using AA as anti personel

[JohnR]

It seems to me that using large amounts of AA deployed as anti personel is unrealistic and gamey. What does everyone else think? I did searches on this topic and my other post but I came up with nothing.

thanks

[Gyrene]

AA vs Troops was common in WWII, but in small quantities.

Some players pick huge amounts of AA in QB's and that is gamey.

Gyrene

[Mr. Johnson--]

Some folks think that in your average QB with 1250 points or so, you shouldn't have more than 2 or 3 AAA guns.

But if you want to model an ad hoc defensive force than more AAA units might show up. But BTS did provide some interesting heavy weapon companys which have 6 20mm guns in them. 3 20mm and one 88mm would be one battery in a Flak regiment.

[Louie the Toad]

It depends on the scenario. If your troops are attacking an enemy airfield expect a lot of AAA to be aimed at you.

OTOH on a meeting engagement you should not expect to face any.

Situational Toad

[Gen-x87H]

Deal with it!

Gen

[Michael Dorosh]

Depends how big your battlefield is too. At Walcheren Causeway (a scenario regarding which is on my CANUCK website, below), one 88mm gun and several 20mm guns were employed by the Germans as anti-personnel weapons, with deadly effect. I haven't been able to pin down how many 20mm guns were present in the actual battle, but the map I've done the scenario on, which is to scale, has a 1600 metre long causeway, so the concentration of a few 20mm guns and an 88 isn't as unrealistic as it would be on say an 800 x 800 map.

[ 01-26-2002: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]</p>

[Thermopylae]

The fact that a 20mm AA gun is QB cheaper than an HMG may contribute to the "gamey" deployment of them at times.

[Silvio Manuel]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Thermopylae:

The fact that a 20mm AA gun is QB cheaper than an HMG may contribute to the "gamey" deployment of them at times.<hr></blockquote>

I agree with that in terms of AAA firing against stationary targets, but my 20mm AA guns suck vs. moving targets- the blast is too low. I mostly use them as a Greyhound/Hellcat-be-gone asset, not as a substitute for an actual MG.

37 & 40mm, and 88+ mm AA cannons (grins evilly)...well now yer talkin'.

[ 01-26-2002: Message edited by: Silvio Manuel ]</p>

[Louie the Toad]

Silvio,

Doesn't it seem odd that an anti aircraft gun

(20 mm) has trouble hitting moving ground targets?

Do you think it is modeled correctly. I have little experience with it.

Wondering Toad

[Charlie Rock]

I think it's extremely gamey.

While the Americans can be forgiven for using quad .50s occaisionally (which they can't have), German AA were more than challenged taking care of the US airpower. It would have made more sense and been more economical to use them to protect tank concemtrations, FA units, etc. then park them in the front line to repel infantry. I understand the 88mm role, but if you lose your 20mm and 37mm you have no airpower support, and you'll lose all your supporting arms even faster.

[Tanaka]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Charlie Rock:

I think it's extremely gamey.

While the Americans can be forgiven for using quad .50s occaisionally (which they can't have), German AA were more than challenged taking care of the US airpower. It would have made more sense and been more economical to use them to protect tank concemtrations, FA units, etc. then park them in the front line to repel infantry. I understand the 88mm role, but if you lose your 20mm and 37mm you have no airpower support, and you'll lose all your supporting arms even faster.<hr></blockquote>

Go here, read some OB... http://w1.183.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/index.html

...then come back and comment your post

[Silvio Manuel]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Louie the Toad:

Silvio,

Doesn't it seem odd that an anti aircraft gun

(20 mm) has trouble hitting moving ground targets?

Do you think it is modeled correctly. I have little experience with it.

Wondering Toad<hr></blockquote>

Apparently this is due to the fact that when firing HE, the firing unit doesn't track the targets movement, as it does w/ AP and MG fire. In my experience, 20mm FlaK is good vs. a stationary firebase-type target, i.e. an MG in a building, and somewhat disappointing when you want it to cut down a squad running in the open.

[Mr. Johnson--]

I've always thought of the 20mm to 40mm guns as HMGs on PCP.

