British Infantry

[Andreas]

Okay, you've convinced me now. I obviously need to do more reading.

[flamingknives]

Okay, overrunning enemy position is the aim of any assault. Is there any army that doesn't us such an 'assault' tactic (i.e. a charge to take the enemies position)?

Is there any particular reason why such a 'bayonet charge' should be uniquely British?

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

Okay, overrunning enemy position is the aim of any assault. Is there any army that doesn't us such an 'assault' tactic (i.e. a charge to take the enemies position)?

Is there any particular reason why such a 'bayonet charge' should be uniquely British?

I don't think the "bayonet charge" is uniquely British; the Russians, Japanese and French seem to have been equally fond of it and can equally claim it as their own.

There are of course other things than a bayonet that one can brandish while rushing towards the enemy position; as I mentioned in my post citing bayonet charges in NW Europe, some people chose to assault using something else. "Basher" Bates and Thomas Peck Hunter both won their VCs making single-handed assaults with a Bren gun. Colonel "H" Jones in the Falklands went down (and again won a VC) assaulting an Argentine trench with a Sterling SMG. I looked in my copy of "infantry aces of the Third Reich" to see if I could find any examples of successful German bayonet charges, but if the book is anything to go by, the Germans seem to have preferred the grenade and the machine-pistol for close combat. At any rate, I believe that the idea that German troops were less prepared to fight it out hand-to-hand than soldiers of other nations is a mistake; accusing the enemy of being unwilling to stand in close combat is a fairly typical kind of national slur, and has at some time probably been used by almost everyone about almost everyone else (including IIRC by Martin Poppel, a German para, about the British in his book "Heaven and Hell").

It seems to me that there are three different approaches that one can use in an assault. One is to close with the bayonet, and try to scare the enemy out; one is to try to destroy the enemy with grenades; and the third to try to destroy him with bullet fire. Any assault will probably include a mix of these (notice that "Dytor's charge" included both fire and movement and grenade-throwing). Paddy Griffith's "Battle tactics of the Western Front" points out that in WW1 the German preference was for grenading (as mentioned also in Gudmundsson's "Stormtroop tactics"), while the British preferred the bayonet (and I wonder if this was not due to the very unfavourable characteristics of the No. 36M grenade as an assault weapon). Presumably such preferences would continue into WW2, and the German advantage in light automatic weapons would also presumably tend to lessen their reliance on the bayonet (why get up and stick someone when you can let him have a mag from your MP-44?).

A peek at the WRG 1925-1950 rules is interesting, as it suggests that formal assaults (suggestive of bayonet charges) tend to be the province of relatively less tactically skilled armies. I don't think that's quite right, but it does seem to me that a full-blooded bayonet charge implies a (perhaps momentary) loss of control that is not necessarily needed if one prefers to fight by grenading (see Tom Wintringham's 1940 book "New Ways of War" and SPI's splendid boardgame "Patrol!" for "grenadist" perspectives on minfantry minor tactics). This loss of control shows in British infantry tactics in the strong emphasis put on re-organising immediately after an assault. It may be that a "grenade-school" assault may not have to surrender control to the same extent. Does anyone have access to WW2-era German infantry tactics documents that indicate whether or not this post-assault reorganisation was emphasised to the same extent?

All the best,

John.

[JasonC]

The idea that bayonet charges matter for anything and that the bayonets or fear of them have anything to do with it is preposterous. It happens to be a bit of bombast with a long and rather inglorious history, dating back to the cult of the arme blanche among the boys in blue pants early in WW I, who lost a million men by taking it seriously.

Does this mean no one ever fixed bayonets since? It does not. Does it mean no one ever charged? It does not. But you can kill men you overrun with anything if you get that close, and the usual thing is the bullets out of the gun the bayonet is stuck on (or grenades, or pistols for that matter). Men run from such assaults the same as they run from any assaults that look like they might succeed, because being close to scores of men with rifles in their hands is bad for your health, unless you have something white waving over your head and are feeling lucky.

