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Originally posted by Schoerner:

What were the reasons for a just-for-fun two-frontier war?

The same reasons he embarked on such a war in 1939 - the threat of two frontiers didn't disuade the attack on Poland. And at the time there was *no* assurance that the Poles would fold as quickly as they did, no matter the pact with the USSR. Or that France and England wouldn't launch an offensive into Germany - only a few 10s of kilometers advance from the low countries would have put a severe hurt on the Reich!

As well, in 1941 it wasn't a two frontier war. Germany was at war with only one other power, and that one was isolated on its island with no ability to threaten Germany. I'd argue that the situation for the attack on the USSR was *better*, less risky (from the view of Germany), than the attack on Poland - a tried and validated military, no threat of attack from the West, an isolated opponent in the USSR, an alliance with a power (Japan) on the other side of the opponent.

In short, I have to disagree with the appraisal that war was launched when it was because Germany felt *immediately* threatened by the USSR. War was, in Hitler's view, inevitable, between the two. When it was launched it was the adventageous time for Germany, not because of any Soviet troop build up on the frontier.

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...and also, there's the fact that the German high command rather underestimated how long Russia could put up a fight, apparently believing that it'd be a pushover. After all, practically every previous opponent had been, and the Slavs were thought to be mere untermensch who got a bloody nose taking on a far smaller opponent in Finland; how could they be expected to last for long?

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von Luke,

well i was going to enjoy my answer but rune beat me to,thanks for saving me all that typing rune ;) On most of my other points you seemed to agree with them more than dispute them.If you will notice i said it was a shared victory,meaning that if it werent for the allies in the west,then germany could have put up a much longer,and more brutal fight for the soviets.I had said that the western allies contribution was mainly only at the end of the war,but i thank you for pointing out my error.One of the synthetic oil plants you mentioned was the target for repeated air raids that left it partial destroyed and ablaze on several different occasions through out the war.Then there was this lil detail about the Uber weapon.Whats that you ask?Atomic weapons,they were getting there,had heavy water plants and all,the time that would have been added by no war on two fronts may have very well meant hiroshima,but in moscow,or stalingrad.Wonder if the war would have gone differently then?

Also,thanks for the stats that prove my point about attacking for resources:

German and Soviet production figures (in millions of tons):

>>>>>>1941><1942><1943><1944

coal

Germany:::246......258......269......281

USSR:::::::151.......75........93.......121

steel

Germany::::31.......32........35......35

USSR::::::::18........8.........10......12

oil

Germany:::::6........7

USSR::::::::33.......22........18.......18

You will also note that there is no listing for rubber.Everyone needed it,and if you didnt have it oil had to be converted,which made their minute amount of oil even smaller.

As far as general winter is concerned,well lets just say that like in CM,luck plays a factor.IMHO it can often be the "icing on the cake" that turns the tide.More than once through out history weather has been the deciding factor in war.Im also confused by why the histroy channel and history books and such,here in the usa,would be giving accounts of the soviet winter that had no key role in stopping the germans,and was completely made up by the germans.

[ February 18, 2003, 12:19 PM: Message edited by: Ares_the_Great ]

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Getting back to the original topic, I think any perceived gamieness (gameyness?) and Russian superiority can all be layed at the feet of scenario designers. CMBB has provided all the tools to represent understrength conscript farmboy units with incompetent officers in 1941, just as they let you represent demoralized German units with no ammo in 1945.

But nobody wants to play conscript Russians or impoverished homeguard Germans in a scenario. There's a strong emphasis on balanced play and 'playability' in scenario design. If you want the game to be more historically accurate you'll have to accept historically accurate outcomes - which, in CMBB scale, means sometime fighting hopeless situations just for the experience of the battle.

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I wonder if Nikke had any idea that his post would generate 4 pages worth of responses?Some of which(and i apoligize for contributing to)strayed way off topic.

"But nobody wants to play conscript Russians or impoverished homeguard Germans in a scenario. There's a strong emphasis on balanced play and 'playability' in scenario design. If you want the game to be more historically accurate you'll have to accept historically accurate outcomes - which, in CMBB scale, means sometime fighting hopeless situations just for the experience of the battle." -MikeyD

I think that says it it all.Maybe BTS took this into account when making the game.It has to be fun,realistic but fun.

