How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

18 minutes ago, Fenris said:

One way RU keeps the ranks filled

 

Very interesting, thanks for sharing this.  8 years pay is quite the enticement.  Of course, once the poor sucker is killed, I bet Putin rarely pays or only pays a fraction.  

Edited Monday at 03:55 AM by danfrodo

[Carolus]

Ukrainian mine-laying USV. 

 

 

[Desertor]

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/s/vrpggogm65

Ukranian stick-holding drone

[The_Capt]

9 hours ago, FancyCat said:

I believe part of the problem of the lack of volunteers is that training is not sufficient enough, long enough or the training personnel aren't enough nor well qualified enough to train and so that increases the reluctance of conscripts to join instead of dodge if they aren't assured of proper training. 

 

So how does a civilian know what is “proper training”? I am sure rumors and stories abound but no civilian joining up knows what “proper training” even looks like or who is “qualified” or not.  Further, no one really knows what “proper training” even looks like for a war like this.  Western training centres are training people to a compressed western basic standard.  We can do somethings right, like basic fieldcraft but in other areas the Ukrainians know more than we do.  Even in defensive works, the West has not really done trenches and bunkers like this for some time. And then there are technical trades: gunners, teams/crews, drivers, maintenance etc.  What is an “acceptable” standard for them?  The answer is really “whatever it can be, as fast as it can be” when units are reporting 50% manning on the front line.

So I think we have internet rumours and expectations management issues but that does not solve the core problem - Russians are still signing up for $$$. Ukrainians are having trouble finding people.  Both sides are receiving poor training - I would argue the Russians are worse than the UA but that is just a sense really.  We have poured billions into this war, set up training systems in other nations, trained 10s of thousands of Ukrainian troops…and still Ukraine is having trouble finding young people to fight for their nation’s existence.

So, no, I do not think that this is all somehow the lack of Western training supports fault - which is where your argument is taking things. There is something else going on here. Or there is not and stories of Ukraine reticence are overblown for effect. The bottom line is that the West can supply a lot for this war, but a will to fight is not on that list. If a young man or woman is watching their home nation being mauled by a foreign invader, the first question he/she should not be asking is “hmm, well I want to fight but is my training really going to be good enough?”  War is not a shopping exercise.

We talk a lot about Russian cracks and creaking.  For my ears this one is the one to watch for Ukraine. I am not of the same mind as Zeleban (or whatever iteration he calls himself), all is not lost and we should sue for surrender. But the UA will not be anywhere near able to conduct offensive operations if that nation is nearing an exhaustion point.  They can likely continue to conduct effective defence and denial, even to the point of exhaustion for the RA, but retaking ground is an expensive business. So what?  Well maximalist metrics and viewpoints are going to suffer greatly in the next year or so unless Ukraine can find a way to fill those ranks. We very may well have to accept a lesser victory if people in Ukraine do not keep stepping up.

Edited Monday at 12:52 PM by The_Capt

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

But the UA will not be anywhere near able to conduct offensive operations if that nation is nearing an exhaustion point.  They can likely continue to conduct effective defence and denial, even to the point of exhaustion for the RA, but retaking ground is an expensive business.

After the costly summer offensive of 2023, I think it is wise for Ukraine to maintain a defensive posture. 

There are plenty of signs that Russia can not afford a "forever war" at this level of activity.  Yet currently they are nowhere near close to achieving even the most basic of Putin's stated war aims (full occupation of the Donbas).  Logically, reducing their level of offensive activity means a reduction in what they can expect to get from this war.  So far, anyway, Putin has shown absolutely no interest in reducing his war aims and that means that Russia will have to continue with a similar level of investment.  And then we're back to how long Russia can maintain that without breaking.

On the other hand, Ukraine's ground strategy of letting the Russians come to them is a viable way to defeat Russia.  Add to this Russia's inability to protect large, expensive, and difficult to replace assets/infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes, it's very obvious that Russia can't absorb the totality of the costs forever as it could the 2015-2022 situation.