Others on this thread are pretending any time people fixed bayonets, or charged, that it was a bayonet charge, in the sense that fear of bayonets matters a whit in them. Um, they were rifle charges and submachinegun charges. No, the defenders don't bug out because they prefer being perforated in one manner rather than in another - perforated is perforated.

Did rather silly officers insist on putting on the bayonets to impress on their men that they were going to run right over the enemy? No doubt. Did that make any difference? Possibly, to morale among the attackers. Just as likely it counteracted any such effect with equal parts idiocy by making more of the rushers less likely to have grenades at the ready. Grenades are the dominate arm in close assaults, with direct fire quickly clearly those in plain sight of each other. So much so that men charging the enemy often slung their rifles to have both hands free for grenades.

Incidentally, the idea that this was unique to the Germans or something does not withstand scrutiny, either. From WW I on, Brits with actual combat experience have known the superiority of the grenade. They even spoke of "the cult of the bomb". Higher ups sometimes resisted the obvious common sense of this, stressing marksmenship, continually movement forward, and the bayonet instead. Which was not leadership or an alternate method, it was purest bombast and bilge, from the safety of a dugout 400 yards from the enemy.

[ March 28, 2002, 06:11 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Articles in Military HIstory Quarterly, as well as references by Pierre Berton (Vimy), Charlie Martin (DCM, MM), Farley Mowat, and Strome Galloway would suggest that the bayonet was a rarely used weapon, and that casualties inflicted through the use of "cold steel" were infinitessimally small...

By 1944, German rifles were being produced without bayonet lugs - albeit due to material shortages, but I still think it says something about the importance of a bayonet in an army that was looking increasintly at the use of automatic weapons firepower as its raison d'etre...

It has been suggested that even as early as the US Civil War, bayonets were mythical objects of attention by fiction writers, and really not used to great physical (not moral) effect. If anyone wants to cite the films Gettysburg or Glory as proof I'm wrong, please do so now.

Might have to revisit Keegan to see what he says about bayonets at Waterloo and the Somme; was it Haig that delayed Zero Hour well past dawn because he wanted the gleam of the sunlight off thousands of British bayonets to frighten the enemy into surrendering?

Jason is right; it is not just the fear of the bayonet, but the fact that another human being, one the soldier has labelled "enemy" in his mind, and more than likely more than one of them, has invaded his "flight" or "threat" space that sends him running or putting his hands up.

[ March 28, 2002, 07:05 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Brian]

Jason, have you ever served in the military?

Tell me, did you read mine and in particular, John's comment, "It's an SOP after you've won the firefight, when the *enemy* is pinned"?

Does it matter if the enemy breaks after you've charged him, if your weapon has a bayonet or not attached to the front or you've used grenades or SMG's (which BTW, in many armies can be fitted with bayonets)? Of course not.

As John pointed out, you can sit there and blaze away at him to your heart's content if you so desire but more often than not, he won't move until you've expended an inordinate amount of ammunition and more importantly, time to do it. Time which you might not have.

Remember the experiences of 1 Airborne at Arnhem. They endured the "hexenkessel" - the witch's cauldren of being surrounded on four sides for nearly a week, with thousands of rounds of mortar and artillery fire being thrown at them, along with small arms and tank fire and they still held out. They didn't withdraw until they decided it was hopeless and no real relief was possible. The German fire didn't break their morale.

At some point, the infantry commander must make the decision to go in, to actually clear the enemy from their positions. Having his men fix bayonets, not only has an effect on the enemy's morale but his own mens'. Anything which helps your own mens' morale is a bonus, anything which effects the enemy's is another added bonus. That the bayonet actually has some degree of utility, giving your diggers something else to attack the enemy with, apart from their personal weapon, should not be disparaged.

Michael, you're right BTW, that the actual number of casualties presenting themselves with bayonet wounds was tiny by WWII. I suspect thats for two reasons - the usual outcome of a bayonet fight is your opponent's death and also, more often than not, the enemy either fled or surrendered before they were actually come to grips with.

Now, interestingly, I quite often find myself in the game, closing with the enemy, and clearing them from their positions, after suppressing them with my own fire. Considering the time restraints imposed upon the player in most scenarios, its often the quickest and interestingly, the least lethal method to get on, towards the ultimate objective.

