Tac AI makes player assets total idiots

[dalem]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The main problem is the terrain fidelity of 20x20m squares.

HAHA!!! I was right!!! Steve proves it!

Now is the time in CM when we dance!

(dances)

-le dale

[Jim Boggs]

Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The main problem is the terrain fidelity of 20x20m squares.

HAHA!!! I was right!!! Steve proves it!

Now is the time in CM when we dance!

(dances)

-le dale </font>

[dalem]

Originally posted by Jim Harrison:

Thanks for the input guys, sorry if some of you think the commentary was obnoxious, but I guess there are always some "thin skins" around.

(edited my comment)

Sorry.

-dale

[ November 20, 2003, 02:48 PM: Message edited by: dalem ]

[Jim Boggs]

Originally posted by dalem:

-dale

Uh.. dalem I'm over here!

You are truly a class act

[ November 20, 2003, 03:06 PM: Message edited by: Jim Boggs ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

Jim -

I sense that this discussion is mostly over, I would like to add my opinion that it's important to be careful about assuming too much about pre-WWII US Army training based on personal experiences or knowledge about post-WWII training. In fact, the overall structure of modern US Army basic training was really developed during WWII.

I would also not make the assumption that USMC and US Army training in WWII were similar in all, or even most aspects. From what I have read, at least on the small tactical level, USMC training was much better from the get-go. This isn't really a slight against the Army - the USMC'a mission was, and still is, more focused on small-unit engagements. It's therefore not surprising that their training focuses more on the small unit tactics.

The quality and length of training the US Army units received before seeing first combat in WWII varied considerably over the course of the war, and even from division to division (this is especially true when comparing the training received by Regular army vs. National Guard vs. Draft Divisons). I think any close reading of the historical record leads to the conclusion that GIs seeing combat for the first time in 1944-1945 were, on average, MUCH better prepared than GIs first seeing combat in 1942 and 1943. There are always, of course, local exceptions.

For me (and probably BFC as well), this means that GIs hitting the beach in Morocco in 1942 are best represented by mostly Green units in CM. You are certainly entitled to see things differently and assign these units "Regular" experience level. What makes this a bit hard to swallow for me is that if 1942 US Army units are mostly "Regular", in order to keep things comparatively realistic it would seem to me that better-trained late war US units would be arriving in-theatre with a fairly high proportion of "Veteran" status units in CM terms.

To each their own though. Happy CMing.

Cheers,

YD

I think Yankee Dog's grasp on this is, in it's entirety, perceptive and instructive.

Manuals represent official practice that evolved during the war; Canada actually had "Training Memorandum"s (I've quoted from these here from time to time) that represented the ongoing learning process. We look at WW II with hindsight; bear in mind infantry tactics as they knew them were really only being pioneered in 1917 or so, and left to languish between the wars (Germany perhaps being an exception). In 1939-42, all the Allies had much to learn, and from the Canadian experience (and apparently the US, as alluded to in other posts) the main goal was simply getting unit formed and able to drill together. Stuff like gas chamber training and marksmanship took priority - stuff which in action had little practical effect. MGs were in short supply, so were trucks, etc.

I'll add another example re: troop "quality", again from my own research. In 1944, remustered soldiers began appearing in Canadian infantry units in large numbers. Technically, you could call them "Regular" troops - they had been in the army 2, 3, and 4 years. They drilled, had trained, maybe even did battle drill. But they were artillerymen and truck drivers. In game terms, they could be classed as "Green" or even "Conscript". Then again, perhaps it would mean a serious dissection of a particular unit action to weed out who performed how...unfortunately few if any unit histories go into that kind of detail. So you the scenario designer makes do with what he has.

I'm currently playing a scenario in which the German force is uniformly CRACK and my Russians are uniformly CONSCRIPT. It is actually a scenario based on the attack on Kamienka by the GD in July 41. I have done my own version of this scenario with the GD as Veteran troops IIRC and the Russians as REGULAR. Two different desginers, two different interpretations, neither one "correct". The source material is open to both interpretations.

If we wanted to get historical results ONLY whenever we played this GAME, what would the point be of taking on the role of the "loser"?

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by MrSpkr:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

I would like to see squads partially react by self-splitting so that a half squad could be broken/routed etc and the other half pinned but in good order.

Now THAT would be quite interesting.

"You men get back here!"

Steve </font>

[Moon]

Tac AI makes player assets total idiots

I am sure the wording would be different, but I believe that many SSGT's, LT's and CPT's in the Army (past and present, any nation) are saying exactly the same thing over and over again

Martin

[rune]

The US Amry had the same thing Mike, they called them:

Combat Lessons Learned

and I believe there were nine of them, including this gem from Spring 1945:

Keep buttoned up

High loses among tank commanders have been caused by snipers. Keep buttoned up, as the sniper concentrates on such profitable targets. This is especially true in villages.