[Silvio Manuel]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mr. Johnson--:

I've always thought of the 20mm to 40mm guns as HMGs on PCP.<hr></blockquote>

Those 37's and 40's must be on meth, vivarin, and crack, too. Lethal, absolutely lethal.

[Charlie Rock]

Tanaka,

Okay, I read your link. In fact,here is a quote from it:

However, it must be made clear that it was usually not necessary to inflict losses to affect ground operations. An air attack almost invariably caused ground units to take cover. Air attacks on German artillery, even if not causing losses, could very well mean that German infantry was left without valuable artillery support at critical moments. Also, even if allied air units did not cause significant tank losses at Mortain, the air attacks caused German tanks to take cover rather than continue thrusting forward.

That's a good example of my point.

From a logical standpoint:

1. Both sides had air power.

2. Operations in and around Berlin, the Ruhr, etc. severely attritted the Luftwaffe to the point that it was severely overmatched against the USAAF and RAF in France.

3. The only counter to the Allied airpower was Flak. The Luftwaffe never achieved parity, other than a suicidal air offensive on 1 Jan 45 (I belive called Bodenplatte)

4. German units had what we would today refer to as high-payoff targets, such as headquarters, FA batteries, logistic bases, resupply convoys, etc. uncovered by friendly air. The ONLY way to defend them besides really good camouflage was AA weapons.

Question:

How did the Germans employ their AA assets?

a. In the front lines firing up half tracks, humbers, stuarts, and other lightly armored gear.

b. As anti aircraft guns.

In fact, I could argue that the reason in your link that the allies were unsuccessful in knocking out tanks is because tanks were well protected by AA defenses.

If your argument is :

1. Aircraft were poor tank killers in Normandy.

2. The wehrnacht, realizing 1., didn't bother defending their tanks with AA weapons, because they didn't need to.

3. It is realistic and ungamey to employ 20mms and 37mms in the front lines against ground targets.

Than I disagree.

The primary purpose of antiaircraft guns is antiaircraft. Doubly so if you have no aircraft of your own.

Patton, as a matter of fact, disbanded AA battalions on occaision and sent their soldiers in as infantry replacements.

Armies usually prefer to employ weapons the way they were designed, unless they have a reason not to. The Americans had a reason not to, the Germans didn't have that same reason.

[Tanaka]

Charlie Rock,

In those options, I would go for argument 3... let me elaborate.

Yes, light flack elements were used on the front line and notice I’m excluding the 88mm in this argument…

Due to the nature of the combat that the Germans were involved in Normandy and after it, mainly defensive/counteroffensive role, flack guns (20mm and 37mm) would be part of the defense line, and I’m not talking about 1 or 2 guns…

Lets take as an example the 21st Panzer Division, who around this time took part in combat around Caen, in its organization you can see that each Pz Grenadier Rgt would have more or less a light flak gun platoon attached (4 to 5 guns). I can assure you these guns were integrated part of the defense, and not guarding some HQ like in Hollywood movies, these are Rgt guns and not army (or any higher then Div HQ) guns, wish, if possible, would be deployed near strategic targets like bridges in order to prevent low level Jabo attack. The Germans knew very well what the 20mm/37mm flack guns were capable of doing to light armored and also infantry in static positions (like houses for instances), in order to confirm this, you only need to check the ammo made for these guns.

I don’t want (and it isn’t) to transform this post in a “exception make the rule” kind of post that players who like to mix airborne troops with tanks do (or any other kind of nationality mix). The argument of those people normally go somewhere near this line,” On the day X that airborne BN attacked with AFV support in that place”, so I can use this whenever I feel like it. My post intetion is not any where near that, this is not 1 or 2 examples, this was common practice… you can see this by any other Normandy divisions, like 346th Infantry Div for instances.

During this time (and now) the prime AA defense for AFVs would be its camouflage (vegetation), and not some sort of AA attack/defense… Ok, any AA will make de live difficult for the attacking plane, but if the AFV is not spotted from the sky (very easy), there will be no attack. Also remember that the Jabo attack on call, style 60’s 70’s, didn’t exist in considerable numbers on the 2nd WW.

Another different business, but not unconnected, that somehow shows this theory, is the high number of light armored vehicle based on the 20mm and 37 mm guns the Germans had and used in recon and fast support missions.

