How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/29/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-donbas.html

In the latest tactic for storming trenches, Russians use motorcycles and dune buggies to speed across open space, often into a hail of gunfire.

 

 

[Letter from Prague]

It is hilarious how the "cavalry assaulted trenches on horses and got mowed down in WW1" is actually a myth, but the Russians still felt "man, that does sound good, let's do it".

[ArmouredTopHat]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The reason we don't have this is because the military, along with its military industrial partners, convinced the civilian leadership (see below) that extremely expensive, high tech wonder weapons didn't require large stocks. 

Part of this was being convinced that long wars were never going to happen again.  The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan gave the West 20+ years of warning that this was not true. 

We DID have deep stocks (Or at least deeper stocks) of kit, but a little something called the end of the cold war came. Germany scrapped such a crazy amount of its hardware for literal pennies that upon reflecting it was an actual crime. Pretty much everyone thought that war was now far less likely, so why spend to maintain keep reserves and large armies? It was a perfectly reasonable attitude at the time when social concerns were a more pressing issue. 

I dont see how Iraq or Afghanistan gave a warning to this either, the conflicts were completely different and revolved around insurgencies after relatively quick and easy conventional campaigns. The problem with both was it made the west largely focus on on COIN developments.

I dont know how else to say it, but the war in Ukraine was not expected for a lot of reasons, even when in hindsight we might find it was obviously coming. The reasons for this war are so illogical to our minds that such a thing was identified as folly. From the strategic point of view, it does not give Russia anything but a black hole for their forces to be eroded away on. People assumed it would not happen because it was a -stupid idea-. Should there have been better plans in case of it happening anyway? Very much so, but you can at least understand why such a thought was considered unlikely. 

[Letter from Prague]

17 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

We DID have deep stocks (Or at least deeper stocks) of kit, but a little something called the end of the cold war came. Germany scrapped such a crazy amount of its hardware for literal pennies that upon reflecting it was an actual crime. Pretty much everyone thought that war was now far less likely, so why spend to maintain keep reserves and large armies? It was a perfectly reasonable attitude at the time when social concerns were a more pressing issue. 

Yeah.

In hindsight, the End of History idea of forever peace after the Cold War ended was a combination of naive, stupid, corrupt and evil. Of course the Russia would eventually attack again. Of course other empires will rise and start attacking neighbors. Of course they did. They always do. Nothing lasts forever, there is always another war behind the corner.

Yet we did spend decades lying to ourselves and making ourselves vulnerable.

But this pales with how the West failed to defend itself against enemy information operations. Putin managed to cause untold suffering and destruction by orchestrating Brexit and Trump. But our own ideology of "marketplace of idea" and "censorship is bad" stops West from being capable of defending itself, and it will lead to our destruction. And there is no need for enemies of West to even do anything anymore, it will just snowball from here into fall od West by itself (see what US Supreme Court did in last few years).

The nuclear war would at least be quick.

...

As for the war being a stupid idea. If it's stupid and it works, it's not stupid. Russia got a lot of territory in exchange for few hundred thousand dead and little economic hiccup - and they will get to keep it forever. They got few million new people to enslave and exploit.

Yes, it's not as good as what they wanted, but still a win.

Edited Saturday at 04:05 PM by Letter from Prague

[Carolus]

It is claimed that Ukraine used an F-16 for an airstrike for the first time.

 

 

[Holien]

17 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

Yes, it's not as good as what they wanted, but still a win.

Hmmm really...

That's like me losing all my money at a casino and saying at least I won the napkin & free box of matches they gave me while pissing away all my life savings....

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

They are reforming at incredible rates because the environment is forcing them to.  Meanwhile the western modern militaries are sitting back, shaking their heads and largely declaring “you are doing it wrong”.  And then when it comes time to discuss our own situations we get excuses, weird rationality and “slow and steady reform”.

FFS, Ukraine was down to FPVs this winter because the US was paralyzed. We just watched them hold off continued RA assaults with C4ISR, infantry and FPVs.  And the assessment is “well, that is because the Russians are doing it wrong”? That was a weak excuse to start with but it simply does not wash.

The Russians are not really reforming though, they went back to basics and seem to be largely improvising at this point. They very much are 'doing it wrong' when they remain incapable of large scale assaults and instead seem set on smaller, managed and regular attacks that allow Ukraine to focus its UAS and limited firepower to best effect. I simply do not understand why they do this when broader attacks might open up more holes in the front and constrain Ukrainian abilities to focus reserves. I suspect its due to the declining quality and quantity of Russian reserves as well as the command and control issues as well as political will from behind that insists on these regular, wasteful attacks. 

We saw their lack of coordination right from the onset of the war, and I remain convinced the Russian army is simply incapable of large scale attacks that might actually bring about some more mobile warfare. This is a core failure of the Russian army and there is no signs of it being fixed alongside their other systemic issues that hamper their effectiveness so much. Its been literally years since we saw any Russian exploitation of a front, something Ukraine was able to achieve with the lightest of mechanised forces in Kharkiv. They were having these issues before FPVs became so prevalent on the front, so it cannot be down to the harsh operational environment entirely. 

I think its very fair for the west to announce that the Russians are doing it wrong, because they are still being limited in numerous respects quite needlessly. Rigid top down command structures, the lack of an empowered NCO system. These things are actively biting the Russians in the *** even before the increasingly polarisation of training and equipment, all of which is decayed by a truly appalling and intrinsic corruption issue. There are obvious limits to NATO criticisms, and I remain so very angry that the NATO response to Ukrainians getting caught in minefields was 'go around them'. NATO are not going to get everything right and they MUST take the lessons learned in this war to heart. This is where I agree very heavily with Battlefront and yourself on this issue. The evidence so far does point to NATO watching closely, time will tell if we see significant changes in consequence. 
 

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The environment has accelerated past modern militaries, history is full of examples of this happening before.  We will need to adapt faster than future opponents, who are not going to stick to “slow and steady reform” and are already in many ways pulling out ahead while we try and figure out how to stick more guns on things.

Who exactly is doing this? China is the only potential that springs to mind and I am very suspicious about their stated capabilities when they feature some of the same issues the Russians do. Not to call them a paper tiger but as I stated before, they feel themselves that they are behind the curve and are still catching up to NATO, let alone trying to surpass them. 

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

As to Syria - those are almost entirely all SOF operations.  So, yes, SOF has adapted - it is kinda their thing, but conventional forces appear to be doubling down on protecting what they have

10th Mountain division are a light infantry unit, not special forces. They are the ones dealing with the constant drone attacks. As the podcast states they are also the most experienced US unit when it comes to drone attacks and have learned valuable information in the process that is even now being actively disseminated through the rest of the Army. 

 

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Russia’s formation adaptations actually support my point - slow and steady reform works right up until the point it does not.  Technology never develops in linear increments, it accelerates until it plateaus.  We have been in an acceleration curve since the 70s.  Yet military reform has been incremental and largely linear - same basic platforms, same basic units and same basic doctrine.  Over 30 years those reforms do add up - I seriously hardest recognize some elements anymore.  But it has not kept up with the pace of technology…not even close.  Nations that are doing radical reforms are the ones in the breach right now. The UA has stood up an entire Unmanned Service:

Russian military reform as we saw was literally their only option outside of doing nothing. They struggled enough with such a steady process and even then it did not work properly. There was no way in hell they could of even attempted anything more radical with the powers that be in the Russian state, let alone things like corruption getting in the way. Its simply not the kind of environment where you can flip a table and reset everything, not when some general does not get to steal funding for whatever project he was working on. 

 

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The good news is that you will not be alone in conservatism. The military is rife with cultural protectionism. And MIC back them up largely due to sunk investment costs.  Governments hate major shifts because it costs a lot of money and accepts a lot of inefficiency risks. History is on my side on this point.  In the end we are in for some harsh lessons because once again we will ignore environmental changes for as long as we can…until we can’t.

