JoshK

Enoch, et.al., While in no way a unit history, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 by Peter R. Mansoor covers night fighting from the U.S. perspective pretty decently and also goes into some detail about the 104th under Gen. Allen.

My recollection from previous discussions on this topic is that the computer uses three levels of AI. To be simplistic: The strategic AI looks at the over all picture and comes up with a master plan. It then "tells" the operational AI what to do; for instance it may "tell" one company to assault that VL on the hill. Then the Operational AI gets the message and says," OK, got to take that VL, lets rally the troops." So the Operational AI "tells" each rifle squad to get off their asses and charge that hill. If I recall correctly, this is when the problem comes in. Some of the squads, "thinking" for themselves, will decide to sit this one out. That means that only a limited number of units will assault, thus increasing the appearance of HQ leading. Sometimes, at the end of games when many units are decimated and have low morale, none will listen. This is why to may see charges of only HQ units. In additional to that (and this is now a guess not a recollection) a "flaw" in the AI logic means that often HQ's do lead from the front. It seems to me from watching the AI HQ units, that they do not consider things like command delays, especially from out of C&C units. Therefore, if the HQ unit does not give itself a pause order (which I as a human player do all the time to make sure my HQ unit does not take off first), then by the logic of the game engine, the HQ unit will run ahead of the rest of the units. Just my take on it.

Situation: Facing a MG Bunker at night that is covered by barbed wire 180 degrees along its front. I sneaked a British para squad and a PIAT around to the rear to take out the bunker. Just as they were about to fire on the rear of the bunker (red target lights just appeared) both the squad and the PIAT took fire (but no casualties) from an unseen MG that was in some woods about 75m behind the bunker. So what did they do: They broke and ran from the MG. Unfortunately, they ran through the bunker (I guess they opened the back door, ran through and dived out the gun port on the front.) This of course brought them face-to-face with the barbed wire that was guarding the front of the bunker. Naturally, they got stuck on the wire, not more than 10m from the front of a fully stocked MG bunker. As soon as the crew stopped laughing, it took the MG bunker 7 seconds to eliminate both units.

Thanks Steve. I find it amazing how short the "to do list" must be getting. Based on the general lack of clamor here, it seems that almost everyone has got his or her pet want in. That is a credit to BTS' customer service, your enthusiasm of WWII, which causes you to want new things as well, and the high level that version 1.0 shipped at. Now that I have buttered you up, how about those M16 SPAA and the ability for U.S. HQ units to call in artillery?

While not a fault, it would be a welcome improvement to have non-FOW kill stats in the AAR.

Shelby Stanton, in Rise and Fall of an American Army, gives numerous examples of company and battalion sized engagements that would be an easy fit to model with a modified CM engine. The idea that you would wonder around a map endless is not correct. There are plenty of pitched battles to model. Of course I am easy, I would also like to see Korea, Central Europe and the Arab-Israeli wars. Regards, Josh

Steve, Thanks for the reply. I take your point about FACs, if you include air in a scenario, and call for it in turn 15, then that can be your abstracted FAC. I was not aware that FO were such an abstraction. So you suggest as a workaround giving a FO to every platoon that has a working radio. Or in a prepared defense, one can also assume landlines. This is OK, I guess, but in a perfect world (i.e., I made CM) I think I would have done it differently. In your last point, I am surprised by your claim that a much greater number of Pumas were used in combat than allied SPAA? I doubt that a single source exists that can address this, but I would guess that many here (yourself included) have read tons of WW II history over the past months, years, or decades. The impression that I got was that using SPAA in a direct fire role was not that rare at all. While I am not claiming that it was common, I do think they fit in CM both in terms of their tactical use, and also in terms of the other decisions to made to include vehicles that were far less numerous.

I have never been under the hood, but if I remember from past posts, there are already distinction for the amount of time before impact and how accurate the barrage is. I do not know enough to say if this should be altered. However, this still may not totally address the historical advantages of U.S. doctrine. Josh

Jeff, Please don't go there. I think that this game is remarkably well balanced and historical. In the past, people have raised valid points about improving the modeling of both sides. BTS has often agreed, and just as often made a real effort to adjust the game. If such an adjustment is warranted in any of my three points, then I hope people comment. If it is not, then a discussion on that would be great. However, this has nothing to do with the over-heated commentary for other threads. Thanks, Josh

I think that the FO modeling is the most important as well (though maybe impossible to model for a patch). While U.S. air power had a huge operational impact (and a significant tactical one for sure) it was U.S. artillery, the "wall of steel", that so often tipped the balance in the U.S.' favor at the tactical level. The fact that the ability to call in a strike was so decentralized was a key part of this advantage.

