Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk

[John Kettler]

Col. Glantz strikes again--online! This should be useful and informative to many.

Regards,

John Kettler

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz2/glantz2.asp

[ August 22, 2002, 05:15 AM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[ParaBellum]

Thx for the link, John.

OOBs, TOEs, maps and great description of the action.

Highly informative reading! Glantz' "The Battle of Kursk" is still one of my fauvorite WWII books.

If someone is interested in the Kursk operation I can only highly recommend it.

[Kilgore]

WoW!!

That link is a goldmine. I'd somehow missed that site. Thanks a million.

Here's just a sample of some of the articles available in addition to the one above....

Fighting the Russians in Winter by Dr. Allen F. Chew frightening stuff!!

Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II Chapter II by Major Timothy A. Wray German defensive doctrine (or the lack of it) during Barborossa.

Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II Chapter III by Major Timothy A. Wray Gives an overview of how the Germans adopted a defence based around strong points during the winter of '41-'42,(contains information right down to squad level). Could provide the basis for some interesting scenarios/operations.

Soviet Operational Deception: Operation Red Cloak by Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong Amazing details on the lengths the Soviets went to to gain operational surprise.

The 101st Airborne's defence of Bastogne by Colonel Ralph M. Mitchell

...and on a more general note they've also got the classic The Defence of Duffer's Drift

All that's just scratching the surface :eek:

It should keep people occupied until the demo at least

Thanks again...

[ August 22, 2002, 10:50 AM: Message edited by: Kilgore ]

[RobVarak]

WOW! Great stuff, fellas. Thanks.

[Commissar]

I believe this article was available as a download once before. Someone posted it and most had a hardtime downloading it. Anyway, thanks for the link.

[arax3]

All I can say to the BS about Soviet tactical brilliance, etc. is: Hoo Ray for Ultra, the greatest intelligence breakthrough in history IMHO (the humbleis for Dorosh.) Soviets had advanced tactical intelligence on the strength and timing of the Kursk offensive and were waiting for it in depth!! Lets suppose hypothetically that the Nazi had counter-intelligence of Red preparations and had launchced their offensive somewhere else with the same vigor. The Red lines would probably have evaporated into a full rout. Had Ultra/code breakers not been available - we might all be speaking German/Japense. :eek:

[Michael Dorosh]

Even if the Germans did acheive a localized breakthrough somewhere else with their unreliable Panthers and outnumbered Tigers and Pz IVs ...what difference would it have ultimately made? The Japanese would suddenly fought better in the Pacific, or the Atom Bomb would have been less successful?

Ultra was important, no doubt, but would WW II have really ended up any differently without it? Hard to believe so. I think the intelligence work the Americans did in the Pacific - especially before Midway - rivalled it in importance.

[ August 22, 2002, 12:22 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[bowman74]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

[QB]Col. Glantz strikes again--online! This should be useful and informative to many.

Regards,

John Kettler

My favorite Kursk site:

http://www.rose.cc.ok.us/faculty/mmorgan/johnson33/

Thanks,

Kevin

[bowman74]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

[QB]Col. Glantz strikes again--online! This should be useful and informative to many.

Regards,

John Kettler

My favorite Kursk site:

http://www.rose.cc.ok.us/faculty/mmorgan/johnson33/

Thanks,

Kevin

[JasonC]

There are quite a few illuminating aspects of the narrative if one actually follows it out, which bely the surface presentation Glantz is trying to give. He details two major fights, one in the secondary sector of the southern effort, and one in the north.

The secondary effort in the southern sector resulted in a clean breakthrough of the Russian defense. A full German corps of armor smashed the front line division in the first two days. The second line division held off part of that breakthrough with one regiment, but was overrun in the adjacent sector where another regiment failed. Each of those regiments facing a full German Panzer division. The less successful PD slid behind the successful one, and thus made it through the defense. Overall, 50 out of 300 AFVs committed were KOed getting through the first two lines of divisions, and a division and a half where shattered in response.

No problem, really. However, the Russians in the meantime sent no less than 4 fresh rifle divisions to the sector of the one second line division hit, along with 100 SUs and such, and an artillery group with rockets. The prepared defenses were through. But the attacking corps, which originally overran 1 RD and then faced a second and cut it in half, now faced 4 RDs on the same frontage. They therefore no longer had the local odds they started with. In armor, they went from 300 to 250, against near 0 rising to 100.

So the basic process on that part of the front was very simple. The Germans massed 3:1 infantry odds along with 300 to nothing armor odds and destroyed 1 1/2 divisions of infantry by using those odds. By then, however, the infantry odds fell to something like 2:3, while the armor odds shifted to 2.5 to 1, and probably more like 2:1 in runners. The Germans nevertheless halted the attacks in that area mostly because of developments elsewhere.

