How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[LongLeftFlank]

Ukraine Volunteer is 76 years old, and quite an outlier.

The UA special forces took him in because of  Russian fluency and a basket of skills (EOD particularly) they can't get easily. And he keeps up with the younger guys.  Sounds like he also had a Ukie SoF mate while contract soldiering in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 2000s who spoke for him.

....Ref my prior posts on this, or just read the 50 odd posts in the blog which will convince you this is not a fake.

The guy is amazing.

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Never. Because locals in Donbas and Crimea are not so big Russia-lovers, that to go to death for it, but just conformists. Most of them will flee to Russia, other... "resistance" of other will be mostly in their kitchen talks. Like in times of USSR and Ukraine. Of course, some fanatics can organize some sort of partisanship, but they will be quickly eliminatet.

There is an UKR movie "Atlantida", filmed in 2019, which describes possible life on liberated-in-future Donbas  

Hey man it is your country but a lot of big assumptions there you might want to be real sure of - a lot of this sounds like the cultural assumptions the Russians made about Ukrainian resistance and we all saw how that turned out.  You will have about 31k who joined to fight the UA - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combatants_of_the_war_in_Donbashttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combatants_of_the_war_in_Donbas

No idea how many survived but that sounds like the start of a nasty insurgency to me but I guess we will have to see.

[dan/california]

26 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

No idea how many survived

Pretty sure there are less of them left every day. Also some possibility they have found being used as the military version of crash test dummies educational. But you are correct, a lot of Russians are so so screwed up that even being marched into minefields without so much a steel pole to use for a probe might not be enough to get it through their heads that this whole Donbas Republic project was just a fun chew toy for the FSB.

Edited December 14, 2022 by dan/california

[Kinophile]

2 hours ago, Ultradave said:

I'm 66 and a cancer survivor. I still run 4 times a week, bike, and swim at the Y. Took a bit to get back to seriousness after chemo but feeling strong now. One thing they told me was that they see that people who are in good health and good shape have the fewest issues handling chemo. Gotta' say I'm glad I WAS in good shape because chemo was a b1tch. Don't recommend. Zero stars out of 5.

My wife is also a runner. She's 68 and looks like she's about 50. Our ultra running days are behind us but I can't stop running. 

Dave

Yah its mental the long term benefits of running. My wife was a runner in her teens, early 20s. Shes never had issues losing weight, just how her system was formed at that age. Good on yah Dave.

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Ukraine Volunteer is 76 years old, and quite an outlier.

The UA special forces took him in because of  Russian fluency and a basket of skills (EOD particularly) they can't get easily. And he keeps up with the younger guys.  Sounds like he also had a Ukie SoF mate while contract soldiering in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 2000s who spoke for him.

....Ref my prior posts on this, or just read the 50 odd posts in the blog which will convince you this is not a fake.

The guy is amazing.

And doesnt blow his trumpet or say dramatic, silly stuff. Consistently low key, analytical and calm. 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Ukraine Volunteer is 76 years old, and quite an outlier.

The UA special forces took him in because of  Russian fluency and a basket of skills (EOD particularly) they can't get easily. And he keeps up with the younger guys.  Sounds like he also had a Ukie SoF mate while contract soldiering in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 2000s who spoke for him.

....Ref my prior posts on this, or just read the 50 odd posts in the blog which will convince you this is not a fake.

The guy is amazing.

I don't normally think cloning is a good Idea, but he might be an exception!

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, NamEndedAllen said:

AND more recently:

“Russia needs to leave, that we can agree upon, but I would hand them over to the international community to manage for a decade or so”

Thanks for your in-depth reply. My comment was part of a response to your earlier thoughts and insights on your vision of the best end state for the war. I do recall your analysis from way back. The sticky part has always been in lining up events between now, “Russia needs to leave”, and your international (peace-keeping?) oversight of occupied oblasts freed of Russian troops who assumed to have all returned to Russia. And an accompanying vision of a new Russia. My questions:

1. Is your scenario built on Russians fully vacating the Oblasts *without* being militarily defeated in detail, each Oblast? If so what are the other assumptions about Russia that bringing this about? Ukraine is already fighting *within* several of them as we speak and will be pushing farther through the winter.