Remember this next time someone complains on tc buttoning up, they didn't learn till late war.

You can find the combat lessons learned here:

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usamhi/dl/atoz.htm

Rune

[ November 20, 2003, 03:17 PM: Message edited by: rune ]

[Battlefront.com]

Bottom line here is that the US Army's training for the NA campaign came from 1940 timeframe, which was based on training from the 1930s which was itself largely the same as that used in WWI. The difference between US units fighting from 1944 on is that they were using doctrine drawn up in 1943. Meaning, almost all the pre war doctrine was chucked right out the window because it was fundamentally flawed.

As has been said before, if you train really well how to handle a knife, fat load of good it does you when you find that the other guy has a full auto sub machine gun and is facing you at 50m. US training wasn't THAT bad, but it was seriously inadequate. Fortunately this was learned really quickly and lessons applied to form new doctrine. This was repeated again in the mountains of Italy, the Hedgerows of Normandy and then again in the forests of the German frontier.

Jim,

BTW Steve I am sure some studies were done on how tanks were destroyed during WWII, I used to stop at Aberdean (sp??) proving grounds when I lived on the East Coast and I think they did alot of research on both enemy and friendly equipment, not sure if they kept seperate stats in "gun damage" though.

That's just the thing. From the reports I have seen the causes of destruction were far more generalized. For example, the report would speculate how many tanks were lost due to air attack, artillery strikes, anti-tank fire, infantry weapons, and tank on tank combat. To date I don't think I have come upon any report that broke out losses by location of hit.

And even that would varry from tank to tank. For example, hardly any Allied tank could KO a Panther or King Tiger from the front at normal combat ranges. So you would see a disporportionate number of side and rear kills for those vehicles. Not because the rounds didn't strike the front, but because they didn't penetrate. Now compare this with a Sherman which could usually get knocked out at any angle... well, the stats would look completely different, wouldn't they? So how are we supposed to figure out trends from such data even if we came upon it? The short answer is... we can't do that any better than (basically) guessing. Our guess is based on pretty much straight probability of where a round could strike, and unfortunately I think that is about as good as it is going to get.

Steve

[Michael Dorosh]

I posted an AAR at the Squad Assault board from the battle at Kommerscheidt; a US Army Sherman platoon (3 tanks) was facing a force including German Panthers. The platoon leader went off on his own, and when faced with two Mark Vs smoke (WP?) rounds were used and the German tank crew, thinking they were on fire, bailed out. (For some reason AP was stored outside the Sherman tank and the commander had to egress to pass ammo inside, in the meantime they fired smoke).

The German crew their nerve up and remanned the tank, the Sherman's AP got a hit in which the AAR specifically mentions hitting the barrel of the Panther and rendering the gun inoperative.

Lots of stuff you don't see in CM, and an entertaining read - I am at work right now but will repost it here if the discussion is still going on. Gun hits did happen, but outside the anecdotal, BTS - like the rest of us - can only guess as to frequency.

[Michael Dorosh]

Taking up position northwest of the village (of Kommerscheidt), Flieg('s Sherman tank) ambushed the approaching German panzers...Seeing that another armored threat was developing...he left the two other tanks to cover the approaches and moved there to engage German tanks at a range of just two hundred yards.

Flieg hit the lead Panther with two HE rounds and didn't dent it, but the German crew panicked and bailed out. Realizing that AP ammo (which was stored outside the turret on the sponson rack) would be necessary...he ceased fire and rotated the turret to get at it. While Flieg and his gunner were getting the shells, the German crew re-entered their tank and opened fire. They missed with their first shot. Working in a fever of anxiety, Fleig's first AP shot took the barrel off the Panther, and the next three penetrated the armor plating and set the enemy afire - killing the entire crew.

THE MEN BEHIND THE CARDBOARD: Who was that 9-2; OR 7-0s are People Too! by Patrick Callahan

I was confused; elsewhere I read a discussion about WP being used on German tanks; the stuff would burn and convince the crews they were on fire, as well as sucking the oxygen out of the poor ventilation system some German AFVs reportedly had.

Anyway, there's nice evidence of at least one gun hit...

[Mr. Tittles]

If the sherman was a 76mm, then it would not have WP. I found no evidence of it till after WWII.

I also found little to only late war evidence of 60mm WP or bazooka WP.

[CombinedArms]

I think treating US troops in North Africa in '42 as green is entirely appropriate.