Notice that I’m not defending the “gamey” use of this or any other weapon, I’m just trying to state/demonstrate what the reality might have been… Any abnormal concentration of a specific asset would be sporadic and considered “gamey” if used regularly. For instance, if I play the game on a company level (1000 to 2000 pts), as in my opinion it should be played, you shouldn’t find more then 4/5 of this guns on defense side, any more and that can be considered “gamey”.

Also notice I’m not including in the argument the unarmored AA vehicles, wish are currently poorly model in CM… with those, it’s my advice, just don’t use them completely if possible.

To complete this already long post, sorry about that, I would state, that if you obey some elementary “friendly” QB conduct rules no problems should arise. In likes of… on advance role battles (attack/assault/probe/ME), for every gun you take, a vehicle capable of transport that same gun as to be bought (even if you don’t use it). (For defense obviously this is not needed).

[Thin Red Line]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Notice that I'm not defending the gamey use of this or any other weapon, I'm just trying to state/demonstrate what the reality might have been? Any abnormal concentration of a specific asset would be sporadic and considered ?gamey? if used regularly. For instance, if I play the game on a company level (1000 to 2000 pts), as in my opinion it should be played, you shouldn't find more then 4/5 of this guns on defense side, any more and that can be considered gamey.<hr></blockquote>

Tanaka,

I'm very interested by what you say, and I would like to hear your opinion : I'm currently playing a 800 pts deense PBEM as the english attacker light tree coverage, village, and my opponent bought 9 (nine) guns (I'm not sure if AA or infantry guns, probably a mix). The approach process is a nightmare ,I have destroyed half a dozen but now my tank are out and my infantry is slaughtered : is his strategy gamey or not? is this common use of support guns ?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Also notice I'm not including in the argument the unarmored AA vehicles, wish are currently poorly model in CM with those, it?s my advice, just don't use them completely if possible.<hr></blockquote>

Can you elaborate about poor modelling of those weapons ?

Thanks

[ 01-28-2002: Message edited by: Thin Red Line ]</p>

[Bastables]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Charlie Rock:

Tanaka,

Okay, I read your link. In fact,here is a quote from it:

However, it must be made clear that it was usually not necessary to inflict losses to affect ground operations. An air attack almost invariably caused ground units to take cover. Air attacks on German artillery, even if not causing losses, could very well mean that German infantry was left without valuable artillery support at critical moments. Also, even if allied air units did not cause significant tank losses at Mortain, the air attacks caused German tanks to take cover rather than continue thrusting forward.

That's a good example of my point.

From a logical standpoint:

1. Both sides had air power.

2. Operations in and around Berlin, the Ruhr, etc. severely attritted the Luftwaffe to the point that it was severely overmatched against the USAAF and RAF in France.

3. The only counter to the Allied airpower was Flak. The Luftwaffe never achieved parity, other than a suicidal air offensive on 1 Jan 45 (I belive called Bodenplatte)

4. German units had what we would today refer to as high-payoff targets, such as headquarters, FA batteries, logistic bases, resupply convoys, etc. uncovered by friendly air. The ONLY way to defend them besides really good camouflage was AA weapons.

Question:

How did the Germans employ their AA assets?

a. In the front lines firing up half tracks, humbers, stuarts, and other lightly armored gear.

b. As anti aircraft guns.

In fact, I could argue that the reason in your link that the allies were unsuccessful in knocking out tanks is because tanks were well protected by AA defenses.

If your argument is :

1. Aircraft were poor tank killers in Normandy.

2. The wehrnacht, realizing 1., didn't bother defending their tanks with AA weapons, because they didn't need to.

3. It is realistic and ungamey to employ 20mms and 37mms in the front lines against ground targets.

Than I disagree.

The primary purpose of antiaircraft guns is antiaircraft. Doubly so if you have no aircraft of your own.

Patton, as a matter of fact, disbanded AA battalions on occaision and sent their soldiers in as infantry replacements.

