"SMG Gap" A Proposal

[gunnergoz]

With respect to the issue of Russian winter and it's effect on Germans in '41 vs. the opposing Russians, I'd heartily recommned you all to read "War without Garlands" by Robert J. Kershaw.

Not only is it an excellent way to understand the opening months of the East Front war, it also helped me envision what the opposing sides experienced at the human level.

When the book goes into detail about the first winter and the German problems that ensued, I began to see that factors besides inappropriate uniforms came into play. Specifically, the Germans had badly outrun their supply capabilities and were barely able to furnish the units in front of Moscow with ammunition. The landsers had to live off the land to a great extent.

Added to this, Kershaw describes the weariness and bone-tired exhausted state of the badly depleted German divisions. The men were not even close to the shape in which they'd crossed over the Polish border. The Russian defenses and Kessel battles had depleted the divisions of hundreds of thousands of experienced troops, especially officers and NCO's. German morale suffered as a result, not to mention front line leadership.

Russian units were laboring under the same weather, but many of their divisions were well-equipped ones brought from the East and were excellently prepared for the extreme weather conditions they faced.

Incidentally, Kershaw points out that the German Army was not used to fighting in such deep winter conditions and during peacetime would return to barracks from the field precisely because it was not contemplated to do combat in such weather. A "wintering over" phase was apparently expected. Similarly, German vehicles, artillery and weapons were not designed for the deep winter conditions that they faced in Russia from October '41 on.

Try the book before you play CMBtB, it'll really fire your imagination!

[ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: gunnergoz ]

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by gunnergoz:

With respect to the issue of Russian winter and it's effect on Germans in '41 vs. the opposing Russians, I'd heartily recommned you all to read "War without Garlands" by Robert J. Kershaw.

[ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: gunnergoz ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The problem is the winter was an important factor but it wasn't deciseive factor in the German defeat outside Moscow. What was an decisive factor was was the choice to continue offensive operations, & the decision on what to supply their forces.

They had a choice with the limited tonnage they could haul, because of the Soviet rail net & German locomotives limited carrying capacity. They could either supply of all basic neccesities Ie, food, medical supplies, ammo, fuel winter clothing etc, & conduct defensive operations.

Or supply more of a few types of what the German HQ considered critical to success, at the cost of other neccesities, & continue offensive operations, they chose ammunition & fuel.

Regards, John Waters

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Kingfish:

Perhaps he's referring to the 22nd Armd. brigade's charge at Bir el Gubi.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's the one, 19.11.41.

I take your point Jeff that it was probably a pointless exercise, but again, if one gives the Italians a blanket 'Spaghetti' modifier (I know you did not ask for that), then the Ariete Division would probably be hard done by.

I think there is mileage in the squad drill approach, seems well worth looking at, although I am not sure how much the current execution of the drill would be a function of the weapons available.

[Tero]

A quick post before we reach the 300 posts mark so that you guys do not think I am totally beaten by all these negative vibes you have been trying to lay on me for being an outspoken infidel.

I was going through some articles and books on WWII small unit tactics over the weekend. And I had a revelation.

It would seem that ALL solutions to tactical situations and tactical problems rely on the units perception of the battlefield. All the training is directed at responding to stimuli that the individual unit receives (radio messages, aural and visual spotting etc) according to the preferences set by the respective military establishments.

And with absolute spotting that individual unit perception is negated. The TacAI works with the data it has available and if that data is gamey (in the sense that the force is handeled as a sort of amoeba and that all the data one part of the amoeba gets is instantly available to all the other parts) there is aboslutely no way to simulate intricate approaches each army developed to counter the changing battle field situations.

Thus any and all attempts to induce differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines to simulate the different paths the different armies took to reach their goals (which were more often than not very different) that are not based on technical facts (mv, fp, signals equipment etc.) or such abstractions as fitness and experience level are inherently impossible to model without the results becomming gamey, unbalansed, unrealistic and historically untrue.

So while my POV on differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines is still as firm as ever I will have to put a lid on it until the spotting is changed from absolute spotting to relative spotting.

[ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

A quick post before we reach the 300 posts mark so that you guys do not think I am totally beaten by all these negative vibes you have been trying to lay on me for being an outspoken infidel.