The most that could be said for the vaunted Russian depth defense system in that case is that it died slowly enough - meaning clean through the initial lines in 5 days - that reserves could slide over beyond the hole, provided such reserves were available. It is not exactly surprising that a sector where the Germans committed 27 infantry battalions and the Russians committed 54, held out.

The other example covered in detail is about the northern sector. It is meant to show the Russian defense system at its most successful. It is first off worthwhile to note that the most successful sector for the Germans - the main southern sector - is not covered by narrative at all, at that link anyway. The south sector explained above was the side show hooking off to the right, not the main drive northward.

And although it is not obvious from anything Glantz deigns to say explicitly, the sector he is talking about in the north is the left flank of the main German drive there, not the main drive itself. It is the 41st corps sector, where the Germans attacked with 1 Panzer divisions and 2 infantry divisions, it a holding attack meant to cover the flank of the main drive. The main drive hit only the left regiment of the 15 rifle division, of the units covered in that narrative. 3/4 of the frontage of the Russian corps that forms the basis of the narrative, was outside the main attack zone, only hit by the supporting attack.

That battle certainly mattered, because it allowed the right side of the main attack sector to remain integrated with the rest of the Russian line. It was one of the "shoulder" fights, in other words - from the Russian perspective, the right shoulder of the German hole-making attempt.

So, what happens up front when the vaunted defense system is hit, even by the subsidiary attack? Answer, the first line regiment positions get penetrated on the first day. Here the attackers are 2 German IDs and the tanks of a single Panzer division. The defenders are a full RD, with another regiment to their left not directly attacked, and a second line RD also not hit yet. There are also 100 AFVs in reserve with the 2nd line RD, which are committed against the subsidiary attack by the evening of the first day.

Notice first off that that means the holding attack performed its primary function - it drew the immediate defending armor reserves away from the point of main effort, which was in the 15 RD sector and to the left of that. The 100 Russian AFVs (23 KV, 16 SU-122, 48 T-34 to be more exact) were instead put in on the right of the 81 RD - 3 regiments over from the point of main effort, along the line. When they immediately went in, they faced only 50 German tanks - 2:1 armor for the defender in that sector. The front line RD still had to withdraw by the second day, probably because it was still facing 2:1 infantry odds, and along that whole frontages the armor odds were similar (1 German PD vs. the 100 Russian AFVs).

Then the Germans put in a second PD, hooking south from the point of main effort on the left of the 15 RD, whose attacked front line regiment had been overwhelmed on the first day. Its non-attacked front line regiment was then hit from two sides, including this fresh PD. It was naturally driven back in disorder.

Only at that point does the overall fight develop, with the secondary drive by 41 corps merging with the main effort German drive. This then falls on the 2nd line RD in the sector, and 307 RD. The remnants of the front line corps rally on this reserve division. But there is no question it would have been overwhelmed in turn, if not for the basic overall story of the overall defense - arriving reserves.

The narrative does not highlight them or aggregate them. You have to follow them almost as incidentals. But what happens is the 307 RD is back stopped by first one then 2 Guards airborne divisions, while 2 guards RDs pinch in from either flank. As a result, the front line corps is supported by 4 additional infantry type divisions, along the line of its own 2nd echelon RD. Meanwhile 9 smaller independent armor formations and 3 tank corps are sent to the area and try to counterattack, without success but doing enough to stabilize the front.

In the main fight area on the left of the 307 RD, the Russian supporting armor comprises 2 brigades of SUs, a regiment of KVs, 2 brigades of T-34s in succession. They are attacked by no more than 200 German tanks. The armor odds are no better than even, purely as a result of reinforcing action by reserves.

Meanwhile, the infantry odds, from original figures as high as 4:1 favor the Germans on the attack sectors, which along with the hundreds to nothing AFV odds enabled the initial break ins, drop as the supporting guards divisions enter the fight from both flanks and the rear. Ignoring the strength of the 15 and 81 RDs as largely destroyed while the odds were still high, there were over 45 battalions of Russian infantry sent to the sector after that. 9 were withdrawn as spent after the rest had all arrived. The German attackers were 2 IDs, 2 PDs, and 1 PGD, or 32 battalions.

Again the story is that the overall infantry odds engaged over the whole period in the sector narrated were 1 to 2, making it unsurprising the Germans did not get any further. They start high by attacker concentration and the Germans make progress easily. The destruction of each line takes a day or two and during that period AFVs are rushed to the sector, reducing the initial armor edge to parity in a matter of days. Enough infantry is sent to reduce the remaining infantry odds to parity or better, despite the loss of an infantry force almost as large as the attacking force in the first week, while the local odds were still unfavorable.