Armies usually prefer to employ weapons the way they were designed, unless they have a reason not to. The Americans had a reason not to, the Germans didn't have that same reason.<hr></blockquote>

German Tactics of Stuezpunkte or hedgehogs in North africa deployed FlaK of 8,8cm and 2cm in the Stuezpunkte to combat enemy tanks as SOP as early as the Commonwealth Operation Battleaxe May 1942. (Jentz 1997 "Tank Combat in North Africa", P155-165). Units in Normandy continued to use Regt FlaK (2cm) in the anti-tank and anti-infantry role.

If you had continued the search you would have come across information that would have led you to

german tactical maps with 2cm FlaK sited for front line work. Opening fire on errent aircraft that close to the front lines tends to be a red rag for arty.

[Bastables]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Thin Red Line:

Can you elaborate about poor modelling of those weapons ?

Thanks

[ 01-28-2002: Message edited by: Thin Red Line ]<hr></blockquote>

9 is far to much unless you're somehow attacking a FlaK regt position. But then with QB's such 'challanges' are to be expected

[ 01-28-2002: Message edited by: Bastables ]</p>

[Tanaka]

Thin Red Line,

On a 800 pts defense battle your opponent has the option of buying a Infantry Coy plus a gun Platoon ( I mean with this 4 to 5 guns) and an AFV wish is acceptable for a defense with this pts . If didn’t buy the AFV, he can somehow exchange it by another gun platoon (doing a total of 8 to 10 guns). He could do this rather inexpensively (its called not putting all eggs in the same basket) with 20mm flack guns, 75mm Inf Guns or yet the 88mm rocket (pp) … making a mix of 1x Coy infantry +2x Gun platoon, wish is a good fighting force for a non flexible and a bit AT oriented defense.

Now, you ask, weren’t 88mm rockets rare? Or, is this an abnormal gun concentration?

The answer to both these questions is probably yes, but from there to calling it ”gamey” is perhaps too much.

His defense had big defects (artillery/HE oriented attack would finish him) and if in advance you knew about them, or even during the battle, you would then, do much better… What he just did it was to surprise you, the element of surprise is ½ battle won… and many players after being surprised fill that somehow the other player was “above” the rules (using them in his favor). Then go and try X rule or Y rule, and each time some ones exits from this expected beaver, they try to make a new rule. For me these special rules only make the game tedious, as somehow it shortens the options to much…

With time, one basically learns to choose a combat force for a certain terrain type wish has the flexibility to endure combat against all kind of force mix and still have a chance of doing ok.

With CMBB, all this talk will be very different, because there will be the option of a point system based on a rarity rule, making the 88mm rocket or any other kind of rare gun not worthy of buying (It is just an example)

For a start I don’t refuse an adversary for a first game. I myself I’ve the personal rule of not doing to the others what I don’t like them to do to me.

So for instances, I don’t like force mix (army brunch and Nationality), don’t like recon by death (2” mortar/zook/lmg in front), don’t like people who use game limitations (like the soft vehicles problem)… Also, I don’t have nothing against any kind of armored vehicle, every one of them in CM has its draw back, ones with bigger and other with smaller ones, but no one is the ultimate super weapon.

Notice that I don’t tell my adversaries that I expected these…every one is entitled to be as he likes (this is only a game), but you can be sure that there are the ones I still talk after more then a year I had played with them.

Has I’ve more then 130 CM pbem/tcpip games played, I know how to see when I’m in front of a “newbie” or a “power gamer”… If it is a “newbie” I try to bring him to the “dark” side of the grognards unspoken rules (“what you shouldn’t do to your adversary in 10 lessons”), on the other hand if it is a power player I just say “thanks for the game” (read until never) and type is e-mail on a little note book I have on left side of my computer. On so many players of CM, it’s natural that some are incompatible…

If you are the historical player type or just like it play historical some times, try the CM-meta campaign at http://www.combatmission.com/ , it is very challenging and puts you doing your best with what you have available and not whatever force you chose to “buy”.

As for the game limitation regarding soft vehicles, try this topic http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=1&t=016215

..another long post, hmmm...I'm in "typing mode" today

[Marlow]

This doesn't go to the main topic of the thread, but since it was brought up ...

