How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

39 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

It was found pretty quickly that infantry sappers tend to get slaughtered clearing mines in front of defences, its why armoured solutions were devised in the first place. At least an AFV can survive a light bombardment. I think a mix of engineering vehicles and drones offers a solution that is both speedy and able to clear a path with minimal fuss. Not an easy answer though. 

It doesn't help that there are now several different ways to throw new mines into the channel you are trying to clear, and keep clear. 

[paxromana]

38 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

It was found pretty quickly that infantry sappers tend to get slaughtered clearing mines in front of defences, its why armoured solutions were devised in the first place. At least an AFV can survive a light bombardment. I think a mix of engineering vehicles and drones offers a solution that is both speedy and able to clear a path with minimal fuss. Not an easy answer though. 

Which is why I indicated 'not for assaults' ... I just don't think engineering vehicles are the answer, or not ones as currently envisioned.

ISTR that someone posted here (or I read elsewhere) that there was at least one ongoing attempt to have drone based mine detection and elimination ... detecting them with onboard sensors and marking their position for either another drone to drop a charge on it or for sappers to neutralise it. Presumably you could have a drone swarm with mixed mine detector drones and charge carrying drones work in tandem.

Do it at night and the drones would be virtually undetectable ... 

Would require a lot of drones, of course, but you could run them so they simply cleared lanes through a larger field while mapping all the routes fior downloading into the GPS of the attacking vehicles.

[paxromana]

8 minutes ago, dan/california said:

It doesn't help that there are now several different ways to throw new mines into the channel you are trying to clear, and keep clear. 

You could use the Drone based system I described above to lay charges on mines and only set them off at the moment the assault begins ... which would provide a degree of surprise. A considerable degree of surprise.

Given the general sluggishness of Russian responses to ... anything ... coupled with the degradation of their artillery systems (heck, how many trained artillerists do they even have left?) plus, I would presume, a lack of artillery launched mines ... such a surprise might work. Especially if you separate the attack lanes beyond the effect range of artillery delivered minelets and didn't trigger all of the lane clearing charges at once ... so if the Russians did manage to get their act together and hit one set, simply blow another series of lanes and hit there.

Of course, Friction would be the problem to beat, per Clausewitz.

Edited Wednesday at 02:24 AM by paxromana

[Offshoot]

6 minutes ago, paxromana said:

ISTR that someone posted here (or I read elsewhere) that there was at least one ongoing attempt to have drone based mine detection and elimination ... detecting them with onboard sensors and marking their position for either another drone to drop a charge on it or for sappers to neutralise it.

It is ongoing field research in Ukraine with reportedly good results for what they are doing, but again, not currently really meant for clearing lanes for assaults.

 

[paxromana]

3 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

It is ongoing field research in Ukraine with reportedly good results for what they are doing, but again, not currently really meant for clearing lanes for assaults.

 

Thanks for that. Interesting article!

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

The tank has survived several numerous generations of the ATGM, including attempts to convert tanks entirely to missile gun platforms that proved to be a disappointment at best and abject failures at worst. MBT-70 for instance. Every time a new innovation allowed tanks a means of dealing or surpassing the problem at hand. I dont see why we should conclude so swiftly that this time is different with the conflict still on going. 

How about I fix that for you:

"The battleship has survived several numerous generations of submarines and aircraft, including attempts to convert battleships entirely to missile gun platforms that proved to be a disappointment at best and abject failures at worst. Every time a new innovation allowed battleships a means of dealing or surpassing the problem at hand. I dont see why we should conclude so swiftly that this time is different with the conflict still on going. "

You keep having to resort to this line of argument that basically boils down to "tanks exist, therefore they are".  It's a weak argument and you should abandon it because, as the saying goes, "past performance is not indicative of future results".  Every time you feel yourself trying that point on for size, abandon it.  It's harming your argument more than helping it.