All the while this is going on there's the cumulative weight of sanctions and trade restrictions on the Russian economy playing into Russia's ability to continue the war "as is".

I've been saying this since the start of the war and, despite Ukraine's manpower issues, I will keep saying... time is on Ukraine's side.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

So how does a civilian know what is “proper training”? I am sure rumors and stories abound but no civilian joining up knows what “proper training” even looks like or who is “qualified” or not.  Further, no one really knows what “proper training” even looks like for a war like this.  Western training centres are training people to a compressed western basic standard.  We can do somethings right, like basic fieldcraft but in other areas the Ukrainians know more than we do.  Even in defensive works, the West has not really done trenches and bunkers like this for some time. And then there are technical trades: gunners, teams/crews, drivers, maintenance etc.  What is an “acceptable” standard for them?  The answer is really “whatever it can be, as fast as it can be” when units are reporting 50% manning on the front line.

So I think we have internet rumours and expectations management issues but that does not solve the core problem - Russians are still signing up for $$$. Ukrainians are having trouble finding people.  Both sides are receiving poor training - I would argue the Russians are worse than the UA but that is just a sense really.  We have poured billions into this war, set up training systems in other nations, trained 10s of thousands of Ukrainian troops…and still Ukraine is having trouble finding young people to fight for their nation’s existence.

So, no, I do not think that this is all somehow the lack of Western training supports fault - which is where your argument is taking things. There is something else going on here. Or there is not and stories of Ukraine reticence are overblown for effect. The bottom line is that the West can supply a lot for this war, but a will to fight is not on that list. If a young man or woman is watching their home nation being mauled by a foreign invader, the first question he/she should not be asking is “hmm, well I want to fight but is my training really going to be good enough?”  War is not a shopping exercise.

We talk a lot about Russian cracks and creaking.  For my ears this one is the one to watch for Ukraine. I am not of the same mind as Zeleban (or whatever iteration he calls himself), all is not lost and we should sue for surrender. But the UA will not be anywhere near able to conduct offensive operations if that nation is nearing an exhaustion point.  They can likely continue to conduct effective defence and denial, even to the point of exhaustion for the RA, but retaking ground is an expensive business. So what?  Well maximalist metrics and viewpoints are going to suffer greatly in the next year or so unless Ukraine can find a way to fill those ranks. We very may well have to accept a lesser victory if people in Ukraine do not keep stepping up.

What all Ukrainian civilians did know is that external support was all but cut off for six months while the U.S.Congress ate its own tail. That contributed to a downturn in Ukrainian morale that it is going to take more than six weeks to fix.

[The_Capt]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

After the costly summer offensive of 2023, I think it is wise for Ukraine to maintain a defensive posture. 

There are plenty of signs that Russia can not afford a "forever war" at this level of activity.  Yet currently they are nowhere near close to achieving even the most basic of Putin's stated war aims (full occupation of the Donbas).  Logically, reducing their level of offensive activity means a reduction in what they can expect to get from this war.  So far, anyway, Putin has shown absolutely no interest in reducing his war aims and that means that Russia will have to continue with a similar level of investment. And then we're back to how long Russia can maintain that without breaking.

On the other hand, Ukraine's ground strategy of letting the Russians come to them is a viable way to defeat Russia.  Add to this Russia's inability to protect large, expensive, and difficult to replace assets/infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes, it's very obvious that Russia can't absorb the totality of the costs forever as it could the 2015-2022 situation.

All the while this is going on there's the cumulative weight of sanctions and trade restrictions on the Russian economy playing into Russia's ability to continue the war "as is".

I've been saying this since the start of the war and, despite Ukraine's manpower issues, I will keep saying... time is on Ukraine's side.

Steve

I am tending to agree with this. I cannot see a scenario where the UA fully collapses on a strategic level - if there is one, it is well hidden.  We will see tactical and operational setbacks but the RA is simply too battered up and denial/defence so low cost right now that long bold red arrow pushes are likely not in the cards.