If you run through the narrative looking for the sorts of incidents Glantz seems to want you to find - attriting of the German armor by AT obstacles, AT gun belts, etc, supposedly wearing the Germans out - you find losses of 6-18 German AFVs in dozens of incidents, aggregating to something like 50 AFVs lost in each attacking corps every day or two. Russian AFV losses are conspicuously absent from the narrative, beyond occasional comments about one tank brigade being "depleted" by now, or vague comments like "while suffering heavily themselves".

There is no question that eventually German armor strength at Kursk was worned down, with the number of operational tanks reduced to a score per mobile division by the end of the operation. But this reduction seems to have mostly taken place in engagements against the Russian reserve armor.

Some was certainly lost in the mine belts, but not enough to make any PD combat ineffective. You find occasions of regimental positions fighting off one thrust of a PD for a day, and occasions of rear area artillery battalions accounting for a company worth of German tanks and blunting a local thrust. But all of these turn on local odds; they reflect the overall strength in a previous attack sector stabilizing. When it is attack concentration against the original Russian defense, that defense gets chopped up in short order.

The narrative focused on one fight in particular, in the sector of the 1019 RR of the 307 RD. But it is the sector "of that unit" in name only - meaning, to identify what part of the front is involved, as originally being its zone. The actual forces engaged there are not one rifle regiment with 1-3 battery sized AT gun nests. Instead we get 2 brigades of SUs (100), as many again T-34s, and 20 odd KVs - plus elements of 4 seperate rifle divisions. That sector is described as attacked by 100 tanks and 6 battalions of infantry at one point, and later a wider sector as attacked by 200 tanks and up to 24 battalions of infantry (actually, 2 IDs and 1 PGD).

Well, what a surprise. 4-12 45mm ATGs in little packets just cleverly laid out in depth did not actually wear down a full panzer corps. No, actually a giant battle between 3-4 infantry divisions per side with 200-250 AFVs supporting and hundreds of guns, with the odds practically even, resulted in mutual exhaustion. This just happened 4-7 days after the Germans destroyed most of the front line corps in the area with temporary local odds created by offensive concentration.

So sure, the defense in depth worked. It worked by using 2 to 1 overall odds and tons of reserves, to shift equal forces in front of the attacked sectors as fast as the forces in those sectors were destroyed. Offensive concentration succeeding in destroying the front line defending forces. More it could not do. It was not tactical ubermenschenhood that brought this about, either, it was simply local odds (~4 to 1 in infantry and guns) and a local armor differential (40-50 AFVs per km vs. none, on the initial attack sectors). When the local odds went away, the lopsided local victories went away, and were replaced by mutual losses, rapidly resulting in exhaustion.

The function of the forward scattered positions was just to die slowly enough for reserves to march to the threatened sectors, eliminating local odds the old fashioned way - by simple shifts of reserves.

[dizee]

Originally posted by arax3:

All I can say to the BS about Soviet tactical brilliance, etc. is: Hoo Ray for Ultra, the greatest intelligence breakthrough in history IMHO

agree...never understood what is so brilliant in massing a 10:1 odd, and still conceede fearsome losses

[Guest Mike]

Jason I'm a little disappointed in your response above.

Youor usually insightful analysis seems to be a bit bitter and twisted.

The 79th GRD was not "destroyed" - it lost 40% casualties and continued to fight througout the period detailed in the article.

And, IMO, it was not the "vaunted" Russian defence in depth at all. The 79th and it's corps had little or no additional forces allocated - they did not have specialised AT kill zones beyond a reference to a single "AT strongpoint" per battalion.

And each front line battalion was holding 2-2.5 km of frontage.

In fact the defences described for this unit are pretty much what I'd expect for any rifle unit of any nationalty that had time to dig itself in at any time after 1942.

To me the most striknig point is the inability of the German armoured forces to break through as quickly as was required and the bankruptcy of the German concept of "Blitzkreig".

They did not use infantry to creat teh gaps and then pour the armour through - instead they tried to use the armour as a sort of "cavalry charge" and had to await infantry support when it was required (cf refernce to a couple of badly mauled companiesbreaking out at night "before German infantry arrived to complete their encirclement").

The relatively unsuported armour simply had insufficient ability to do the job - it had plenty of fighting power and mobility, but they were not the requirements needed to quickly break through an infantry defence in depth...even one mounted by a relatively unsupported Guards Rifle Division.

Later on vs teh 15th RD teh german armour easily smashes a flank battalion after a massive artillery preparation and sweeps behind an adjacent unit. Surrounded, the battalion commander orders his companies to retire throug the German armoured cordon - the armour alone was not a suficient force to ensure a victory - suer the enemy retired, but the Germans were still losing tanks they couldn't replace in excehange for men the Russians could replace.