[ February 18, 2003, 12:46 PM: Message edited by: Ares_the_Great ]

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I agree entirely with Grisha's postings.

I'd like to add the following:

1. The germans - ON A TACTICAL LEVEL - truly understood and implimented concepts that reinforced small unit cohesion & toughness

example: troops were encouraged to call out to each other and woop during battle the opposite of us army doctrine at the time. US troops complained of feeling cut of in battle.

example: In the german army officers were PROMOTED, not COMMISSIONED as in the US army,

even officer cadets (FAHNENJUNKERS), hte true leaders of the pack were the leaders. This was practiced unofficially by the US army(see: "Death Traps" by Cooper and "A Colonel in the Armored Divisions" by Triplet).

2.In examining the Mius River Offensive July 43

von Mellinthin in "Panzer Battles" uses it as an example of Soviet Bullheaded stupidity as do other german commentaries, however in Glantz, in

"Soviet Military Deception in the 2nd World War" states "...In mid-July, although beaten at Kursk,the Germans retained a significant, if shaken, operational reserve...which, if employed as a body,could frustrate any Soviet attempt to achieve operational success. ...The Soviet solution was to lure these units to othersectors of the front. Experience had sshown thyat simulations or simple feints might not serve this purpose. What were required were full scale offensive operations, if necessary in full view of German intelligence, and offensives of sufficient strength and credibility to both attract and tie up German operational reserves until requisite damage was done in the key stategic sector, the Kursk region. The two diversions of July 17 were both strong and credible." See also "Scorched Earth" by Carell and "Decision in the Ukraine Summer 43" by Nipe.

3. It might also be a question of thinking big:

travel 200 kilometers in Germany and you'll likely be in another country, 200 kilometers in Russia, you're still in Russia. Thus on the operational/stategic level the Soviets were mentally disposed to a much more realistic view of the Time/Space dilemma.

Ludendorff showed this operational blind spot when commentting on his operational plan for the western front offensive in 1918 (op Micheal) "... We'll blow a hole in the line and then see what happens, thats what we did in the east"

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"Mein Kampf" was the book of a opposition-politician.

Take the personal circumstances into account.

Take the circumstances of the german nation into account.

And then take a look at the extremely pragmatic politics Hitler made: South-Tyrol, hallway to Danzig ("No other german politician could dare to strive for that minimal solution").

The attack against the Soviet Union was improvised due to the over 100 russian divisions concentrating on the west-border.

There was no more time to wait until the Heer was perpared for a russian war.

The concentrated russian forces were that massive, once they had started to attack, several hundred kilometers in extremely high populated Germany country and deep defensive positions would have been needed to stop them (Germany isn't that big).

Only a fool can believe, that Hitler after he had won against France and was in war against Britain, that he and german HQ was that stupid, to start a two frontier war, while ALL involved strategists, including Hitler, knew what a two frontier war would mean, from WW I.

It's really funny, how (excellent informed) people ignore the huge soviet troop concentrations of millions of soldiers on a quite small strip close to the german border, although it made absolutely no sense for a defensive strategy, in such a huge and neverending country like the USSR was.

Do you really prefer to believe in such a primitve story, that "Mein Kampf" was the reason, while the historic military facts of troop-concentrations, movements and orders are speaking for themselves?

But even if we believe the tale about the "peaceful" communistic USSR (and ignoring all the attack wars since 1917 against it's neighbours), this story becomes even more ridiculous:

can you explain to me in a logical way, where was the reason for Hitler to attack the "peaceful" communistic USSR, while the war in the west still was going on?

Why did he start just for fun a two-frontier war?

And please, don't come with that explanations for school-children, that the evil does things 'cause it's evil and the enemy of western democracies and their aliies (as long as they are alliies) are eating children just for fun.

Let's assume, that the most successful politician in this time, had rational reasons for what he did.