Forgive me but this seems a little...arrogant? Assuming that your viewpoint is right and incontrovertible is exactly the kind of issue your claiming is prevalent in the military. Militaries need to be a little more pragmatic than that in my view. Is it not fair to point out that that what we consider the future for military organisation could very well change entirely, or shift back to something more familiar? This sort of stuff is hard to predict. I again need to make it clear, I agree with you on a lot here, I just think its a little silly to deride numerous countries entire military systems based on your sole opinion. You guys are not the only ones coming up with great ideas!

 

Edited Saturday at 04:26 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[kimbosbread]

36 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

But this pales with how the West failed to defend itself against enemy information operations. Putin managed to cause untold suffering and destruction by orchestrating Brexit and Trump. But our own ideology of "marketplace of idea" and "censorship is bad" stops West from being capable of defending itself, and it will lead to our destruction.

I want to emphasize this! If you haven’t read https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html, it’s worth skimming at least.

For a while I’ve thought having an information provenance system would be cool. IIRC Darpa was soliciting ideas for this, but I am too busy to do it. Basically the idea is to skim “sources”, ie places where new original content comes in, specifically 4chan, tiktok, reddit, the remaining special interest forums, and then track how memes and information propage to the slower parts of the internet like the news, nextdoor, facebook (stuff used by over 50s who actually vote).

[mosuri]

T-80 is slowly going extinct:

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

2 hours ago, ASL Veteran said:

 

This is sort of my point, countries are already in the process of adapting current structures from the lessons learned in Ukraine. 

[Tenses]

1 hour ago, Carolus said:

It is claimed that Ukraine used an F-16 for an airstrike for the first time.

 

 

Now lets hope that Russians will slowly start to whine about lack of sufficient air support. I don't expect a lot of actual shootdowns but some restrain from Russian pilots should make an effect. Air support is the last thing(and numbers superiority but that is here to stay) in which Russians have clear adventage. This is a major factor as air force is still an apex predator on modern battlefield despite all the problems it faces, both new and old.

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/27/world/asia/escape-from-russian-army.html

Facing grim job prospects, a young Nepali signed up to join Russia’s military, which sent him to fight in Ukraine. His ordeal of combat, injury and escape turned into a tale worthy of Hollywood.

 

Quote

 

After two weeks of basic training — he had been promised three months, he said — he was told that he was going to a frontline position near Donetsk, a Ukrainian city occupied by Russian troops.

Terrified and feeling betrayed, he tried to protest, saying that he wasn’t ready, and that he’d rather sit in jail. But that wasn’t an option.

“Even inmates there are taken to the front line,” he said. “I had to go.”

 

It is almost like signing up to be cannon fodder for an utterly amoral and autocratic regime is a bad idea. Who knew.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

The Russians are not really reforming though, they went back to basics and seem to be largely improvising at this point. They very much are 'doing it wrong' when they remain incapable of large scale assaults and instead seem set on smaller, managed and regular attacks that allow Ukraine to focus its UAS and limited firepower to best effect. I simply do not understand why they do this when broader attacks might open up more holes in the front and constrain Ukrainian abilities to focus reserves. I suspect its due to the declining quality and quantity of Russian reserves as well as the command and control issues as well as political will from behind that insists on these regular, wasteful attacks. 

We saw their lack of coordination right from the onset of the war, and I remain convinced the Russian army is simply incapable of large scale attacks that might actually bring about some more mobile warfare. This is a core failure of the Russian army and there is no signs of it being fixed alongside their other systemic issues that hamper their effectiveness so much. Its been literally years since we saw any Russian exploitation of a front, something Ukraine was able to achieve with the lightest of mechanised forces in Kharkiv. They were having these issues before FPVs became so prevalent on the front, so it cannot be down to the harsh operational environment entirely. 

I think its very fair for the west to announce that the Russians are doing it wrong, because they are still being limited in numerous respects quite needlessly. Rigid top down command structures, the lack of an empowered NCO system. These things are actively biting the Russians in the *** even before the increasingly polarisation of training and equipment, all of which is decayed by a truly appalling and intrinsic corruption issue. There are obvious limits to NATO criticisms, and I remain so very angry that the NATO response to Ukrainians getting caught in minefields was 'go around them'. NATO are not going to get everything right and they MUST take the lessons learned in this war to heart. This is where I agree very heavily with Battlefront and yourself on this issue. The evidence so far does point to NATO watching closely, time will tell if we see significant changes in consequence. 
 

Who exactly is doing this? China is the only potential that springs to mind and I am very suspicious about their stated capabilities when they feature some of the same issues the Russians do. Not to call them a paper tiger but as I stated before, they feel themselves that they are behind the curve and are still catching up to NATO, let alone trying to surpass them. 

10th Mountain division are a light infantry unit, not special forces. They are the ones dealing with the constant drone attacks. As the podcast states they are also the most experienced US unit when it comes to drone attacks and have learned valuable information in the process that is even now being actively disseminated through the rest of the Army. 

 

Russian military reform as we saw was literally their only option outside of doing nothing. They struggled enough with such a steady process and even then it did not work properly. There was no way in hell they could of even attempted anything more radical with the powers that be in the Russian state, let alone things like corruption getting in the way. Its simply not the kind of environment where you can flip a table and reset everything, not when some general does not get to steal funding for whatever project he was working on. 

 

Forgive me but this seems a little...arrogant? Assuming that your viewpoint is right and incontrovertible is exactly the kind of issue your claiming is prevalent in the military. Militaries need to be a little more pragmatic than that in my view. Is it not fair to point out that that what we consider the future for military organisation could very well change entirely, or shift back to something more familiar? This sort of stuff is hard to predict. I again need to make it clear, I agree with you on a lot here, I just think its a little silly to deride numerous countries entire military systems based on your sole opinion. You guys are not the only ones coming up with great ideas!

 

For the life of me I cannot understand what your thesis is here.  I have offered that 1) warfare is shifting, dramatically, 2) western forces will need to adapt and cannot write this all off to Russia and Ukrainian ineptitude, 3) other militaries unfriendly to us are taking notes and will be investing heavily to gain advantage, and 4) we really do not have a great track record in adapting to need, in time.

Your central premise appears to be that you do not entirely agree. This whole discussion started around the future of tanks, where again you do not fully agree. Ok, so what?  So how does Ukraine solve for this war?  How do we in the west solve for the next one.  What is your position here?  What is your assessment?

I presented a vision of a future force and you dismissed it as "too far".  Ok, so what is your answer? You have largely ignored Steve in all this, nor really presented any evidence that supports your own position...which again you have not really defined.

I mean this has been a real laugh but all we are doing here is throwing evidence up to support those points up there...you niggle and declare them "not good enough"...rinse and repeat.

Do you have anything beyond your own opinion?  As to your points in this last post:

- The RA was capable of large scale maneuver in 2014, they did not simply forget how in the last ten years.

- No one, including you, has presented a coherent theory as to what is happening in this war.  Mission command and "NCO Corp" gets tossed around but that is about an inch deep.  It is right along with "be more maneuvery". 

- The Russian military clearly has issues but I suspect that they, and the UA, are behaving for reasons.  Reasons that have to do with point #1 up there. If you disagree, prove otherwise.

- The US NDS highlights China and the Chinese military as the strategic focal point.  Why?  Because China is ahead in unmanned technology and catching up fast elsewhere - it is who Ukraine is buying stuff off right now...Russian too.  If your opinion trumps US ND strategy, well ok. 

- SOF were first into Syria and have far more experience in anti-drone warfare. They first went in 2014 and were fighting with partners for nearly a decade.  10th mountain, Airborne and Marines moved onto the ground but you are linking unconventional forces in an unconventional war to a very large conventional problem...your logic is broken.

- Both UA and RA have been adapting.  It has been noted here multiple times that they are evolving to this type of warfare faster than NATO is...why on earth would we somehow think we know better then them at this point?

- Arrogance or experience. I have 3 and half decades in defence, no small amount of that at the institutional level. Military history is pretty clear on how much large bureaucratic militaries have lagged shifts in the environment.  Of course people in the military have good ideas, they are often smothered by the weight and inertia of that bureaucracy.  Regardless, if armored cars in the 20s are considered "innovation" in your books, then obviously there is too much distance in our perspectives. I encourage you to present a position, maybe some analysis because simply disagreeing is not really that.