2. Do you foresee Ukraine deciding that after greater successes on the ground, freeing more territory, the USA and Allies will force Ukraine to stop and accept terms? And Russia will, as well?

3. AND after difficult negotiations, the Russians will agree to fully retreat, everywhere? And agree to the rest of your terms - reparations, war crimes trials? Why? What do they get out of this? 

4. If the Russian concessions are predicated on Putin’s downfall and a new friendlier government, would this really happen *before* decisive defeat in Ukraine? Wouldn’t the government fall *after* utter defeat and humiliating concessions? Is the assumption that during the coming warfare phase, Putin’s government will fall first, and the friendlier government would emerge? This seems shaky.

5. But If Ukraine has militarily defeated the Russians on the ground in each Oblast, I think it is an open question whether Ukraine would accept giving over some sort of international jurisdiction of them. You state reasons  *why* that would be wise from an international perspective. But Ukraine and likely some of its close allies may not agree. So - a good scenario but Devil in the details.

6. NATO membership - How?  I asked earlier about the requirement for a nation to be fully in control of its borders in order to apply for membership. Your scenario would complicate or derail that. Or do you know ways around it?

7. But if everything fell into place and your post war vision took place, my pessimism about Russia and the current state of governments everywhere leads me to wonder how the imposition of meaningful - meaning massive -reparations, and coughing up national and military leadership for war crimes shown worldwide…how all that would or could be enforced. Isn’t it likely that any conceivable future Russia would renege on various parts of such an agreement? All the allied nations party to such an agreement would have to agree on how to handle various violations by Russia, and get international corporations to buy in on starting and likely stopping specific aspects of trade. And are we relying on Ukraine or NATO or the UN or ?? to enforce banned activities within the four liberated  Oblasts?? Who polices them? 

To be clear, your vision has much to commend it! But it raises questions about the two warring parties perceptions and whether either or both would agree. And then of course, all the devils in the enormous amount of details. So it may be the Best Outcome. But is it the Best Likely Outcome.

Seriously you are approaching the line where I normally get paid with this list.  But here are some short shots because I love you guys that much:

1.  Could be either to be honest.  How the Russians vacate the occupied regions will matter in the post-war narratives, but in the short term either will do - negotiated likely gives the best chance of keeping Russia from collapsing, maybe and depending who one talks to.  Defeat in detail and total collapse a la Kharkiv would remove any doubt of Ukrainian victory but may trigger a Russian identity crisis of epic proportions.  An orderly withdrawal set us up for “stabs in the back” myths.  Neither is great strategically to be honest but one second to midnight at a time.

2.  Tough one, only guaranteed allied pressure and ultimatums will be at the Russian border - UA punching into Russia in a ground incursion is definitely off the table.  So are the pre-Feb 24 borders enough?  At what point does the west get bored of this and calls for a stop?  Pre-2014?   Not sure.  One thing is sure, Putin needs to be gone before any of this becomes an option.  He is never going to accept the pre- Feb 24 borders as it means after all this they gained nothing - he will be tossed out a window and he knows it.  While I suspect pre-Feb 24 is the minimum western allies will accept.  Who blinks where and when is one of the biggest unknowns in all this.

3.  Sanctions will likely stay in place until a level of reparations are agreed and warcrimes prosecution is conducted - if we renormalize with Russia without that then shame on us, and the western order is going to look weak and shaky.  After Bucha, blatant civilian targeting across Ukraine and numerous other warcrimes, if we let that slide then the LOAC is in tatters and so is western credibility.  Russia get re-normalization if they agree.  We can start buying gas again etc and perhaps return to whatever weird normal comes next.  Russia could simply say “Screw you” and continue its slide into a third world nation.  China and India may do business with them but Russia will get taken to the cleaners as their negotiating position will be incredibly weak.