[flamingknives]

So on a basic (i.e. game) level, British infantry is pretty much the weakest infantry unit.

The strength of the British army is armour and artillery.

I think that this is quite understandable, as the No. 4 SMLE was, by that time, quite obsolete. The main reason that the British army continued in it's use was that they had vast stocks of 0.303" ammunition. Being a rimmed cartridge, it was ill suited for use in a semi-automatic rifle (though the Bren gun ate it up quite nicely, by all accounts. Anyone know the difference? Beyond semi/auto)

CM:BO already models HtH combat, so a run move at the enemy, followed by a bit of HtH would seem to madel a bayonet charge quite well.

[Doodlebug]

Hold hard my friend.

"the No. 4 SMLE was, by that time, quite obsolete"

I don't agree with that. Right about now virtually every army still used the bolt action rifle, the Us Army being the exception with the Garand. As bolt actions go the Lee Enfield was about the best and although they've been replaced post war can't be damned that quickly.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The idea that bayonet charges matter for anything and that the bayonets or fear of them have anything to do with it is preposterous.

If it matters so little, then why did I have remarkably little difficulty finding evidence of so many of the things? How, if edged weapons have no psychological effect, do you account for the Argentine abandonment of their defensive position at the appearance of 1/7th Gurkhas in the Falklands?

I take it that you haven't bothered to read Griffith's "Forward into Battle". You don't seem to be familiar with Dave Hackworth's remarks about bayonet training and Willie Lump-lump in his "About Face", either. Of course, it's possible that you understand more about infantry close combat than Dave Hackworth; but I beg leave to doubt it.

It happens to be a bit of bombast with a long and rather inglorious history,

If you think "bombast" is out of place in an assault, then I think your understanding of the way infantry tactics works is badly underdeveloped.

dating back to the cult of the arme blanche among the boys in blue pants early in WW I, who lost a million men by taking it seriously.

My military history goes wobbly and out-of-focus before about 1914, but I could have sworn that bayonets had been used for a while before then.

I suggest that you read Griffith's "Battle tactics of the Western Front", especially from page 68 onwards, where it is pointed out that many British Army trainers, including Maxse, were looking upon the bayonet with renewed favour in 1918, especially as an adjunct to the creeping barrage.

[snips]

It does not. But you can kill men you overrun with anything if you get that close, and the usual thing is the bullets out of the gun the bayonet is stuck on (or grenades, or pistols for that matter).

...or sharpened entrenching tools, or knuckledusters, or passenger handles removed from the London Underground. It has been noted that "fighter types" tend to fight with, as the saying has it, "all available weapons" (see "War on the Mind"). So no disagreement with this particualr "blinding flash of the obvious", although in the hands of the average soldier, I would estimate the likely effectiveness of the bayonet as rather higher than the pistol in close combat. But you seem to have muddled your thinking by the assumption that only killing matters, and that psychological effects don't. It's hard to think of a more grossly erroneous assumption when dealing with infantry combat. People shout and yell when they are assaulting; do you claim that they should not do so because it won't kill anyone? Of course not.

[snips]

Others on this thread are pretending any time people fixed bayonets, or charged, that it was a bayonet charge, in the sense that fear of bayonets matters a whit in them. Um, they were rifle charges and submachinegun charges. No, the defenders don't bug out because they prefer being perforated in one manner rather than in another - perforated is perforated.

I think that something that is described in accounts of it as a "bayonet charge" is, on the face of it, likely to be a bayonet charge. So the fact of their occurrence seems not to be at issue. What the precise mechanism of the psychological effect is in making the enemy pack it in is of course debatable; but I notice that you don't present any evidence for your suppositions about the question. It might seem to be "common sense", but that often misleads in questions of battle psychology.

As an example, your apparently "common-sense" statement that "perforated is perforated" will not stand up to a moment's inspection. If infantrymen did genuinely weigh the risks of different threats to their health, they would, presumably, prefer being attacked by grenade to being shot at, as the proportion of deaths from bullet fire is much higher. People do not, however, make such rational judgements in combat; Stouffer's famous table showing comparative rankings of different weapons for lethality and how frightening they were is reproduced, I think, in both "War on the Mind" and Ellis' "The Sharp End". Likewise, the after-action report for the Ia Drang Valley battles reports that the VC reacted quite differently to HE and WP fire, tending to go to ground under the former but get up and run around under the latter, and it is generally accepted that flame weapons have psychological effects much greater than their destructiveness would warrant.