I was going through some articles and books on WWII small unit tactics over the weekend. And I had a revelation.

It would seem that ALL solutions to tactical situations and tactical problems rely on the units perception of the battlefield. All the training is directed at responding to stimuli that the individual unit receives (radio messages, aural and visual spotting etc) according to the preferences set by the respective military establishments.

And with absolute spotting that individual unit perception is negated. The TacAI works with the data it has available and if that data is gamey (in the sense that the force is handeled as a sort of amoeba and that all the data one part of the amoeba gets is instantly available to all the other parts) there is aboslutely no way to simulate intricate approaches each army developed to counter the changing battle field situations.

Thus any and all attempts to induce differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines to simulate the different paths the different armies took to reach their goals (which were more often than not very different) that are not based on technical facts (mv, fp, signals equipment etc.) or such abstractions as fitness and experience level are inherently impossible to model without the results becomming gamey, unbalansed, unrealistic and historically untrue.

So while my POV on differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines is still as firm as ever I will have to put a lid on it until the spotting is changed from absolute spotting to relative spotting.

[ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: tero ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Tero, you wont read this, but one more time. What you want is to replace what the human does (order units around) with a computer AI deciding if a Finn would do that or a German do this. And you want a few nationalities to be all powerful based upon bar room talk.

Luckily, neither will ever happen, as Steve has said. Post all day long, and it still wont happen.

If you could define a variable in which one unit was superior to another that was not already simulated in the game. If you could present it in a form that was not nationalistic (for example, your variable would have to apply to all soldiers if the same situations which caused it came about). If you could support your contention with more than a citation from a single narrative source, and if a model could be built on your concept that implied that it actually mattered in the game, then you would be in the big league and it would not be world + dog versus you.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Thus any and all attempts to induce differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines to simulate the different paths the different armies took to reach their goals (which were more often than not very different) that are not based on technical facts (mv, fp, signals equipment etc.) or such abstractions as fitness and experience level are inherently impossible to model without the results becomming gamey, unbalansed, unrealistic and historically untrue.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, I'll be damned. I guess I'll have to get a new sig now.

[Tero]

>Well, I'll be damned.

That revelation trashed the entire basis I was laying my point on.

In the true über-Finn fashion I was low on ammo with the hordes attacking from all sides. I was looking for new ammo when I discovered my position was getting eroded by a force of nature I had no contol over. And consequently I had nothing else left to do but to acknowledge the fact, cut my losses and pull back in a controlled fashion to fight another day. :cool:

Mind you, as I said my POV on the issue is still basically unchanged.

>I guess I'll have to get a new sig now.

And I a new hobby horse. Trade your sig for a well ridden and tested hobby horse ?

[ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Tero]

>Tero, you wont read this, but one more time.

I've read all your posts.

>What you want is to replace what the human

>does (order units around) with a computer AI

>deciding if a Finn would do that or a German

>do this.

No no no no no. What I look for is a set of variables that directs the the units to act according to their respective historical tactics and doctrine if and when they encounter unexpected stimuli while fulfilling the orders given by the human player.

>And you want a few nationalities to be all

>powerful based upon bar room talk.

Where DO you get this **** ? Is the transmitter in you mouth acting up again or what ? Are you still looking for a way to best me in a debate ?

It seems to me to you this is all about winning the debate, not having one.

BTW: did you check those arty volumes of yours for the number of pages as I requested ?

>Luckily, neither will ever happen, as Steve

>has said. Post all day long, and it still

>wont happen.

So ? Should I get started with the ashes and a spare set of clothes ?

>If you could define a variable in which one

>unit was superior to another that was not

>already simulated in the game.

Is it really all about superiority ? Really ?

I am contesting the premise that every unit of the same class do things exactly the same fashion and manner regardless of their respective historical tactics and doctrine. Not better or worse but DIFFERENTLY.

I think the others used the term squad drill to give a name to the phenomenon.

>If you could present it in a form that was

>not nationalistic (for example, your

>variable would have to apply to all soldiers

>if the same situations which caused it came

>about).

>

>If you could support your contention with

>more than a citation from a single narrative

>source, and if a model could be built on

>your concept that implied that it actually

>mattered in the game, then you would be in

>the big league and it would not be world +

>dog versus you.