4.  Sure it could.  This is Steve’s point - with enough Russian war dead the people in Russia may simply buck.  More likely is a drug deal with some elites to depose him will be made and we get a bunch of gangsters with slightly cleaner hands. Total military defeat will definitely do it but in that scenario the risk of total collapse of Russia goes up in my mind. Transition of political power will likely not be orderly or peaceful in a total military defeat, or at least the risks go up.  But the old bastard has had 20 years to solidify power and surround himself with dependent power players.  Tough and tall order to remove him early but that is where we are.

5.  Definitely. If Ukraine takes back the occupied regions by force, they are going to lose people doing so. Handing them back over to the international is very unlikely at that point.  Better to have Russia pull out before that point and we get a chance to sell ZOS concept.  The risk to occupation is one can go from being the “good guy” to bad in an afternoon.  If Haikduk is right and they simply go quietly - fantastic, but I have my doubts.  If they do go all insurgency (partisans is the wrong word) it is going to get ugly right when Ukraine needs the full support of the international community for reconstruction.  Better to make them someone else’s problem for a few years until the see what western investment looks like and beg to reintegrate with Ukraine rather than by force.  This sucks as there are a lot of people simply caught in the middle in those regions but this is ugly work when one gets into ethnic based conflicts. However this goes down Ukraine will be selling Ukraine in how it deals with those regions make no doubt about that. First hint of abuses and guys like Macgregor will be all over Fox News screaming about “Ukrainian Nazis” and why is the US spending billions etc.  Hell they will make it up anyway but real abuses may swing moderates - really hard to keep hands clean in an insurgency.

6.  Entry into NATO will be critical and we will waive whatever “rules” we have to in order to make it happen. Ukraine needs to be squarely in a western orbit after all this in order for this to be a clear western “win” for the rules based order.  I am sure Turkey and a few other nations will make duck  sounds but the US can buy off or break arms when it has too.  Victory for the West is Ukraine inside NATO - hell they are already better armed than half of NATO, with NATO weapons and training.  We mess that up then we risk the point of this entire war and the political level in NATO knows this.

7. Sanctions.  And at the rate things are going removing Russia’s state sponsor of terror designation - if Russia goes on this list - https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/. They become pretty toxic pretty fast.  US has not pulled this trigger yet but the EU has https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221118IPR55707/european-parliament-declares-russia-to-be-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism

All that stays in place until the conditions we are talking about are met - even after the shooting stops.  I am not an economist but this does not look good:

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/

Now imagine that after 5 years, 10 years?  At some point they will hit bottom but Putin is not a Kim, and the Russians will likely not accept becoming North Korea either.

So navigating to this point is going to be incredibly hard and fraught with failure points, with cliffs on either side.  For example Russia may not negotiate and Putin hangs on too long. Then the Russian collapse will be worse, Russia in free fall.  Less likely but possible if Russia drags this out until western resolve falters.  Or we fail on the follow through and leave Ukraine hanging on reconstruction. Or someone really missteps and the conflict widens.

I am often afraid people think this is easy and simple - destroy the RA, they will leave, Russians will pick a new government and we can all get back to normal.  Normal has left the building.  Navigation of this crisis is incredibly hard.  We need to keep the west together on this through the war and well beyond in the face of a recession and political divides. Ukraine has to win the war and the peace afterwards while landing on its feet facing west. Russia needs to lose but not too much, and have a relatively soft landing.  Russia needs to get back in line and re- normalize.  All of these concepts are in tension and could fly apart very easily.  Oh and the spectre of a 70 year old pin head triggering WW3 is still out there.  This is a strategic minefield if there ever was one - makes the Cuban Missile crisis look quaint.