I love this game, but seldom get to play it. While I don't post very often, and I am at work and without sources, I do want to address a question that has been lost in all of the static in these my country is better than your country treads: In CM, are there ways that U.S. tactical effectiveness is under modeled? This is not a criticism of the game or BTS' work, but I have noticed the impact of each one of these ways while I have played. After reading this post, I hope people let me know if they think I am way off base, or if there is something to be said about my points. Like I said, a good question has been lost in the static: Does CM, in any way, under model the tactical effectiveness of the U.S. I think that the answer is yes in three ways. To back up my first two points, I will quote Steve from a thread titled WW2 U.S. inferiority complex 101. "By the end of the war the US Army's forward air control and artillery coordination was better than the Germans ever had." While the above statement is an opinion (one very well supported by historical evidence however), there are some objective ways that this could and, IMO, should have been modeled in CM. First, the U.S. procedure for allocated artillery had two distinctions. First, it did no solely rely on FOOs. In fact, the importance of FOOs decreased as the war went on. Almost all veteran officers and senior NCOs (down to platoon Sargent level often) were able to (through training and equipment) call in artillery. While one would presume that this was at a diminished ability vis-à-vis FOOs, the lack of this ability in CM undervalues a key U.S. tactical advantage. Secondly, the technical means that U.S. artillery was linked by radio meant that often these junior officers or senior NGOs were able to call in guns that were on general support (such as idle divisional or corps units) without even realizing it at the time they called in for the strike. Closing with the Enemy, Company Commander, and Time for Trumpets give examples of all of these phenomenon in practice. Second, the U.S. had a working model for tactical level (i.e., CM scale) dedicated FAC to call in air strikes. I think that Doubler has an entire section devoted to this. These forward air controllers were often on call down to the battalion level, even to point of riding in tanks or occupying front-line foxholes. Beyond Doubler, Ambrose's Citizen Solders talks about this skill in its chapter on fighting in Normandy. Finally, there is a third way that the U.S. effectiveness at the tactical level is under modeled: some key equipment is left out. This is not a laundry list, but small numbers of units are conspicuous by their absence. First is 155mm self-propelled artillery. These were used in a direct fire role on several important occasions: Brest, Aachen, and in assaulting the west wall. While this may be a relatively rare occurrence, it happened on CMs scale, and was certainly more common than battles between some of the supper-rare heavies modeled in CM. Read Doubler and The Good War for accounts of DF 155mm. The second type of allied unit missing is SPAAA, especially the quad- .50 M16 half-track. This weapon was used on the tactical level quite often. It was SOP to use them to as suppression weapons in river crossings. Doubler has a whole chapter on river crossing that makes numerous mention of this tactic. Also, they were used as a defensive weapon time and again during the Bulge. Several CM scenarios cover battles where U.S. AAA played a key role, but this could not be modeled. See a time for Trumpets or any other good tactical level history of the Bulge for numerous examples. Regards, Josh p.s. sorry for all of the edits. [This message has been edited by JoshK (edited 10-12-2000).] [This message has been edited by JoshK (edited 10-12-2000).] [This message has been edited by JoshK (edited 10-12-2000).]

Caution: From memory only. From The Good War, a great oral history btw. An infantry commander's account of facing the west wall. His unit's advance was totally stopped, so SP 155mm was called in. The SPA drove up to the ridge overlooking the bunkers. They lined up a DF shot and had a first round hit. The gunner told the infantry officer that he took out the bunker, yet the infantry officer pointed out that it was structurally unaffected. The gunner basically said "trust me on this one" What happened is that the explosion on the face of the bunker caused overpressure that killed or incapacitated the entire crew. Later on in this account the infantry officer got to pull the lanyard himself. He seemed to get quite a kick out of it.

Heinz, How do I enlarge the "flash" part of your page. As it is now, it is far too small to read. Thanks, josh

Keep in mind that one company landed at Omaha beach when they were unable to see any visual signals from the Pointe-du-Hoc rangers to reinforce the initial assault. In fact, it was there (Omaha) that the U.S. Army Ranger's motto: "Rangers, lead the way!" was born.

