How battalions re-organize after casualties ? (Ukraine ?)

[STURM-FAKTION]

aj,

Imagine you have 3 battalions: all fully manned and equipped.

After a few days, there is casualties. What you have is: I.Battalion is at 85% strength; II.Battalion is 82% strength; III.Battalion is 90% strength.

IRL even 10% casualties could results in dramatic operational dilemma.

Does battalions tends to merging like this ? I.Battalion 100% ; II.Battalion 100% ; III.Battalion 57%

With the third acting as a reserve ? And a reservoir to feed the two others ?

I mean, it's pretty bad to mix units...

I just wanted to have your opinions. I'm not even talking about Ukraine. Because in that case, Russians for example; never been at full strength even at start. All the things we saw about Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) is partially because of this. Like divisions or brigades organizing around 2 BTS's.

i know all of it depends on many things; and top of that is probably how much you can or not stretch you positions depending on how much terrain you must hold.

thanks 

[chuckdyke]

Somebody once said I lead the 6th Panzer Division because we have only 6 tanks left. Here you go that is how they did it.

[STURM-FAKTION]

mmmh...

reminds me of this pirate: "One-eyed Joe"

because he had one eye.

[Combatintman]

Cohesion, cohesion, cohesion is the general rule - one of those soft factors that is generally overlooked.  As a result, best practice is for each battalion to be kept together and those at lower levels of combat effectiveness pulled out of the line or kept as a reserve rather than breaking it up to bring other battalions to 100%.  Of course, desperate times sometimes require that rule to be broken but most swept-up armies try to avoid getting into that situation.  If you want a good example of what happens when you dump a whole bunch of odds and sods from various units onto a battlefield and hope that you'll win through superior numbers - the Argentine forces in the Falklands War in 1982 demonstrated that it wasn't the greatest of ideas.  

[Dynaman216]

The 85, 82, and 90% figures are such that they would not be reorganized.  That is pretty much "full" strength for a unit that has been in any kind of battle.  Even in western armies it would take getting down to 65% strength or so before being reorganized.  Even at the 65% or so more likely new leaders would be chosen if needed and the Repple Depple would send in replacements (for the US).  Perhaps not even taking the unit(s) out of the line.

[STURM-FAKTION]

@Dynaman216 I didn't made myself clear about these figures. I mean; yes you're right. I read few places that the average Russian BTG were ranging from 62 to 78% the day before the invasion.

Considering 2 BTG's are made of a brigade that should have 3 battalions; it means 78% of an already downed 66% brigade.

Meaning 51,48% for a full brigade in this example.

https://defence24.com/armed-forces/land-forces/russia-losing-22-battalion-tactical-groups-is-btg-a-myth-or-is-it-truly-effective-in-combat-analysis

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Estimation-of-Weapons-and-Vehicles-in-a-Battalion-Tactical-Group-circa-2014-2015-5_fig1_369920711

https://www.ausa.org/publications/reflections-russias-2022-invasion-ukraine-combined-arms-warfare-battalion-tactical

 

[Sgt Joch]

Every military is different, but battalions in combat operations are almost never at full strength because losses almost always outnumber replacements. For example, recently been reading about Vietnam and U.S. Infantry Battalions were never at full strength because of the constant rotations of draftees coming in for their one year tour.

‘That said, there is not much of a difference in the combat effectiveness of a Battalion at 85-90% strength. A Battalion will derive most of its firepower from its heavy weapons, MMGs, HMGs, AFVs, mortars, artillery, air power. Having squads with 6-7 rather than 8 soldiers will limit some missions, but won’t have much of a material impact.

[Dynaman216]

From what I have read in WWII the Russians and Germans pretty much ran a unit into the ground and then took it out to reorganize.  Though just as often they left it in combat and put another fresh unit right beside it.  The US did the Replacement pool and kept feeding new guys into existing units without normally doing any reorganization as such.  Switching around experienced NCOs and Officers was about it.  There were still other times when sub-units where mixed together too though.

Long story short - just about anything and everything was done at some point by every army.

[STURM-FAKTION]

@Sgt Joch can't agree with your phrase here: "That said, there is not much of a difference in the combat effectiveness of a Battalion at 85-90% strength. A Battalion will derive most of its firepower from its heavy weapons, MMGs, HMGs, AFVs, mortars, artillery, air power. Having squads with 6-7 rather than 8 soldiers will limit some missions, but won’t have much of a material impact."

-This is exactly why Russian VDV (Airborne) been wiped out at the beginning of Ukraine's invasion. They were elite soldiers compared to others Russian ground forces standards; but still got horribly surprised and almost annihilated in first weeks...if not days.