[billbindc]

3 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

Yeah.

In hindsight, the End of History idea of forever peace after the Cold War ended was a combination of naive, stupid, corrupt and evil. Of course the Russia would eventually attack again. Of course other empires will rise and start attacking neighbors. Of course they did. They always do. Nothing lasts forever, there is always another war behind the corner.

Yet we did spend decades lying to ourselves and making ourselves vulnerable.

It should be clear that Fukuyama's idea of the 'end of history' is nothing like this all-too-popular and later misconception. Far from being a claim that struggle was over, he actually predicted exactly the civilizational conflict we are engaged in throughout the West right now. 

“But supposing the world has become “filled up”, so to speak, with liberal democracies, such as there exist no tyranny and oppression worthy of the name against which to struggle? Experience suggests that if men cannot struggle on behalf of a just cause because that just cause was victorious in an earlier generation, then they will struggle against the just cause. They will struggle for the sake of struggle. They will struggle, in other words, out of a certain boredom: for they cannot imagine living in a world without struggle. And if the greater part of the world in which they live is characterized by peaceful and prosperous liberal democracy, then they will struggle against that peace and prosperity, and against democracy.”

[ArmouredTopHat]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Your central premise appears to be that you do not entirely agree. This whole discussion started around the future of tanks, where again you do not fully agree. Ok, so what?  So how does Ukraine solve for this war?  How do we in the west solve for the next one.  What is your position here?  What is your assessment?

What Ukraine needs / wants might not necessarily be what NATO countries need or want, there is a very different level of capability and access to said capability on display. Literally different goals in mind. NATO forces fight with the realistic assumption of a strong air contingent for instance with all the support it offers. Ukraine does not have that.

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

For the life of me I cannot understand what your thesis is here.  I have offered that 1) warfare is shifting, dramatically, 2) western forces will need to adapt and cannot write this all off to Russia and Ukrainian ineptitude, 3) other militaries unfriendly to us are taking notes and will be investing heavily to gain advantage, and 4) we really do not have a great track record in adapting to need, in time.

If my ideas are not clear, allow me to clarify:

1. I agree there is a shift, but I do not see it being a drastic one, just a continuation of trends people were aware of served with a slice of reality. 

2. Western forces -are- adapting. We are already seeing changes to force makeup that will be implemented in a matter of years. This is pretty fast for a peacetime force. 

2.b No one is saying this is entirely down to ineptitude, but it clearly plays a part, especially with the Russians when they had so many on paper advantages that they cannot leverage properly. As with all things the answer is far more complicated. Technology plays a part in this just as much as doctrine and incompetence. 

3. As highlighted, EVERYONE is taking notes here, there is plenty of evidence shown in the last few pages here alone that different forces in NATO are actively using the conflict to draw up changes to force structure. the US is literally gaining active experience RIGHT NOW that tells them what systems are working to intercept drones and what are not in Syria. 

4. I'm sorry but what? Based on what evidence? The whole reason we saw a triumph in western approach to war in the Gulf was because we have mostly kept ahead with adaptations' understand if some wrong lessons were learned (the whole need for stocks for high intensity conflict is the main point I guess)  Are you referring to the Chinese ability to build lots of drones that's more a product of their cheap industrial labour pool instead of any particular military innovation? Western military companies are clearly on the cutting edge of pretty much every major military technology. I entirely agree there is an issue of scale that needs to be addressed, but why are you acting like China holds actual parity in terms of technology when they literally self admit to being behind?

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Your central premise appears to be that you do not entirely agree. This whole discussion started around the future of tanks, where again you do not fully agree. Ok, so what?  So how does Ukraine solve for this war?  How do we in the west solve for the next one.  What is your position here?  What is your assessment?

I presented a vision of a future force and you dismissed it as "too far".  Ok, so what is your answer? You have largely ignored Steve in all this, nor really presented any evidence that supports your own position...which again you have not really defined.

So, here is my broad take / vision on things for the future overall. For the record I am typing when I can, there is a lot to answer here but I will do my best. I do find it unfair for you to say that I have not posted evidence though, the last....6 or so posts I made all included plenty of links for you to enjoy.

Future considerations for NATO armed forces.

• New generation of vehicles required that are better protected from all around attack, especially with regards to IFVs, APCs and Tanks, a true shift away from cold war era chassis and designs that seem increasingly unfit for purpose. APS should be a new standard of protection and needs to become more widely integrated.
   
• Together with this, we should be keenly exploring practical applications for UGVs to supplement and potentially even replace certain roles down the line. Doctrine should be overhauled to reflect this should they prove viable.
   
• Close range air defence needs to prioritise drones and a means for cheap disposal. Layers required to combat drones from the UAV recon level to the FPV. 
   
• The development and deployment of counter-drone technologies, such as anti-drone rifles, jamming devices, and radar systems, have become crucial in defending against drone threats and should be viewed as a top priority. 
   
• Adjustment on force makeup to include more organic drone capability both for recon and strike potential, at least platoon based if not squad level. Presumably tied in to more effective battlefield management systems.
   
• Heavy usage on loitering munitions as a means of leveraging infantry firepower, with traditional artillery aspects for battalion fire support backing. Mortars used to be the go to for infantry firepower on the company / Battalion level but I wonder if they are simply too exposed to do so given the threat of drone / loitering munitions.
   
• Overall emphasis on a flexible command and control alongside ISR capability, while also acknowledging that you need the means to move forward to take the fight to the enemy while also dominating them with firepower and superior recon capability. FPV munitions are not the correct solution for every problem. 
   
• Recognition that EWAR needs to became a focal point for force structures, present in as many levels as possible all the way to the squads (Though in practicality were looking at platoon or company level for most systems)
   
• Understanding that drones should be viewed as a munition to be disposable and replaceable. Drone losses are high in Ukraine and thus platforms need to be cheap and effective.
   
• Recognition that denying drone / recon capability is now a priority, be it through soft or hardkill measures. Utterly key to maintaining mobile mechanised warfare by denying enemy fires the ability to target you effectively. 
   
• Upholding of strengths of NATO force structure that remain relevant, perhaps even more so in this evolving environment. Squads / platoons on the ground need to be able to make important decisions quickly and have the tools to do so. 
   
• Reassessment of reserve concepts, especially with regards to ammunition. We should be planning for the means to stock months / years worth of ammunition, not days, together with the ability to fabricate more readily. South Korean approach is sorely needed here.
   
• Defence as well as Offense are equally important. Assets for attack need appropriate protection while maintaining fire supremacy.
   
• Mine sweeping technology and measures need a major overhaul. One of the few areas we should be actually learning from the Russians with their heavy emphasis on sapper / pioneer / engineering units. Mines were the problem strangling mechanised movements well before FPVs become relevant on the battlefield. 

• Improvements made to exercise and innovations that reflect a Ukraine conflict and can simulate it to allow NATO forces realistic preparation for a conflict with Russia. 

 As I said before I agree on a lot of points. I will personally want to see Ukrainians come to NATO countries after the war and help with new combat exercises in perfecting what works best and what does not. There is a golden opportunity here and it should not be wasted. A lot of the above points ARE being actively discussed or acted on now as we speak, at least according to some sources. 

Assessment of Ukraine war

• Ukraine serves as an example that Nations need to maintain high levels of military readiness and adaptable defence strategies to deter potential aggressors.
   
• The ability to adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield is vital. Both Ukraine and its supporters have had to innovate continuously and have broadly enjoyed an advantage most of the time.
   
• Technology is king, something the West already understood well but its more important than ever here, this could be quantified in so many ways, from how a battery of grads are relatively worthless in comparison to a couple of HIMARS platforms to how ancient T-62s are being turned into glorified sheds because they simply cannot do much else. I think people focus a little too much on FPVs when in reality I would place higher emphasis on the NATO hardware Ukraine got that gave them new and unique capability. HIMARS for example was far more dramatic in my view when it came to actively shaping Russian operations (and blowing a lot of stuff up) Both are equally critical to Ukraine winning.
   