A quote from a previous post of yours:

>I only seem to attack you because this

>element of blind nationalism (and sexism) is

>distasteful, and counterproductive.

So in fact you are not attacking me, you attack my disease ? Glad to see your rationalization is still working 100% so that you can explain away your bitterness with really solid facts.

If only you could get in terms with the sore loser side of yours and get on with your life. I am capable of admitting defeat, are you ?

[Slapdragon]

When there is defeat to be admitted absolutely.

National Modifiers = Bad Idea

Engine modifiers based on history and science = Good idea

When this gets shown to be in error, I will admit defeat. Unless it gets shown to be in error, I will be against national modifiers through CM99.

I was merely pointing out how your argument could be couched better. Take it or not as you see fit.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Did World War Two airborne troopers really run as much as is done today?

And do you suppose they smoked any less? EVERYONE smoked in the 1940s, with very few exceptions. I don't understand your logic here.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No they ran more. They ran in combat boots. When I was in bragg you ran in sneakers and shorts. But dont take my word, read Burketts or other airborne accounts of training. They were in incredible physical shape, cigs or not.

The reason is that they could be dispersed far and wide. You would have to use footpower to get to the objective.

Funny thing is that airborne guys (when I was in) call non-airborne units 'legs'. Do they still do that?

Lewis

[dalem]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Tero:

Is it really all about superiority ? Really ?

I am contesting the premise that every unit of the same class do things exactly the same fashion and manner regardless of their respective historical tactics and doctrine. Not better or worse but DIFFERENTLY.

I think the others used the term squad drill to give a name to the phenomenon.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Okay, let's assume for the sake of argument that your point is relevant here. Let's go even further and let's say that you're correct, or even partially so, in that some nations were 'just better' (which I don't think is the case). How would you apply those to CM anyway? So my squad drill is different than yours - does that mean I go to ground differently than you do? That I run differently? That I die differently? Squads under fire seek cover, stay put, and may or may not fire back whilst doing so. Currently CM allows you to have an experience of Veteran, which means on average that your squad will do any and all of these things better than mine if mine is 'merely' Regular. The addition of the Fitness attribute in CM2 will allow even more differentiation.

I still fail to see why you are dissatisfied with the current implementation.

-dale

[aka_tom_w]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by dalem:

Okay, let's assume for the sake of argument that your point is relevant here. Let's go even further and let's say that you're correct, or even partially so, in that some nations were 'just better' (which I don't think is the case). How would you apply those to CM anyway? So my squad drill is different than yours - does that mean I go to ground differently than you do? That I run differently? That I die differently? Squads under fire seek cover, stay put, and may or may not fire back whilst doing so. Currently CM allows you to have an experience of Veteran, which means on average that your squad will do any and all of these things better than mine if mine is 'merely' Regular. The addition of the Fitness attribute in CM2 will allow even more differentiation.

I still fail to see why you are dissatisfied with the current implementation.

-dale<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

By Now we are A LONG way off the topic of the "SMG gap" that this thread started out with...

At any rate I think the new CM2 "element" or "factor" of fitness will be a new and welcome varient that will enhance the some of the "differentiation" (with a nationality modifier) that some here seek.

This element was needed more in CMBO I would say to model the less fit Volkstrum units who I understand were coomposed mostly of old men with automatic weapons, but in CMBO the ONLY factor that is relevent is "men with LOTS of automatic weapons".

The "fitness factor" in CMBB should be VERY interesting!

Now what the hell was the SMG gap we were talking about??

-tom w

[Slapdragon]

The solution has of course already been mentioned. For people who want the uberFinn of legend modeled, buy only crack troops with maximum fitness ratings. This way the game is not ruined, and individuals will be able to have uberFinns.

[ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]

[Battlefront.com]

Hehe... this thread is now coming into rather select company in terms of long arguments about fine points. I recognize quite a few faces here that will remember the King of Fine Point Argument Threads -> "Gamey Recon". Still my all time favorite

The most important goal of a simulation, especially one that is designed to reflect reality, is to keep a balance between the extreme aspects of the simulation. The less capable the system is in this regard, the less robust it becomes, and therefore the extremes cause the system to fail. In the case of a historical simulation, the less realistic it becomes.