What were the reasons for a just-for-fun two-frontier war? [/QB]

Seems like someone sleeps with a copy of "Mein Kampf" under their pillow. Respectible historians such as Glantz have soundly shattered the revisionist "theory" that the Germans were merely doing a preemptive strike when they attacked the U.S.S.R. Just read "When Titans Clashed". Next you will be saying that the racially superior Germans had to do their ethnic cleansing in Russia for preemptive purposes.

[ February 18, 2003, 01:25 PM: Message edited by: Keith ]

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As far as general winter is concerned,well lets just say that like in CM,luck plays a factor.IMHO it can often be the "icing on the cake" that turns the tide.More than once through out history weather has been the deciding factor in war.Im also confused by why the histroy channel and history books and such,here in the usa,would be giving accounts of the soviet winter that had no key role in stopping the germans,and was completely made up by the germans.
To assume victory from such a vague set of plans as Barbarossa within a time span that was never really determined, but was generally agreed to be before winter, is asinine, in my opinion, and is but one more indication of the rudimentary nature of German operational theory. I'm sorry, but I really don't care how effective your fighting force may be at the tactical level, if you're going to place the success of your entire strategic campaign on that, then you deserve whatever comes your way.

And another thing, the Germans never formally made the distinction between a strategic campaign and an operation. Nearly every operation they planned had wide strategic significance, and therefore a lot was riding on their operations. Too much, in my opinion. Unlike the Soviets, the Germans never considered conducting war in measured steps, it always had to be big, fast, and final. The obsession for the fast, single campaign blinded the Germans of the possibility to study the operational level, indeed, to even recognize it as a level between tactics and strategy. Of the German generals, only a military genius like von Manstein was able to recognize the necessity of an operational level, and he figured that out on the job! A few others had inklings of the operational level, but it was at the most rudimentary level. Even so, without a firm grounding in operational art, the German Army denied itself of an entire methodology, rich in versatility and increased efficiency. What resulted was an amazing tactical system that had to work doubly hard to make up for a patchy, obscure operational theory. Much like assigning highly skilled carpenters to build a warehouse, but only supplying them with sections of wood no longer than a meter.

Winter is a season, one of four in continental Europe. Seasons have existed more or less since the last time the Earth went into an Ice Age. Thus, winter's inevitable appearance around December should come as no surprise for Europeans. If the Germans decided not to consider that war might last longer than 5-6 months - they have no one to blame but themselves. "General Winter" is just plain lame. Nazi Germany has only their arrogance and amazing capacity for self-denial to blame for freezing their soldiers to death in the winter of 1941.

Apologies for the acidic tone, but some things are just not worth serious consideration.

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Sergei is right that the largest losses occurred in 1941 in disorganized, fruitless counterattacks. He just left out why they were conducting so many counterattacks and why they were so disorganized when launched. It wasn't because Russians were dumb peasants or their commanders were idiots or because they thought charging across an open field into machine guns with infantry only was a bright idea.

It was because they were already surrounded. The Russians took their big losses in the pockets. The Germans ran rings around them, and then defended on the interior lines of those rings, while the Russians tried frantically to get out. The Germans were on the tactical defensive in lots of this fighting - that was the advantage number one of having driven a ring around the enemy. He had to attack you, or run out of everything where he stood.

And he had already run out of a lot of things. Coordination for one. Morale. Ammo for the artillery. Any semblance of organized rear areas. Simply because he was pocketed. That is where the 15 to 1 kill ratios of 1941 came from. The Russians didn't have artillery coordination because it was an ad hoc breakout attempt, half the guns were in the wrong places, the rest out of ammo, there were no communications, etc.

Put German infantry in a linear defense with MGs and foxholes and guns and FO 105s, and give the Russians infantry force type, weakened green men and an exit requirement through the Germans. If that doesn't give you enough giggles, give the Russians a 50% starting ammo state, and/or put the Germans on two sides, and/or give them a "combined arms" level of tank support (it was mostly the Panzer divisions holding the outer walls of these pockets, on the east side the Russians tried to get away through, anyway).

