fieldcraft was super... This is not because of training or imparted skills from the Russkis, it's because the side without the air superiority learned how to hide and the side with the planes didnt because they didnt have to. If you slap branches on a tank turret the paint scheme beneath doesent matter all that much, IMHO

The Germans were far better at camouflage then the Western allies. For that matter everyone the Allies have faced in the last 60 years, in general, have been better at camouflage then them. I dont think it has that much to do with the Soviets. Air power and a responsive, flexible indirect fire system meant if you could be seen you could be shot at. There was a story about this somewhere ( I forget, sorry) about some of the Western front generals having to explain to veterans from the East that open tank attacks against jabos would not work. I am thinking either of 2SS near Falaise or 12th SS early in June. Point being that the foliage covered panzer was an airpower created product. Some great pictures of this in Paul Carell's "They're coming." At the individual fighting position level--perhaps learned from the Russians.

Another point to be made re: the BAR is that the M1918 variant, ehich fired single shot and fully automatic, was later replaced by the 1M1918A2, hich fired a slow rate of 400 ish RPM and a high rate that was more around 600. Approx numbers. At slow late it was not too hard to control. In the Pacific it was a very popular patrol weapon; it was a one man weapon that combined controllable automatic fire with more penetration then 45ACP or 9mm SMGs when fired through jungle underbrush and the like. The fire team concept devised by Carlson's raiders, later the USMC, and the US Army in 1945 revolved around a 4 man element with one BAR and a mix of M1s, SMGs, and carbines. So in that sense it is more of the historical predecessor for the SAW then an LMG. Favors less well when compared to the MG42--different weapon for a different concept. On another subject, the thompson M1928 had a 50 rd drum which was phased out because it was noisy--the MG34 or 42 came with a 50 round drum or a belt. My point being that if noise discipline, like a night patrol, was the order of business a bren or BAR might have been more useful. So for mobile types of squad patrolling the BAR wasnt poor ly deisgned; it was a well desgigned weapon for a type of tactical situation that probably wasnt that important. It was a function of a mobility-oriented doctrine and a great deal of thought went into keeping the weight down, as JasonC said previously. Remember it came out in 1918, the MG34 16 years later. Some contemporary accounts (one book of note was written in 1940 by the inventor of the Johnson automatic rifle) relay that US authorities thought their concept of BAR and M1 was better then MG34+Kar98k. They had a few years to look at it and decide whether they liked it or not. The BAR followed the concept. In modern terms, the USA has decided to split the difference. They kept the BAR in the form of the fire team SAW and added the MG42 role at platoon level in the form of the M240--two pler platoon.