Did rather silly officers insist on putting on the bayonets to impress on their men that they were going to run right over the enemy? No doubt. Did that make any difference? Possibly, to morale among the attackers.

I don't know what rank you imagine the officers who would typically give the order "fix bayonets" would be, but I would think that they would typically be Majors at most, and expected to lead their men from the front. To call such officers "rather silly" from the comfort of an armchair is not something I would feel comfortable doing.

As you admit yourself that the result may have been a morale boost for the attackers, I am at a loss to discover what the substance of your argument is. Or do you think that opportunities for raising morale are so plentiful that you can afford to pass up a few?

Just as likely it counteracted any such effect with equal parts idiocy by making more of the rushers less likely to have grenades at the ready.

This is an extremely silly argument. I cannot imagine any mechanism whereby having or not having a bayonet attached to your rifle would have the slightest effect on your ability to prepare grenades.

Grenades are the dominate arm in close assaults, with direct fire quickly clearly those in plain sight of each other. So much so that men charging the enemy often slung their rifles to have both hands free for grenades.

Grenades, by their nature, tend to be used either against people behind cover or from a distance. Again, you would do well to refer to "Battle tactics of the Western Front"; many British tacticians at the end of WWI considered that extensive grenading effectively meant that progress of the attack had come to an end.

Incidentally, the idea that this was unique to the Germans or something does not withstand scrutiny, either.

Quite so. That's probably why nobody has ever said it was. Inventing counter-arguments solely to knock them down is not a mode of argument I find very convincing.

From WW I on, Brits with actual combat experience have known the superiority of the grenade. They even spoke of "the cult of the bomb". Higher ups sometimes resisted the obvious common sense of this, stressing marksmenship, continually movement forward, and the bayonet instead. Which was not leadership or an alternate method, it was purest bombast and bilge, from the safety of a dugout 400 yards from the enemy.

I have open in front of me a copy of the "Report of the committee on the lessons of the Great War" (the Kirke Report), originally published in 1932, re-issued by the British Army Review in 2001 and available from the PRO as WO33/1297. On page 71 of the BAR edition, in Gen. Kennedy's report on operations on the Western Front, there appear the words "For a short distance, pace and the bayonet are the two deciding factors". So an official publication synthesising the combat experience of the period directly contradicts you. Perhaps you would like to post your sources for your position -- or are you in fact the one engaging in "purest bombast and bilge"?

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Articles in Military HIstory Quarterly, as well as references by Pierre Berton (Vimy), Charlie Martin (DCM, MM), Farley Mowat, and Strome Galloway would suggest that the bayonet was a rarely used weapon, and that casualties inflicted through the use of "cold steel" were infinitessimally small...

Indeed so; as I had rather thought I had pointed that out some time ago. Some people seem absolutely determined to continue to muddle the effectiveness of a weapon with the number of casualties caused by it. Weapons have effects other than the infliction of casualties.

By 1944, German rifles were being produced without bayonet lugs - albeit due to material shortages, but I still think it says something about the importance of a bayonet in an army that was looking increasintly at the use of automatic weapons firepower as its raison d'etre...

By that time in the war, the Germans were well on their way to doing away with conventional rifles altogehter. Still, how many military rifles have been produced since WW2 without bayonet lugs?

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

So on a basic (i.e. game) level, British infantry is pretty much the weakest infantry unit.

The strength of the British army is armour and artillery.

Strengths of British infantry that don't seem to have been mentioned yet are the fact that there was at full strength a fourth rifle company in the battalion, and the carrier platoon, which has an assortment of uses. Forward resupply, casevac and liaison uses are not modelled in CM:BO, but you might try putting a screen of carriers along the front of an infantry assault against an infantry defence, and see how that helps. I believe the Bn organisation provided in CM:BO is badly short of carriers; as well as those needed to two the 6-pdrs and carry the 3-in mor platoon, there should be 13 in the carrier platoon.