Plus, I do not agree with your premise that tanks have "successfully" dealt with all the threats of the past.  Western tanks have never gone up against an enemy with top attack ATGMs.  It's doubtful they would do any better than the Soviet/Russian smoldering junk that litters Ukraine now.   APS is not a proven cure for them either because a) few Western tanks even have them installed and b) those that do have APS haven't dealt with top attack ATGMs.  It's thought that China has a Javelin copy and there will likely be others.

 

Yesterday I listened to a talk by Jack Watling about his excellent book, "The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century":

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-books/arms-future-technology-and-close-combat-twenty-first-century

While he doesn't explicitly say that "the tank is dead", he explains in detail how the battlefield has FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED and that all previous bets on what works are off.  What he outlines we've talked about here.  Making any sort of assumption that past performance is enough to indicate future value is off to a very bad start.  Not just tanks.

The entire video is well worth listening to.  However, if all you have time for is a few minutes, at least listen to this couple of minutes of why he wrote his book:

Steve

[cesmonkey]

 

[cesmonkey]

Updates from DeepState and Mashovets on Russian advances:

https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19815

Quote

The map has been updated!

The enemy advanced near Progress , Volodymyrivka , Karlivka , Krasnohorivka , New York , Chasovoy Yar and Makiivka .

🏚Literally on June 9, " the enemy was not in the city ", on June 27 the spokesman " knocked out all the occupiers from the city ", and already today the Katsapas occupied the completely destroyed Kanal microdistrict (Novij on the headquarters map).

Unfortunately, mistakes have to be paid for - with people and territory. If we continue to pretend that everything is fine, the situation will be on the verge of disaster. There are units and brigades from which it is worth taking an example, and there are units that become someone's career ladder, where the foot of some general should step.

The main tactical mistakes remain attempts to restore positions when it does not make any sense, and defense at disadvantageous boundaries, and sometimes in the environment.

https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2005

Quote

Two more "fortresses" are approaching at once...

Toretsk and Chasov Yar...

Just yesterday I wrote in the review that the pigdogs will be rushing to New York from the south and east (not yet knowing about the "latest changes"), but judging by the nature of the work of the enemy aviation and artillery, during the last 24 hours, it was quite possible to understand.

Probably, the southern part of the village of New York is lost...

They are ALREADY climbing to Kalinovo, it's only a matter of time - when they will try to break through to Alexandropol and will climb from the side of Shiroka Balka...

In the Kramatorsk direction, judging by everything, the "Kanal" microdistrict in the "chasov" is also completely lost...

Obviously, the review of the North Korean "tourists" and the continuation about the enemy's "assault companies" - will have to be postponed, a little further...

The next review will be about the current situation on the front...

 

[cesmonkey]

 

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

While he doesn't explicitly say that "the tank is dead", he explains in detail how the battlefield has FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED and that all previous bets on what works are off.  What he outlines we've talked about here.  Making any sort of assumption that past performance is enough to indicate future value is off to a very bad start.  Not just tanks.

 

He does a nice job on battlefield transparency starting at about 10:39 - basically anything you do anywhere (even far back from the FEBA), you'll be seen within 20 minutes.  And I can assure you it's only going to get worse.

Then he follows it up by pointing out that if you're seen, your enemy can send a precision weapon to kill you.  Probably on the first shot.

So it's basically borg spotting for tens (or hundreds) of km providing targets for long range precision weapons.  

I'm only about 20 minutes in so far, but skimming the labeled sections it looks like he covers all the things we've been talking about here.  And what he's discussed so far is pretty accurate.  It's good that when talking about fires he takes a broad view of delivery systems.  

[Grey_Fox]

On 6/30/2024 at 1:45 PM, The_Capt said:

Along those corridors they had infantry

 

On 6/30/2024 at 1:45 PM, The_Capt said:

And then the RA just forgot how to do “combined arms”…for 6 weeks?

That's exactly what happened. Russian units were going forward with a fraction of the infantry they were supposed to have due to not calling up the conscripts who were supposed to fill out the infantry roles.