And why would he make detailed mention of Soviet armoured losses? the article is about the defence of an essentially infantry force agaisnt the German assault - which was mainly armour. What is important here is the attrition of the atacking armour and the figitng ability of the defence. Soviet armour in this sector was evidently quite limited in numbers and impact, and so simply isn't that important.

I loved the read - it really makes me look forward to CMBB even more!!

[ August 22, 2002, 07:15 PM: Message edited by: Mike ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Mike:

To me the most striknig point is the inability of the German armoured forces to break through as quickly as was required and the bankruptcy of the German concept of "Blitzkreig".(sic)

Since when was "blitzkrieg" a German concept? The term was invented by an English newspaper reporter. The Germans never used it, and had you mentioned "blitzkrieg" to Guderian et al they would have asked you what you were talking about.

Did the Germans really plan armour-only breakthroughs at Kursk? Or is that what you mean by blitzkrieg? Since the Germans never used it, maybe you need to define it for us.

With the exception of the schwere panzer abteilungen (Tiger units), all the armour mentioned seems to have been attached to panzer or panzergrenadier units - each with two regiments of grenadiers, mostly truck borne. What exactly did the operational plan call for them to be doing during this time, if not accompanying the armour? The examples you cite of waiting for infantry to catch up - was this by design, as you imply, or was it a result of the infantry not being able to follow the plan?

Honestly don't know, thought I would ask. You can't criticize someone for a faulty analysis when you seem not to understand things from the German perspective. The article discusses Soviet tactics in detail but not the German ones; it's a common misconception to think that German offensives were tank only affairs - to my knowledge, they never were.

[ August 22, 2002, 07:35 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Guest Mike]

Err...OK - then the German idea of using "armoured" units to break through a front.

Mea culpa for being a bit colloquial.

Yes I know that they had a lot of infantry in Panzer Divisions - yet this account provides a lot of evidence that they were not used all that well. Eg there are sections referring to accompanying infantry being stripped away from the tanks by artilelry, the ability of Russian units to berak out through armoured cordons, etc.

And yes I know that strippingtanks of their escorting/accompanying infantry is always a useful tactic........but then isn't that what APc's are for - to enable the infantry to keep up even whilst under fire (esp artillery fire)?

My overall point is that the German concept of the attack was bankrupt - armoured formations are best used to exploit holes created by infantry, notas battering rams to make those holes.

[JasonC]

The problem with you description, Mike, is that it is simply not recognizable as refering to the same battles narrated by Glantz.

"The 79th GRD was not "destroyed""

The 79th? The narrative is about the 78th GRD. Glantz describes 3 of its component battalions as "crushed", "overrun", or "smashed" on the first day, with other elements encircled and the rest pushed against. Glantz describes the defenses as "shattered in three sectors". It is then backed by the 73rd GRD in corps second echelon, 4 other RDs, A TD brigade, tank regiment, SPA regiment, and an artillery group. Nowhere does it say the Germans are performing "cavalry charges" with "unsupported tanks". In fact, the usefulness of rockets is obviously tied to stripping off infantry, which he therefore mentions at that point in the narrative. Later he explicitly refers to the actions of the 73rd Pz Gdr regiment. Since the attack force hitting the division on the first day was 2 full panzer divisions, it was in fact facing 8 infantry battalions, plus 2 recce and 2 pioneer, in addition to about 300 tanks.

On the 6th, the German advance destroys "remaining forces" where two of the component regiments are located, with "remnants" encircled. A third Panzer division enters the fight. Of the fighting on the afternoon of the 2nd day, Glantz says the Germans "after having dealt with the 78th Guards Rifle Division's defenses, the 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions engaged in heavy combat with the 73d Guards Rifle Division". The 78th GRD was blown through in a day and a half. Of "heavy losses", footnoted as amounting to 39 tanks over 2 days, they occurred after the battle with the 78th, when the 73rd and the Russian "shock group" (armor reserves etc) had already reached the area.

Glantz explicitly states that the 78th's role in the battle was over by July 7, that it had absorbed the full weight of 2 Panzer divisions "and shattered under the blow". "In a narrow sense, the defense failed". The Russians claimed 50 tanks for the division, but it is impossible to seperate losses due to elements of the division itself and those due to the massive reinforcements that arrived in the sector after it was spent. The manpower losses are described as "as much as 40%", meaning around 3000 out of 7500 men. You may not understand that those losses are concentrated in front line rifle strength, but Glantz certainly does. It was reduced to a cadre, and it plays no further role in any fighting until taking replacements three weeks later.

