Bulge Contention

[Guest Bobb]

A couple or three years back I ran across a book in Barnes and Knoble for which I had only time for a quick glance. The gist of it

seemed to consist of contending that Bradly and Eisenhower both had advance knowledge that the German counter offensive was coming. And that they found it an opportunity for breaking the back of German strength, so they kept their secret allowing it to proceed.

They found it useful to keep the matter a secret, both to prevent the enemy from withdrawing his head from the noose and to bury any posibility of criticism of their action of expediency, which would predictably cost a lot of loses.

Has anyone here seen such a book and if so could you provide any clearer understanding of what it contained? I only obtained an impression in the time I had.

[Guest KwazyDog]

That interesting Bobb, not something Ive heard before.

From what Ive read that allies had knowledge that there was *something* happening but had both assumed the German wouldnt attack through the tough terrain (as they had in the past), and didnt have the manpower for such an offensive. Its quite an interesting read and its suprising that the allies ignored a lot of the information that they were recieveing that was seriously pointing to a German offensive (though this is easy to say in hind site ).

Anyways, its an interesting question Bobb

[Tom Servo]

Yeah the front line troops constantly heard engines off through the forests but the HQ's ignored these reports...

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Formally Tom punkrawk

"Tomorrows killed by yesterday..." -Link80

[Guest KwazyDog]

I read a book about it a couple of months ago and its amazing how much they really did know but just didnt put together. Things like units moving from other areas, being refitted and not returning, telling recon photos were there too, but also other thing like villagers whom were reporting massive buildups of men and fuel and even in intercepted transmission from the Japanses ambassador to Japan describe 'Hiters great new offensive in the West', with little excitement I may add as he didnt even see if feasable, hehe.

I *think* the book was called The Battle of the Buldge by Charles McDonald? Interesting, but big

[Major Tom]

Conspiracies are a way to shift blame. Generals might say afterword that "Oh yeah, we planned it like that, yeah, that's it..."

It makes the commanders appear smart when they say that they listened to the reports and it was all a part of a master plan rather than admitting to dismissing the accounts outright and having a near disaster resulting.

There are many such, as that involving Pearl Harbour and JFK. I have a neat spin on the JFK conspiracy though... What if the conspirators were actually good instead of the portrayal that they were an evil conspiracy? Possibly they knew that JFK was a dangerous person to be at the helm of a nuclear bearing nation. Marilyn Monroe could have been a Soviet Spy who seduced JFK, but the CIA caught wind of this and killed Marilyn, but, JFK was already corrupted by the Communist virus....

These books could all just be some historical excuse making in order to reason how a top American commander (later to become President) could overlook such a weakness in their defensive strategy as well as blatant signs of an enemy buildup in troops in an area that they proved was great for armoured breakthroughs.

[EScurlock]

Originally posted by Bobb:

. The gist of it seemed to consist of contending that Bradly and Eisenhower both had advance knowledge that the German counter offensive was coming. And that they found it an opportunity for breaking the back of German strength, so they kept their secret allowing it to proceed.

Seems like the writter was putting his own unique spin on the situation. Yes Ike and Monty had many signs brought before them suggesting the possibility of a counter attack. All first hand accounts that I'm aware of suggest that Ike and Monty simply couldn't conceive that the evidence pointed toward an actual counterattack. It was simply unbeleivable that the Germans would try such a thing.

Beyond that, I don't think Ike would conciously sacrifice troops by not deliberatly preparing a defence in depth in order to crush the audacious German move.

IMHO the author had no clue of how a battlefield is managed or he would have never made such a specious logic leap.

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He who gets there the fastest with the mostest wins.

[JoshK]

While a country has a right to demand that its top generals always perform perfectly, this is not a very realistic expectation.

Should it be shocking that that a very professional German military would be able to achieve operational surprise at different occasions through the war? Of course not. Was this, none the less, a huge failure of allied intelligence? Of course.

To his credit, Ike immediately saw the offensive for what it was: A short term danger, but also a tremendous opportunity to put an end to any hope that the Germans had for a stalemate on the Western Front. By smashing the most mobile and capable German formations, the Allies had a much easier time come spring.

[Bullethead]

EScurlock said:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>IMHO the author had no clue of how a battlefield is managed or he would have never made such a specious logic leap.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Never having read this mysterious book, but having read MacDonald's "A Time for Trumpets," my instinct is to agree with this assertion. MacDonald goes through what the Allied command knew and I trust his research. The Allies did know a lot of things, but didn't put them together. Even when 1 high intel chief, in the midst of a staff discussion, actually said there'd be an offensive in the Ardennes, nobody took him seriously because even this guy himself was just guessing.