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Tanaka:

I don’t want (and it isn’t) to transform this post in a “exception make the rule” kind of post that players who like to mix airborne troops with tanks do (or any other kind of nationality mix). The argument of those people normally go somewhere near this line,” On the day X that airborne BN attacked with AFV support in that place”, so I can use this whenever I feel like it. <hr></blockquote>

A while ago, I posted the following thread: Paratroopers and Armor in regards to the general perception that U.S. Airborne combined with armor support is a gamey combination.

From that thread:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Marlow:

Based on what I have seen in the forum, many people consider the mixing of force types to be "gamey" (e.g. German mountain troops + Heer or American paratroopers + regular army). This philosophy has been incorporated into certain sets of "rules" or conventions designed to optimize "realistic" force selection. However, this rule has struck me as odd for two reasons.

First, from a playability point of view, it offers far greater choice to the Axis player who can choose a variety of different infantry types, and still have a good selection of armor from which to choose. Compare this with the allies who can either pick rifle squads and armor, or paratroops without armor support. Additionally, if playing combined arms, armored, or mechanized forces, the point allocation system virtually prohibits use of paratroopers as a sole force type.

Second, from a realism point of view, the mix of paratroopers and attached armor does not (based on my admittedly limited knowledge) fly in the face of what really happened. According to AIRBORNE TROOPS IN GROUND OPERATIONS at the Army's Center for Military History Website, armor was used in support of airbirne infantry in much the same way as it supported regular infantry.

"The one deficiency that definitely did affect operations was the lack of heavy antitank weapons. The 37-mm. and even the 57-mm. antitank gun were inadequate against the armor to be faced in 1944-45. But this affected the division's operations more in strictly airborne operations than it did in ground operations; for just as were regular infantry divisions, the airborne divisions were usually reinforced with tank and tank destroyer units after contact with ground troops was established."

Since American Airborne forces spent a considerable time in the line after airborne operations, often weeks or months longer than intended, it would appear that attachment of tanks and tank destroyers would be fairly common. The same document provides a list of units attached to airborne troops for all the major engagements. While the amount of armor support is not massive, it is far from insignificant or uncommon. At CM scale, armor support of a platoon of tanks per battalion of paratroopers would seem to be supported, particularly considering that any armor support would likely be concentrated where it was needed most. Note, I have omitted armored artillery from the list, as there is no way to determine if it provided direct or indirect fire support. I have also limited attached Commonwealth units to armor and antitank (when I can figure out what is what).

NORMANDY

Following their D Day parachute drops and glider landings on 6 June 1944, both the 82d and 101st Airborne Division remained in the line in Normandy for several weeks.

Attachments for the 82d during this period were as follows:

Troop B, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 1-23 June.

Co. C, 746th Tank Battalion, 1-11 June.

Co. A, 746th Tank Battalion, 13-21 June; 1-8 July.

Co. C, 899th TD Battalion, 1-19 June.

Co. A, 607th TD Battalion, 19 June-4 July.

801st TD Battalion, 30 June-1 July.

803d TD Battalion, 1-8 July.

The following were attached to the 101st Airborne Division for the periods indicated:

Co. D, 70th (L) Tank Battalion, 6-16 June.

Co. A, 70th (L) Tank Battalion, 7 June (date of termination unknown).

1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 17-26 June.

Also attached for some portion of the period were the …4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron; and the 1st Platoon, Co. B, 899th TD Battalion.

HOLLAND - OPERATION MARKET

Because of shortage of divisions and multiple responsibilities, the British 21 Army Group retained the 82d Airborne Division in the line for 57 days beyond D Day in Operation MARKET (until 13 November 1944) and the 101st Airborne Division for 71 days (until 27 November). For most of this time, the two divisions held defensive positions but were subjected to strong German counterattacks.

The following units were attached to the 82d Airborne Division for the periods indicated:

1st British Coldstream Guards Armored Battalion, 19-22 September.

2d Irish Guards Battalion, 16 September-23 October (2 sqdns. until 10 November).

Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, 19 September-10 October.

Royals Reconnaissance Battalion, 19 September-9 October.

3d British Guards Battalion, 30 September-1 October.

304th British Antitank Battery, 30 September-3 October.

2d Grenadier Guards Battalion, 6-7 October.

13/18 Hussars, 10 October-10 November.

Canadian 27th Armored Regiment, 10-12 November.