[The_Capt]

51 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Pretty sure there are less of them left every day. Also some possibility they have found being used as the military version of crash test dummies educational. But you are correct, a lot of Russians are so so screwed up that even being marched into minefields without so much a steel pole to use for a probe might not be enough to get it through their heads that this whole Donbas Republic project was just a fun chew toy for the FSB.

Well something got them out of the kitchen and I am not sure a whole lot of them dying is going to address whatever that was.  Further, losing fathers, brothers etc tends to create grudges that last for generations.  I would not count on flags and kisses when the UA re-takes Sevastopol or at least not from the entire population. I honestly hope I am wrong here because a long term armed occupation with this sort of baggage rarely ends well. The re-taking of Donbas and Crimea has been a concerning question to me since about May, and definitely after this fall. Ukraine has demonstrated incredible political nuance and few miss steps but if this goes sideways it could really mess up western support.

[BlackMoria]

3 hours ago, Ultradave said:

I'm 66 and a cancer survivor. I still run 4 times a week, bike, and swim at the Y. Took a bit to get back to seriousness after chemo but feeling strong now. One thing they told me was that they see that people who are in good health and good shape have the fewest issues handling chemo. Gotta' say I'm glad I WAS in good shape because chemo was a b1tch. Don't recommend. Zero stars out of 5.

My wife is also a runner. She's 68 and looks like she's about 50. Our ultra running days are behind us but I can't stop running. 

Dave

I envy you.  17 years of humping a ruck in full tactical fighting order means I can't run anymore.  My knees are shot.  Best I can do is a slow jog and only a short distance.

Edited December 14, 2022 by BlackMoria

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Rare footage of Switchblade 300 work. Though it has too weak warhead.

 

Now here is one area where I am in the “why won’t they give them?!” camp.  The 600 series has the Javelin warhead and the Spike NLOS is in the same class. Spike NLOS has a 25 km range and the 600 Switchblade has a whopping 40km range.  Both man portable and fits the UA approach extremely well.  The 300 Switchblade is adorable but is only AP. 

[kevinkin]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/russias-quiet-riot

Behind a paywall. Here some of it below. Russia could be in the process of sublimation i.e. the transition of a substance directly from the solid to the gas state, without passing through the liquid state. If Russia was merely evaporating it might be able to hold the fort for a while ignoring its pathological history. A soft landing for a while. But the entire society is in a form of the Stockholm syndrome so this will be tough. In the 90's Microsoft baled out Apple over anti-trust fears. MS needed a competitor. Apple re-made itself and the rest is history. Perhaps that's a model to consider. There is nothing wrong with a freedom loving competitor. Better than having the light switch thrown as Russian passes into the ethers. 

In October, at this year’s edition of the Valdai forum in Moscow, Putin’s highly staged annual meeting with foreign political analysts, the writer and ultranationalist Alexander Prokhanov defended Russia against its critics. Addressing the president, he said, “Very often foreigners ask us, ‘What can you, Russians, offer to the modern world? Where are your Nobel Prize winners? Where are your great discoveries, industrial and scientific achievements?’” To that, Prokhanov offered his own answer: “Russia can offer a religion of justice, because this religion, this feeling is at the heart of all Russian culture and Russian self-sacrifice.”

His statement fits well with the messianic tone into which Moscow’s propagandists, ideologues, and officials have fallen, claiming that Russia is in an existential battle with the West—or what they deride as the embodiment of global Satanism, in this sense, unwittingly imitating the Iranian clerics who have long denounced the United States as “the Great Satan.” (Perhaps in a nod to Russia’s multiconfessionalism, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has extended the line of Russia’s spiritual enemies to Satan, Lucifer, and Eblis.)

In fact, all that Putin’s Russia now “offers” to the world is violence and the imperial idea. And the symbol of the Russian soldier today is not the heroic savior of Europe, as commemorated in Treptower Park in Berlin, where 80,000 Soviet soldiers were killed in the final battle against Hitler. Rather, it is a thug dragging a stolen toilet bowl or washing machine (revealing the profound poverty of the areas deep inside Russia from which Putin’s soldiers are mostly recruited).