There have been other claims of this nature by modern authors. A few years ago, somebody asserted that the RAF's raid on Nuremburg, in which they lost about 100 bombers, was betrayed to the Germans. His theory was that the Allies had turned a German spy and needed him to send some true intel to the Germans so they'd keep believing him. But there is no evidence at all for this, and much counter-evidence.

Basically, I think authors like this don't care about the truth, they just want to make a sensation.

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-Bullethead

jtweller@delphi.com

WW2 AFV Photos: people.delphi.com/jtweller/tanks/tanks.htm

[scoop88]

Interesting topic. The Bulge has been one of my favorite battles to read about. Never have I seen it mentioned in anything I've read that Ike and Monty knew about it beforehand. Put yourself in their places and think what conclusion you'd have reached:

1. They'd just chased the Germans all across France and destroyed who knows how many divisions and most of their equipment.

2. The Allies had complete air superiority.

3. The Ardennes was very poor tank country even in good weather ... and much worse in mud, snow and ice.

4. In December 1944 the most dangerous threat to the Germans were the Russians, who were much closer to Berlin than the Western Allies. Therefore, logically any substantial reserves the Germans could build up would be used in the East.

5. In general it's not a militarily sound idea to launch a major offensive in the dead of winter. Poor road conditions, freezing temperatures and short daylight are not conducive to large-scale offensive operations.

6. Ike and Monty had no warning from Ultra. Per Hitler's orders all the plans and orders for organizing the offensive were hand-carried by officers rather than communicating via the Enigma code machine. By contrast, in the past Ike and Monty were made fully aware of German plans from Ultra. A good example is the German offensive at Mortain in an attempt to cut off Patton's breakout from Normandy. Ultra warned Ike and the attack was quickly repulsed.

Therefore it's understandable the Ardennes offensive was a surprise. As someone else wrote in this thread, it's a tribute to the American command that they quickly recognized it as an all-out offensive rather than a local attack and reacted much faster than Hitler anticipated. As Patton said, "The Krauts have their head in the meat grinder and I've got the handle!"

[killmore]

I have a book which gives exact dates/message numbers and info of ULTRA intercepts which detail German attack. Basically it says - "What do you mean we got no ULTRA intercepts? Here they are! Thats how you can find them..."

[dalem]

FYI, Charles B. MacDonald's book, "A Time for Trumpets" is indeed a wonderful and in-depth book about the Ardennes offensive, but it doesn't go into any conspiracy theories. It might mention them in passing (I don't recall), but the author doesn't make any claims as to their validity.

MacDonald in fact spends a fair amount of time describing the intelligence blunders on the Allied side; there was (in hindsight) some obvious evidence of an impending German offensive in that area but most of the Allied intelligence officers blatantly ignored it or misinterpreted it. And even Bradley discounted the possibility.

I recommend this book highly. If you liked MacDonald's "Company Commander" then you'll be glad you picked up "A Time for Trumpets".

[Spook]

Let’s look at some of the facts underlying the circumstances leading up the Bulge battle:

1) Bradley’s 12th Army Group HQ (for 1st, 3rd, & 9th Armies) was located at Luxembourg City, south of the Ardennes, and quite relatively “forward” as far as allied army group HQ’s would normally be (within 20 miles of the front). A German breakthrough in the Ardennes would ensure that Bradley would have his lines of communication cut with 1st & 9th Armies. Was it part of Ike & Brad’s plan to have this happen, so to require that the north armies would be given to Monty? Brad was so embittered at losing those armies to Monty that he threatened to resign if they weren’t handed back by year’s end. (The famous “Monty vs. Patton” feud was nothing compared to that between Monty & Bradley.)

2) In the timeframe of Oct/Nov 44, Ike had warned Brad of the possibility for a “nasty little Kasserine” (German attack) coming from the Ardennes. From there on, however, he left it to Brad to see about troop deployments there.

3) With that, the lineup of formations in the Ardennes composed of three green divisions (99th/106th Infantry & 9th Armored) and two burnt-out units (4th & 28th Infantry) sent there to rest and absorb replacements. In effect, the weakest and least reliable of the US divisions were concentrated into one sector. If a mass attack was anticipated in that sector, then why were these divisions there? Were Ike & Brad trying to give “depth” to the German success by letting it potentially annihilate all of these divisions? And why weren’t some added “refit” divisions also there in closer reserve, like the 1st Infantry?