The following units were attached to the 101st Airborne Division:

British 44th Armored Regiment, 19-25 September.

13/18 Hussars, 18-22 October.

4/7 Dragoon Guards, 2-11 November.

British 53d Reconnaissance Regiment, 5-6 October, 13-19 October.

British Squadrons A & B, Royal Scots Greys, 6-7 October.

British 61st Reconnaissance Regiment, 6-12 October.

Squadron C, Royal Scots Greys, 6-17 October.

Squadron C, 61st Reconnaissance Regiment, 10-12 October.

British Sherwood Rangers, 22 October-2 November.

British 304th Antitank Battery, 12-13 October.

British 74th Antitank Battery, 9-13 November.

THE ARDENNES

When the Germans launched a major counteroffensive in the Ardennes on 16 December 1944, the only strategic reserve immediately available to Allied Supreme Headquarters was two U.S. airborne divisions, the 82d and 101st, both of which were located near Reims following relief from the 21 Army Group in Holland. On 17 December, both divisions were directed to move to the road center of Bastogne, though this was subsequently altered to send the 82d to the north shoulder of what became known as "the bulge" where it came under the XVIII Airborne Corps. The 101st at Bastogne was under the VIII Corps.

The bulk of the 82d Airborne Division reached the north shoulder in the vicinity of Werbomont early on 19 December. Here the division fought defensively until joining a major offensive of the First and Third Armies on 3 January. From 10 through 27 January the division was in corps reserve, though one of its regiments was from time to time attached to other attacking units. The division was relieved on 4 February, then from the 8th through the 12th assisted in an attack on the Roer River Dams.Attachments were as follows:

14th Tank Battalion, 9th Armored Division, 23-24 December.

703d TD Battalion, 20 December-1 January.

740th Tank Battalion, 29 December-11 January, 27 January-5 February.- 1 -

628th TD Battalion, 1-11 January.

643d TD Battalion, 25-31 January.

32d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 28 January-5 February.

629th TD Battalion, 31 January-18 February.

Co. B, 744th Tank Battalion, 9-19 February.

Two platoons, 893d TD Battalion, 9-11 February.

All the 101st Airborne Division had reached Bastogne by early morning of 19 December. Here the division would fight defensively through 1 January, engage in limited objective attacks on 2 January, and participate in the major offensive by First and Third Armies from 3 through 17 January. On the 18th the division moved out of the line for transfer to new positions in Alsace.

Attachments to the 101st were as follows:

2d Tank Battalion, 19-30 December.

Combat Command R, 9th Armored Division, 20-31 December.

Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, 20 December-18 January.

Combat Command B, 4th Armored Division, 8-10 January.

705th TD Battalion, 20 December-18 January.

Co. B, 811th TD Battalion, 3-11 January.

Co. C, 704th TD Battalion, 4-6 January.

Co. A, 602d TD Battalion, 4-6 January.

611th TD Battalion, 6-7 January.

Co. B, 704th TD Battalion, 9-11 January.

Co. C, 609th TD Battalion, 11-12 January.

The document also goes on to provide attachments to airborne forces in the Alsace, Operation Varsity, and later, but you get the picture. The point is that airborne troops spent a lot of time acting as regular strait leg infantry, and when they did, they had reasonable levels of armor support. This makes considerable sense, given that for the Americans, neither regular infantry or paratroopers had inherent armor support, and both had to rely on attached units.<hr></blockquote>

[Thin Red Line]

Tanaka,

First, thank you for the exhaustive answer, I appreciate very much.

I was looking for an external opinion, and yours makes sense. BTW, my problem is that I have not that much HE, (my AFV were Challengers and I picked up no arty). Well, at least I learned something from that QB.

The rarity system will be a great improvement indeed.

About the soft vehicules problem, in another PBEM I bought one of this 20mm AA german vehicules who behaved very nicely ; didn't about the game limitation, but I really like that quadruple gun sound !