In 2020, the Russian economist Vladimir Gimpelson predicted that by 2030, the number of working Russians in the 20- to 40-year-old age group would decline by about 25 percent primarily because of fewer births. But since then, there has been a pandemic and a war and an exodus, and the hole in the workforce will soon become gaping. The demographer Mikhail Denisenko has estimated that if those mobilized this fall serve in the military for one year, Russia’s population will experience 25,000 fewer births.

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Seriously you are approaching the line where I normally get paid with this list.  But here are some short shots because I love you guys that much:

1.  Could be either to be honest.  How the Russians vacate the occupied regions will matter in the post-war narratives, but in the short term either will do - negotiated likely gives the best chance of keeping Russia from collapsing, maybe and depending who one talks to.  Defeat in detail and total collapse a la Kharkiv would remove any doubt of Ukrainian victory but may trigger a Russian identity crisis of epic proportions.  An orderly withdrawal set us up for “stabs in the back” myths.  Neither is great strategically to be honest but one second to midnight at a time.

2.  Tough one, only guaranteed allied pressure and ultimatums will be at the Russian border - UA punching into Russia in a ground incursion is definitely off the table.  So are the pre-Feb 24 borders enough?  At what point does the west get bored of this and calls for a stop?  Pre-2014?   Not sure.  One thing is sure, Putin needs to be gone before any of this becomes an option.  He is never going to accept the pre- Feb 24 borders as it means after all this they gained nothing - he will be tossed out a window and he knows it.  While I suspect pre-Feb 24 is the minimum western allies will accept.  Who blinks where and when is one of the biggest unknowns in all this.

3.  Sanctions will likely stay in place until a level of reparations are agreed and warcrimes prosecution is conducted - if we renormalize with Russia without that then shame on us, and the western order is going to look weak and shaky.  After Bucha, blatant civilian targeting across Ukraine and numerous other warcrimes, if we let that slide then the LOAC is in tatters and so is western credibility.  Russia get re-normalization if they agree.  We can start buying gas again etc and perhaps return to whatever weird normal comes next.  Russia could simply say “Screw you” and continue its slide into a third world nation.  China and India may do business with them but Russia will get taken to the cleaners as their negotiating position will be incredibly weak.

4.  Sure it could.  This is Steve’s point - with enough Russian war dead the people in Russia may simply buck.  More likely is a drug deal with some elites to depose him will be made and we get a bunch of gangsters with slightly cleaner hands. Total military defeat will definitely do it but in that scenario the risk of total collapse of Russia goes up in my mind. Transition of political power will likely not be orderly or peaceful in a total military defeat, or at least the risks go up.  But the old bastard has had 20 years to solidify power and surround himself with dependent power players.  Tough and tall order to remove him early but that is where we are.

5.  Definitely. If Ukraine takes back the occupied regions by force, they are going to lose people doing so. Handing them back over to the international is very unlikely at that point.  Better to have Russia pull out before that point and we get a chance to sell ZOS concept.  The risk to occupation is one can go from being the “good guy” to bad in an afternoon.  If Haikduk is right and they simply go quietly - fantastic, but I have my doubts.  If they do go all insurgency (partisans is the wrong word) it is going to get ugly right when Ukraine needs the full support of the international community for reconstruction.  Better to make them someone else’s problem for a few years until the see what western investment looks like and beg to reintegrate with Ukraine rather than by force.  This sucks as there are a lot of people simply caught in the middle in those regions but this is ugly work when one gets into ethnic based conflicts. However this goes down Ukraine will be selling Ukraine in how it deals with those regions make no doubt about that. First hint of abuses and guys like Macgregor will be all over Fox News screaming about “Ukrainian Nazis” and why is the US spending billions etc.  Hell they will make it up anyway but real abuses may swing moderates - really hard to keep hands clean in an insurgency.

