Tac AI makes player assets total idiots

[Los]

"In short, American troops were very well trained to fight WWI at the start of WWII."

This statement probably applies to everyone of the major combatants to one degree or another with the possible exception of the Germans...

Los

[CombinedArms]

BTW,in response to Jim and others, when I said that I thought making US troops green in NA in '42 I meant exactly that. The fighting in Tunisia contined halfway into '43 and by that time many units had no doubt developed well past green.

Also, I've wondered before if the line between green and regular isn't too stark. A case could be made that there should be a gradation between these two. We have the luxury of three levels of troops from vet to crack to elite. A semi-green, semi-regular level might be very useful--even sacrifing one of these top grades-- esp. if I'm right that there's a stark drop in quality from B level for regulars to C- or D level for green. Having a C+ troop category might be helpful to scenario designers and help answer some of Jim's concerns as well. Clearly it won't happen before the next CM generation, though.

[ November 21, 2003, 11:22 AM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Eddy]

Good idea. You could call it Pale Green

[dalem]

I do agree that the "Rout" modeling remains unsatisfactory, but I don't see what can be done about it until the CM2 engine buds and swells from Charles' cranium.

Personally I would "rather" just see Broken units disappear and let them pop back in when they're Rallied somewhat. Routed units should ideally have a chance of dispersing in some fashion, with a chance of later Rallying, but if that Rallying is not going to occur until after the current battle, which seems highly likely, then just take them off the game board. We already don't see medics, chaplains, runners, and listening posts in the game, and we know they're abstractedly "sort of there", so I don't see the problem with not seeing Routed units either - just let the AI tally up how many actually survived the battle/rout "for later".

That's my opinion, worth what its worth.

-dale

[Mr. Tittles]

Perhaps the combat driven split-squad could help this green 'thing'.

There could be a sub-class of Green called Replacement-Green. These are representative of fresh replacements, that have traning (they are not conscripts) but have no combat testing.

My thought would be that they are very susceptible to the splitting when under fire (see my previous post). Not only do they split easily, but one of the half squads might 'flip' to a conscript. This models men's first reaction to battle.

My reading seems to indicate that it takes at least a few battles to get anywhere near veteran status. Beyond the scope of CM campaigns.

The real test was when men actually had to face firepower for the first time. If they lived past the first few days, they had a chance to become an old timer. The new guys, with undeveloped reaction times and limited combat smarts, often filled the body bags.

Units that flip to a conscript can not recombine with the other half squad during the battle. They have the usual conscript penaltys. They may recombine only during a campaign and the unit remains Replacement-Green. Replacement-Green units that did not split or rout during the battle have a chance to turn to normal green during teh campaign.

Normal troops (anything but conscripts and replacement-greens)that are given advance or assault orders have a greater tendency NOT to self-split but Replacement greens still would. Very dicey using these guys you see.

Replacement-Greens that are pinned (whole or half squads) take a long time to un-pin.

Conscripts would be very susceptible to combat splits.

[ November 21, 2003, 12:43 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Grumbling Grognard]

Originally posted by Lurkur:

The problem in the game is that squads have to act as whole units. Perhaps a better solution would be to factor in the fleeing troops as casualties, making a squad dissolve over time, rather than having whole units skeedaddle.

Yes, and this idea was mentioned several years ago as well and quickly bashed into the ground by the fan-boys IIRCC.

[YankeeDog]

Well, I'm stuck at work again with nothing to do, and a non-CM capable computer, so I might as well spout off some more on this thread. . .

Jim -

First, regarding the learning curve of American Troops in North Africa:

I absolutely agree that there is a very steep learning curve for American troops in 1942-1943. Globally, there would be a substantial difference in the experience level of American troops hitting the beach on November 8th, 1942, and American troops entering Bizerte on May 7th, 1943.