Although equipped with better IFVs and AFVs than regular infantry (a BMD of any type got more firepower, mechanics, armor than every BTR, as well as BMP).

VDV forces were also better supplied, and being thrown from Belarus is way shorter than deep in Russian territory. All those airborne forces had the best equipment. From weapon, uniforms, logistics to radar...I'm not talking about fancy things only issued in ridiculously small amount. I'm talking about day to day man equipment. Like having a squad equipped with AK12 instead of AK74. Or simply PKP instead of RPK74. 

-But still go wiped out for a simple fact: They didn't had the necessary manpower from lowest echelon in infantry. When dismounted; a VDV squad is 5 men (7 if taking in account both driver and gunner). 15 dismounted men for a platoon at full strength is pretty damn few. Even for today's standards.

-A mechanized Ukrainian squad is 9 men. On a pre-set up defensive positions, you are more likely to have just the gunner inside the vehicle. And the rest dismounted. Just take down a russian at first fire exchanges and you outnumbered your enemy by being twice as him.

But yes airborne VDV, had everything from heavy weapons to AA or AT. Same MG or Grenadier in squad. Even a greater number of RPO-A Shmel. With almost one for every dismounted soldier.

From Brigade, to Division. Just not enough infantry to manned it. 

So I guess it matters a bit :-))

 

[Artkin]

5 hours ago, STURM-FAKTION said:

@Sgt Joch can't agree with your phrase here: "That said, there is not much of a difference in the combat effectiveness of a Battalion at 85-90% strength. A Battalion will derive most of its firepower from its heavy weapons, MMGs, HMGs, AFVs, mortars, artillery, air power. Having squads with 6-7 rather than 8 soldiers will limit some missions, but won’t have much of a material impact."

-This is exactly why Russian VDV (Airborne) been wiped out at the beginning of Ukraine's invasion. They were elite soldiers compared to others Russian ground forces standards; but still got horribly surprised and almost annihilated in first weeks...if not days.

Although equipped with better IFVs and AFVs than regular infantry (a BMD of any type got more firepower, mechanics, armor than every BTR, as well as BMP).

VDV forces were also better supplied, and being thrown from Belarus is way shorter than deep in Russian territory. All those airborne forces had the best equipment. From weapon, uniforms, logistics to radar...I'm not talking about fancy things only issued in ridiculously small amount. I'm talking about day to day man equipment. Like having a squad equipped with AK12 instead of AK74. Or simply PKP instead of RPK74. 

-But still go wiped out for a simple fact: They didn't had the necessary manpower from lowest echelon in infantry. When dismounted; a VDV squad is 5 men (7 if taking in account both driver and gunner). 15 dismounted men for a platoon at full strength is pretty damn few. Even for today's standards.

-A mechanized Ukrainian squad is 9 men. On a pre-set up defensive positions, you are more likely to have just the gunner inside the vehicle. And the rest dismounted. Just take down a russian at first fire exchanges and you outnumbered your enemy by being twice as him.

But yes airborne VDV, had everything from heavy weapons to AA or AT. Same MG or Grenadier in squad. Even a greater number of RPO-A Shmel. With almost one for every dismounted soldier.

From Brigade, to Division. Just not enough infantry to manned it. 

So I guess it matters a bit :-))

 

VDV units have an extremely limited mission. They are not "elite" troops either. They are pretty much the only contracted professional soldiers in the entire Russian military. So they're "regulars". If I recall correctly Spetsnaz follows as second but is still nowhere near the VDV.

I highly doubt BMD's are more armored than contemporary BMP's, considering they're supposed to be air deployable.

The ak12's aren't desirable weapons either. They've already been revised since the invasion with the 2 round burst being recalled. The internet is full of ak12 reliability issues.

A report just came out on The Thread(R) saying that >75% of Ukrainian casualties were caused by artillery or mrls. So yeah, the support assets are still king of the battlefield and light infantry retain the mission of taking and holding territory.

The real failure of the VDV during the 2022 Hostomel airport attack was because the Russian ground forces didn't have adequate time to link up at Hostomel, which meant the first wave of airborne troops were wiped out. Despite the size of their squads light infantry without a logistics trail (airborne troops) are not going to stand up to a mechanized attack being supported by high power (203mm) artillery.

VDV toe is very lacking in support assets

 

[Sgt Joch]

I also do not think it is relevant to focus on squad size. A squad is not supposed to fight in isolation. If a point unit runs into a superior enemy force, SOP should be to retreat and bring up other forces to deal with the threat.