Another factor that cannot be modelled at the CM scale is the British infantry troop replacement policy, which was much superior to the deplorable American one.

[snips]

though the Bren gun ate it up quite nicely, by all accounts. [snips]

Jac Weller's "Weapons and Tactics: Hastings to Berlin" quotes Colonel Gore-Langton, based on his WW2 experience: "He found that three Brens were required to make as much noise as one MG-42. He believed, however, that one Bren was as good as two MG-42s for shooting at men under combat conditions". A fairly unusual view of the relative merits of the two weapons, I think.

CM:BO already models HtH combat, so a run move at the enemy, followed by a bit of HtH would seem to madel a bayonet charge quite well.

I would think that HtH combat would be less common than CM:BO makes it. In "Squad Leader" terms, I would have some pretty stiff morale tests to be passed by the attacker before closing to contact, and by the defender to stand. Once an assault goes in, I would expect the normal result to be the enemy fleeing, rather than standing and slugging it out.

All the best,

John.

[flamingknives]

HtH, or CQB, whever you like to call it, goes on from 20m and under, i.e.grenade range, so it would be fairly common in dense terrain

The No4 SMLE, by '44 was certainly showing it's age. The US had the M1 Garand, a semi-auto, and the Germans were issuing the MP 44 in ever increasing numbers.

As for my question on the Bren gun, the rimmed 0.303" cartridge caused feed problems when used in a box-fed semi-automatic. Does anyone know why it didn't foul the automatic, box fed, Bren.

Incidently, the Kukri isn't the only scary thing about the Gurkhas. They are very motivated, and quite comparable to special forces (Paras, Marine Commandos etc) They are also superior shots when compared to most British Army units, as they have no preconcieved ideas about handling a rifle.

Originally posted by: Me

So on a basic (i.e. game) level, British infantry is pretty much the weakest infantry unit.

Just to clarify, British infantry is the weakest at the squad level.

Obviously, higher up in the TO&E, they have all the excellent support equipment like 6pdrs, 3" mortars (why are thes so good btw?) and the ubiqitous Universal carrier.

[Slapdragon]

Rimmed cartridges are harder to make work in an autoloading weapon, not impossible. The original Bren design created after WW1, before it was the Bren or adopted by the British, was actually a full-blow belt fed LMG with a bolt mechanisiam designed to work in the trenches and handle a wide range of ammunition, some of it considerably more powerful than the rather average .303 round (in terms of pressure or recoil -- not in terms of killing power).

In converting that design to use a box magazine, they were following a trend set by the US BAR and several French designs that saw the automatic inside the squad as too wasteful of ammunition when equipped with a belt. But the main parts of the mechanism including the bolt remained just as strong, and the very overbuilt gas operation rod and taps were unchanged from the weapon.

So, in terms of using a rimmed cartridge, it was not a big deal. The mechanism started life very much like a MG-34/42 and only later down graded. Lots of machineguns used rimmed cartridges. Rims mostly become a problem in smaller mechanism.

One change that had to be made to the Bren to feed a rimmed cartridge when most of the versions of the ZB-26 fired rimless was the adoption of a curved magazine, and the requirement that gunner pay attention to cartridge to make sure that they did not interlock case rims when loading the magazine. Later WW2 magazines even made this not much of a problem, since the lip design assured that the rounds went into the magazine in a proper manner (unless they were forced).

[Andreas]

Flamingknives, the 3" mortar is better than its 81mm pals because it packs a much hgiher HE load. If you do a search in the archives with my member number and '3" mortar HE load' you may find a thread containing a link to a site with all the data you need.

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Brian:

At some point, the infantry commander must make the decision to go in, to actually clear the enemy from their positions.

Good point, and very true. Clauswitz refered to fire as the destructive act and the charge as the decisive act... that hasn't changed from his time to ours

[Slapdragon]

Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:

At some point, the infantry commander must make the decision to go in, to actually clear the enemy from their positions.