• The use of drones, cyber warfare, and advanced surveillance technology has played a critical role. Both sides have leveraged technology to gain tactical advantages and disrupt enemy operations. Key takeaway in staying just ahead of the opponent when it comes to things like jamming frequencies to prevent loss of effectiveness for drone platforms. Ukraine needs to maintain this as best they can and so far seems to be doing so.
   
• What should Ukraine do? I think they have already at least partially found the solution that works for them best. IE maintain drone advantage while steadily reforming their military to a western approach supplemented with more and more NATO kit (perhaps with some sprinkle of soviet doctrine in areas where applicable / suitable) Continuous training (And refinement of that training) of Ukrainian forces, along with the continued acquisition of advanced weaponry and equipment from allies, is crucial.
   
• The West in the meantime needs to continue their support and build up their military industries to supply it. This is happening at least, even if its sluggish. 
  
  My tank is running on empty here, but I will address a few more points before I roll over and perish.

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The RA was capable of large scale maneuver in 2014, they did not simply forget how in the last ten years.

The Ukrainian army was not exactly prepared or adequate by any means in 2014, that's really the key difference. Competent large scale manoeuvre and coordination eroded fast when unprepared and overconfident Russian columns were getting ambushed in 2022 by far more determined soldiers with better equipment, organisation and preparation than in 2014. This was covered in detail here already.
 

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- Both UA and RA have been adapting.  It has been noted here multiple times that they are evolving to this type of warfare faster than NATO is...why on earth would we somehow think we know better then them at this point?

This does not remove the competencies of NATO, especially when they are pretty actively involved with helping / taking notes at the same time. We -do- know better than either party when it comes to high technology systems and their effective application. Its very much a two way street of lessons to be learned. 

 

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

SOF were first into Syria and have far more experience in anti-drone warfare. They first went in 2014 and were fighting with partners for nearly a decade.  10th mountain, Airborne and Marines moved onto the ground but you are linking unconventional forces in an unconventional war to a very large conventional problem...your logic is broken.

Did you listen to the podcast? Because I feel like you did not. 
 

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

No one, including you, has presented a coherent theory as to what is happening in this war.  Mission command and "NCO Corp" gets tossed around but that is about an inch deep.  It is right along with "be more maneuvery". 

- The Russian military clearly has issues but I suspect that they, and the UA, are behaving for reasons.  Reasons that have to do with point #1 up there. If you disagree, prove otherwise.

This is simply not true, there has been a wide degree of suggestions made both on this forum and elsewhere as to what is going on. The short answer is that its complicated. Russian failings are down to everything from politics, corruption, equipment, technology, doctrine and Ukrainian resistance. I thought this was obvious at this point. No one key reason exists here. I personally think the corruption and political interference are hampering them severely at this point. Given how much this has been beaten to death at this point I wont go into further detail. 

 

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- Arrogance or experience. I have 3 and half decades in defence, no small amount of that at the institutional level. Military history is pretty clear on how much large bureaucratic militaries have lagged shifts in the environment.  Of course people in the military have good ideas, they are often smothered by the weight and inertia of that bureaucracy.  Regardless, if armored cars in the 20s are considered "innovation" in your books, then obviously there is too much distance in our perspectives. I encourage you to present a position, maybe some analysis because simply disagreeing is not really that.

I will not detract from your credentials, you clearly have experience and expertise on the subject that make for very valuable input, but this does not entitle you or anyone into thinking 'my way or the high way', not does it mean everything you think is necessarily right. We need to be more pragmatic than that when arm chairing these things. 

I think thats about all I can handle for now. Ill try to reply to other posts when I can. 

Edited Saturday at 08:58 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[ASL Veteran]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

For the life of me I cannot understand what your thesis is here.  I have offered that 1) warfare is shifting, dramatically, 2) western forces will need to adapt and cannot write this all off to Russia and Ukrainian ineptitude, 3) other militaries unfriendly to us are taking notes and will be investing heavily to gain advantage, and 4) we really do not have a great track record in adapting to need, in time.

I haven't been following the back and forth with all this stuff, but the idea that western militaries aren't adapting to shifts in warfare seems a bit of a stretch to me.  At least in terms of the US military.  I get that this is in your wheelhouse, and you apparently are very passionate about it - and that's a good thing.  I hope I'm not misrepresenting your beliefs or arguments and I absolutely respect your opinion.  However, one could make the argument that the US is at the leading edge of the changing face of warfare.  I'm not sure when Canada first knew what a drone was, but the US has been using drones since the 1990s. 

The General Atomics MQ-1 Predator (often referred to as the Predator drone) is an American remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) built by General Atomics that was used primarily by the United States Air Force (USAF) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Conceived in the early 1990s for aerial reconnaissance and forward observation roles, the Predator carries cameras and other sensors. It was modified and upgraded to carry and fire two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles or other munitions. The aircraft entered service in 1995, and saw combat in the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the NATO intervention in Bosnia, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the Iraq War, Yemen, the 2011 Libyan civil war, the 2014 intervention in Syria, and Somalia.

Granted these were recon drones, but the US came up with the FPS drone with a warhead in 2012

Designed by the United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and developed by the United States Army,^[7] The Switchblade was designed to assist US troops in responding to enemy ambushes in Afghanistan. Close air support takes time to arrive, is costly to operate, and risks collateral damage in urban areas. Troop-carried guided missiles, such as the FGM-148 Javelin, are also significantly larger, heavier, and more expensive, and only a few, if any, are carried on a typical patrol. Human-portable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the Raven or Puma can spot threats but lack weapons. The backpackable, relatively inexpensive Switchblade has sensors to help spot enemy fighters and an explosive warhead to attack them from above, which is especially helpful in dug-in positions like rooftops or ridge lines.

On July 29, 2011, the U.S. Army awarded AeroVironment a $4.9 million contract for "rapid fielding" of an unspecified number of Switchblades to forces in Afghanistan.^[8][9][10] On March 20, 2012, the Army added $5.1 million, totaling $10 million.^[11]

So yeah, the US is fully aware of drones and has been using them for decades.  Now did the US Army anticipate the full impact that these drones are having on the current battlefield?  I'm not sure - probably not, but I'm pretty confident that someone in the US Military had a stray thought of what might be possible so the idea that Western Military's are sitting back with mouth agape going 'wow, what the heck is going on in Ukraine?  I've neither seen such a thing nor anticipated such a thing!' is just crazy to me.  Maybe a review of the drones currently in use by the various branches of the US Military could be instructive (from Wikipedia).  It's not like the US Military doesn't know what a drone is.

Current

• MQ-1C Gray Eagle
• RQ-4 Global Hawk
• MQ-4C Triton
• RQ-7 Shadow
• MQ-8B Fire Scout/MQ-8C Fire Scout
• MQ-9 Reaper
• CQ-10 Snowgoose
• RQ-11 Raven
• RQ-12 Wasp
• MQ-19 Aerosonde
• RQ-20 Puma
• RQ-21 Blackjack
• RQ-170 Sentinel
• RQ-180
• Altius-600
• Black Hornet Nano
• Coyote
• Jump 20 VTOL
• Snipe NAV
• Switchblade
• Stalker
• ScanEagle
• Northrop Grumman Bat
• Phoenix Ghost

Future

• MQ-25 Stingray

 

One might make the argument that the US Army was already anticipating the current environment to some extent with the Future Combat System way back in 2003.  I put some stuff in red below (from Wikipedia)

Future Combat Systems (FCS) was the United States Army's principal modernization program from 2003 to early 2009.^[1] Formally launched in 2003, FCS was envisioned to create new brigades equipped with new manned and unmanned vehicles linked by an unprecedented fast and flexible battlefield network. The U.S. Army claimed it was their "most ambitious and far-reaching modernization" program since World War II.^[2] Between 1995 and 2009, $32 billion was expended on programs such as this, "with little to show for it".^[3]

One of the programs that came out of the $32 billion expenditure was the concept of tracking friendly ("blue") forces on the field via a GPS-enabled computer system known as Blue Force Tracking (BFT). The concept of BFT was implemented by the US Army through the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) platform. The FBCB2 system in particular and the BFT system in general have won numerous awards and accolades, including: recognition in 2001 as one of the five best-managed software programs in the entire U.S. Government,^[4] the 2003 Institute for Defense and Government Advancement's award for most innovative U.S. Government program,^[5] the 2003 Federal Computer Week Monticello Award (given in recognition of an information system that has a direct, meaningful impact on human lives), and the Battlespace Information 2005 "Best Program in Support of Coalition Operations".^[6] The proof-of-concept success of FBCB2, its extensive testing during Operation Foal Eagle (FE 99, FE 00), its certification at the Fort Irwin National Training Center, and its proven field usage in live combat operations spanning over a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to BFT adoption by many users including the United States Marine Corps, the United States Air Force, the United States Navy ground-based expeditionary forces (e.g., United States Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) units), the United Kingdom, and German Soldier System IdZ-ES+.