6.  Entry into NATO will be critical and we will waive whatever “rules” we have to in order to make it happen. Ukraine needs to be squarely in a western orbit after all this in order for this to be a clear western “win” for the rules based order.  I am sure Turkey and a few other nations will make duck  sounds but the US can buy off or break arms when it has too.  Victory for the West is Ukraine inside NATO - hell they are already better armed than half of NATO, with NATO weapons and training.  We mess that up then we risk the point of this entire war and the political level in NATO knows this.

7. Sanctions.  And at the rate things are going removing Russia’s state sponsor of terror designation - if Russia goes on this list - https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/. They become pretty toxic pretty fast.  US has not pulled this trigger yet but the EU has https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221118IPR55707/european-parliament-declares-russia-to-be-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism

All that stays in place until the conditions we are talking about are met - even after the shooting stops.  I am not an economist but this does not look good:

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/

Now imagine that after 5 years, 10 years?  At some point they will hit bottom but Putin is not a Kim, and the Russians will likely not accept becoming North Korea either.

So navigating to this point is going to be incredibly hard and fraught with failure points, with cliffs on either side.  For example Russia may not negotiate and Putin hangs on too long. Then the Russian collapse will be worse, Russia in free fall.  Less likely but possible if Russia drags this out until western resolve falters.  Or we fail on the follow through and leave Ukraine hanging on reconstruction. Or someone really missteps and the conflict widens.

I am often afraid people think this is easy and simple - destroy the RA, they will leave, Russians will pick a new government and we can all get back to normal.  Normal has left the building.  Navigation of this crisis is incredibly hard.  We need to keep the west together on this through the war and well beyond in the face of a recession and political divides. Ukraine has to win the war and the peace afterwards while landing on its feet facing west. Russia needs to lose but not too much, and have a relatively soft landing.  Russia needs to get back in line and re- normalize.  All of these concepts are in tension and could fly apart very easily.  Oh and the spectre of a 70 year old pin head triggering WW3 is still out there.  This is a strategic minefield if there ever was one - makes the Cuban Missile crisis look quaint.

Your analysis of the various possible outcomes is spot on as usual. I just feel that Western decision makers are way too confident in their ability to shape the details of the outcome, and too comfortable with the idea that the current glide path gives them the most control. I would humbly submit that Ukraine winning faster is the lowest risk, lowest cost scenario. We have discussed endlessly what would help Ukraine the most, But the simplest answer might be taking the small risk of depleting our artillery, both guns and ammo more than doctrine theoretically allows. And another 200 tubes would move this thing right along.

The casualties on both sides are high enough every day that the ever increasing sunk cost makes both sides demands more maximalist, there is ample precedent for this from WW1. That isn't going to change until one of them breaks, we really want that to be the Russians. I don't think the finale will be any better if Russia manages to cobble two hundred thousand mobiks for a spring offensive and Ukraine turns half of them into fertilizer. I don't think that will reduce the odd of Russia collapsing spectacularly either, rather the opposite. The sunk cost, and the generational bitterness, will be that much higher on both sides

I realize bad things happen at the worst time. This war being launched at the tail end of Covid with intentional malice is example A. But the only other looming fight that looks existential for the West is Taiwan, and we don't seem to shipping stuff there with any sense of urgency. So at least ship Ukraine enough of what we are already sending them, and yes, for bleeps sake, send two hundred of the same kind of gun.

Edited December 14, 2022 by dan/california

[JonS]

3 hours ago, dan/california said:

Pretty sure there are less of them left every day

If there is one - just one! - thing we all should have learnt out of the last 20 years of misadventures in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, et al, it's that you can't kill your way out of an insurgency.

Should have, but apparently didn't.

[FancyCat]

7 minutes ago, JonS said:

If there is one - just one! - thing we all should have learnt out of the last 20 years of misadventures in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, et al, it's that you can't kill your way out of an insurgency.