Good point, and very true. Clauswitz refered to fire as the destructive act and the charge as the decisive act... that hasn't changed from his time to ours</font>

[Determinant]

This is an interesting thread with many good, and well written, points being made.

Nobody would argue that the bayonet charge a la 'the thin red line' has not been 'an act of war' since the introduction of the rifled musket. Robert E Lee must have thought different when he sent Pickett's division to clear Cemetary Ridge but the result speaks for itself.

But that is not to say that the bayonet is redundant. The quoted role of the infantry in the British Army was traditionally 'to close with and kill the enemy, in all weathers, by day or night, over any ground' or some such. 'Kill' has now been downgraded to 'defeat' which speaks much for the intellectual dishonesty of our times.

On a philosophical level therefore the bayonet is an expression of the infantry role: 'Close with and kill the enemy'.

On an practical level (and speaking as an ex-infantryman) I would always want to have a bayonet on my rifle if I was going to be within a stone's throw of an enemy. Rifles do run out of ammo, and they do break down (particularly the SA80 Mk1!) At least the rifles of WWII made useful clubs - not something you could claim of the modern assault rifle.

Anyway - thanks for an interesting and thought provoking thread...

[Vanir Ausf B]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

Just to clarify, British infantry is the weakest at the squad level.

Regular squads, yes, but British Airborne rock, especially on the attack IMO.

As far as the regular squads go, they are weaker than the regular US squads mainly due to squad size. On a per man basis there is not much difference.

[ March 29, 2002, 12:38 PM: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Good point, and very true. Clauswitz refered to fire as the destructive act and the charge as the decisive act... that hasn't changed from his time to ours

[Determinant]

Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Good point, and very true. Clauswitz refered to fire as the destructive act and the charge as the decisive act... that hasn't changed from his time to ours</font>

[Tero]

Very interesting topic.

One angle that does not seem to have been covered is walking fire vs fire base/squad rush tactics.

IMO this is a very relevant factor when looking at the "bayonet" charge and how it was effected and how effective it was.

Also, what has to be considered is the goal of the charge in relation to the master plan. It would seem the bayonet charge was often considered to be the culmination of the British infantry attack whereas it was not necessarily the culmination of a German attack.

... but it does seem to me that a full-blooded bayonet charge implies a (perhaps momentary) loss of control that is not necessarily needed if one prefers to fight by grenading

What is meant by loss of control ? Apart from the Japanese the only instances I can think of when a charges like that were made were in (tactically) desperate situations. Also quite often they were made with relatively poorly trained troops or by well trained troops facing infavourable numerical odds.

This loss of control shows in British infantry tactics in the strong emphasis put on re-organising immediately after an assault. It may be that a "grenade-school" assault may not have to surrender control to the same extent. Does anyone have access to WW2-era German infantry tactics documents that indicate whether or not this post-assault reorganisation was emphasised to the same extent?

German troops operating alongside Finnish troops were reported to having maintained their cohesion more than the Finnish troops. The junior leaders excerted more direct control over their units than their Finnish counterparts. I can not imagine a German Company commander reporting his subunits being "in the general area performing unspecified attack operations under adhoc command of any number of my neighbouring Company CO('s)" and not have his arse kicked for not knowing the specifics.

The Finnish assault tactics were modelled to a large degree after the WWI German tactics and adapted to suit the local conditions and forces. In WWII the assaults and follow up operations were often made with mixed forces. It was thought more expedient and prudent to follow any lead and worry about the higher level cohesion later than waste time reorganizing and lose both the momentum and the initiative. This was partly facilitated by the Finnish reservist army and the call up system where units were formed from men from the same region.

To try to answer your guestion: the Germans were more cohesive in their planning than the British were. They did not wish to wind up in a situation where they would have been forced to reorganize after an assault. They tried to keep their plan focused on the mission and to maintain cohesion within the parameters of the mission. Having to reorganize in the middle of the mission was not what they planned for.

[JonS]

Originally posted by tero:

... Having to reorganize in the middle of the mission was not what they planned for.