[Tanaka]

Marlow,

As you know, Axis and Allies late in the war had 2 distinct policies regarding airborne troops. This was in part due to the role of each one, one offensive (allies) and the other defensive (Axis). (there was more into it for the axis part, remember Crete, no air superiority)

The intention behind the airborne assaults on both those operations, D-Day and Market Garden was for the airborne troops to secure strategic positions behind enemy lines that would make the enemy defeat faster and easier. The original idea was for them to be relived once the regular army catches up with them. The truce is that into a certain extent no plan survives contact (Rommel) and airborne troops often find them selves fighting beyond what was “programmed”.

Now, this is a meter of opinion, but I still don’t see evidence of common practice in airborne and armor AFV conjunct attacks (yes, in front of the army by land attacking and assaulting). At least on the link you provide, there are more examples of them fighting without AFVs (I see AFV attachments, but the large majority of them for defensive roles)

On the Ardennes another well known operation, the airborne units were couth in the middle of the fight and in defensive positions on zones were heavy enemy activity wasn’t expected.

For the Germans the all business is rather different, as the FJ had their own vehicles assigned to them, wish by the way is modeled in CM, players that want more AFV choice and somehow justify the Tigers, normally go to the Ardennes operation for source of “inspiration”… right when Hitler was hand picking the forces, mixing them, scraping the bottom of the barrel and destroying the German Army (wish he was doing for quite some time).

I’m doing another long post errrrrr… I will try to make it shorter.

The fact is that it does not meter if it was a less common practice or an uncommon one…The truce behind it is simple, players o "sherry peak" the best of each army branch are for sure trying to get that special advantage that would make them win the game “at all costs no meter what”. Taking, in my view, a little bit too far, the already “unreal” troop “buying” method… (we want CMBB…we have mature )

Notice I’m not losing sleep over this, for me this is a lesser offense, distant go the days where I was playing a QB, and “stupid” has I am I bought only inside the Heer… (as I still do, only one army branch)

So, just to finish will tell that story…

A strong Heer task force of motorized Pz grenadiers Coy (2 I think) with AFV support …the fight went on until after some small skirmish I found out my adversary was fighting with glider troops (USA airborne)… and I thought … well, glider troops are good at close and have no AFV (they just cant glider/parachute them) :cool: … So, what I did was:

1-Regularly opened fire at long distances (making use of those rifles)

2-Let my AFV move freely and without much care (only outside zook range) supporting and opening fire whenever needed.

Of course all of you know what will happen in the next turns… my “well intentioned” adversary “poped” up a few rifle 45 platoons with 3 AFV support… and my mouth went to the floor :eek: yes, I lost

PS- Every one does mistakes, when I started playing pbem … I was mean… GJ+AFV mix until some good hearted soul showed me the “light” and passed me to the dark side of the force (yes, dark…we all sow the star wars only because of the style of the guy, yes, the asthmatic one ).

[ 01-28-2002: Message edited by: Tanaka ]</p>

[Redwolf]

Antiaircraft systems are extremly effective weapons due to their high rate of fire and sophisticated targetting systems. But while that makes them effective, that is also what makes them inefficient: they are not very robust, especially not against dirt and HE fire. They need large crew spaces to feed all the ammo which makes them vulnerable. They deliver very high amount of projectiles to the targets, but they need a lot of ammo, actually too much ammo to be efficient on a cost/effect basis even while shooting, plus they are expensive to produce to start from.

Antiaircraft guns (and vehicles mounting them) are extremely popular with frontline soldiers. Besides WW2, this is especially apparent in Korea, to a lesser extend Vietnam and as late as the Russians in Grozny. Note that this usually means they get to direct fire only when the opponent is short of airplanes, as compared to i.e. the Battle of the Bulge where the Americans still had their AA units protecting non-frontline installations from the scare but alife Luftwaffe. In these conflicts you also see that the side using them has large amount of ammunition available.

For CMBO, it is the same issue as with other units. The player does not need to fight another day with the same units. In reality, a commander with that premise would use the AA units in frontline duty as well, but unless the US in Vietnam, that is not the usualy attitude.

The Tacops game teaches abuse of AA units much better. Loose your AA asserts and you are in deep trouble. Tacops also doesn't have the extreme hit probablity that CMBO applies to AA guns.

[mrcitizenkane]

The what if factor is always FUN to play but my not be historically correct! If you don't like them don't use them! Its always nice to have all the time period arms modeled for game play use!