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Good book on German operations in the Ardennes?


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I'm looking for a good book on the German operations during the offensive in the Ardennes, or the battle of the Bulge as it is often called. I found the following title and wonder whether it is any good: "Panzers in Winter: Hitler's Army and the Battle of the Bulge" by Samuel W. Mitcham. Does anybody own it and if so, what is your opinion of this book? What would be your alternative to this book? It has to be focused on German operations.

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After The Battle Publications :

Battle Of The Bulge Then And Now

Amazon UK have it for GBP 42.70

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Battle-Bulge-Then-Jean-Paul-Pallud/dp/0900913401/sr=1-1/qid=1157048006/ref=sr_1_1/202-7880985-1289410?ie=UTF8&s=books

Excellent tome with massive amount of photos (with modern comparison photos of locations) and reasonable text from German sources.

Weight and size makes it a lethal weapon in itself :)

Cheers

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Oh I can see it alright. Peiper was an arrogant idiot who threw away his entire command, and was outplayed at every turn by Ridgeway and company. Why the fanboys all want to pretend he was some genuis is one of those eternal mysteries. The heer formations in the south did ten times better.

Peiper was leading a formation that had 3 times more infantry again than he had, and even if all of it had been up with him he still would have mustered 1:2 infantry odds. Instead he took 300 armored vehicles into impassable terrain with about 8 companies of infantry, facing oh about 9 times as many once they were all up.

If ever a proof were wanted that armor is not decisive and combined arms does not mean infantry as an afterthought, it was the fate of Peiper's column. If he were looking for a noose he couldn't have done worse. There were clear better moves on the map operationally that he ignored to stick to a plan visibly falling apart, he arrogantly left his supports, failed to secure is one LOCs, ignored the help he could give to formations on his flanks, etc.

Pride is a weakness, it is demonstrated a hundred times a day for anybody with eyes. But for some bizarre and pathological psychological reason, the conclusion is vehemently resisted everywhere.

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Originally posted by JasonC:

Pride is a weakness, it is demonstrated a hundred times a day for anybody with eyes. But for some bizarre and pathological psychological reason, the conclusion is vehemently resisted everywhere.

Yes, pride and arrogance... :rolleyes: But back to my question about "Panzers in winter" by Mitcham, there is indeed a fixation on Peiper and the Waffen SS formations that took part in the offensive in the Ardennes. Thats why Mitchams book seems so attractive. I've read this description at Amazon.com, Germany.

"The greatest military disaster, the United States suffered in Europe during World War II happened in the Ardennes Offensive, when most of the 106th Infantry Division was destroyed in the Schnee Eifel mountains. This defeat was not inflicted by the vaulted panzer troops, the elite paratroopers, the hardened SS men, or German commandos. It was administered by a mediocre and unheralded unit - the 18th Volksgrenadier Division. Most of its men had been industrial workers or in the Luftwaffe or navy the year before. This book covers the Battle of the Schnee Eifel from the German point of view in greater depth than any book has ever done, using unpublished German reports and manuscripts, especially those of Lieutenant Colonel Dietrich Moll, the chief of operations of the 18th Volksgrenadier"

It sounds like another approach. Can anyone recommend this book? I would like to hear whether it is worth it. The price seems a bit high for a book of only 250 pages or so.

[ September 01, 2006, 12:49 AM: Message edited by: Aragorn2002 ]

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Yup, pride, bizarre, pathological vehemence...

Um, obsessiveness... whatever... We can only do our best.

Anyway, Thanks for the pointer Aragorn2002, I'll try and chase that book up at some stage.

You might try 'Men of Steel, the 1st SS Panzer Corps' by Michael Reynolds if you don't already own it. ;)

Also, the 12th SS volumes 1 and 2 in the Stackpole range by Hubert Meyer are quite good and they deal with the region at times.

Osprey's 'Ardennes 1944' Campaign series #5 ain't so bad as an overview...

Or, 'SS-Leibstandarte' by Rupert Butler for the same.

I'm currently reading 'Grenadiers' by Kurt Meyer in the Stackpole series... I figure it might get around to the Ardenne at some stage. Good read so far!

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Originally posted by JasonC:

Oh I can see it alright. Peiper was an arrogant idiot who threw away his entire command, and was outplayed at every turn by Ridgeway and company. Why the fanboys all want to pretend he was some genuis is one of those eternal mysteries. The heer formations in the south did ten times better.

I wouldn't say he was a genuis at all, but he was a pretty aggressive commander in the Ardennes compared to say, Bayerlein. It would be an interesting study to see how his KG would have done if it would have crossed the Our at Dasburg.

Peiper was leading a formation that had 3 times more infantry again than he had, and even if all of it had been up with him he still would have mustered 1:2 infantry odds. Instead he took 300 armored vehicles into impassable terrain with about 8 companies of infantry, facing oh about 9 times as many once they were all up.