As for the losses of the German 7PD and 19PD on the 5th and 6th, the former recorded 229 casualties and 24 tanks, the latter 602 casualties and 18 tanks. Very few of these tank losses were TWOs, incidentally. The 6PD alone claims 30 Russian tanks on the 6th, the same time Glantz's narrative has the "shock group" reserve arriving, with around 100 AFVs. None were encountered on the 5th, by German reports. Tank losses on the 5th were mostly due to mines. So, a few tanks hit mines and are under repair, while the front line infantry battalions are being chopped to pieces by tank-infantry teams. Then the reserve armor shows up on the 6th, loses 30% of its own numbers in one day, and takes similar numbers from the Germans in return. The 78GRD is out of action at the end of the second day in return for less than 1000 casualties. Bug on a windshield.

What stops the drive by Army Detachment Kempf is first of all the fact that 5, count 'em 5, fresh rifle divisions appear behind the first line one mauled on the 5th and 6th. The first of them, which is the second line of the corps position 73 GRD), is engaged by the second day, while the other 4 are all sent by then. The 209 GRR, part of this division, is overrun on the afternoon of the second day. The remnants of the first line division did not prevent even the second line division from being penetrated on the second day of the fighting.

Behind the hole in the second line division there are however 4 other RDs - 111, 270, 92G and 94G - plus the armor and artillery shock group. 3rd Panzer corps had 3 PD s and 1 ID, which means 21 infantry battalions. On the initial attack sector, they hit the forward elements only of 1 GRD only, which in 2-1 formation throughout is 4 front line battalions. But by the 7th, despite rendering ineffective the whole first line RD and one regiment of the second line RD, for losses only about equal to a single battalion, the infantry odds have moved to 42 defending battalions against 20 attacking.

Up to 5 to 1 up front plus hundreds of tanks against none results in clean overrun positions and deep cuts into the defense for minor losses. Hundreds of tanks arriving to help plus massive infantry reserves shifted in front of the advance reduces the overall infantry odds to 1 to 2 and the tank odds to only about 3 to 1. The Germans stop attacking. The real capability of the defense is simply having massive unengaged reserves and sliding them in front of the schwerpunk on 48 hour time-scales.

"The 79th and it's corps had little or no additional forces allocated"

Poppycock. "Its corps" provided a second line division, army provided 100 AFVs and a brigade of artillery to the threatened area, and front provided 4 fresh RDs to backstop the whole position. The last of which being what actually held, after all of the previous were penetrated. What makes it the "vaunted Russian defense in depth" is that kind of echelon layering, and not any impassible walls of anti tank obstacles and AT regions and mobile minelaying detachments, which aren't present to begin with, as you say.

"To me the most striking point is the inability of the German armoured forces to break through as quickly as was required"

Um, how quickly? The second line division had to commit one regiment by the evening of the first day. It was penetrated by 2 in the afternoon on the second day, even with 100 reinforcing AFVs. Lickety split to me. Did the Germans then break through the 4 additional RDs behind that one? No. Was this due to lack of speed? No. It was due to 21 infantry battalions in the whole sector against 54 by then. If you want to credit something, credit the Russians for having 4 "free" RDs waiting around at front level (well, shifted from the two neighboring armies by front) and able to shift behind the threatened area within 48 hours. Could the Germans get 3 to 1 local odds by massing against 54 defending battalions? Not without 160 attacking battalions, which was more like what the whole Kursk operation had, north and south - not what they had for one panzer corps making a subsidiary thrust in the south.

"They did not use infantry to create the gaps and then pour the armour through"

Wasn't the doctrine anyway. The doctrine was combined arms, not "infantry makes holes". That is a WW I cavalry idea out of British textbooks, not the modern mobile doctrine actual developed by the Germans in the interwar period and used successfully through 1942. The holes are made by hitting a narrow sector with full panzer corps, attacking with combined arms. As in, one defending regiment faces a full PD, each defending battalion faces an attacking Pz Gdr battalion with a full battalion of armor, with a second battalion of Pz Gdrs in second echelon behind the first.

That is how they did it in Poland, and France, and 1941, and 1942, and it is how they got through the 78 GRD inside of 48 hours and overran the 209 GRR of the second line RD by the afternoon of the second day. It is just that on previous occasions, once they had done that they were through the whole defense and into the Russian operational rear. On this occasion, there were instead 4 more RDs waiting for them, even on the sector of a subsidiary Panzer corps thrust. On the point of main effort in the south, the Russians had to throw in an entire reserve army group, but that was enough.

"cf refernce to a couple of badly mauled companies breaking out at night before German infantry arrived to complete their encirclement".

Not quite. They were the remnants of badly mauled regiments, not companies. It takes a rather larger infantry force to draw airtight nighttime rings around regiments. Not enough far enough forward yet to do that, that wasn't facing forward instead (e.g. penetrating the second line division).