So you had motor rifle platoons which had maybe 2 dismounts per APC/IFV, tank regiments that had to share a company of infantry when they should have had a battalion, etc.

Russia didn't have a combined arms force - they had a ton of armoured vehicles, and a profound lack of infantry.

Mike Kofman goes into it in this article: https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/

Edited Wednesday at 08:33 AM by Grey_Fox

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Grey_Fox said:

 

That's exactly what happened. Russian units were going forward with a fraction of the infantry they were supposed to have due to not calling up the conscripts who were supposed to fill out the infantry roles.

So you had motor rifle platoons which had maybe 2 dismounts per APC/IFV, tank regiments that had to share a company of infantry when they should have had a battalion, etc.

Russia didn't have a combined arms force - they had a ton of armoured vehicles, and a profound lack of infantry.

Mike Kofman goes into it in this article: https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/

You completely miss my point, as does Kofman - no one has “the infantry they are supposed to have” to try and secure a corridor fully illuminated by enemy ISR and harried by precision weapon systems with ranges 5-10kms.  That corridor in my example is 1000 sq kms that needs to be defended from small ATGM teams with NLAW and Javelin…that know exactly where the Russian are.

There is no military on earth that can deal with that right now.  Finally, the other big problem with this entire theory of “not enough infantry” is that the RA has definitely had plenty of infantry since Summer of ‘22.  The UA had western based formations summer ‘23.  And they did not solve the same fundamental problem the RA had on day 1 - ISR + Range = broken mass.

In fact this entire BTG = not enough infantry is a myth/excuse not a sound observation.  The BTGs as designed is basically somewhere between a western battlegroup and ACR Squadron.  They are modular and lighter on manpower but upgunned by firepower significantly (no surprise there being Russian).  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battalion_tactical_group

Advantages and disadvantages

The combination of different weapons systems including heavy ones at a low organisational level allows heavy artillery bombardments to be laid on more easily and makes them available for use tactically. As such, a BTG can engage opposing units out to a longer range than, for example, a US Brigade Combat Team (BCT), which does not have heavy weapons devolved down to it.^[29] Up to two BTGs can compose a brigade in the Russian army. Divisions and regiments have been superseded by brigades.^[30]

However, the basic BTG's relative lack of manpower (they deploy with about 200 infantrymen) means it is not designed to hold ground but to continually inflict casualties while remaining mobile. This makes it reliant upon Marines, VDV and other troops such as paramilitaries (pro-Russian militias in the Donbass war) to hold ground or provide security along the flanks and rear.^{[5]: p. 3} That said it is a flexible tactical formation and additional infantry can be added if needed/available as the mission requires.^[31]

So if you are planning a fast offensive war against an opponent with a fraction of your force - and given the ridiculous frontage that Ukraine had to defend along its entire eastern border, they did not have enough infantry either - they make a lot of sense.  What they are not built for is trying to hunt down two man teams with a 5km weapon system backed up by ISR everywhere.

But the “not enough infantry” has become and easy button excuse that makes us feel good but really avoids the uncomfortable truth of how much the battlefield is changing.

[The_Capt]

15 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I'm a little hesitant with regards to smart fires being a given thing, given we know that the Ukrainians are reporting some issues with Excalibur due to jamming and have largely moved elsewhere with regards to munitions from their NATO guns. (Is this something that can be compensated for? Does AI correction even exist for artillery rounds? GPS clearly cannot be relied on) Regular NATO 155 is not exactly inaccurate but its still a case of needing several rounds on target, less so if cluster is used. 

Why would we be “hesitant”?  The Excalibre round is nearly 20 years old.  In fact almost everything being sent to Ukraine is last-gen technology.  Even the UAS/FPVs are commercial tech being re-rolled. I don’t know what current generation smart artillery looks like but we already have laser guided and it is easy to mount on a spotting laser in a drone. The last thing I am hesitant about is more smart munitions on the battlefield, or dumb ones made smart by forward processing power.  We would be mad to not assume it is either already in motion or will quickly be off drawing boards.  