So... can someone make a case that in x specific situation with y specific variables that z specific force would fight a little/alot better/worse in such and such a way compared to the enemy? Yes. But do these assumptions always apply, as a rule, to all forces of that particular side in the same defined situation (if there is even an attempt to narrow the scope)? No. I firmly believe that this CAN NOT be done. Not as an inherent assumption based on nationality. So there are most likely other reasons why x in y does z besides concluding "the Human beings in German uniforms weren't as capable of dealing with the cold as Humans in Soviet uniforms were."

The main factors that I see when looking at a battle go something like this:

1. Basic level of training.

2. Amount of actual combat experience.

3. Unit cohesion prior to the battle.

4. Motivations specific to that battle, including the "big picture" surrounding this particular battle.

5. Physical fitness/wellness of the force.

6. Disposition of BOTH sides prior to combat.

7. Leadership strengths/weaknesses at particular levels of command.

8. Terrain and other natural conditions (like weather).

9. Weapons available to each side and how they generally matched up against each other.

10. General supply level (usually only a factor when extreme).

11. LUCK, which is most likely influenced by above.

There are certainly more factors that could be important, some of which might be more unique to the particluar battle (like a sentry being asleap on duty or most defenders being drunk on captured alcohol), but the above list is a pretty good sample of major influencing factors on a battle. Almost all of the above factors can be simulated in CMBO, but a few have been added to CMBB.

Here is a good excercise for the "pro-National Modifiers" to engage in. When you look at a particular battle, think about all the major aspects as I noted above. When you are all done look at how the two sides stack up against each other. I will bet that whatever the outcome of the battle was these factors will explain (in a hindsight way) how the battle was fought and why it ended as it did. All this without even thinking about "this particular side was better at picking their noses while under fire compared to the other side" So even IF one could argue that some national modifier or another was justified, would it have had a significant impact on the battle compared to these other factors? I think not.

Now, onto a slightly different aspect. And that is about training as opposed to some natural (i.e. born with) attribute type modifier.

Jeff's point about drill having an impact on the INTERNAL way a squad fights is valid. Not just because of what weapon was the basis for squad tactics, but more importantly how training was actually conducted in general. For example, Waffen SS training supposedely dropped most of the "standard" aspects of training in favor of more practical use of time, such as exposing recruits to live fire overhead. Now, if this is totally true, and a different force instead all sat around in classrooms for the same length of time, I would expect there to be a difference when out on the field of battle. However, this can be rectified in CM by giving one force a better Experience rating than the other. So for extreme differences in training standards, I think the Experience rating (coupled with Fitness) does just fine.

But what about more subtle differences? I totally agree that 8 weeks of similar training for one nation did not necessarily create the same exact type of soldier as another nation's army which also put its men through 8 weeks of training. I also agree that putting a fresh bunch of young lads from a rural district into rural combat for the first time would likely yeild better results than taking another bunch of young lads straight out of an urban gehto.

BUT...

How in the WORLD are we supposed to qualify and quantify all thses multitude of possible differences in the large variety of situations that can be experienced in combat? More importantly, how do you compare a set of such attributes from one nation vs. the attributes of another FAIRLY? And how do you do this in the correct relation to the real world impact such differences would have on the outcome of a combat engagement? I say that it is utterly impossible to do this. Because of that, trying to modify a select, almost random, assortment of differences based on whatever invented values are thought up is "bad...bad...bad"

Jeff said in another thread that we only ask for strict fact finding and scientific results when someone's opinion is at odds with our "gut instinct". That is not exactly true, as we have changed things around when a) the element is highly subjective (but necessary to simulate) to begin with and a good rational argument can be show as to why our opinion is flawed. Facts of course help the other side out

But in general, Jeff is correct that when we have a strong opinion about something we demand MORE than just another strong counter opinion. Otherwise we would be changing things every other day depending on which way the wind blew. Worse, the introduction of national modifiers would encourage such behavior on our part, otherwise we would be constantly labled as "baised this, biased that". And that would be "bad...bad...bad" So I say that digging our heels in, when necessary, is a good thing for everybody.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

There is another aspect of national modifiers that got tossed in here, and that is the tactics used by the player (or "mouse-wielding player" as Jeff put it ).