"Later on vs the 15th RD"

Stop right there. It is "later on" in Glantz, yes, but you do realize that it is actually occuring at the exact same time, right? Just off in the northern sector instead of the south. And on the easternmost flank of the northern attack.

"the german armour easily smashes a flank battalion after a massive artillery preparation and sweeps behind an adjacent unit."

Not just massive arty prep and not just armor. The left flank battalion of the 15 RD is in the path of the main effort in the north. The rest of its corps is not. The rest of the corps is only in front of the German 41 corps, with only 1 PD and 2 IDs, which is conducting a holding attack on the flank of the main effort, which goes in 2 hours before the main affair. Along the main effort line, there are 3 PDs, 1 PGD, 1 ID in first echelon, with 2 PD and 1 PGD additional behind. The left regiment of 15 RD is one of the ones in that path of that. The narrative identifies the units hitting that one regiment as the bulk of the assault elements of one infantry division, one Panzergrenadier division, supported by 2 panzer divisions. All to itself. That is not tanks alone as cavalry. It is 19 infantry battalions against 3, along with 2 PDs worth of armor. There is only one PD (the 18th) hitting the rest of the corps.

Second, it is wrong that only armor "sweeps behind". Yes, that happens tactically to the rightward forward infantry battalion of the left regiment, after the leftmost one is overrun. The tanks get behind them first, and they run. Notice that later this is referred to as that whole regiment "thrown back in disarray", and its elements are called "remnants". Nowhere is the withdrawl of the rightward battalion described as any kind of success. Indeed, it explicitly says, instead, that it was reserve armor and artillery (100 AFVs etc) rushed to the area that halted the Germans in that sector, though "losing heavily" themselves. And the sequel is the Germans rolling up that flank from the north. The break in in the sector of the 45 RR exposes the left flank of the right hand front regiment of the 15 RD, the 676 RR. The 676 RR is attacked from two sides, front and left flank (north), with 50 tanks from the front. It explicitly says a regiment of infantry from the north, and tanks supported by infantry from the front. They hold out until nightfall, as a salient between the main effort to their left (which is collapsing), and 41 corps' holding attack to their right (which grinds through 81 RD, but with the help of more reinforcing Russian armor, slower than the left).

"the Germans were still losing tanks they couldn't replace"

Actually, they were having tanks sent to the repair shops for the most part, which they could indeed replace, as their total write offs are miniscule. The armor force is reduced in readiness, yes, which effects the overall offensive. But that is not why they don't break through or win. Instead, they are stopped by a giant fight several days later involving 4 divisions on a side and hundreds of AFVs, long after the front line units have ceased to matter a wit. The northern prong was stopped by reinforcement of the threatened sector by an entire tank army - not by second echelon rifle regiments or any mythical lack of combined arms or overreliance on tanks alone on the part of the Germans. Which even Glantz never so much as insinuates, and which you are making up yourself out of whole cloth.

"why would he make detailed mention of Soviet armoured losses?"

Because the actual blunting of the German armor concentration attacks was done by deploying the Russian reserve armor, as his own narrative makes quite clear, along with infantry reserves sliding in front of the threatened areas in huge numbers. The thrust through the 47 RR sector is halted by "the 237th Tank, 1441st and 1541st Self-Propelled Artillery Regiments, two mobile obstacle detachments, and all available artillery". The right of the corps in the 81 division zone holds under 41 corps attack due to the intervention of "the 27th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment (twenty-three tanks), the 129th Separate Tank Brigade (forty-eight tanks), and the 1442d Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (sixteen SU-122s)". If these interventions stopped the local penetrations at least temporarily, it is rather important whether the Russian AFVs used for it were or were not reduced themselves.

The overall northern drive is met by "The 16th and l9th Tank Corps of 2d Tank Army and the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, with its subordinate 15th, 148th, and 74th Rifle Divisions, supported by three tank and self-propelled artillery regiments", and "On the evening of 6 July, the 2d Tank Army's 3d Tank Corps also moved into the Ponyri area. Subsequently, its tanks also served in an infantry-support role." Oh yeah. By day two, a full tank army and 9 seperate small armor formations had intervened in the sector. Just a little thing like that, you know, just 800-1000 AFVs. "Actually, I did it with my trusty ATR can opener and a jar of Sterno, but sure there was a little higher echelon armor too".