One thing I've noticed in CMBO and CMBB is that there seems to be a huge difference between green and regular in terms of how they play. This seems to me, in practical terms, the biggest experience level difference in CM. What I mean is that regular troops will generally do their jobs in a solid, effective manner--and sometimes will perform much better than that. Veterans, Crack and Elite perform better still, but regulars can be counted upon to solidly perform their jobs. Greens on the other hand, are quite dicey, with conscripts being just down the scale from the greens. So I tend to see the real dividing line in CM between green and regular. It's sort of like regular is B, vet B+, crack A- and elite A, but green plumets all the way down to C-or D.

Steve, if you're still listening, am I reading this right? And was this a deliberate decision on the part of CM? Did you mean to draw a particularly sharp line between green and regular?

[DDogg]

I think my only question about the gun damaged issue is why it has to damage all the guns on the tank including the MG's. If your main gun is damaged you should be able to fire your MG's at least to defend yourself.

On the Green issue, being a former Force Recon Marine, we always used green as someone who was trained but had no combat experience, plain and simple, someone who never saw the ****, so to speak. I do have to say BigJim, that those types usually wind up doing something stupid first time out, that you just want to smack em.

Oh and by the way, Michael Dorish it's obvious that other people do have the same problem Jim has.

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by DDogg:

Oh and by the way, Michael Dorish it's obvious that other people do have the same problem Jim has.

Is it gas? 'cause, if it is, then count me in as one who has it.

[dalem]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

I think treating US troops in North Africa in '42 as green is entirely appropriate.

Not that it's relevant, but I agree wholeheartedly. As anyone who has been around the CM boards for long can tell, I am a very solid "booster" of the quality of American fighting forces and equipment in WWII because they get treated unfairly in much of the literature and most of the games I've run across. But, one thing that's pretty clear from my reading is that U.S. Army tactics and training (and to some extent the equipment) were just plain outclassed in most of the N.A. campaign. A Green rating is indeed very appropriate.

-dale

[ November 20, 2003, 11:36 PM: Message edited by: dalem ]

[SgtMuhammed]

Another little note just because...

The American units that formed much of the initial force during Kasserine were the 1st Armored and the 34th Infantry. Both were some of the first troops to be rushed to full strength and sent to Europe after the outbreak of war. There training back in the States came during the startup of the mobilization cycle.

While they were in England (or Ireland) units still in the States began training with new lessons learned and with new equipment. In early February the 34th began to recieve quantities of the new bazookas. LTC Thomas Drake, commander of the force on Djebel Ksaira (just south of where the Demo scenario takes place), planned to figure out how to use them and then start training on 14 February.

As has been stated by others, American troops were trained under some pretty unrealistic doctrinal expectations. During prewar exercises infantry were able to KO tanks by hitting them with bags of flour which simulated hand grenades. Troops were taught the "tank roll over" technique of hiding in your hole and popping out behind an enemy tank. Of course this ignored the close cooperation practiced by the Panzers and Panzergrenadiers.

In short, American troops were very well trained to fight WWI at the start of WWII.

[Jim Harrison]

The problem as I see it, is that everyone who is posting on the "green" status of the GI in North Africa seems to be ignoring the fact of how quickly the GI's "learned their lessons". The game models many battles after Kasserine and in fact after Patton took over the GI's in North Africa never again took such a beating there. The human ability to withstand a combat situation varies from person to person even amoung family members, my dad and all but one of his 7 brothers served in WWII, one of them was unable to take the combat situation and was sent home as "shell shocked" while the rest served out their time during the war, one being taken prisoner at the battle of the bulge. My point is that "how you take it" is a personal makeup thing and no amount of training will change your ability to withstand or not withstand being under fire. Here in the game we have to make some designation between quality of troops in "general" terms, all I have asserted is that I feel BTS has made a decision about how "green" troops react based on the worst of them and not the middle of the road. In fact many so called "green" troops adapted rather quickly to the invironment they found themselves in, as did the officers involved and acquitted themselves quite well. Rommel was kicked out of North Africa after all, quite an amazing feat based on many of the opinions I have seen quoted here.

My interest is in "having a good gaming experience" and to that end BTS has done a great job with the CM series, I hope that in future when someone like myself expresses some small dislike he will not be pounced on like some of the poster's here have done to me, I must take time to applaud BTS who answered my concerns in a very informative and professional way. I completely understand now that they made a decision as to how to handel the differing troop types and ratings and allowed me to have an editor to "change" the balance to my likeing if I didnot agree with their decisions (this is one of the things that makes the CM series such a great success IMHO)

[ November 21, 2003, 02:44 AM: Message edited by: Jim Harrison ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Jim Harrison:

Rommel was kicked out of North Africa after all, quite an amazing feat based on many of the opinions I have seen quoted here.