Everyone is watching this war and seeing the results. Ukraine just Moneyballed Russia in a game changing way.  Precision and smart are at the centre of that shift.  Why we would be slow to move because some tech that is two decades old is disrupted? That does not sound like a good idea.

[Edit: and we are already out of date.  Looks like the UA was using UAS mounted laser guided artillery at the beginning of this thing: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/04/05/one-shot-one-kill-ukrainian-gunners-fire-laser-guided-shells-at-russian-vehicles/]

Edited Wednesday at 12:39 PM by The_Capt

[cesmonkey]

Quote

The fire on the Russian missile ship "Serpukhov" in April was a special operation of the GUR, fighters from the "Freedom of Russia" Legion and the representative of the GUR Yusov said at a press conference

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3881500-operation-rybalka-hur-damaged-serpukhov-ship-and-received-secret-data-about-russias-baltic-fleet.html

 

[Vanir Ausf B]

Random stat about deployment density in Ukraine:

450,000 divided by 700 km equals 643 troops per kilometer.

The main point is that the density is around a fourth of the typical density on the Western Front in WWII. And again, that is in one dimension.

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2024/07/02/density-of-deployment-in-ukraine-2/

[Artkin]

10 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Random stat about deployment density in Ukraine:

450,000 divided by 700 km equals 643 troops per kilometer.

The main point is that the density is around a fourth of the typical density on the Western Front in WWII. And again, that is in one dimension.

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2024/07/02/density-of-deployment-in-ukraine-2/

His ukraine book released in May iirc. It's on my list. I believe it has vdv battalion TOEs.

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Random stat about deployment density in Ukraine:

450,000 divided by 700 km equals 643 troops per kilometer.

The main point is that the density is around a fourth of the typical density on the Western Front in WWII. And again, that is in one dimension.

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2024/07/02/density-of-deployment-in-ukraine-2/

I have seen this before.  If one takes into account logistics, C2, reserves and rotations some calcs are coming in and around 300 frontline troops per km on any given day.  So exactly how much infantry is "too little or too much" now?

With force densities like this a solid Battlegroup should be able to punch through that and keep going...but they are not, for either side. So neither the UA are RA know how to glue together a BG now? After two years of war?  I keep hearing from experts like Kofman that Ukraine "needs to upscale".  They have 300-450k troops in the field right now...they know how to upscale.  That was a Bn sized attack we saw last summer, so the know-how is there.  Russia did Bn sized manoeuvre in 2014.

So two sides with the means and knowledge cannot seem to be able to muster a dense 1000 troop assault force to crash the gates of 300 troops defending 1000ms?  Theoretically, given the terrain, this should be a fluid and mobile crazy fight but instead we are seeing WW1...why?  No one has been able to explain this adequately based on qualitative themes of "mission command, NCO Corps".  Russia may suck but they are sustaining a 600k force in the field despite very high loss rates...that is not "sucking" operationally.  UA officers are graduating from western war colleges every year (just watched one do it), so Ukraine understands how to do this.  But instead what we keep hearing (and ignoring) from Ukraine is that we in the West do not fully understand this environment...and I think they are right.

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

 

I listened to an older Perun interview with Ben Hodges (LTG Ret) and he talked about how far behind we are in terms of EW. 

Perun also spoke in another episode about the dangers of who does the jamming because it's an emission and emissions can be homed in on.  In particular Perun underscored that one of the "easiest" potential uses of fully autonomous "kill bots" is seeking out, homing in on, and killing anything emitting a jamming signal.  Because it is highly unlikely a civilian would be jamming things so the chances of accidentally killing grandma going to the grocery store is just about zero.

In other words... I'm not sure I'd like to be the guy carrying a jammer on my person.

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

APS is not a proven cure for them either because a) few Western tanks even have them installed and b) those that do have APS haven't dealt with top attack ATGMs.  It's thought that China has a Javelin copy and there will likely be others.