On November 8th, 1942, I would see virtually all American units save a few exceptionally well motivated and trained units (like the Ranger battalion that took fort Arzew near Oran) as averaging a "Green" level of experience in CM. By the time of the fall of Bizerte, I would see a substantial proportion of the American Ground forces that had been in the Theatre of most of the campaign (such as units in the 1st, 34th & 4thA Divs.) as having average "Regular" or even "Veteran" status. Of course, even in these divisions, as has been noted, individual platoons and companies that had seen high losses would probably be back at average "Green" status, reflecting a high proportion of replacements.

Note that I see the above experience levels as generalized averages. Even on November 8th, 1942, there would be individual American Platoons and Squads with Regular, and possibly Veteran Status even outside the Ranger battalions. I see this as reflecting American units that just happen to have gotten lucky, and have a high proportion of smart, perceptive and motivated commanders and soldiers with good instincts for combat. I would also see the occasional Conscript American platoon, reflecting a platoon with poor commanders and lower than average quality recruits. Basically, in every bushel of apples, there's a few exceptional specimens, and a few worm-eaten ugly ones. To me, this same distribution of experiences levels holds for all nationalities throughout the war, it's just a matter of where the mean lies.

So I don't find scenario featuring Regular, and even some Veteran American units in 1942 completely unrealistic. It would be an uncommon situation, but there were certainly American units that fought like seasoned Veterans on their first combat, just as there were other American units that seemed to go through combat after combat without learning much of anything.

There is a larger issue here, too. CM oversimplies troop quality a bit in that it recognizes only two factors: Experience and Fitness. For the most part, I think this is fine, but ultimately it would be nice to see this aspect of the model expanded a bit for CMX2. For example Airborne Assault, which used BFC used to publish (the game has moved to another publisher), actually tracked a number of different aspects of a unit's 'personality', including Training, Experience (actual combat experience, distict from training), Aggressiveness, Morale, Fitness, etc.

It was therefore possible in AA to depict a very well-trained unit with no combat experience, and a 'gung-ho' attitude, or a unit with lots of combat experience, but with poor overall morale and motivation and therefore likely to break for the rear as soon as things start to go badly, and all sorts of combinations inbetween. Ultimately, it would be nice to have this kind of refinement in CM, so you could model things like extrememly well trained and motivated but unblooded units such as the British forces that took Pegasus bridge, or some German units late in the war that were extremely experienced, but were beginnning to question the wisdom of continued resistance against an overwhelmingly superior allied force, etc.

Who knows, maybe for CMX2. For now, I think the present system does remarkably well considering it only tracks two 'quality' variables for units.

As for your original reason for starting this thread - the tendency of low experience units to expose theselves to killing fire when they break, I agree with you comments to an extent (though I did find your original tone a bit harsh). I would make the following additional observations:

1) This 'problem' is actually not limited to Green units. In fact, all units in CM have a tendancy to expose themseleves to killing fire when they rout. It's just that you see it more with Green and Conscript units because they rout more easily. Even an Elite unit will try to run across an MG fire-swept field toward a small patch of scattered trees if it routs.

2) IMHO, units 'break' fo safety at about the right time in CM in terms of exposure and intensity of received fire. The problem is that the TacAI appears a relatively simple idea of what 'safety' is. It seems that routed units make a beeline for the nearest terrain tile with a relatively good cover rating that is in the general direction of their rear area. This works passably well in area with decent density of good cover, but in areas with a very low cover density, such open desert or steppe, the TacAI sometimes makes some rather improbable decsions. Units sometimes run across wide swathes of open ground covered by enemy fire towards a small patch of brush when a slightly different path would take them over a crest in into defilade, where they would be in open ground but out of view of the enemy and therefore more or less safe.

In BFC's defense, it's asking a lot of the TacAI to expect it to be able to recognize what withdrawal routes are likely to be out of LOS relative to possible multiple sources of enemy fire, and then make pathfinding decisions based on this reasoning. Refinement like this in the pathfinding logic might be possible for CMX2, I don't know. I'm not an AI programmer. Another alternative might be to allow the player to set a 'withdrawal SOP' order, where you could plot a retrograde movement order to be executed *if* things get to hot in the unit's present location. This might give the player too much control, though - routed soldiers generally aren't thinking too straight. . .