They should have. I think you may be misunderstanding the usage of the word. In Brit usage it is an SOP that deals with reorganising consituent units (unmingling sections etc);

* organising the position you have just taken for defence,

* calling back units and/or men who have exploited too far,

* calling up units/men that have lagged behind,

* redistributing ammo,

* taking care of wounded,

* handling POWs,

* policing up captured weapons and equipment, and

* preparing to move on if required to.

If the Germans didn't bother with, or plan for, all that after an attack I would be very surprised.

It does not mean 're-organising' in terms of;

* changing the axis of advance,

* changing the objective,

* changing unit affiliations,

* changing unit attachments,

* issuing new orders, etc.

Regards

JonS

Edit: good spelling and clarity is good manners

[ March 29, 2002, 05:58 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

So on a basic (i.e. game) level, British infantry is pretty much the weakest infantry unit.

The strength of the British army is armour and artillery.

I think that this is quite understandable, as the No. 4 SMLE was, by that time, quite obsolete. The main reason that the British army continued in it's use was that they had vast stocks of 0.303" ammunition. Being a rimmed cartridge, it was ill suited for use in a semi-automatic rifle (though the Bren gun ate it up quite nicely, by all accounts. Anyone know the difference? Beyond semi/auto)

Basically, the trick when loading a Bren magazine is to always remember to load 28 rounds, not the indicated capacity of 30 rounds (in reality, you can manage to fit up to 32 rounds in them). The spring on the magazine became strained with 30 and was simply unable to feed with 32. 28 was the maximum it could handle. Failure to do this results in stoppages due to misfeeds or failure to feed. This is part of the basic introduction to the Bren gun, which I remember well from my days.

In addition, when loading the magazine, one placed one rim behind the other of each successive round, rather than interleaving them. This is why the magazine is curved - on the L4a4 version, which uses a rimless round the original magazine was straight, as in the case of the original ZB-26, from which the Bren was developed. However it was found that a slightly curved on eliminated the occasional feed problems with 7.62x51mm rimless rounds, which is why you'll now see L4a4's with the slightly curved magazine (the straight box magazine is a very rare beast).

CM:BO already models HtH combat, so a run move at the enemy, followed by a bit of HtH would seem to madel a bayonet charge quite well.[/QB]

Which is basically how I conduct it. Find, fix, suppress, charge. Sitting on one's arse, blazing away results in excessive usages in ammunition and perhaps the most precious commodity of all, time.

Despite what some might think, no one is proposing the the return to the exclusive use of the bayonet, over all else. Rather a recognition that as I said, at some point the commander must recognise he has to clear that position and the only sure way of doing that is to go in and do it by hand. If he doesn't, the enemy will sit there and hold up his advance, preventing him from gaining his objectives.

BTW, I think you're using the wrong word about the SMLE. Try "obsolescent" rather than "obsolete".

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Determinant:

Firepower will neutralise or destroy the enemy but only maneouvre can defeat him. Or so the doctrine would claim.

That is an odd claim to make on several grounds. It is rhetorically odd in that I would think that a destroyed enemy would be a rather soundly defeated one.

Tactically it is at least incomplete in that maneuver can defeat an enemy only if you are able to get someplace decisively useful thereby. And to get there you usually have to fight, i.e. use firepower. And to remain there likewise. Astute maneuver is extremely useful, but it is not the whole game by any means. Maneuver means getting your firepower where it will do the most good, either through destruction of something critical or threat to do same.

All this was hashed out in a couple long threads a year or so back. If you're interested you might look it up in the archive under "maneuver warfare" or some such.

Michael

[gibsonm]

Originally posted by Brian:

Basically, the trick when loading a Bren magazine is to always remember to load 28 rounds, not the indicated capacity of 30 rounds (in reality, you can manage to fit up to 32 rounds in them). The spring on the magazine became strained with 30 and was simply unable to feed with 32. 28 was the maximum it could handle. Failure to do this results in stoppages due to misfeeds or failure to feed. This is part of the basic introduction to the Bren gun, which I remember well from my days.

Sounds like the good old F1 SMG (which could also accommodate a bayonet) Now there's a definition of bravery / stupidity - going into battle with a weapon with an effective range (aimed shots) of 100m and even when fitted with a bayonet you were still just about within arms reach of your opponent!!