For example in Vietnam, you had several situations where a U.S. infantry platoon on point ran into a NVA company/battalion. Typically, the platoon would retreat/go defensive, call in artillery/air strikes and bring up the rest of the company/battalion/other battalions, as required to deal with the threat.

[Vergeltungswaffe]

On 7/29/2023 at 7:53 AM, Sgt Joch said:

‘That said, there is not much of a difference in the combat effectiveness of a Battalion at 85-90% strength. A Battalion will derive most of its firepower from its heavy weapons, MMGs, HMGs, AFVs, mortars, artillery, air power. Having squads with 6-7 rather than 8 soldiers will limit some missions, but won’t have much of a material impact.

This is absolutely true.

Support is a huge force multiplier.

[Combatintman]

8 hours ago, Sgt Joch said:

I also do not think it is relevant to focus on squad size. A squad is not supposed to fight in isolation. If a point unit runs into a superior enemy force, SOP should be to retreat and bring up other forces to deal with the threat.

For example in Vietnam, you had several situations where a U.S. infantry platoon on point ran into a NVA company/battalion. Typically, the platoon would retreat/go defensive, call in artillery/air strikes and bring up the rest of the company/battalion/other battalions, as required to deal with the threat.

Correct a Rhodesian stick was four guys - stick leader, two riflemen, and a MAG gunner.  Why - That's how many people fitted into an Alouette III G-Car.  However, that stick would be at least one of three and or possibly four dumped onto the ground.  Later in the conflict, para sticks were deployed from a Dakota adding another five or six sticks to the mix.  The key factors were however:

• An Alouette-III K-Car with a commander on board who could see the battlefield and a 20mm cannon.  That would orbit the contact zone and target the enemy accordingly with the 20mm while the commander could see for himself where his own troops and the enemy troops were located and issue orders appropriately.
• A Lynx light strike aircraft would also be orbiting the contact zone and would either initiate the contact or strike as directed by the commander in the K-Car.
• Superior training.
• High motivation.
• Close cooperation generated by familiarity with working with each other.

Numbers are not the be-all and end-all by any stretch of the imagination - well-trained troops, used to working together, commanded by someone who knows what they're doing with good situational awareness having support assets on call will always deliver out of proportion to their physical numbers.

[STURM-FAKTION]

@Artkin-" VDV units have an extremely limited mission. They are not "elite" troops either. They are pretty much the only contracted professional soldiers in the entire Russian military. So they're "regulars". If I recall correctly Spetsnaz follows as second but is still nowhere near the VDV  " -I am talking about what's on the ground. So yes, VDV are "elite" to Russian standards. And "Spetsnaz" is a generic term. You have "Spetsnaz" everywhere. They are just ****.

-" I highly doubt BMD's are more armored than contemporary BMP's, considering they're supposed to be air deployable. "  I wasn't clear enough; my fault. But yes they are. What is really issue on the ground to a division or brigade is generally BMP-2 and BTR80. By now, it's even BMP-1 and BTR-D.

Contemporary BMP-3 are rare. But BMD-2 was widely issued to dedicated troops. Just as the BMD-4 for airborne.

-"The ak12's aren't desirable weapons either. They've already been revised since the invasion with the 2 round burst being recalled. The internet is full of ak12 reliability issues." Ukrainians fights with the same Kalashnikov as Russians. Both sides have a lot of model and era. That's why I said I wasn't talking about "fancy".

-"A report just came out on The Thread(R) saying that >75% of Ukrainian casualties were caused by artillery or mrls. So yeah, the support assets are still king of the battlefield and light infantry retain the mission of taking and holding territory." Artillery casualties were counted for 50 or 60% of the total losses in WW2. I'm sure 75% is a bit too much; even for a drone-era war. But yes artillery rules.

 

-"The real failure of the VDV during the 2022 Hostomel airport attack was because the Russian ground forces didn't have adequate time to link up at Hostomel, which meant the first wave of airborne troops were wiped out. Despite the size of their squads light infantry without a logistics trail (airborne troops) are not going to stand up to a mechanized attack being supported by high power (203mm) artillery.

VDV toe is very lacking in support assets" I wasn't specific about Hostomel airport battle. And VDV were also deployed in the south. Anyway, you are right about it. And the 72nd mech.brigade is "elite" to this war standards. Everything was wrong about Russian plan. 

But your picture of Russian TOE is not that great. I've seen it already. It doesn't show any of the sub-units attached to a battalion for example. Could be mortars, could be PKP machine-gun.

BTW, Ukraine TOE is not that much different everywhere you look at it. Truth is: despite the 2008 reform in Russian ground forces, they still are organized as soviet era. Just as Ukrainians. And just as Ukrainians are riding BMP-1 and T-64.