3) Although I can completely accept that routed soldiers might make some bad descisions as to where try to run, as had already been noted, one of the big problems in CM is that ALL members of a routing CM squad make the SAME bad decision, which means they can all be pinned down and killed by the same source of fire. This problem gets magnified in the kind of scarce cover situations noted in (2) above. The 'auto-split' ideas put forth above are an interesting idea for how to improve this aspect of the model. It is worth noting, though, that the practical, short term results in the CM battle would be the same. Squads that rout in CM are already pretty much wortheless for the remainder of that game unless the battle is very long - it just takes too much time to rally. A Squad that routs combined with the surviving soldiers scattering over a wide area would almost certainly be useless for the rest of a CM battle.

4) There is another issue that I think compounds the Rout behaviour problem: CM players play for points. Breaking or Routing enemy soldiers gives you a tactical advantage, but it does nothing for your final score in CM in and of itself. As a result, CM players (and even the StratAI and TacAI, IMHO) tend to put an somewhat unrealistic amout of effort into actually 'finishing the job', and either killing or capturing enemy units in order to up their score. When this combines with routed units' tendancy to expose themselves to fire, you get very high casualty counts. I'm not sure much can be done about this aspect of the problem. Personally, I usually avoid wasting fire on routed enemy units that are breaking for the rear if at all possible, preferring to focus my limited ammuntion on the enemy that is still up and fighting. Once I have an area of the map under control, I might send it a high-ammo, low cost unit (American HTs are a personal favorite!) to 'clean up' and kill/capture and enemy stragglers. In general, though, I find that I score better against both the AI and human players if I focus my efforts on breaking enemy units still fighting, rather than trying to rack up the body count.

To paraphrase Churchill: CM's TacAI is the worst. . . Except for all the others.

Cheers,

YD

[Wicky]

Inspired from the above

An exceptionally well motivated and trained "Green" that featured in an allied draw vs AI axis;)

A major factor seems to be how they perform under command with the variable factors that can be given to the officer units by the scenario creator which can improve by degree a squads performance.

Note the major brush fire in background

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Jim Harrison:

Micheal are you ascerting that even without the Americans' in Tunisia the Commonwealth troops would have defeated Rommel???.

I think that is a viable argument. It would have taken longer, but the difference would have been measured in months, or even weeks, and not in years.

A lot depends on what the Americans are actually doing. Are there American forces still in Morroco and Algeria? Or do they stay at home freeing up more Lend-Lease and shipping space for the Brits? Or are they raising a ruckus somewhere else distracting the Axis from North Africa?

I believe you are right about whole companies running and breaking up at the battle of Kasserine, but to my knowledge that NEVER happened again in Tunisia???

You may be right. At least I do not know that you are wrong. But the campaign was already halfway through at that point. And some of their attacks in the month following were stalled and didn't amount to much. Some of that can be laid at the door of Alexander, who in some cases misused what was available to him in the form of II Corps, but most of it was just the Americans still learning their craft and working the bugs out.

I am in agreement with historians who take the position that the Americans did learn and learned fast. But learn they had to do, and the lessons were not cheap.

It is interesting to consider that North Africa was the training ground for both the British and American armies. I think each drew different conclusions from their experience and that showed later in the war in the ways that each army went about its business. But each system seems to have worked for its practitioner.

We of course did get overrun in the Ardennes much later in the war...

I think it is important to note the difference between breaking and running on one hand and general ineptness on the other. The former was seldom a problem in Allied armies. The latter was a continuing problem that got better over time but never entirely went away.

All of this is really moot, for the best way to model battles with CM IMO is to figure out what happened "generally" in various battles and try to match those capabilities using what the game offers to meet that goal, regardless of what "history" labeled the various troop qualities.