How was he to know what was in front of him? He had only sporadic radio contact with Division, and he didn't have much choice in the deployment of the LAH Pzgr regiments seployed to the south on the other "rollbahn".

If ever a proof were wanted that armor is not decisive and combined arms does not mean infantry as an afterthought, it was the fate of Peiper's column. If he were looking for a noose he couldn't have done worse. There were clear better moves on the map operationally that he ignored to stick to a plan visibly falling apart, he arrogantly left his supports, failed to secure is one LOCs, ignored the help he could give to formations on his flanks, etc.

History shows that he held the key to success on the northern shoulder by turning the 99th & 2nd division flanks at Bullingen-Rocherath but failed to do it. Yes, Arrogance clearly failed him here. but the responsibility of his LOC was not his so much as it was the 3rd FJ division, which failed him miserably.

Pride is a weakness, it is demonstrated a hundred times a day for anybody with eyes. But for some bizarre and pathological psychological reason, the conclusion is vehemently resisted everywhere.

No argument here. Pride seems to be an admirable trait only to those who have little of it.
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Aragorn2002,

I'm reasonably well read, but what are vaulted panzer troops?

On a more serious note, did any of you see the History Channel's "The Damn Engineers" when it aired?

In essence, the argument advanced, and the title's from a Peiper quote, is that the U.S. Army combat engineers, who blew up, often in his face, practically every bridge in sight that Peiper needed, were instrumental in stopping his otherwise powerful armored thrust. No matter where he tried to move his monster Tiger IIs and other AFV and softskins, the engineers and their bridge wrecking explosives lay before him. From what I could tell, he basically ran his tanks dry moving them from one potential crossing site to another, ultimately running out of fuel and time.

Regards,

John Kettler

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Yes engineers blew bridges, they also laid antitank mines, staged ambushes with bazookas and the occasional ATG. No it wasn't enough on its own to stop the column. That took men from the 82nd airborne in front of the column, and from the 30th infantry division to the north, hitting its long right flank. The latter took parts of the route he had originally advanced along, which he failed to keep open for the follow on forces because he was singlemindedly racing west. He did not run out of fuel simply running around - it is not like he was limited to what was in the gas tanks.

He was resupplied regularly - *until* the Americans cut in behind him and cut him off. Then they started running low on fuel, and went defensive. Others tried to hack their way up to them, but found it hard to reach the field, since Elsenborn and St. Vith were still holding out at that point, jamming most of the road net much farther east.

The real story is that infantry cutting roads after flanking moves through the woods, was a more mobile *combat* arm in this terrain, than the tanks were. It also got across rivers - which every army could bridge with pontoons and the like if both banks were held by friendly forces. But Peiper had very little infantry. Rigid doctrine about the supposed importance of massed armor was simply wrong. A cutting edge of high quality armor along the roads and opposite the towns certainly helped, but it took tactical off road maneuver by leg infantry to turn all the roadblocks and clear all the routes.

There is no sign Peiper actually understood any of that, incidentally. The performance was really remarkably poor, all around.

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Originally posted by John Kettler:

What I really liked about the combat engineer documentary was that it had new footage and told a side of the Bulge story I'd never seen addressed before.

I don't know, John, what you cite and what Jason mentioned is pretty much the same thing I've come across in most of the accounts I've read in the last 40 years. I haven't read this book myself, but it looks like a good one on this particular subject (I did thumb through a copy some years ago) if you are interested in pursuing the matter farther.

Michael

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Originally posted by John Kettler:

JasonC,

Another great and informative post! Am unaware, though, that the Germans ever had a pontoon bridge capable of supporting a King Tiger. What I really liked about the combat engineer documentary was that it had new footage and told a side of the Bulge story I'd never seen addressed before.

Regards,

John Kettler

That angle is based on research at least as far back as MacDonald's 'A Time for Trumpets'. He had a chapter in his book called 'The Damn Engineers'

Sorry for spoiling the book for you Richie. Remember, the murderer is always the butler.

Final note: Peiper was an idiot. He must be one of the most over-rated German commanders. When he was first given a Panzerregiment to command he managed to lose it in a very short space of time. But because he was one of Himmler's favourites, that did not seem to matter. Read Timo Worst's posts on the matter here:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=106165

All the best

Andreas

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Here -- came across this recently released book that seems to fit the bill:

Hitler's Ardennes Offensive:

The German View of the Battle of the Bulge

Author/Editor: Danny S. Parker

Pub: Greenhill

www.scholarsbookshelf.com/military

(code: 5g3te)

I ordered something from Zenith Press recently. One or two of their offerings might have focused more on the German side as well.

Good luck

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