Trophy specifically has top attack countering ability. Not sure about Iron fist. The reality is also that we will see a lot more APS going forward. British Chally 3s are slated to either have them or the capability of mounting them for instance. Tank design has been a little stagnant since the end of the cold war but I expect this conflict has served as a wakeup call for redesign and modification of in service platforms. 

 

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

"The battleship has survived several numerous generations of submarines and aircraft, including attempts to convert battleships entirely to missile gun platforms that proved to be a disappointment at best and abject failures at worst. Every time a new innovation allowed battleships a means of dealing or surpassing the problem at hand. I dont see why we should conclude so swiftly that this time is different with the conflict still on going. "

You keep having to resort to this line of argument that basically boils down to "tanks exist, therefore they are".  It's a weak argument and you should abandon it because, as the saying goes, "past performance is not indicative of future results".  Every time you feel yourself trying that point on for size, abandon it.  It's harming your argument more than helping it.

Pointing out that tanks have in fact survived numerous battlefield changes remains a valid argument. The battleship saw one major change at sea and became obsolete, the two are really not comparable. This war has shown that tanks from the cold war era of design are increasingly vulnerable and should be redesigned to reflect that. No one is -really- suggesting that tanks are useless, neither combatant is and several NATO countries are actively expanding their tank fleets. You talk about past performance but this is literally active and future plans in motion.

In short, its clear both combatants would much rather have tanks than not. That alone implies value. Until you come up with something that replaces the desired role that a tank provides on the battlefield I do not see that changing. 

Edited Wednesday at 03:23 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Why would we be “hesitant”?  The Excalibre round is nearly 20 years old.  In fact almost everything being sent to Ukraine is last-gen technology.  Even the UAS/FPVs are commercial tech being re-rolled. I don’t know what current generation smart artillery looks like but we already have laser guided and it is easy to mount on a spotting laser in a drone. The last thing I am hesitant about is more smart munitions on the battlefield, or dumb ones made smart by forward processing power.  We would be mad to not assume it is either already in motion or will quickly be off drawing boards.  

Everyone is watching this war and seeing the results. Ukraine just Moneyballed Russia in a game changing way.  Precision and smart are at the centre of that shift.  Why we would be slow to move because some tech that is two decades old is disrupted? That does not sound like a good idea.

[Edit: and we are already out of date.  Looks like the UA was using UAS mounted laser guided artillery at the beginning of this thing: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/04/05/one-shot-one-kill-ukrainian-gunners-fire-laser-guided-shells-at-russian-vehicles/]

I think the point is that precision is not always a guarantee in an increasingly high tech battlefield with plentiful jamming and other countermeasures in the works. I suppose part of it goes back to the West's overwhelming reliance on precision instead of deep stocks, we really do need to dabble with both rather than relying so heavily on the former. 

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, chrisl said:

He does a nice job on battlefield transparency starting at about 10:39 - basically anything you do anywhere (even far back from the FEBA), you'll be seen within 20 minutes.  And I can assure you it's only going to get worse.

Then he follows it up by pointing out that if you're seen, your enemy can send a precision weapon to kill you.  Probably on the first shot.

So it's basically borg spotting for tens (or hundreds) of km providing targets for long range precision weapons.  

I'm only about 20 minutes in so far, but skimming the labeled sections it looks like he covers all the things we've been talking about here.  And what he's discussed so far is pretty accurate.  It's good that when talking about fires he takes a broad view of delivery systems.  

His arguments that everybody is getting their panties in a twist about fully autonomous kill systems are spot on.  The three arguments are:

1.  We've been using such systems for a very long time.  At least since the land mine.  Conventions to curb them have not worked.

2.  They're too damned effective, so everybody is going to develop them and nobody will withhold their use in time of war.  So, basically, "get over it".