I'm not sure I understand this, so I will just state my position and you can decide whether it concurs with your own or not. I think that for the first three months of the battle in Tunisia, it is fair to say that American troops should be modeled as green more often than not. After that point, greenness should be encountered less and less frequently. By the same token, I think it fair to say that some of the other nationalities should experience a similar handicap. Some of the British formations coming from the UK were only marginally better off, and the French should in some cases be rated as conscripts. I suppose that some of the Italian formations were in the same boat.

In all cases, "greenness" was not uniform throughout the armies. Some formations fought better than others, and I see no reason why this cannot be reflected in troop ratings in scenarios.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

With Engima helping the allies to sink supply convoys left and right, and the failure to reduce Malta as an air base, I think Axis defeat in NA was inevitable even without US intervention.

[thewood]

One thing Wicky mentions that is probably more important than any other is leadership. The key to German infantry success was small unit leadership and the stressing of initiative. American combat infantry performance can probably be traced to a large extent to lack of solid, motivated, and trained company/platoon leadership. Most good books on WWII stress small unit leaders made the day for either side. Green troops with adequate experienced leadership can perform as well as elite forces with poor small unit leaders in many situations.

On a side note...The main reason Americans were needed in Torch was for landing craft and amphibious support craft. It was also expected to be the live-fire training ground for the invasion of Europe. Although I do believe that Rommel would have eventually collapsed, it would have taken longer without American logistical support. It would also have meant that the core of the american infantry divisions would have been green going into Italy, and Torch problems would have been transferred to the Italian landings.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by thewood:

One thing Wicky mentions that is probably more important than any other is leadership. The key to German infantry success was small unit leadership and the stressing of initiative. American combat infantry performance can probably be traced to a large extent to lack of solid, motivated, and trained company/platoon leadership.

Has this ever really been explored in depth? I should think that a company with good platoon and squad leaders but a horrible company commander could still do a creditable job in action at the CM scale...witness E/506th at Bastogne/Foy, if you consider Ambrose's study research.

US, British and Canadian officers were a mixed bag - notice that most German platoon commanders were NCOs.

But By 1944, squad and platoon commanders in the Allied armies were not averse to exercising individual initiative - I would suggest that good company and battalion commanders held back the men more than their immediate (squad/platoon) leadership. Battle Drill got the Canadians and British thinking about immediate actions and what to do in a firefight, and this was ingrained pretty well in training beginning in about 1942. I would argue sections and platoons had no real shortage of qualified leadership from 1943 at the latest onwards; attrition was high amongst these, though. Canada had a surplus of platoon commanders, in fact - hence CANLOAN where many lieutenants went to British Army platoons and many became company commanders, battalion 2 i.c's and several were decorated for valour and leadership.

Perhaps something worth discussing, anyway.

[ November 21, 2003, 03:49 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Ace Pilot]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Has this ever really been explored in depth? I should think that a company with good platoon and squad leaders but a horrible company commander could still do a creditable job in action at the CM scale...witness E/506th at Bastogne/Foy, if you consider Ambrose's study research.

If I recall, the attack on Foy was in the process of faltering under Echo Company’s commander, Lt. Dike, because of his indecision and lack of leadership. It wasn’t until Major Winters ordered Lt. Spears to relieve Lt. Dike and take over the company that the attack regained its momentum. I think this example shows that even great platoon leaders and non-coms cannot make up for a bad company commander.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Ace Pilot:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Has this ever really been explored in depth? I should think that a company with good platoon and squad leaders but a horrible company commander could still do a creditable job in action at the CM scale...witness E/506th at Bastogne/Foy, if you consider Ambrose's study research.

If I recall, the attack on Foy was in the process of faltering under Echo Company’s commander, Lt. Dike, because of his indecision and lack of leadership. It wasn’t until Major Winters ordered Lt. Spears to relieve Lt. Dike and take over the company that the attack regained its momentum. I think this example shows that even great platoon leaders and non-coms cannot make up for a bad company commander. </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by thewood:

Green troops with adequate experienced leadership can perform as well as elite forces with poor small unit leaders in many situations.

I think as far as CM goes, the experience rating of squads can be used to represent, in part, the competency of the squad leaders.