4) If an attack was waited for in the Ardennes, then why would have Brad let Hodges (1st Army) let the 2nd Infantry Division, in turn, keep attacking for a nearby town (Monschau) and using up troops in the process?

5) The 1st Army fuel dump was located near Spa, VERY close to the Ardennes sector. The Germans came close to capturing this. This capture wouldn’t have likely changed the course of battle much, but it would’ve been a severe logistical blow to 1st Army.

6) The primary reason that the Allies (ULTRA & the G-2’s) weren’t tipped off well about the German buildup was that the German standing order for the Ardennes planning was to communicate by telegraph & dispatch, NOT by radio. Also, the increasingly poor weather of the Western Front didn’t allow very much for aerial recon by the US. The one G-2 office that anticipated an attack (due to reports from some of the frontline troops) was that of 1st Army, but the information that was passed on wasn’t taken seriously by 12th AG’s G-2.

7) Monty also noted in his own dispatches, leading up to Dec. 16th, that he didn’t think the Germans had sufficient strength & resolve anymore to launch a mass counterattack on the West Front.

So regardless of what one author might write, the balance of events & circumstance fully indicate that none of the Allied commanders really saw a counterattack coming in the scope that actually happened, nor did they all anticipate it coming in the Ardennes. If Ike & Bradley could be proven to have planned things to happen as they did, then they would rank to me as being among the stupidest commanders of WW2.

And regarding the comment from Patton about the German “head” being in a meatgrinder, he was right. But when it was over, it turned out that the US “hands” got caught into that meatgrinder too, and often in an unnecessary way.

[ARCHANGEL]

It seems rather obvious that there was a failure to "put" together all the intell that was there...(wasnt the first time (Market Garden) and wouldn't be the last).

I suggest that Ike's bigger folly was the inch for inch slugfest of retaking the bulge across its front, as opposed to attacking the narrower edges and "pinching" it off, as they tried to do in the Normandy breakout.

There are a lot of original docs available on this, not to mention recent books...(past ten years).

[Los]

I couldn't agree more with Archangel, that strategy to push the Bulge back "head on" instead of snipping it off from the sides like any second year military academy student would have been taught cost the Allies an unnecessary 40,000 casualties.

Los

[Spook]

For historical reference, both Bradley & Patton did come to the same conclusion just after the peak of the German attack (Dec. 26th) and wanted to implement a counterattack against the Bulge "shoulders". It would only have worked, however, if Monty got the weight of the northern US forces to attack from the northen shoulder (Elsenborn). As we all know, this didn't happen. For another thing, the north/south US attacks weren't even syncronized on their start dates.

One open question remains to me, however. The Ardennes road net was primarily based for east/west movement (not completely, though). So while I would agree that "attacking from the shoulders" would have been the better counterattack to "bag" the Germans, I do wonder how well fresh US forces could have been assembled to attack at these shoulders, given the combined problems of the weather, terrain, and possibly insufficient roads.

[Los]

Well given the fact that Patton was able to turn his entire axis of advance from E-W to N-S in just 48 hours, during ****ty weather days before a major offensive of his own, there is certainly precedence that a move could possibly have been achieved by US forces.

Anyway, it's all water under the bridge.

Los

[This message has been edited by Los (edited 02-05-2000).]

[This message has been edited by Los (edited 02-05-2000).]

[dalem]

Guys, re any attacking from the shoulders, that is EXACTLY what Bradley had expected of Monty when he gave him control of the U.S. 1st Army - an immediate attack from the north to support Patton's drive up from the south. Instead, panicky Monty ordered a general *retreat* for all divisions of the 1st Army "to regroup". It took him days just to get his head out of his ass while the forces he demanded control of "to save the war" were pissing in the snow. Any hope of pinching the shoulders, regardless of terrain, etc., was thrown away by Monty during those few days.

Small wonder that Bradley referred to his giving Monty control of 1st Army as his biggest mistake of the war.

-dale

[Teutonic]

For an interesting take on this and also for other info I would suggest a look at Death Traps by Cooper. This is a very good book from the view of the maintenance side of things.

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Teutonic

[Guest Bobb]

Spook, it seems to me you make a well reasoned arguement for disbelieving any such thesis as I seemed to have encountered. As you indicate, if that was the case, the people concerned certainly did not take best advantage of their intell. Muffing this would not have been the only example though.

[Username]

Best Bulge book is "seven roads to hell"

Its the story of 101 screaming eagles at Bastogne. Author fought at Noville and actually had a panzer track on top of his foxhole.

he also said that a King Tiger chased him and that he must have killed dozens during these battles.

Only the airborne would stand up to the cold miserable hell described in this book.