Higher level tactics, which are totally within the control of the player, can be influenced to more-or-less conform to the real world tactics used by that formation in the same situations in the real war. The Germans tried to engage the enemy at longer ranges than shorter, whenever possible. So if you are a German player, your tactics will (generally) yeild better results if you try to emulate the real tactics used by the Germans in WWII. Not because the player is FORCED to do this, or that there are some national modifiers in place, but because the weapons, TO&E, C&C, etc. were designed to be used with such tactics. A player can attempt to engage T34s or Shermans at 100m, but it is not a good idea.

It is true that the player can only influence the tactics used above squad level. This is true for all games I can think of, including Close Combat, that do not focus on the single soldier as a commandable element. So any differences that would come about at the sub-unit level would have to be programmed in by us. But WHAT changes should we be programming in?

Jeff quoted a section from Gajkowski's translation of the German Squad tactics manual/s used around mid-war timeframe. The quote stated that unlike other nations, the Germans based their squad around the LMG and not the Rifle. I agree that this was the case, but what does this have to do with making changes?

The reality that was described by Gajkowski is in fact already simulated in Combat Mission. Either the tactic was an outgrowth of a better LMG vs. rifle reality OR was the outcome of a specific design goal to have a better LMG and skimp on the rifle OR a combo of the two. Personally, I believe it was more a result of design and a little to do with circumstances.

In any case, this German squad level tactical reality IS represented in Combat Mission. The German squad is more effective at longer distances than the US squad (for example), which is more centered around the rifle than the LMG (just as Gajkowski states). However, when distances are closed, the Germans often found themselves at least evened out because another truism of combat is that the more points of effective fire that can be brought to bear, the better the overall results. Hence the German tactics designed to keep the enemy at a distance, especially while on the defensive.

If the enemy has the same number of men and only bolt action rifles with 5 shots, then the Germans would still have an edge or at least be even. But this was not the case with US or Commonwealth troops, both of which had more men and better rifles (Enfield was bolt action, but had 10 round box mag). So the number of atomatic weapons, in addition to the LMG, was in theory upped in order to compensate. Some formations, like SMG troops, were designed to give superior firepower at closer range, sacrificing longer range firepower.

So what? Well, I for one use different tactics when I play as the German or Allied side. These tactics are, in part, based on the capabilities of the squads under my command. The reason why is because the squads "behave" differently and therefore must be used differently. These differences are based on their weapons and how they were supposed to be used by the squad members using them. So if Tero and others are simply asking us to make squads inherently different from each other, it is already done If we are being asked to make the individual men (all else being equal) different from each other, we will never do that.

Steve

[Jeff Duquette]

What truly disappoints me about this entire thread is that Dorosh never once acknowledged my quote from a rather famous Canadian Panzer Commander named Radley Walters. Known for his aptitude in winging short-barreled Sherman 75mm rounds off of Panther Mantlets onto their thinly armored decks. Now there’s a Canadian who could play in the NFL any day.

[ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Sirocco:

This has nothing to do with freezing to death! As a Russian, if you have experienced Russian winters - note, I used the term Russian - all your life, then you must be able to operate in those conditions better than someone who is experiencing it for the first time. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is neither physiologically nor, more importantly, historically correct. Leaving aside for the moment the point that at some locations in the USSR (Russia, even), it gets really, really hot, and not very cold, it is also true that soviet troops suffered lots and lots of cold related casualties in the winter war. For this reason alone the "acclimatized" argument would have to fail, unless someone could demonstrate that acclimatization suddenly occurred in 1940.

The real reason, as others have pointed out, that the soviet troops did better in the winter is because they were better equipped with winter clothing. The reason that they were better equipped with winter clothing is because that is one of the lessons that they drew from the Winter War. (There are lots of Winter War lessons, actually, including the need to have more heavily armed tanks, and tanks that are more reliable in the winter). If there had not been a winter war, the soviet troops would have been as poorly equipped as the Germans for fighting in the bitter cold.

Regardless of the reason, of course, it is true that Germans were at a disadvantage fighting in the cold against better prepared soviet troops. But the reason is not a national quality reason; it is solely the result of one side being better equipped than the other. Nevertheless, it is something that should be simulated; I assume CMBB will make use of the "fitness" modifier.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

The quote stated that unlike other nations, the Germans based their squad around the LMG and not the Rifle

But this was not the case with US or Commonwealth troops, both of which had more men and better rifles (Enfield was bolt action, but had 10 round box mag). So the number of atomatic weapons, in addition to the LMG, was in theory upped in order to compensate.