In April and May 2009, Pentagon and army officials announced that the FCS vehicle-development effort would be canceled. The rest of the FCS effort would be swept into a new, pan-army program called the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program.^[7]

Oh, and the end of the tank because of the use of Javelins on the battlefield?  One would assume that since the US makes the Javelin, the US Army would be aware of its capabilities and how it impacts the battlefield.  Whether or not the US Military anticipated how it might operate if on the receiving end of all these drones and Javelins is an open question.  However, I'm not sure that you are giving enough credit to how powerful the US Military is - by itself without even adding in any allies.  Could China cause some issues?  Recent reports of missiles with fuel cells filled with water aside, on paper maybe China would be an issue, but that would doubtless primarily be a naval and air conflict.  If Russia fought the US and NATO, Russia would be pounded into dust.  There is no scenario where NATO fights Russia and it turns into Trench Warfare where nobody can advance and drones rule the battlefield to the detriment of NATO.  That's not even accounting for the leadership advantage that NATO holds.  If NATO holds air supremacy then guess what happens to all your logistics trains?  Guess what happens to all your artillery batteries?  Can FPV drones have an impact for Russia?  Sure, but let's not get carried away and assume that NATO is going to get stuck in trench warfare.  I can't sit here today and rule it out completely, but the odds are not in favor of that sort of an outcome.  You dismiss Iraqi capabilities, but they were widely regarded as having some of the most numerous and capable air defenses in the world at the time and look how much good it did them.  I am confident that the US Military can adapt appropriately to the shifts warfare.  

 

Quote

 

A prominent Ukrainian officer this week accused a top commander of incompetence, blaming him for “thousands” of casualties in a rare public criticism from within the military that reflects growing discontent among the troops as Russia has advanced on the battlefield.

Maj. Bohdan Krotevych, the chief of staff of the influential Azov Brigade, filed a request to Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation concerning “a military general who in my opinion has killed more Ukrainian soldiers than any Russian general,” he wrote Monday in a post on Telegram.

Within hours, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that he had replaced Lt. Gen. Yuriy Sodol as Ukraine’s Joint Forces’ commander. Sodol is also in charge of the ground forces for the critical section of the front stretching across the eastern Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions, and is expected to be removed from that post as well.

The incident is the latest in a series of military leadership shake-ups this year amid Ukraine’s struggles along the 600-mile front line. Sodol had been in the post for just four months after he was installed by Ukrainian military chief Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, whom Zelensky only appointed to the top position earlier this year.

Sodol was the mastermind behind the crossing of the Dnieper River, which had no visible operational impact — Russia moved troops from that area to other fronts, showing that the operation had no effect on Russian operations. Both sides suffer from having sprung from the Red Army. Command slots are allocated by political considerations and membership in the right "good ol' boy" network. Favored officers are pulled into higher headquarters, and less favored officers have combat commands. Zelensky has to break this command-by-clique system down because I'm not sure the Ukrainian military is capable of doing it on its own.

 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

9 minutes ago, ASL Veteran said:

I haven't been following the back and forth with all this stuff, but the idea that western militaries aren't adapting to shifts in warfare seems a bit of a stretch to me.  At least in terms of the US military.  I get that this is in your wheelhouse, and you apparently are very passionate about it - and that's a good thing.  I hope I'm not misrepresenting your beliefs or arguments and I absolutely respect your opinion.  However, one could make the argument that the US is at the leading edge of the changing face of warfare.  I'm not sure when Canada first knew what a drone was, but the US has been using drones since the 1990s. 

The argument isn't that the US can't innovate, it's that it only seems interested in innovating if it costs billions to achieve.  Entire country's worth of GDP were put into things like the Predator, but absolutely nothing into cheap and effective FPV.  Why?  Because it was cheap and effective?  Something like the Switchblade does make it seem that way.

Let me turn this around.  If the US is so amazing at innovation, don't you think that the US should have been the one to come up with the idea of cheap platoon level ISR drones and mass produced FPV killer drones?  I sure do.

Ukraine and Russia have been using cheap commercial drones for most of the last 8 years.  That is plenty of time for the Western militaries to have saw something, anything, of value to invest in.  They did not.

On top of not investing in the sorts of things that has significantly aided Ukraine staying in the fight against Russia, but it hasn't addressed the "tank is dead" threat with anything even approaching a practical solution.  Even now there's tons of pressure to maintain the status quo and reject real change. 

Steve

[kimbosbread]

Switchblade is a horrible example. It is an expensive, inflexible drone that is kind of outclassed by the homebrew solutions. It doesn’t acknowledge that FPV drones are precision munitions that will be fired in extreme quantity.  $100k per unit is just not doable. It should cost $5k max.

The US needs to focus on mass-manufactureable airframes (a quad, hex and fixed wing) in a few sizes, with a common sensor/compute package and several warhead options. Common FPV control, common autonomy roadmap. You could get a few hobbyists (or Ukranians) together and figure this out in a few months. The primary cost should be manufacturing and software development, both of which can scale.

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

We DID have deep stocks (Or at least deeper stocks) of kit, but a little something called the end of the cold war came. Germany scrapped such a crazy amount of its hardware for literal pennies that upon reflecting it was an actual crime. Pretty much everyone thought that war was now far less likely, so why spend to maintain keep reserves and large armies? It was a perfectly reasonable attitude at the time when social concerns were a more pressing issue.

I also remember very sober conversations that cutting back on the stocks was a bad idea because the current kit was too costly and too slow to produce on short notice.

We had a good wake-up call early in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq when stocks of medium caliber munitions were run down to the point where even with new production taken out of mothballs the ammo produced was going straight on a plane to one of the two theaters.

And this was to fight insurgencies, not a near peer war.

5 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I dont see how Iraq or Afghanistan gave a warning to this either, the conflicts were completely different and revolved around insurgencies after relatively quick and easy conventional campaigns. The problem with both was it made the west largely focus on on COIN developments.

The lessons were that very expensive, slow to ramp up, militaries struggled to fight protracted wars against vastly inferior enemies.  The enemies being able to fight on the cheap, and therefore sustainably, was a major factor.  We are seeing this play out in a full on conventional war.  The lessons were there for all to see, but not many within the military were interested in pursuing them because the answer always came back to "less expensive stuff, but more of it".

5 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I dont know how else to say it, but the war in Ukraine was not expected for a lot of reasons, even when in hindsight we might find it was obviously coming. The reasons for this war are so illogical to our minds that such a thing was identified as folly. From the strategic point of view, it does not give Russia anything but a black hole for their forces to be eroded away on. People assumed it would not happen because it was a -stupid idea-. Should there have been better plans in case of it happening anyway? Very much so, but you can at least understand why such a thought was considered unlikely. 

I am going to once again evoke the imagery of a very large steaming pile of excrement from a bovine like creature

Riddle me this... if the military and its civilian leadership were so convinced a war like this would never happen... why did it ask for trillions of Dollars to prepare for just such a possibility?

The obvious answer is because the people pressing for those huge sums of money said that it was explicitly needed for a large conventional conflict with a near peer.