Russian collapse is a good question. Remember that defence/denial is working for them too.  I still put stock in corrosive warfare but it is predicated upon two key conditions: 1) rapid full system precision attrition of an opponents system at a rate they cannot sustain for, and 2) an ability to put offensive pressure on that system, while projecting friction/attrition, in order to force a buckling collapse.  Right now the UA can still do #1 - as demonstrated in the Crimea yesterday.  But #2 is my largest concern.  How much pressure?  Where?  The RA is sustaining a very low energy state right now.  The vast majority of RA are simply holding the line while select outfits are conducting front edge tactical biting actions.  I am not sure what it will take to get that mass of Russian defensive meat to rot and buckle under an offensive weight.  And I am not at all sure if the UA could build it.

I am not sure why Ukrainians are appearing to get less enthusiastic about fighting, nor do we actually know the real numbers - all rumor at this point.  We also have no idea how exhausted the Russian are either. It is not like that they have open and transparent government, so of course the official line is "Russians signing up everywhere". 

Regardless, this is a war of exhaustion at this point - pure and simple. We are past attrition, and annihilation is a long ago fever dream. For Ukraine the ability to continue to sustain human capital on this war is deterministic, more so than the West's ability to send in the "capability of the day".  The UA held off the RA with next to nothing last winter.  We definitely should not let it get that bad again, no argument there. But all that western sexy kit is useless without people to use it.

If Ukraine runs out of troops we will be down to some harsh calculus and fewer options...never a good way to go.

[The_Capt]

15 minutes ago, dan/california said:

What all Ukrainian civilians did know is that external support was all but cut off for six months while the U.S.Congress ate its own tail. That contributed to a downturn in Ukrainian morale that it is going to take more than six weeks to fix.

Then the Ukrainian government must fix national morale. A nations will to survive cannot be entirely predicated upon the whims of western politics - that is the lesson from this war. Nor should its means, but that is a different issue. Young Ukrainians should not be a position of refusing to fight because US Congress is waffling.  I have no idea how to solve this issue, but the Ukrainian government needs to figure that one out, quickly.

[Battlefront.com]

Some official acknowledgement of Russia's clandestine attacks against targets in the West that are connected to delivering Ukraine aid:

https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-berlin-fire-diehl-behind-arson-attack-on-factory/

Steve

[FancyCat]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

So how does a civilian know what is “proper training”? I am sure rumors and stories abound but no civilian joining up knows what “proper training” even looks like or who is “qualified” or not.  Further, no one really knows what “proper training” even looks like for a war like this.  Western training centres are training people to a compressed western basic standard.  We can do somethings right, like basic fieldcraft but in other areas the Ukrainians know more than we do.  Even in defensive works, the West has not really done trenches and bunkers like this for some time. And then there are technical trades: gunners, teams/crews, drivers, maintenance etc.  What is an “acceptable” standard for them?  The answer is really “whatever it can be, as fast as it can be” when units are reporting 50% manning on the front line.

So I think we have internet rumours and expectations management issues but that does not solve the core problem - Russians are still signing up for $$$. Ukrainians are having trouble finding people.  Both sides are receiving poor training - I would argue the Russians are worse than the UA but that is just a sense really.  We have poured billions into this war, set up training systems in other nations, trained 10s of thousands of Ukrainian troops…and still Ukraine is having trouble finding young people to fight for their nation’s existence.

So, no, I do not think that this is all somehow the lack of Western training supports fault - which is where your argument is taking things. There is something else going on here. Or there is not and stories of Ukraine reticence are overblown for effect. The bottom line is that the West can supply a lot for this war, but a will to fight is not on that list. If a young man or woman is watching their home nation being mauled by a foreign invader, the first question he/she should not be asking is “hmm, well I want to fight but is my training really going to be good enough?”  War is not a shopping exercise.