[Spook]

Well, Bobb, I won't argue against the porported thesis with 100% certainty. (I wasn't there to check, ) But again, the weight of present factual evidence goes against the notion that Ike & Brad had cooked up a "master plan" that would have the Germans attack throught the Ardennes with the kind of weight that was used.

What CAN be also stated as fact, however, is that both Ike & Brad DID want the Germans to counterattack SOMEWHERE, solely for the purpose of attriting the Germans and getting them out from their Siegfried Line positions. Somewhere is attributed the following exchange between Ike & Brad concerning their first knowledge of the German attack:

"Well, Brad, it looks like you got your counterattack."

Brad responded, "Yeah, but I'll be damned if I wanted one this big!!"

So yes, Ike & Brad wanted the Germans to attack, but not likely where it actually happened in the Ardennes. More likely the case, with Hodges' 1st Army attacking the Hurtgen and out of Aachen, and with Patton's 3rd attacking towards the Saar, either of those places is probably where Bradley hoped that any counterattack would come.

Again, considering the appalling lack of preparation against an attack in the Ardennes, if Ike & Brad had planned for it to happen there, then they would both be guilty of criminal negligence in command duty. Not that the front-line troops didn't prepare---in fact, the stern defense of some of those troops (like 28th & 99th Divisions) caused the higher German commanders to regard the attack as a failure after only two days of fighting! But once that initial defense line was cracked, there was nothing much in their way until reinforcements were hustled in from the north & south.

Dalem: Bradley's regarding the loss of 1st/9th Armies to Monty as a mistake is a moot point. He didn't willingly give command of those armies to Monty, Ike made that decision over Brad's objections. Bradley's location of his army group HQ caused him to lose communication with the northern armies when the attack progressed. So realistically, Ike didn't have much choice.

[MarkEzra]

In Bruce Lee's book, "Marching Orders", the history of the Magic intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic code, the Allies were well aware of a proposed counter stroke on the West front scheduled for early November (page 264-266). When that didn't happen the Shafe conclusion seems to be it couldn't happen. The Allies just seemed to believe their own press clippings.

[AfrikaKorps]

You have to consider that the brithish secrect services were the best in the world. they used a lot of spies and double agents. They were the first one to really study Sun Tsu teaching about uses of them. Certains thing we will never know about ww2. They were even capable of making Hitler beleive in the Pas de Calais landing. Brithish and usa mount the biggest sea assault ever done in before, without the germans beleive the would. The british use of expentable spies and the sacrifice of many double agents saved the lifes of thousands.

For the bulge i beleive that the allies knew about at high level of command. But they didnt expect to have the sky covevred during a lot of the operation. Patton was ready to close the trap. And allies superiority would have made theis sector a real crushing victoty for allies. Since the operation didnt went like it was suppose to go, we sure wont hear that they let so many american die because of a sacrifice. If the dead were a lot less, we could be sure we will have heard them telling us that it was a nice plan. All the plan for closing the gap was even already made. Some info leaked during the operation, but they keep the secret about the sacrifice of so many men. They want to give a finger to the germans wolves, but the woflves eat the whole arm.

No wonder why James Bond was portrayed on a british. Brits were on almost everywhere since centuries fingthing many colonials wars. They were on hostiles land away from their iles. The intel services save their country and colonials possession many times

[Guest KwazyDog]

Delam, just in case I wasnt too clear earlier I just wanted to say that indeed no where that I recall in book does Charles B. MacDonald mention any conspiracy theories such as the one the topic is about. Just wanted to be clear of that as I may not have been earlier It is an excellent book, very comprehensive.

I wasnt aware he had another book available, but I will be sure to keep an eye out for it

[Mark IV]

On 15 Nov, Japanese ambassador Oshima mentioned to von Ribbentrop that Germany had made a mistake to go on the offensive in the West in 1918. Von Ribbentrop advised him that regardless, Germany was going on the offensive in the West again.

This was communicated by Oshima to Tokyo. I have no idea whether it was intercepted, but US Pacific intelligence were avid readers of Japanese diplomatic correspondence. They certainly wouldn't have found out any details, though. General von Manteuffel wasn't told of the offensive until 3 Nov., and had to sign a non-disclosure agreement punishable by death at the beginning of the meeting, according to his memoirs. Von Rundstedt and Model were only told "a few days earlier".

Other than the possibility of a Magic intercept of the Japanese diplomatic message, I know of no "evidence" that there was real foreknowledge of the Ardennes Offensive. It's always amazing, the extent to which "coulda" is interpreted as "evidence".