I don't know why you are so insistent of excusing things which are really inexcusable.  I will ask you this again... how is that that I, a civilian, with AT BEST a minimal professional level of experience in these matters saw this war coming and was far more right than wrong about how it would play out?  If you can't answer that question, then please concede the point that the West had what it needed to be prepared for this war but, for various reasons, CHOSE not to.

Then we can get back to how this intersects with the "tank is dead" discussion.  Because it does.  A lot.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

28 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Switchblade is a horrible example. It is an expensive, inflexible drone that is kind of outclassed by the homebrew solutions. It doesn’t acknowledge that FPV drones are precision munitions that will be fired in extreme quantity.  $100k per unit is just not doable. It should cost $5k max.

The US needs to focus on mass-manufactureable airframes (a quad, hex and fixed wing) in a few sizes, with a common sensor/compute package and several warhead options. Common FPV control, common autonomy roadmap. You could get a few hobbyists (or Ukranians) together and figure this out in a few months. The primary cost should be manufacturing and software development, both of which can scale.

Yup.  I've mentioned the following anecdotal many times in this thread already.  It illustrates that the US military personnel on the ground have long since understood the realities of these sorts of Switchblade like decisions.

During Desert Shield a reporter (IIRC it was 60 Minutes) interviewed some low level supply NCO or officer in Saudi Arabia.  Behind him were piles of cheap civilian "laptops" (they were basically glorified calculators back then).  The discussion went something like this:

Reporter: "I see you have a bunch of civilian stuff behind you.  Is the military sending you civilian items?"

Soldier: "No, we bought those with our own money from Radio Shack".

Reporter: "Why?  Doesn't the Army have something like this?"

Soldier: "Yes, but they will only give us one because they are so expensive"

Reporter: "Why are they so expensive?"

Soldier: "Because they are designed to work everywhere under any conditions".

Reporter: "Do the civilian ones work as well?"

Soldier: "No.  They have a fairly short life due to the heat and dust".

Reporter: "Isn't that bad?"

Soldier: "No.  We have stacks of them so when one breaks we just grab another one and we're good to go".

Reporter: "Wouldn't you rather have a military one that didn't break down?"

Soldier: "No.  The expensive military ones are just as easily misplaced or run over by Specialist Bonehead.  The difference is when that happens to an issued one we don't have a backup and need to wait a long time to get a replacement.  With the commercial ones I just grab another one off the rack here and we're good to go."

 

So on and so forth.

This was nearly 35 years ago.  Does this sound familiar?  Because it damned well should. 

The reason I remember this 1 minute long TV interview 35 years later is because even as a young 20 something year old I realized how important this was.  Which is why I call BS on the "oh, this is all hindsight" excuses for the mess we're in right now.

Steve

[photon]

42 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

The US needs to focus on mass-manufactureable airframes (a quad, hex and fixed wing) in a few sizes, with a common sensor/compute package and several warhead options.

So, towards the end of the war in the Pacific, we started treating airframes as disposable munitions. Fly your Hellcat a little close to a Japanese ship and take some stray bullets in the (self-sealing) fuel tank while dropping your bomb? Land on your carrier, hop out, and the deck crew will push the plane over the side and issue you a new one. Easier than fixing the damage. That's how many planes we had lying about.

And that's where we want to be with drones in all airframe sizes (and UGVs, I'd suggest). Or that's where we want to be able to get in the event of a peer on peer conflict.

[The_Capt]

45 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

So, here is my broad take / vision on things for the future overall. For the record I am typing when I can, there is a lot to answer here but I will do my best. I do find it unfair for you to say that I have not posted evidence though, the last....6 or so posts I made all included plenty of links for you to enjoy.

Future considerations for NATO armed forces.

• New generation of vehicles required that are better protected from all around attack, especially with regards to IFVs, APCs and Tanks, a true shift away from cold war era chassis and designs that seem increasingly unfit for purpose. APS should be a new standard of protection and needs to become more widely integrated.
   
• Together with this, we should be keenly exploring practical applications for UGVs to supplement and potentially even replace certain roles down the line. Doctrine should be overhauled to reflect this should they prove viable.
   
• Close range air defence needs to prioritise drones and a means for cheap disposal. Layers required to combat drones from the UAV recon level to the FPV. 
   
• The development and deployment of counter-drone technologies, such as anti-drone rifles, jamming devices, and radar systems, have become crucial in defending against drone threats and should be viewed as a top priority. 
   
• Adjustment on force makeup to include more organic drone capability both for recon and strike potential, at least platoon based if not squad level. Presumably tied in to more effective battlefield management systems.
   
• Heavy usage on loitering munitions as a means of leveraging infantry firepower, with traditional artillery aspects for battalion fire support backing. Mortars used to be the go to for infantry firepower on the company / Battalion level but I wonder if they are simply too exposed to do so given the threat of drone / loitering munitions.
   
• Overall emphasis on a flexible command and control alongside ISR capability, while also acknowledging that you need the means to move forward to take the fight to the enemy while also dominating them with firepower and superior recon capability. FPV munitions are not the correct solution for every problem. 
   
• Recognition that EWAR needs to became a focal point for force structures, present in as many levels as possible all the way to the squads (Though in practicality were looking at platoon or company level for most systems)
   
• Understanding that drones should be viewed as a munition to be disposable and replaceable. Drone losses are high in Ukraine and thus platforms need to be cheap and effective.
   
• Recognition that denying drone / recon capability is now a priority, be it through soft or hardkill measures. Utterly key to maintaining mobile mechanised warfare by denying enemy fires the ability to target you effectively. 
   
• Upholding of strengths of NATO force structure that remain relevant, perhaps even more so in this evolving environment. Squads / platoons on the ground need to be able to make important decisions quickly and have the tools to do so. 
   
• Reassessment of reserve concepts, especially with regards to ammunition. We should be planning for the means to stock months / years worth of ammunition, not days, together with the ability to fabricate more readily. South Korean approach is sorely needed here.
   
• Defence as well as Offense are equally important. Assets for attack need appropriate protection while maintaining fire supremacy.
   
• Mine sweeping technology and measures need a major overhaul. One of the few areas we should be actually learning from the Russians with their heavy emphasis on sapper / pioneer / engineering units. Mines were the problem strangling mechanised movements well before FPVs become relevant on the battlefield. 

• Improvements made to exercise and innovations that reflect a Ukraine conflict and can simulate it to allow NATO forces realistic preparation for a conflict with Russia. 

 As I said before I agree on a lot of points. I will personally want to see Ukrainians come to NATO countries after the war and help with new combat exercises in perfecting what works best and what does not. There is a golden opportunity here and it should not be wasted. A lot of the above points ARE being actively discussed or acted on now as we speak, at least according to some sources.

Oh good, my turn. First off you really have not posted any hard evidence or supporting analysis.  I can count one post where you provide citations, most have none…like this one.  Regardless, let’s unpack this one now that we have a position to talk to:

- You fundamentally do not solve for a fully illuminated battlefield here. Illumination directly affects mass.  As does C4.  While you correctly identify tactical trends and requirement, you are missing operational ones, and some are fatal.  

- Your primary focus is on preservation of extant forces in order to allow them to do what they have theoretically done in the past. EWAR and C-UAS all point towards Shield functions that will allow for offence and defensive paradigms we can fall back upon.

- You do not address the elephant in the room. An illuminated battlefield, plus long range precision strike, plus distribution (empowered by modern C4) makes modern logistics impossible.  We can layer APS and CUAS on front edge all day but logistics is our weak link and it can and will be a show stopper.

- You are focusing far too much on “drones”.  Almost as if we could solve for them then we can solve for war, this is short sighted.  Drones are a symptom, not a cause of the major shift in warfare we are seeing.  ISR and precision strike alone breaks most modern military doctrines as they render mass theories obsolete.  We see evidence of this in this war…almost every day.

- You make no mention of AirPower or even effects on Naval power.  We have seen drastic level of denial for AirPower in this war.  Or has Russia also somehow forgotten how to use AirPower as well as manoeuvre at scale as well?  Apparently Russia has also forgotten how to project maritime power as well…that is a lot of “forgetting” in order to justify a view of things.