We talk a lot about Russian cracks and creaking.  For my ears this one is the one to watch for Ukraine. I am not of the same mind as Zeleban (or whatever iteration he calls himself), all is not lost and we should sue for surrender. But the UA will not be anywhere near able to conduct offensive operations if that nation is nearing an exhaustion point.  They can likely continue to conduct effective defence and denial, even to the point of exhaustion for the RA, but retaking ground is an expensive business. So what?  Well maximalist metrics and viewpoints are going to suffer greatly in the next year or so unless Ukraine can find a way to fill those ranks. We very may well have to accept a lesser victory if people in Ukraine do not keep stepping up.

I wouldn't say lack of Western training support is "at fault", more like NATO knows how to train and maintain a modern fighting force vs whatever Russia does and what Ukraine does, and Ukrainians are aware of what works and what doesn't.

As the article I linked notes, Ukrainian commanders are reporting lack of basic training, including familiarity with weapons, firing, many not having fired any ammo in training.

A training instructor at a center reported only 20 bullets per trainee and no grenades or grenade launchers.

One of the links you posted, the Congressional report, notes

Quote

According to the Department of Defense, since 2022, U.S. and allied nations have trained more than 123,000 UAF soldiers.

At the time of the invasion, Ukraine did not have a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, which it previously had been seeking to develop along NATO standards. Due to the high number of trained veterans, many with combat experience, there was less of a need for an NCO corps to train new recruits. Losses among these veterans have increased the importance of developing a professional NCO corps.

Additionally, the UAF reportedly struggles to train officers for staff positions to assist commanders in managing and coordinating operations. The lack of trained staff officers has in some cases led to higher-level command staff coordinating and managing tactical operations, leading to centralized and slower decisionmaking.

So sure the West has trained 122k in some form but the Ukrainian military went from its pre-invasion strength of 200k in total to a million today. We can definitely do more training and expansion in Europe to meet demand.

[cesmonkey]

On 6/23/2024 at 6:40 AM, Carolus said:

If South Korea and Japan join NATO because of Ukraine, Xi will strangulate Putin in his sleep.

(won't happen but a funny thought)

 

[kimbosbread]

As long as Ukraine can take out Russian refinieries and substations and rail infra, Ukraine can win.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

So sure the West has trained 122k in some form but the Ukrainian military went from its pre-invasion strength of 200k in total to a million today. We can definitely do more training and expansion in Europe to meet demand

I am going to put aside the baffling pre-war decisions from both NATO and Ukraine on force readiness and posture - needless to say, mistakes were made.

Can we do more? Sure, we can always "do more". However, 122k troops in two years is a lot of training effort.  No NATO nation is really set up to train up a million troops in quick order on basics, let alone more complex technical trades.

I am sure we could expand, but again this does not address the fundamental point of "shrinking demand." Ultimately Ukraine's force generation is their responsibility.  We have gone some way to shift our training based on feedback coming from the theatre, more needs to be done.

One cannot point out the shortfalls in UA manning and not address all the issues, particularly those in Ukraine's areas of responsibility - bolstering morale, legal mechanisms, pay and benefit policy, training and doctrine.  The issue of poor UA manning is not simply - "Hey NATO do more training!"

Edited Monday at 05:13 PM by The_Capt

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://www.reddit.com/r/DroneCombat/comments/1dn957y/ua_28th_mechanized_brigades_kurt_and_company/

 

The B in BMP stands for BOMB!

Quote

 

https://www.reddit.com/r/DroneCombat/comments/1dnfl9g/ua_main_directorate_of_intelligence_hur_special/

https://www.reddit.com/r/DroneCombat/comments/1dna53l/ua_93rd_mechanized_brigades_signum_drone_team/

 

 

Two excellent vids of drones hunting trucks, day and night.

[FancyCat]

49 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

One cannot point out the shortfalls in UA manning and not address all the issues, particularly those in Ukraine's areas of responsibility - bolstering morale, legal mechanisms, pay and benefit policy, training and doctrine.  The issue of poor UA manning is not simply - "Hey NATO do more training!"