The real fight was between those massive armor reserves and the German spearheads, which had already made it into the depth of the Russian defended zone. When the main fight was joined around Ponryi Station, it is not like 15 RD was still the opponent of the German drive - or even the 307 RD in second echelon. No, 4 other GRDs (2 para) were in it by then, and all of that armor. The defense didn't hold because the 676 RR waited until nightfall to withdraw from its salient or anything so pictureseque. It held because a tank army and numerous fresh RDs stepped in front of the overall German main drive. Which had all of 6 PDs, and so no longer had 4 and 5 to 1 armor odds once an entire tank army came in against them. The only way the Germans were going to break through is if they killed that armor. Making it rather important to track whether they were doing so.

See, the Germans can afford to take tank losses, if they are also reducing the Russian tank force enough that they will still be left with one after the Russians run out. They can't afford to otherwise. The tank losses they are taking are mostly to the intervening Russian armor (there are, e.g. two full brigades of SUs behind Ponryi station). If they run through that armor in return, they might fight their way through. If they don't, then the Russians will stop them, by reducing the odds in armor as well as infantry to parity or worse at the points of attack.

By not talking about the Russian armor losses at all, Glantz leaves the erroneous impression that the German armor is being attrited by Russian infantry defenses alone, while the Russian armor seems unscathed. It is "one entry accounting". The relevant variable over time is the AFV ratio, locally and globally. If the Germans can keep the AFV ratio high, they can get the initiative effects and local break-ins etc that a local armor edge offers. Mentioning the German armor losses but not the Russian ones creates the impression that the armor ratio is moving against the Germans because of losses, when the reality is largely that it is moving against the Germans locally because of reinforcements - the simple process of local offensive concentration being leveled out by reserves arriving at the point of main effort. Globally, the Russians have half again as many AFVs in the region as the attacking Germans do. So the Germans only ever have local armor odds, and only until reserves show up. To keep it beyond the point where reserves arrive, they have to kill those arriving reserves rapidly. And Glantz just doesn't bother to say whether they were or weren't, here or there along the front.

Your idea that it was all about Russian infantry alone, attriting a German attack by armor alone, is a completely false impression that Glantz has evidently managed to leave. He is not to blame for your "by armor alone" notions, incidentally, which are your own overreadings of 2-3 withdrawls, hardly successful, of cut off Russian infantry. He is to blame for not providing you with proper emphasis on the critical role of Russian reserve armor interventions, although he provides the narrative detail to see it happening if you know to look for it. And he is very much to blame for just sitting on Russian armor losses in these battles, giving a one entry accounting version, to play up the impression he wants to create, that attriting of the German armor was somehow a key aspect of the Russian positional infantry defense. Which is simply not supported by his own narrative, which clearly shows that shifting the deep reserves in front of the points of main effort was the real process involved, and that it succeeded quite simply by neutralizing the local odds attacker concentration created for the initial attacks. Which succeeded until such reserves had removed those local odds.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by arax3:

All I can say to the BS about Soviet tactical brilliance, etc. is: Hoo Ray for Ultra, the greatest intelligence breakthrough in history IMHO ...

Not sure what tactical brilliance has to do with intelligence, but ... Ultra basically was the equivalent of somebody telling somebody else that "I think something is going down. Can't say when, but sometime in the near future." That's it. Ultra provided indications of "German intentions at Kursk(1)" a full two and a half months before the operation, but gave no indication of a launch date. Then, Ultra started expressing doubts of a German Kursk operation. This was because the Ultra intercepts were off Luftwaffe signals traffic in the Kuban and Crimea region, and that traffic was relatively quiet as Zitadelle approached. The lion's share for painting the Kursk intelligence picture was Soviet razvedka (intelligence & reconnaissance).

I haven't read the Glantz paper on Soviet defenses at Kursk yet, but I did read Glantz' book, Battle of Kursk. The gist of the book is that on the Voronezh Front, the campaign was not won at Prokhorovka, but along the flanks where the Soviets committed to incessant counterattacks against LII Army Corps and XXXXVIII Panzer Corps of 4th Panzer Army, and III Panzer Corps of Army Detachment Kempf. These counterattacks had the effect of upsetting German timetables and drawing away reserves and reinforcements from the spearhead, which forced II SS Panzer Corps to go it alone and with badly stretched flanks. Eventually German losses and outside events would intervene, but with more fresh Soviet units in reserve (27th and 53rd Armies, 4th Guards Tank Corps, and 1st Mechanized Corps) it's doubtful the German push would've succeeded - especially since the northern pincer was defeated days earlier.

What I'm reading here from Jason's post is that Glantz is trying to convey the picture that it was the timely arrival of reserves along with a sufficient holding action on the line that put an end to the German attack. That and the continuous counterattacks on the flanks. Given that this had never been possible before (you just didn't stop a full scale German attack - nobody did) the combination of defensive works, defense in depth and reserves did the trick. They lost an ungodly amount of lives and equipment, but the Soviets did it.