Michael

[thewood]

Michael, Actually, I was refering to early war US Army. The Army did a much better job after North Africa in getting competent leaders into the field, although they struggled in the rush to get 90-day wonders out in late '44.

As far as green troops go, I was suggesting that green troops also represent green leaders, in CM terms, but if you have a lot of high-quality leaders in platoon and company, you can make green troops in CM very effective.

[Jim Harrison]

Micheal what I ment by my suggestion regarding senario design, is that I must take into account how the "game engine" treats things in order to reflect "historic" battles. Many senario designers in the past have just simply made one side "green" and the other "vet" based on the reading of the actual history (which may have been true) but the way the "game" over simplifies the rating difference (which also may be the only way it can be done) means to get that historic "flavor" you may have to "rerate" certain elements to produce the battle that was using CM constraints.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Jim Harrison:

Micheal what I ment by my suggestion regarding senario design, is that I must take into account how the "game engine" treats things in order to reflect "historic" battles.

Well sure. I thought that's what we were all saying all along.

Michael

[Ace Pilot]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Ace Pilot:

If I recall, the attack on Foy was in the process of faltering under Echo Company’s commander, Lt. Dike, because of his indecision and lack of leadership. It wasn’t until Major Winters ordered Lt. Spears to relieve Lt. Dike and take over the company that the attack regained its momentum. I think this example shows that even great platoon leaders and non-coms cannot make up for a bad company commander.

Echo Company? I think you were watching The Empire Strikes Back recently. Easy, please!

</font>

[TheCrow]

Well, I think than give a general "green status" to American troops at Afrika and even at Sicily, it´s a easy decision. But What status will you give to Commonwealth, and German troops?

Commowealth: regular,

AFrika korps:Veteran, or regular with veteran o better HQ platoons?

[Andreas]

I think that depends on which part of the forces you look at. Some Commonwealth formations were fresh out of the UK, e.g. 78th 'Battleaxe' division. Some German formations were also untried, AFAIK.

The Americans are probably the only ones where a blanket approach is defensible. The Germans and Commonwealth need to be looked at on a unit-by-unit basis, IMO.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by TheCrow:

Well, I think than give a general "green status" to American troops at Afrika and even at Sicily, it´s a easy decision. But What status will you give to Commonwealth, and German troops?

Commowealth: regular,

AFrika korps:Veteran, or regular with veteran o better HQ platoons?

TROOP QUALITY

5th Canadian Armoured Division went into the line in early 1944 - green - and got the **** kicked out of them in their first action. Some men apparently threw their weapons away and ran during their first contact with the Germans. This was on the Arielli River front, and without armour support.

As the 5th marched past men of the 1st Canadian Division (old veterans by now) on the way to the assembly areas for the attack they laughed and said "we'll show you Red Patch bastards how it's done!"

When they came streaming back a few hours later, dirty and shaken, the vets didn't hold it against them. "Welcome to the big leagues" was the prevailing sentiment.

FITNESS

On the other hand, First Canadian Division performed not too badly in its first battles in Sicily, but were not used to the heat immediately following the landings - scenario designers may want to note that the entire division was given a day or two of rest by Montgomery personally, just after the landings - and Canadian troops may even be represented as WEAKENED in the first days of the invasion, as they were not acclimated yet.

While the other units of the invasion force had been in North Africa - the 1st Cdn Div came straight from Scotland. Sicily is rather hot in July! Scotland is rather not.

Lots of things to consider along these lines, and proves Andreas' point - ya gotta consider them unit by unit.

[ November 22, 2003, 10:23 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The Americans are probably the only ones where a blanket approach is defensible.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. I wasn't arguing that every American squad in a game be given a green rating, but rather that one would encounter it fairly frequently.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

The Americans are probably the only ones where a blanket approach is defensible.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. I wasn't arguing that every American squad in a game be given a green rating, but rather that one would encounter it fairly frequently.

Michael </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

...stop being difficult and get on with starving the masses.

I'm trying, I'm trying! But the sneaky buggers keep hiding peanut butter sandwiches in the damndest places.

Michael