If you want to simulate the Russians using their tanks, too, that is perfectly reasonable. Use the armor force type and give them 15 (green) T-26s to 1 platoon of infantry, and no artillery support. Give the Germans combined arms, with towed light PAK and infantry guns, a company of infantry, and a platoon of tanks. No, the Russians didn't have very good combined arms force structures in 1941, and yes their tanks were that light, and used in that lopsided, tank-heavy a manner. Try it.

Did the Russians sometimes have more coordination and better equipment? Sure, and the Germans had to counter those, when they occurred, with more than the above "usual thing" forces. If you want to simulate that sort of thing, give the Russians -

1 platoon of green T-34s

3-4 platoons of green BT series tanks

1 company of tank rider SMGs

1 82mm FO

Then give the Germans a "gun front" defense. That means - 37mm PAK in batteries of 3-4 guns (1-2 of them), 105mm howitzer in pairs or 4 gun batteries, 88 FLAK sections of 2 guns, a pioneer platoon, an infantry company, 105mm FOs, air support, and a tank platoon.

OK, but sometimes the Germans had to attack. Yes. You can try German infantry forces with arty against weakened, green Russians who are surrounded and low on ammo and lack arty support beyond a pair of on-map 76mm guns. That is mopping up operations by the infantry divisions.

Or you can simulate the breakthrough fights at intact lines. Give the Russians 1-2 infantry companies and 2-4 45mm ATGs, 1-3 light FOs. The Russians may or may not have a reserve of one platoon of BTs or T-26s and a single SMG platoon. Give the Germans one company of panzer infantry, 105mm radio FOs, 3 platoons of tanks.

Now you know how the tactical war actually looked. If instead you play QB meeting engagements where the Russians always have either KVs or flocks of T-34s (if not both), are regular quality, and are supported by 120mm mortar FOs, then you've got the wrong year of Russian forces, that is all. Against Russians that coordinated, the Germans had long Pz IVs and StuGs, or at least Pz III longs. And oh, the result of the fighting was see-saw by then, not lopsided German successes.

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Re: Soviet TACTICAL clumsiness think on the following:

A 41-43ish German tank company has radio transmitter/receivers for the company commander, platoon commanders and MAYBE for all the other tanks in the unit, receivers for all; after mid 43 ALL, thus wingman tactics can be employed as in aviation formations with instant reaction to changing tactical threats.

A Soviet tank company has radio a transmitter/receiver for the company commander MAYBE, receivers for the platoon commanders MAYBE, receivers for all MAYBE after 43.

The Sovet tank company therefore just doesn't have the reaction time a German tank Company would have, regardless of the training levels of the troops. A German battion commander works with platoons that can operate INDEPENDANTLY, his Soviet counterpart with SEMI-INDEPENDANT

companies

The Soviets compensated by using mass. As a friend from Communist China said to me the other day "In communist countries, equiptment is more important than peaple"

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Originally posted by rune:

[QB] Oil? Perhaps the plans he had to capture the caucusas and their oil fields had something to do with it?

tongue.gif

Well, you surely know, that Rumania was on Axis side.

The rumanian oilfields were more than enough.

Don't you know, why the oil fields in the caucasus were choosen? They were choosen to take them the oponent away.

That is an important difference.

Perhaps because he believed it would only last 6 months.

Where do you know, what he believed?

Can you read thoughts?

I suggest to use historic facts, like strategic papers, orders and troop movements.

Perhaps because he believed it would give him a back door into the mideast and it's oil?

Again, you can read thoughts?

Which sources are you referring to?

Which strategic papers of the OKW do exist, that are prooving this?

Perhaps we all don't believe in revisionist claptrap?

So once history is written by the winners, it is guilty for all times?

This i call crap.

And again you do know, what all believe?

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Originally posted by rune:

Oh yeah, don't forget the coal mines of the caucusas, or the wheat field of the Ukraine, or the fact that in 1937 a document was written about "The aim of German policy was Lebensraum (living space), German people had 'the right to a greater living space than other peoples' and they would find it in Europe 'in immediate proximity to the Reich.' Two countries stood in the way, Britain and France but, despite their own problems, they and Russia must be factors in Germany's political calculations."

I am sure that had nothing to do with it.

Rune

Can you name the source?