Look, you are well read and invested but you are only seeing part of the larger picture.  I think this is the fundamental issue between us in these discussions.  If I were to only look at a narrow slice of the picture - drones, tanks/AFVs/mech and tactical offence/defence, I think it is easy to understand why things look far less dramatic. But we are seeing so much more in this war.  All domains are impacted by shifts in the modern environment.

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Did you listen to the podcast? Because I feel like you did not. 

I don’t have to, I was in the room.

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

This is simply not true, there has been a wide degree of suggestions made both on this forum and elsewhere as to what is going on. The short answer is that its complicated. Russian failings are down to everything from politics, corruption, equipment, technology, doctrine and Ukrainian resistance. I thought this was obvious at this point. No one key reason exists here. I personally think the corruption and political interference are hampering them severely at this point. Given how much this has been beaten to death at this point I wont go into further detail. 

Hold the phone now, this is selective and cherry picking.  When we cite the thousands of examples of FPVs and their effects, your pushback was that there is not enough solid evidence.  Now when I ask “so what is happening” your position is “self evident to be true”?  This is shoulder shrugging and evasive.

I know no one has a coherent theory of what has happened in this war.  Every professional in the business understands that we will be unpacking it for the next ten years.  Half the data we need is held by the RA, we may never get a full picture.  You clearly think you know or that it is knowable, but it is not.

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I will not detract from your credentials, you clearly have experience and expertise on the subject that make for very valuable input, but this does not entitle you or anyone into thinking 'my way or the high way', not does it mean everything you think is necessarily right. We need to be more pragmatic than that when arm chairing these things. 

I have never posted my full credentials, it is unfair and not helpful.  You keep citing “pragmatism” in your posts yet your position is anything but.  Pragmatism means dealing with practical realities as opposed to theories. The practical reality is that neither Russia nor Ukraine can 1) concentrate above company strength, 2) UAS are dominating the battlefield, 3) C4ISR has fundamentally impacted warfare, 4) AirPower is blunted, 5) Sea power is blunted, 6) Denial is dominant, forcing both sides into attrition based warfare, 7) military mass no longer works as we knew it. We have seen two years of evidence of all of this.

And yet somehow the “pragmatic” answer is - “it’s ok, we will adapt, steady as she goes…and Russia sucks.” I am of course paraphrasing but the heart of your position is to take what we already have in both theory and practice, protect it to the point where it will work again. This not only fails to be practical based on what we have observed, it fails to grasp opportunities.  There is enormous potential here but by anchoring ourselves to extant theory and practice - the least pragmatic thing we can do given the circumstances - we miss the opportunity for advantage.

Regardless, believe me..or don’t.  Hold onto your position, it is worth having on the board.  We will see as things unfold.  I suspect the truth lies in between, as it always does in these things.  I can only encourage you to lose your hold on your certainty.  We are in uncertain times and it will not serve well.  I do not know what the future holds, but I strongly suspect we are in the middle of a Revolution of Military Affairs, we have seen the signals for some time.

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, ASL Veteran said:

I haven't been following the back and forth with all this stuff, but the idea that western militaries aren't adapting to shifts in warfare seems a bit of a stretch to me.  At least in terms of the US military.  I get that this is in your wheelhouse, and you apparently are very passionate about it - and that's a good thing.  I hope I'm not misrepresenting your beliefs or arguments and I absolutely respect your opinion.  However, one could make the argument that the US is at the leading edge of the changing face of warfare.  I'm not sure when Canada first knew what a drone was, but the US has been using drones since the 1990s. 

The General Atomics MQ-1 Predator (often referred to as the Predator drone) is an American remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) built by General Atomics that was used primarily by the United States Air Force (USAF) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Conceived in the early 1990s for aerial reconnaissance and forward observation roles, the Predator carries cameras and other sensors. It was modified and upgraded to carry and fire two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles or other munitions. The aircraft entered service in 1995, and saw combat in the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the NATO intervention in Bosnia, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the Iraq War, Yemen, the 2011 Libyan civil war, the 2014 intervention in Syria, and Somalia.

Granted these were recon drones, but the US came up with the FPS drone with a warhead in 2012

Designed by the United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and developed by the United States Army,^[7] The Switchblade was designed to assist US troops in responding to enemy ambushes in Afghanistan. Close air support takes time to arrive, is costly to operate, and risks collateral damage in urban areas. Troop-carried guided missiles, such as the FGM-148 Javelin, are also significantly larger, heavier, and more expensive, and only a few, if any, are carried on a typical patrol. Human-portable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the Raven or Puma can spot threats but lack weapons. The backpackable, relatively inexpensive Switchblade has sensors to help spot enemy fighters and an explosive warhead to attack them from above, which is especially helpful in dug-in positions like rooftops or ridge lines.

On July 29, 2011, the U.S. Army awarded AeroVironment a $4.9 million contract for "rapid fielding" of an unspecified number of Switchblades to forces in Afghanistan.^[8][9][10] On March 20, 2012, the Army added $5.1 million, totaling $10 million.^[11]

So yeah, the US is fully aware of drones and has been using them for decades.  Now did the US Army anticipate the full impact that these drones are having on the current battlefield?  I'm not sure - probably not, but I'm pretty confident that someone in the US Military had a stray thought of what might be possible so the idea that Western Military's are sitting back with mouth agape going 'wow, what the heck is going on in Ukraine?  I've neither seen such a thing nor anticipated such a thing!' is just crazy to me.  Maybe a review of the drones currently in use by the various branches of the US Military could be instructive (from Wikipedia).  It's not like the US Military doesn't know what a drone is.

Current

• MQ-1C Gray Eagle
• RQ-4 Global Hawk
• MQ-4C Triton
• RQ-7 Shadow
• MQ-8B Fire Scout/MQ-8C Fire Scout
• MQ-9 Reaper
• CQ-10 Snowgoose
• RQ-11 Raven
• RQ-12 Wasp
• MQ-19 Aerosonde
• RQ-20 Puma
• RQ-21 Blackjack
• RQ-170 Sentinel
• RQ-180
• Altius-600
• Black Hornet Nano
• Coyote
• Jump 20 VTOL
• Snipe NAV
• Switchblade
• Stalker
• ScanEagle
• Northrop Grumman Bat
• Phoenix Ghost

Future

• MQ-25 Stingray

 

One might make the argument that the US Army was already anticipating the current environment to some extent with the Future Combat System way back in 2003.  I put some stuff in red below (from Wikipedia)

Future Combat Systems (FCS) was the United States Army's principal modernization program from 2003 to early 2009.^[1] Formally launched in 2003, FCS was envisioned to create new brigades equipped with new manned and unmanned vehicles linked by an unprecedented fast and flexible battlefield network. The U.S. Army claimed it was their "most ambitious and far-reaching modernization" program since World War II.^[2] Between 1995 and 2009, $32 billion was expended on programs such as this, "with little to show for it".^[3]

One of the programs that came out of the $32 billion expenditure was the concept of tracking friendly ("blue") forces on the field via a GPS-enabled computer system known as Blue Force Tracking (BFT). The concept of BFT was implemented by the US Army through the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) platform. The FBCB2 system in particular and the BFT system in general have won numerous awards and accolades, including: recognition in 2001 as one of the five best-managed software programs in the entire U.S. Government,^[4] the 2003 Institute for Defense and Government Advancement's award for most innovative U.S. Government program,^[5] the 2003 Federal Computer Week Monticello Award (given in recognition of an information system that has a direct, meaningful impact on human lives), and the Battlespace Information 2005 "Best Program in Support of Coalition Operations".^[6] The proof-of-concept success of FBCB2, its extensive testing during Operation Foal Eagle (FE 99, FE 00), its certification at the Fort Irwin National Training Center, and its proven field usage in live combat operations spanning over a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to BFT adoption by many users including the United States Marine Corps, the United States Air Force, the United States Navy ground-based expeditionary forces (e.g., United States Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) units), the United Kingdom, and German Soldier System IdZ-ES+.