Overall, what really worked at the beginning was this "panzerfaust" tactic. With Javelin and NLAW.

Still; Russia is missing manpower.

[STURM-FAKTION]

@Sgt Joch "I also do not think it is relevant to focus on squad size. A squad is not supposed to fight in isolation. If a point unit runs into a superior enemy force, SOP should be to retreat and bring up other forces to deal with the threat.

For example in Vietnam, you had several situations where a U.S. infantry platoon on point ran into a NVA company/battalion. Typically, the platoon would retreat/go defensive, call in artillery/air strikes and bring up the rest of the company/battalion/other battalions, as required to deal with the threat." -   what a strange example you are serving here...At first I thought you were about to talk about how a squad of under-equipped Viet Cong ambushed and dealt with an entire US company. 

You know...talking about terrain and all.

But no. Well; in that case, why not talking about how a single forward observer can rout an entire regiment ?

[Artkin]

No, no no. Nobody is elite. These units have been wiped and reformed already. 

[Sgt Joch]

3 hours ago, STURM-FAKTION said:

 

   what a strange example you are serving here...

I doubt anyone else had trouble understanding it....

[STURM-FAKTION]

Well Artkin...I said they were "elite" to Russians standards. Which is the case. Elite too get wiped and reformed. Especially by Russians standards.

I though it was clear enough when calling it sh**.

But sad truth is: No western armies could have done better than what Russia did. What I mean is; in a similar conflict, same ground, same ennemies. I'm pretty sure that every countries would have failed the same. 

Russia was just too dumb to try it.

[Artkin]

On 7/20/2023 at 9:36 PM, chuckdyke said:

Somebody once said I lead the 6th Panzer Division because we have only 6 tanks left. Here you go that is how they did it.

Lol yep the "six" panzer division. I think I remember hearing that from a David Stahel audiobook.. probably Barbarossa.

[STURM-FAKTION]

it's the 6.Panzerarmee

not division.

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Yep, Sepp Dietrich made the 6 panzers comment in early 45 after the Ardennes offensive.

[Artkin]

He may have, but the comment I'm referring to was about the division, not the army. And it was probably the winter of 41-42.

[Centurian52]

• BMDs are less armored than BMPs. The armor is aluminum. It is tough enough to withstand small arms fire only, and will be easily penetrated by even an HMG. The BMD-1 has the same firepower as the BMP-1. The BMD-2 has the same firepower as the BMP-2. And the BMD-4 has about the same firepower as the BMP-3. The BMD-1 and BMD-4 each have room for 5 dismounts, while the BMD-2 can carry 6 dismounts. As the airborne equivalents of the BMP series, the design priority for the BMD series was to make it air droppable, not tougher or more "elite". They needed to be lighter, so they are smaller (less room for dismounts) and more lightly armored. Whenever any army in any time period gives armored vehicles to its airborne forces, those vehicles are always lighter than the equivalent armored vehicles given to the regular infantry, so there was never any chance of BMDs being given more armor than BMPs.
• The low number of dismounts that can fit into a BMD compared to a BMP is a serious problem for the VDV. Squad size does matter. Small squads can't absorb many casualties (everyone always seems to forget the importance of being able to absorb casualties). And having too many key weapon systems and too few riflemen can seriously hamper mobility and limit your offensive capabilities (who wants to assault a trench while lugging around an MMG? How many spare riflemen do you have to assault a trench if everyone is either manning or assisting a key weapon system?). And casualties can force you to abandon key weapon systems if you don't have enough riflemen in reserve to pick them up.
• VDV are not the only contract soldiers in the Russian army. The pre-war Russian army was a two tier army made up of contract soldiers and conscripts. Every Russian unit had both contract soldiers and conscripts (except the VDV, which had no conscripts). Russian law prohibited conscripts from being used outside Russian borders except during a time of war (which is why Russian units were generally understrength at the start of the war, since they had to leave their conscripts behind, though it's a curious feature of Russian law that mobiks don't count as conscripts). Since Russia never declared war, if VDV were the only contract soldiers in the Russian army then only VDV (and no other Russian soldiers) would have been in Ukraine. It would have been a very easy war.
• There is no internationally recognized set of standards that defines how much training is required to qualify a soldier as being "elite". But VDV troops are better trained than regular Russian soldiers (at least they were before the war (high attrition rates may have changed that)). So by the loose definition of "elite" as meaning "better than the typical formation", pre-war VDV formations were "elite" formations (don't think of "elite" as being equivalent to the "elite" experience level in Combat Mission), though I've read ISW assess that they are probably no longer elite formations.