Should have, but apparently didn't.

tbf, didn't they kill their way thru the UPA? On that note, since no insurgency is defeated purely thru killing, don't we have plenty of examples of insurgencies that are defeated? Chechnya, the Baltic anti-Soviet insurgencies, Polish, etc, just to remark on a few in Soviet/Russian orbit. 

Edited December 14, 2022 by FancyCat

[JonS]

8 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

tbf, didn't they kill their way thru the UPA? 

Ukrainian Peoples Army? Well, there's two responses I could go with here.

1) No, not really. Otherwise Ukraine would never have broken away from Russia, and stayed broken away in 2014, and then again in 2022.

2) Maybe sorta, but ... do you really want to go with that as an example to emulate?

 

Edited December 14, 2022 by JonS

[FancyCat]

1 minute ago, JonS said:

Ukrainian Peoples Army? Well, there's two responses I could go with here.

1) No, not really. Otherwise Ukraine would never have broken away from Russia and stayed broken away in 2014 and 2022.

2) Maybe sorta, but ... do you really want to go with that as an example to emulate?

1. Pretty doubtful we can classify the UPA as a direct ancestor of the post-Soviet state of Ukraine. 

2. That could apply to both sides? 

[Zeleban]

5 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Do we have any idea of how much force the UA has in that area.? The info might be impossible to get or publish on the internet. If so, it's understandable.

 

No, such information is not distributed through the Ukrainian media.

[JonS]

33 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

1. Pretty doubtful we can classify the UPA as a direct ancestor of the post-Soviet state of Ukraine.

My expertise, such as it is, is on a different albeit nearby former-SSR. They too had a post-war insurgency, that sputtered on for a decade or so after the end of WWII. Was the signing revolution a direct descendant of the forest brothers? No. Of course, not. But it'd be just as wrong to say that the legend of the forest brothers had no part to play in the freedom movement of the late 1980s.

Quote

2. That could apply to both sides? 

Sure, but shouldn't it only apply to one?

Edited December 14, 2022 by JonS

[FancyCat]

Just now, JonS said:

My expertise, such as it is, is on a different albeit nearby former-SSR. They too had a post-war insurgency, that sputtered on for a decade or so after the end of WWII. Was the signing revolution in 1991 a direct descendant of the forest brothers? No. Of course, not. But it'd be just as wrong to say that the legend of the forest brothers had no part to play in the late 1980s.

Sure, but shouldn't it only apply to one?

Was the Baltics ungovernable during the Soviet era? No? I would say that the goal of the occupation succeeded. Only with the collapse of Soviet central authority and via non-violent resistance did the Baltics break away. 2014 sure didn't start out peacefully and occurred with significant Russian government backing. 

In the situation where the Donbas and Crimea is liberated via militarily overrunning the regions, there will be no way for Russian infiltration and support to filter back into the Donbas and Crimea. 

Which one would it apply to? 

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Now here is one area where I am in the “why won’t they give them?!” camp.  The 600 series has the Javelin warhead and the Spike NLOS is in the same class. Spike NLOS has a 25 km range and the 600 Switchblade has a whopping 40km range.  Both man portable and fits the UA approach extremely well.  The 300 Switchblade is adorable but is only AP. 

Just to clarify, do we know the Switchblade 600 is available in any meaningful numbers, and will stand up to Russian jamming? At least some versions of the Spike use a fiber optic cable instead a radio link. Pretty sure those are close to fool proof in terms of ECM.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

If there is one - just one! - thing we all should have learnt out of the last 20 years of misadventures in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, et al, it's that you can't kill your way out of an insurgency.

Should have, but apparently didn't.

I perhaps didn't make my point in the best possible way. If Ukraine winds up taking the Donbas and Crimea it will be because they have beaten the Russians more or less completely. And in the process the Ruskie Mir dream that seems to account for most the ideologically motivated fighters in the DPR/LPR will have been tested and found wanting. The stupidly brave are probably mostly dead already, and any that are left are not exactly out of chances between now and when the Ukrainians clean out that last little Southeastern corner of the Donbas. There is simply no way they will ever be able to tell themselves that they have a better shot at their so called dream than the one that has just been smashed. I can't prove that would matter, but I really think it might. 