In April and May 2009, Pentagon and army officials announced that the FCS vehicle-development effort would be canceled. The rest of the FCS effort would be swept into a new, pan-army program called the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program.^[7]

Oh, and the end of the tank because of the use of Javelins on the battlefield?  One would assume that since the US makes the Javelin, the US Army would be aware of its capabilities and how it impacts the battlefield.  Whether or not the US Military anticipated how it might operate if on the receiving end of all these drones and Javelins is an open question.  However, I'm not sure that you are giving enough credit to how powerful the US Military is - by itself without even adding in any allies.  Could China cause some issues?  Recent reports of missiles with fuel cells filled with water aside, on paper maybe China would be an issue, but that would doubtless primarily be a naval and air conflict.  If Russia fought the US and NATO, Russia would be pounded into dust.  There is no scenario where NATO fights Russia and it turns into Trench Warfare where nobody can advance and drones rule the battlefield to the detriment of NATO.  That's not even accounting for the leadership advantage that NATO holds.  If NATO holds air supremacy then guess what happens to all your logistics trains?  Guess what happens to all your artillery batteries?  Can FPV drones have an impact for Russia?  Sure, but let's not get carried away and assume that NATO is going to get stuck in trench warfare.  I can't sit here today and rule it out completely, but the odds are not in favor of that sort of an outcome.  You dismiss Iraqi capabilities, but they were widely regarded as having some of the most numerous and capable air defenses in the world at the time and look how much good it did them.  I am confident that the US Military can adapt appropriately to the shifts warfare.  

 

 

That list is almost entirely small-quantity, high-cost uncrewed ISR aircraft that function mostly as crewed aircraft substitutes. The principle behind most of them is to spot something so that you can then send some precision strike later (probably from a crewed aircraft, sometimes fired from the drone itself or artillery)  The lower half of the list lean toward smaller things, but still very much ISR rather than munition.  Several of them can carry and fire standard aircraft munitions (in small quantities), and two, maybe three of them are actual munitions unto themselves.  The cheapest thing on the list is about $100K/unit and has a production rate of ~500/month (switchblade).  

Ukraine is making (and using) more drones every month (80K to 100K) than the combined lifetime production of everything on that list.  They're using them in a fundamentally different way than everything on the list - they're taking advantage of what is apparently an infinite supply of of RPG-7 warheads and are replacing the launcher tubes with drones.  It extends their range to well beyond visual and drastically reduces the risk to the operator.  In running out of artillery shells, they've figured out a way to take advantage of something that they can get in large quantity (drone parts) and turned them into personal delivery systems for RPG-7 warheads.  There are other small munitions that they put on them, but it's the same idea - low cost, disposable system that has long-ish range and direct visual feedback, each carrying a munition that can destroy one of anything on the battlefield.  And up until the moment that each drone blows up on something, it's also providing ISR (usually redundant to other ISR drones that are on overwatch to guide and evaluate).  

 

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:

Switchblade is a horrible example. It is an expensive, inflexible drone that is kind of outclassed by the homebrew solutions. It doesn’t acknowledge that FPV drones are precision munitions that will be fired in extreme quantity.  $100k per unit is just not doable. It should cost $5k max.

The US needs to focus on mass-manufactureable airframes (a quad, hex and fixed wing) in a few sizes, with a common sensor/compute package and several warhead options. Common FPV control, common autonomy roadmap. You could get a few hobbyists (or Ukranians) together and figure this out in a few months. The primary cost should be manufacturing and software development, both of which can scale.

 

2 minutes ago, chrisl said:

That list is almost entirely small-quantity, high-cost uncrewed ISR aircraft that function mostly as crewed aircraft substitutes. The principle behind most of them is to spot something so that you can then send some precision strike later (probably from a crewed aircraft, sometimes fired from the drone itself or artillery)  The lower half of the list lean toward smaller things, but still very much ISR rather than munition.  Several of them can carry and fire standard aircraft munitions (in small quantities), and two, maybe three of them are actual munitions unto themselves.  The cheapest thing on the list is about $100K/unit and has a production rate of ~500/month (switchblade).  

Ukraine is making (and using) more drones every month (80K to 100K) than the combined lifetime production of everything on that list.  They're using them in a fundamentally different way than everything on the list - they're taking advantage of what is apparently an infinite supply of of RPG-7 warheads and are replacing the launcher tubes with drones.  It extends their range to well beyond visual and drastically reduces the risk to the operator.  In running out of artillery shells, they've figured out a way to take advantage of something that they can get in large quantity (drone parts) and turned them into personal delivery systems for RPG-7 warheads.  There are other small munitions that they put on them, but it's the same idea - low cost, disposable system that has long-ish range and direct visual feedback, each carrying a munition that can destroy one of anything on the battlefield.  And up until the moment that each drone blows up on something, it's also providing ISR (usually redundant to other ISR drones that are on overwatch to guide and evaluate).  

 

 

They both nailed it.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I also remember very sober conversations that cutting back on the stocks was a bad idea because the current kit was too costly and too slow to produce on short notice.

We had a good wake-up call early in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq when stocks of medium caliber munitions were run down to the point where even with new production taken out of mothballs the ammo produced was going straight on a plane to one of the two theaters.

And this was to fight insurgencies, not a near peer war.

The lessons were that very expensive, slow to ramp up, militaries struggled to fight protracted wars against vastly inferior enemies.  The enemies being able to fight on the cheap, and therefore sustainably, was a major factor.  We are seeing this play out in a full on conventional war.  The lessons were there for all to see, but not many within the military were interested in pursuing them because the answer always came back to "less expensive stuff, but more of it".

I am going to once again evoke the imagery of a very large steaming pile of excrement from a bovine like creature

Riddle me this... if the military and its civilian leadership were so convinced a war like this would never happen... why did it ask for trillions of Dollars to prepare for just such a possibility?

The obvious answer is because the people pressing for those huge sums of money said that it was explicitly needed for a large conventional conflict with a near peer.

I don't know why you are so insistent of excusing things which are really inexcusable.  I will ask you this again... how is that that I, a civilian, with AT BEST a minimal professional level of experience in these matters saw this war coming and was far more right than wrong about how it would play out?  If you can't answer that question, then please concede the point that the West had what it needed to be prepared for this war but, for various reasons, CHOSE not to.

Then we can get back to how this intersects with the "tank is dead" discussion.  Because it does.  A lot.

Steve

I have to say that this entire discussion was initially frustrating and then became enlightening.  If I were viewing this war through a strictly tactical lens, I think I could see how this whole thing boils down to drone-v-tank/AVF.  If one is able to dismiss other phenomena as Russia or Ukraine “suxs” and here I am talking Air and Sea observations, along with the weirdness about mass - then a distillation down to that snapshot actually makes a lot of sense.

The problem is that seeing the bigger picture is really hard.  In fact people who have been on this board from Day 1 tend to take it for granted, but we are in a minority.  Linking trends across domains, the effects of C4ISR and precision on mass, the dominance of defence and denial (and why) - we take a lot of these as self-evident when in fact for most people they are not.

To most “tanks is dead…because of drone.”  They did not see the 12:1 advantage the RA had at Kyiv or were here when mass died in the face of all the thing we have been watching for two years.  They have not watched the Black Sea Fleet get pushed into port and then hammered there. The RuAF completely denied…less lob bombing we are seeing now.  If one distills this war down to drone-v-tank then “solve for drone and let’s get back to business” actually makes a lot of sense.

We are really talking about a Battlefront doctrine here.  And while we have created pages of analysis and assessments, we have never really codified the thing.  The corporate trajectory of knowledge. I mean we watched the RA approach WW1 level of artillery saturation at Severodonetsk and still fail.  That was concentration of mass through fires…and it still was not enough.  We watched HIMARs and deep strike.  We watched the RA meat assaults through two winters and still are left wondering “how do they do it?”

The lesson is not “we are right” it is really “how do we share what we have seen and experienced”?  Because not everyone has the been on the same journey.