I am not here to get in on a lynch mob. However, this issue does bother me. Creative people (musicians and software programmers in this case) should expect to be able profit from their own intellectual property. Ultimately, if this is threatened, we all lose because there will be a disincentive to create. Authors own the rights to their works, and have exclusive power to sell them or not. Clearly, selling or distributing stolen property (Napster songs or warez software) is far worse than d/ling it. However, it bothers me that people think that by downloading they are committing a victimless crime. What's more, just because "everyone" is doing it, and it is impossible to be caught, too few people seem to be bothered to do what is right. Hell, one women in my office justifies stealing music from Napster by arguing that music companies should make individual songs available to d/l so she does not have to buy a whole album, then she wouldn't steal them.

Take a look at Patton's Best: An Informal History of the 4th. Armored Diversion. Very good first-hand account of what was right and wrong about U.S. tank equipment, tactics, etc.

I have thought about posting your #3. I also think that the post-battle FOW should be "less than zero" and tell you everything (e.g., the types of previously "unknown" vehicles you destroyed, the total amount of casualties caused by fires called down by FO units, etc.). It would be a small (but welcome) touch, but I guess when you have such a wonderful game, there are only small touches left.

While the Germans and Japanese leaders were tried for, among other crimes, "Waging aggressive war", the legal basis was not the Geneva Conventions. Written in 1949, they did not go into affect until October of 1950.

Henri, I agree totally. I am trying very hard not to read into people's posts and take what they say at face value. However, legally, logically, or morally, I can not understand two things. One, the claim that two wrongs (let both allied and German war criminal's go free) would make a right because it would not be "fair" to only try and convict some of the guilty parties. Most war crimes trails of Germans and Japanese were regarding large-scale atrocities that were the direct result of official civilian and/or military policy. No one ever tried to convict every individual German solider that shot a prisoner, raped a civilian etc. Yet this happened. Did Allied soldiers do these things? Yes. All of these acts are inexcusable. Did allied governments and/or military leaders order systemic war crimes? If they did, they were obviously not tried for them. In of itself, how can this excuse the actions of others? Second, I think that some people are being guilty of historical relativism. The vast difference in scale between any German and Allied atrocities makes it incompressible draw parallels between them. To blithely suggest that we should call it even belittles the actions of a totally reprehensible (not rather reprehensible) regime, nearly unique in human history.

I have seen a Stug pop smoke and reverse when faced frontally w/ a single Sherman(75). One could argue that is this situation, the Stug would have the advantage, yet still chose to bug out.

Lars, I agree, that Goldhagen is a must read. However, you will find that some people are willing to explain away the systematic actions of Germany by highlighting the occasions when the Western Allies committed war crimes. I think that one can rationally distinguish between the two without excusing the actions of British or American troops. As per the topic, the fact that Peiper was not at the seen does not (either morally or legally) exonerate him from guilt. One could do a much better job of demonstrating that not all SS were murders than by bring up Peiper.

The American Civil War is an interesting case-study of how tactics are impacted by revolutionary (I speak relatively here) changes in weapons performance. Civil War firearms and artillery were more accurate and had greater range than their predecessors. Combine this with mass armies and old tactics and you have a slaughter on your hand. However, there was much tactical experimentation that tried to deal with this. Infiltration, mobility, and static defenses, were all utilized at various times to address the obsolescence of pre-war tactics. In addition, you can argue that Sherman's total war strategy was also a way of addressing the new realities.

In scenario X there were no reinforcements discussed in the briefing. My right flank had just collapsed when I got the magical "Reinforcements have arrived" box. An M4(105) and a platoon of infantry make me yell out loud in joy and surprise. Great scenario briefing!!!!

FYI- I once did a search and remember reading that gun depression was modeled. I had asked if gun elevation limits were in the game, but I don't remember getting a reply.

As has been stated, if you do a LOS check on a target, you can find out if you are hull-down to it and visa-versa. It is clear how this check is done to see if your target is hull-down (you can only see the turret). Yet the LOS check also tells you if you are hull-down. I assume that this abstracts the ability of a crew to communicate about its own line of sight. As has been mentioned earlier, the gunner can see a target, but some terrain feature blocks the driver, one would assume that you are hull-down. If the LOS tool allows you to do this when you have LOS to another AFV, then logic seems to dictate that you could also use the tool to aim at a road juncture, a house, a tree-line, etc. This abstraction is identical to getting hull-down info on your own unit when you target another AFV. After all, it is not as if you call up the other tank on your radio and they say "Hey you hull-down bastard, if you think that will save you…" If my logic works (which admittedly is not all that common) one should be able to do a LOS check on any point and be told if you are hull-down to it.