I hope it has a better quality like the "documents" for the trial of Nürnberg.

A Trial without authentic documents, originals. Only faxsimiles.

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Originally posted by Grisha:

Nearly every operation they planned had wide strategic significance, and therefore a lot was riding on their operations. Too much, in my opinion. Unlike the Soviets, the Germans never considered conducting war in measured steps, it always had to be big, fast, and final. The obsession for the fast, single campaign blinded the Germans of the possibility to study the operational level, indeed, to even recognize it as a level between tactics and strategy.

[snip]

If the Germans decided not to consider that war might last longer than 5-6 months - they have no one to blame but themselves. "General Winter" is just plain lame. Nazi Germany has only their arrogance and amazing capacity for self-denial to blame for freezing their soldiers to death in the winter of 1941.

[snip]

Lots of interesting stuff going on in this multi-dimensional thread. I'll just pick up on a couple of points in Grisha's well articulated piece.

For a counter-example of the "big, fast and final" German approach to war, we could look not just at the Soviets but at the Western Allies. For them the war was quite clearly broken down into measured steps, and each step was accomplished decisively (though often only after a fierce and very protracted struggle). For example:

1. Stop Sealion by maintaining air superiority over England (check)

2. Block attempts to conquer Middle East oil (long and protracted but check)

3. Win the U-boat battle (long and protracted but check)

4. Invade North Africa, pinning the Axis forces and discrediting the Vichy govt (check)

5. Invade Sicily, knocking Italy out of the war (check)

6. Invade Italy and pin down German forces (check--well sorta; this was probably the messiest step from the strategic standpoint, but it wasn't allowed to consume excessive resources)

7. Win air superiority over France (check)

8. Establish an invasion force in Normandy (check)

9. Break out from Normandy (hard fighting but check)

etc., etc....

I won't spell it all out, since you know it, but the Allies had a coherent strategy based on hard-headed mutual dialogue between the Combined Chiefs and the heads of state. Really bad ideas did not survive the winnowing process and the victory was in fact accomplished in measured steps, each step providing the starting point for another step. Like the Soviets, the Western allies took the war one step at a time .

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The Decision for War, WIlliam Waller, March 20, 2001. for the documents.

When Titans Clased, Glantz

Decision in the Desert, Crusader 1941-1942, the author interviewed several German Generals and Rommel's wife. Documentation on the invasion of the caucusas there, as well as plans to launch attack from Syria. Can get the author then I get home.

The Trial of German Major War Criminals

Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany

27th February to 11th March, 1946. German Generals speaking of why they invaded Russia.

The Meaning of Hitler, quote: "The operation was ordered on December 18, 1940. Hitler wanted to strike at Russia because it would have given Germany the "space and resources" that the Germans needed. He also wanted to strike before they made an alliance with England. Since July, Hitler had been building up forces on the eastern front, and Romania and Finland had joined Germany for the attack on Russia. The only problem for the Germans was that Italy had already been taken and Germany was vulnerable to attack from the south. Russia figured out what Germany was doing and started to send them "gifts" and relaxed their grip on Finland and Romania. Despite this, Hitler decided to commence the attack.

Hitler began his four-year campaign against Russia, sending 7.2 million troops who caught the Russian army off guard and were initially successful."

If all these historians are wrong, let us look as what Universitys think:

http://www.cs.mtsu.edu/~alex/ww2/barbarossa.htm

http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/barbarossa.htm

http://www.themilitarybookreview.com/html/granddelusion.shtml

SO, Do I believe the Historians who talked with the people who talked to Hitler, as well as documents from the era, or do I believe your revisionist claptrap? Oh, there are countless other books and web sites I could post, including University of Hamburg, but why bother?

Rune

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Originally posted by Three_Oh_Eight:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Schoerner:

[qb]What were the reasons for a just-for-fun two-frontier war?