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I disagree completely; check out Infantry Training 1937, or numerous articles by Mike Chappel, Ian V. Hogg, and others - the British and Canadians also used the firepower of the Bren Gun in the same way the Germans based their tactics on the MG 34/42. The rifle was virtually useless in combat - read Galloway for this.

I agree with the earlier point that the squad should be allowed to break down without morale penalty to reflect the actual tactic of breaking the section into a rifle and LMG team. The Battle Drill manual lays it out right there, and it was practiced religiously in action.

[Jeff Duquette]

From Major John English’s book: “On Infantry”. Referring to British Army Infantry tactics during the early war years and the shortcomings of the Infantry Training manual of 1937.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Although the Infantry Training manual of 1937 attempted to accommodate these new developments (ie development of the Bren Gun as a replacement for the Lewis), it remained very much a compromise publication. While it stressed fire and maneuver rather than "reinforcement of troops held up in the hopes of carrying a position by weight of numbers," it also recommended "rapid and extensive digging" in defense on a Great War scale. Though alluding to depth and counterattack action in so many words, it tended to recommend in its several defensive diagrams a basically linear and frontally oriented posture. Furthermore, flank security was strongly stressed in both attack and defense, and objectives were strictly limited. The stereotyped frontal attack supported by a timed barrage received as much emphasis as the flanking attack. The manual nonetheless represented a slight step forward in the modernization of British military thought.

Unfortunately, however, it was a case of too little too late. As it came at virtually the eleventh hour, the British army went off to fight armed largely with weapons and equipment developed before or during the Great War. Many of its regular soldiers had never before seen most of the important weapons with which they would later fight. Worse yet, the army that finally went to war in 1939 stressed old deliberate methods of attack and defense, not even as up to date as those used by the Canadian and Australian Corps in the Great War. There had, indeed, been scant time spent on collective training. Although capable of marching 20 to 30 miles a day and sticking bayonets into sacks filled with straw, the British infantry in truth was not prepared for modern war. According to General Fuller, the mentality of the times was such that it was "like living in a lunatic asylum. The Great War trenches had exacted their toll; in preparing for "mole warfare,"...the British army, too, came to suffer from the blindness of a mole.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[Michael Dorosh]

Jeff, what on earth does that have to do with CMBO?

British troops in France in 1940 also wore kilts and dug trenches.

By 1944, when CMBO picks up the story, infantry tactics had become considerably more - quite probably due to observation of what the Germans had done.

In fact, Blackburn tells us about the Demonstration unit that dressed in German uniforms and demonstrated German platoon tactics in open air theatres before most troops going into Europe in the summer of 1944.

Check out the US Army Handbook on the German Forces to see just how much the Allies really knew about German tactics - and how much they learned from them.

[ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

What truly disappoints me about this entire thread is that Dorosh never once acknowledged my quote from a rather famous Canadian Panzer Commander named Radley Walters. Known for his aptitude in winging short-barreled Sherman 75mm rounds off of Panther Mantlets onto their thinly armored decks. Now there’s a Canadian who could play in the NFL any day.

[ 07-09-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

WAH!!!!!

You have had a number of excellent posts in this thread; on many points I couldn't agree more. Once you've expressed yourself so well, I figured further comment by me to be extraneous and superfluous.

Though I don't think Walters did it quite so often as he liked to have told the interviewer in the Valour and the Horror miniseries.

The interviewer quite incredulously asked "you mean you tried for a 6 inch bullseye on the first shot?"

Walters simply said "sure, why not" and the scene changed abruptly. Makes you wonder what was edited out...

[Madmatt]

Guys, I hate to do this (actually I really don't care IO was just being nice) but as threads which go over 300 posts seem to crap out the server I am gonna shut this one down now. Feel free to start a new SMG Thread in continuation of this one but PLEASE only start ONE new thread.

Thanks!

Madmatt

[Madmatt]

Actually, I wil ldo it for you.

You can continue Here:>

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=1&t=020232

Madmatt