It might be different if the Russian cut bait right now, ceded all Ukrainian territory right up the 2014 borders, and intentionally set up an incipient insurgency in an organized way as they leave. That is sort of a scary thought actually.

Ukraine also won't have the language issue that utterly bedeviled our efforts in the Middle East.

[JonS]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

In the situation where the Donbas and Crimea is liberated via militarily overrunning the regions, there will be no way for Russian infiltration and support to filter back into the Donbas and Crimea. 

lol

[FancyCat]

21 minutes ago, JonS said:

lol

Russia had to invade openly in 2014 to prevent the separatists from being crushed. How will that occur again? 

[LongLeftFlank]

3 hours ago, JonS said:

If there is one - just one! - thing we all should have learnt out of the last 20 years of misadventures in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, et al, it's that you can't kill your way out of an insurgency.

Should have, but apparently didn't.

I don't know whether that is a hard and fast rule. I do agree to the extent that such a strategy requires a great deal of time (and a very lethal army to carry it out), and that where it does work it's likely a multiple causation thing.

1.  In postwar analysis, the Vietnamese noted that the American war had all but run the Southern provinces out of capable draft age males for the VC intake by the time the US left in 1972. In addition to taking kids and oldsters, they were sending large numbers of Northerners south. Cultural conflicts were  driving southerners -- including VC cadre -- back toward the SVN government, which in spite of its own manifold defects and corruption still required a series of large conventional attacks from the North to topple in 1974-1975.  Demographic data comparing northern and southern provinces supports this conclusion.  So, did casualties (and strategic hamleting/population denial) defeat the VC insurgency? We will never really know, but it seriously impaired them.*

2.  The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988 mainly owing to Iranian casualties, worsened by their reckless and costly human wave attacks with young volunteers early in the war. Iran's rulers wanted to continue, but simply could not do so.

3.  Less well documented, the often intense insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala wound down when pro-rebel areas ran short of men willing to fight far from their villages. The governments basically paid the remainder to stay home as militiamen.

4.  In Iraq, while Allied forces didn't interdict the host populations as such, AQIZ and other insurgent forces ran out of willing recruits to replace those lost in 2003-2005. By 2008 the US was ambushing groups of inexperienced young volunteers crossing the deserts from the borders, as local tribesmen were no longer interested in fighting. In this case, the Allies focused on isolating and shrinking the pool of fervent jihadis.

5. There's some case to be made that Japan was getting pretty close to empty on its national first line manpower pool, had the Bomb never been invented and OLYMPIC had to be executed. The Kwantung army was its last million man formation and when Zhukov took it out, they were really in a kids and codgers situation.... teenage girls with bamboo stakes, etc.

Again, I'm *not* responding with a hard and fast 'Oh yes you can kill your way to victory' either.  But it can absolutely be a major factor.

* This is tempting me to pull one of my favourite hex-and-counter wargames VIETNAM 1965-1975 off the shelf (or onto VASSAL, really).  If I only had time for such things, sigh.....

Edited December 14, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Haiduk]

Russia tried to attack objects in Kyiv oblast and Kyiv with Shakheds. 13 UAVs shot down. One or two were shot down over Kyiv. Four buildings in Kyiv and one cottadge in Vyshneve town, western suburb of Kyiv got light damages from Shakeds fragments. No casualties.

This is third Shakheds salvo during about 10 days. First was directed on Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, all 17 were shot down. The second launch was on Ochakiv, Mykolaiv and Odesa about week ago - 15 Shakheds. 10 were shot down, but 5 hit critical power objects in Odesa oblast, so Odesa city and most of Odesa oblast were without electricity and water supply for two days

Edited December 14, 2022 by Haiduk