The same reasons he embarked on such a war in 1939 - the threat of two frontiers didn't disuade the attack on Poland.</font>
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Re: Schoerner

Stalin - Russia, Ukraine, etc, Hitler - Germany, Austria , Pilsudski - Poland, Horthy - Hungary, Antonescu - Rumania, Mussolini - Italy, Metaxa -Greece; Dictators all! Oh yes, they all have the same justifiable greivances, the MOTHERLAND is threatened from without, from WITHIN, THEY (the other, the foreigner, the auslander, the cosmopolitan, the jew, the black, the one-that-is-not-like-US) must be destroyed.

THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION.

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Originally posted by Schoerner:

So once history is written by the winners, it is guilty for all times?

This i call crap.

And again you do know, what all believe?

The time was running out against Germany, due to it's geostrategical position and the jews in USA were already mobilizing.
I believe you don't get many dates.

[ February 18, 2003, 03:00 PM: Message edited by: mcgivney ]

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Originally posted by rune:

The Decision for War, WIlliam Waller, March 20, 2001. for the documents.

When Titans Clased, Glantz

Decision in the Desert, Crusader 1941-1942, the author interviewed several German Generals and Rommel's wife. Documentation on the invasion of the caucusas there, as well as plans to launch attack from Syria. Can get the author then I get home.

The Trial of German Major War Criminals

Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany

27th February to 11th March, 1946. German Generals speaking of why they invaded Russia.

The Meaning of Hitler, quote: "The operation was ordered on December 18, 1940. Hitler wanted to strike at Russia because it would have given Germany the "space and resources" that the Germans needed. He also wanted to strike before they made an alliance with England. Since July, Hitler had been building up forces on the eastern front, and Romania and Finland had joined Germany for the attack on Russia. The only problem for the Germans was that Italy had already been taken and Germany was vulnerable to attack from the south. Russia figured out what Germany was doing and started to send them "gifts" and relaxed their grip on Finland and Romania. Despite this, Hitler decided to commence the attack.

Hitler began his four-year campaign against Russia, sending 7.2 million troops who caught the Russian army off guard and were initially successful."

If all these historians are wrong, let us look as what Universitys think:

http://www.cs.mtsu.edu/~alex/ww2/barbarossa.htm

http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/barbarossa.htm

http://www.themilitarybookreview.com/html/granddelusion.shtml

SO, Do I believe the Historians who talked with the people who talked to Hitler, as well as documents from the era, or do I believe your revisionist claptrap? Oh, there are countless other books and web sites I could post, including University of Hamburg, but why bother?

Rune

Rune,

where are the references to the documents?

And documents are not papers produced by the winners.

They are proven to be authentic german papers.

It's not of interest to me, what Höß, Commander of Auschwitz "said", with squashed testicles.

I don't gice anything what a german general said at Nürnberg, knowing that otherwise he will hang.

History science is based on the same principles as every legal proceedingses:

1. authentic documents

2. scientific expert-certificates

3. witnesses

Sorry, as long as the first point is totally ignored and neglected by all the system conform "historians", i can't take them serious.

Or should i really believe oponents of Hitler and Nationalsocialism more, than the principles of science?

I'm wondering, if that is all true, what is told about Hitler, Himmler and their targets, why are there no authentic documents available, although it was a totaldefeat?

All documents, everything was available to the winners and they are not capable to show authentic documents, that are prooving, what they are telling about the oponent?

If they really planned what is told, wouldn't it be logical, that there are tons of papers, original studies and authentic documents, substantiating the claims by the winners?

Even the communistic USSR archives were full with studies about world-revolution and their complete papers did never fall into hands of enemy systems.

And the winners of WWII are not capable to reference to authentic-papers?

I think it's extremely strange, that in the important topics, only secondary-literature references do exist, but no authentic ones!

In such a case, i prefer to believe in the since the Roman empire prooved VAE VICTIS.

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Originally posted by rune:

"The time was running out against Germany, due to it's geostrategical position and the jews in USA were already mobilizing."

A Very Racist statement if I ever saw one. I leave this thread, now knowing what kind of person he is.

Rune

Racist?

"Judea declares war on Germany" (several international newspapers, 1933)

Hm.

Is it racist to talk about the truth?

Then i'm a racist.

And proud of it. ;)

Keep your morals-club, nobody is frightened anymore from it.

At least freethinkers.

You know what person am i?

Do you know me?

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