Interestingly, Glantz also points out that what his research has shown was that from 1943, on, it was usually the defensive side that took more casualties during a full scale offensive on the Russian front, not the other way around.

(1) Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War, 221.

[fridericus]

the whole operation in kursk-area was a big mistake in this time, so mean guderian and manstein. both wanted to start the op fast after the mud-period eraly in the year for destroying the russian tank-reserves before there rebuilding and before russians could fortify their lines. but hitler delayed it by waiting for new panthers and ferdiands. but in this time russians fortified the lines. germans attacked too late because of hitler but cut through russian lines, bur in the moment of success german troops in east had to give PDs to italianfront an france.

conclusion: if manstein and guderian had to decide, they had win the battle because of no delay.

(see books "verlorene siege" of manstein and "erinnerungen eines soldaten" of guderian)

[fridericus]

forgot: russians had never tactics but only too much men.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by dizee:

...never understood what is so brilliant in massing a 10:1 odd, and still [concede] fearsome losses

Granted, it took the Soviets time to get their house in order, but by 1944 it was pretty much a brick house. A good link to peruse is:

www.adamfive.com/guerrero/maskirovka

Here you'll see the difference between what the Germans thought was across the other side, and what was really waiting for them. Soviet deception efforts were part of normal operational planning and very effective in creating surprise. Yassy-Kishinev is one of many successful operations in the third period of the war (1944-45). And make sure to look at Soviet losses.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Grisha:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by arax3:

All I can say to the BS about Soviet tactical brilliance, etc. is: Hoo Ray for Ultra, the greatest intelligence breakthrough in history IMHO ...

Interestingly, Glantz also points out that what his research has shown was that from 1943, on, it was usually the defensive side that took more casualties during a full scale offensive on the Russian front, not the other way around.

(1) Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War, 221.</font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by fridericus:

forgot: russians had never tactics but only too much men.

Please do some reading, or refrain from posting, since you are quite clueless.

There are a number of booklists around on the board that you can access.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by arax3:

All I can say to the BS about Soviet tactical brilliance, etc. is: Hoo Ray for Ultra, the greatest intelligence breakthrough in history IMHO (the humbleis for Dorosh.) Soviets had advanced tactical intelligence on the strength and timing of the Kursk offensive and were waiting for it in depth!! Lets suppose hypothetically that the Nazi had counter-intelligence of Red preparations and had launchced their offensive somewhere else with the same vigor. The Red lines would probably have evaporated into a full rout. Had Ultra/code breakers not been available - we might all be speaking German/Japense. :eek:

A lot of the Soviet intel on the battle came from other sources than Ultra. Zhukov in his memoirs mentions:

1) POWs

2) Deserters

3) Downed pilots

4) artillery reconnaissance (flash and sound)

5) Local reconnaissance by the frontline units

He also mentions partisan activity, and it is likely that these would inform the Soviet command of troop movements. Ultra would have provided the general idea, but local measures were necessary to identify specific units etc. Quite interesting is that in May they knew that an attack was not forthcoming because no heavy artillery units had been identified. Ultra would have told them the same I guess, but the local corroboration would have strengthened the case. Zhukov also says that they actually failed to identify the southern sector as the main sector of the attack - which is why the Germans broke in so deeply there, compared to the north, where the Red Army expected the main thrust.

As to the idea that the Germans could just have attacked anywhere else while the Red Army sits at Kursk and waits for them to attack there - please... Unless the Germanuberweapon of 1943 was a magic Army Group beam system there was no way they could have just gone and switch the attack from Kursk to, say, Velikije Luki to surprise the Soviets without the Soviets noticing. One should also remember that the Soviet reserves were sufficient to rebuild its 'shattered' defensive formations near Kursk to a degree that allowed a rapid counter attack within four weeks (including rebuilding the whole of the almost destroyed 5th GTA and the severely hit 1st TA.

[fridericus]

@ andreas: i dont have to read books when i see the losses of germany and russia and i can hear this history by veterans.

( hauptmann (panzer in russia), sturmbannfuehrer (russia)and oberst (stalingrad))

i read enough books, i speak russian and can read the books

[Andreas]

Then why don't you? If your posts are all going to be along the line of:

'The Soviets were crap, the Germans were great, why - because I say so', you can spare the time to post them. Some people here are trying to get some serious discussion going, and just throwing out stuff like you do that is:

1) not backed up by anything

2) plain wrong (which would not be so bad if you at least tried to argue the case)

is both pointless and annoying. Either put up some evidence, or leave those who are prepared to talk about the topic like adults to get on with it, watch and learn.

[fridericus]

my english is not good enough for a quality discussion.

the russians were not crap, but they hasd no need for being good because of their big numgers