Why? About 80+% of the troops fighting in Tunisia were British/Commonwealth/Empire. Whatever opinion one may hold of them, they in fact did most of the fighting there.

I would agree with you that the Americans learned the lessons of battle quickly—much more quickly than their British critics gave them credit for—and by the time of the battle for Bizerte acquitted themselves handsomely. But until the later stages of the battle of Kasserine they mostly showed a distinct lack of professionalism and clearly did not know what to expect in battle with the Germans or how to conduct themselves on the battlefield against the kind of opposition the German could put up.

Finally, I think that while you are correct that some green troops did about as well as more seasoned troops would have done in the same situations, most of them did not. Entire companies and even battalions simply disintegrated and fled. Others suffered from inertia and did nothing. Yet others showed gallantry and courage, but used poor tactics and got slaughtered. These are the marks not of cowards or fools, but of inexperienced and inadequately trained troops. It's notable that before the battle for Bizerte, troops were pulled out of the line and given additional training. This showed. Thereafter, they pulled themselves together and performed well.

And don't forget that an important part of this process involved culling out the "deadwood", peacetime officers who weren't up to leading men in battle. I think there were more officers per capita fired and replaced in Tunisia than in any other comparable period of the war in the US Army. Some of this may have been hysterical overreaction in some cases, but mostly it seems to have been for the better.

Michael

[ November 21, 2003, 03:58 AM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[massimorocca]

Anyone had noticed the ratio between gun damages and immobilizations (tracks hit, engine and transmission damaged)? I've the feeling (and only a feeling) that we may have a bit too much of the first and a bit too low of the second....

[CMplayer]

Originally posted by massimorocca:

Anyone had noticed the ratio between gun damages and immobilizations (tracks hit, engine and transmission damaged)? I've the feeling (and only a feeling) that we may have a bit too much of the first and a bit too low of the second....

Were you hull down when it happened?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by massimorocca:

Anyone had noticed the ratio between gun damages and immobilizations (tracks hit, engine and transmission damaged)? I've the feeling (and only a feeling) that we may have a bit too much of the first and a bit too low of the second....

Not sure about that. You still need to get through some sort of armour to get to the engine or transmission, and from what I understand, tracks are quite resilient even when hit, while the running gear has some redundancy built in. As was pointed out earlier, a large part of the gun system is completely unprotected, and other parts of it are potentially vulnerable to non-penetrating strikes.

We did a lot of testing with gun damage in the early days of CMBB. This was adjusted down a lot, and the beta testers in general felt it was fine at the end of that process. I did not notice much of a difference between BB and AK, and I would suggest waiting with your judgement until you have seen it play out on a larger map. The demo maps are quite constricted, and that could theoretically have an effect too.

[Jim Harrison]

Micheal are you ascerting that even without the Americans' in Tunisia the Commonwealth troops would have defeated Rommel???.

I believe you are right about whole companies running and breaking up at the battle of Kasserine, but to my knowledge that NEVER happened again in Tunisia??? We of course did get overrun in the Ardennes much later in the war and for the same reasons in some respects as the debaucle at Kasserine. The facts are in combat that if the enemy has overwhelming mass he will succeed generally given fairly equal ground, this hasn't changed too much since Klauswitz wrote the rules of war (excepting of course the modern battle field which he could never have invisioned).

All of this is really moot, for the best way to model battles with CM IMO is to figure out what happened "generally" in various battles and try to match those capabilities using what the game offers to meet that goal, regardless of what "history" labeled the various troop qualities.

[flamingknives]

If my assesment is correct, Jim, your complaint stems from the Fruhlingswind scenario - which took place at the start of the Kasserine offensive, so one would expect to see routing troops.

Later actions in Tunisia saw the US army successfully defend against the 10th Panzer. Although there are accounts of companies giving ground, this seems to mostly be in good order.

Most actions in Tunisia post-Kasserine were, however fought with the Allies on the offensive.

As the war progressed, US units were kept up to strength by simply adding replacements, who hadn't seen combat before, into the front line. This would mean that there would be green troops in the front line up to the end of the war.

The problem that you seem to have is with scenario design, not troop quality.

My particular grumble in this respect is the preponderance for scenario designers to use 'micro-terrain' - lots of little patches of cover. Europe and Russia is rarely like that.

[Jim Harrison]

Well my complaint is not that I haven't won that senario vs the AI in fact I never lose it with the American troops. My actual complaint is how the Tac AI handels those routing units, they seem to inevidabitly give the enemy the best opportunity to kill them (in the game), some have said this is realistic I am not convinced of that and that is the "basic" disagreement. You are of course right about the senario and I have no real problems with the senario per se.