3.  It's quite possible that a well designed "kill bot" system will be LESS likely to cause civilian casualties.  He cited an example of an automated MG covering a sector of street possibly killing someone carrying a non-weapon that is interpreted as a weapon.  His point?  A 19 year old kid who is pumped up on adrenaline and lacks sleep is likely to do the same exact thing.  At least the kill bot is always logical, never emotional.

I read some of his book and really need to read the rest.  I remember having some quibbles with it, but now I'm wondering if my quibbles were about things that weren't reflective of the book on the whole.  Because there was absolutely nothing Watling said in that presentation and Q&A that I found even remotely off the mark.

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

You completely miss my point, as does Kofman - no one has “the infantry they are supposed to have” to try and secure a corridor fully illuminated by enemy ISR and harried by precision weapon systems with ranges 5-10kms.  That corridor in my example is 1000 sq kms that needs to be defended from small ATGM teams with NLAW and Javelin…that know exactly where the Russian are.

I really think you are missing just how bad it was for the Russians to have so little dismounts on hand. They could not even begin to properly secure gains or screen their vehicles effectively, or respond to ambushes properly. We literally saw this in motion with videos of ambushes happening at point blank range. This happened more than enough times to clearly be a systemic issue. 

If they had their intended compliments of infantry, then they could of at least began to properly fight and attrite the infantry repeatedly doing these ambushes at such short range, which would of preventing follow-up units from being hit in the same way. Combat tends to happen at quite shorter ranges than one might expect.
 

 

 

Edited Wednesday at 03:34 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Trophy specifically has top attack countering ability.

 

Name me one, even one, real world engagement where a Western armed APS tank defended against a top attack munition.  You can't because it hasn't happened.  So until that happens you can not conclude, with *ANY*, degree of certainty that the top attack threat has been neutralized by APS.  And yet we're going to spend billions on making heavy, expensive, slow rate of production things heavier, more expensive, and slower rate of production.

6 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Pointing out that tanks have in fact survived numerous battlefield changes remains a valid argument.

It is only a valid argument that it has managed to remain in place on the battlefield.  It is not an argument that it will remain so.  Therefore, saying "it will always be because it has always been" is a really bad premise to base any argument for the tank's future.  And that goes for anything, not just the tank.  Cheap, autonomous flying things acting on unprecedented levels of low lagtime ISR have fundamentally changed EVERYTHING.  Hell, we're sitting here wondering if an infantryman has a place on the battlefield.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I really think you are missing just how bad it was for the Russians to have so little dismounts on hand. They could not even begin to properly secure gains or screen their vehicles effectively, or respond to ambushes properly. We literally saw this in motion with videos of ambushes happening at point blank range. This happened more than enough times to clearly be a systemic issue. 
 

 

Nobody is missing that.  We were here discussing it as it happened and it was repeatedly pointed out as a major reason for Russia's plans failing.  However, the plan couldn't have been carried out with more infantry because they simply did not have it.

We also have seen what's happened since then and it's only confirmed the premise that the quality and quantity of dispersed kill capabilities is proving to be too much for armored formations.  As Watling said in the previously linked presentation, he doesn't think that a NATO force would have done any better at Vuhledar.  That was an engagement where the Russians had the proper ratios of infantry.  They still got slaughtered.

The_Capt's point, specifically, is that even if Russia tripled, even quadrupled, it's infantry it still would have gotten mauled.  With weapons that can kill out to several KMs there just isn't enough infantry possible to do force protection.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I think the point is that precision is not always a guarantee in an increasingly high tech battlefield with plentiful jamming and other countermeasures in the works. I suppose part of it goes back to the West's overwhelming reliance on precision instead of deep stocks, we really do need to dabble with both rather than relying so heavily on the former. 

Jamming and EW don't do squat against autonomous systems.  And in many cases, not even semi-autonomous.

Mass is already being beaten by precision.  It doesn't seem that is going to get better, it seems it will get worse.  Which is why doubling down on systems that are already struggling to prove themselves useful is a bad idea.

Steve