Of course, all true, just important to note reassurances like expanding training of NCOs in the UKR military alongside staff officers, expansion of basic training training in Europe, require not just Ukrainian PR to get out to the public in Ukraine, but the required buy-in from NATO countries, but have the effect of reassuring a worried UKR public that Soviet doctrine is fading out. i've seen floating around reasons for having Western trainers return to Western Ukraine I suppose Lviv, be based not on escalation but on the ability for Ukraine to move personnel for training in Western Ukraine, train then come back to the front, and allowing Western trainers to more readily be able to defuse the learning of the personnel than from Poland or Germany. 

General Sodol has been sacked.

Quote

Yuri Sodol, a Ukrainian general who was accused by Bohdan Krotevych (and others) of "killing more Ukrainian soldiers than any Russian" through incompetence and the use of "meat assaults" has been sacked by Zelensky. He will be replaced by Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov.

Sodol was extremely unpopular amongst the ZSU's rank and file; soldiers have been grumbling about him for quite a while. Once Bohdan Krotevych - the extremely well respected commander of the Azov Brigade - denounced him publicly, his position had probably become untenable.

 

[The_Capt]

1 minute ago, FancyCat said:

Of course, all true, just important to note reassurances like expanding training of NCOs in the UKR military alongside staff officers, expansion of basic training training in Europe, require not just Ukrainian PR to get out to the public in Ukraine, but the required buy-in from NATO countries, but have the effect of reassuring a worried UKR public that Soviet doctrine is fading out.

So here is the thing...I am not sure Soviet doctrine is all bad in this particular war.  We in the West assume it so and lay all sorts of poor performance on it's doorstep but I think we are woefully blind to the realities of this war.  Why?  Because we have not come close to fighting one like this since 194-1918. Only the Soviets in WW2 faced this sort of warfare - we did not even come close, and here I speak of attrition and exhaustion at national levels.

So expanding training to meet some sort of western standards makes the very large assumption that our system is better, or that it will even work. Both sides are spending lives at a frightening rate in this war. The UA less so, but still higher than anything we have seen in so short a time since at least WW2. Russia is off the map.

So What? Well militaries are organisms that must adapt to the environment or die. War is straight up Darwinism. The loss rates are so high that force generation calculus must shift.  There is nothing to be gained by investing months of training into soldiers whose life expectancies are measured in days, weeks at best. Mission command is great so long as one has a highly trained junior officer and NCO corps. If the war is so intense that sustainment of these key groups becomes untenable then centralized, industrial Soviet style C2 starts to make a lot more sense. 

I know people training UA in Poland and they are seeing this exact pressure. Overinvestment can be just as harmful as underinvestment.  The harsh calculus of this war is that offensive mass as we knew it is dead, but that does not mean we still do not see mass dying.  It takes 10-15 years to train a professional Snr NCO and field grade officer to a point where mission command and western style works...and in this war it takes a second to kill them at speeds that neither we nor the Ukrainians can sustain at that standard.

 This is not a cry for "Ukrainian meat assaults", far from it. But it is a recognition that both sides are likely pulling from Soviet force generation and C2 doctrine for a reason. And I strongly suspect the reason is straight up burn rates. Attrition like this creates a race to the bottom and we are seeing it unfold everyday on this thread. We are at the point in this war that neither side can afford to fight like the West, in form or function. We wouldn't be able to either if we were in either sides shoes.

[Carolus]

I wonder about the Ukranian targeting lists and how much allies have a say in it. I will just rant away a bit about it. Dont worry, I won't do it again.

"Tactical "Targets:

- infantry

Generally worthwhile targets, even though no real shortage on the Russian side is likely, especially since most recruits seem to be unskilled labor with little or no benefit to the Russian economy. And Putin can just print money to cover the hiring fees for whoever can be found to sign in Asia or Africa. A lot of men with questionable upbringing and little economic perspectives on these continents, so quasi unlimited.

-armored vehicles: tanks, APCs, IFVs

Russia still has deep soviet-era reserves and refurbishes its old stocks at a rate that seems to keep up enough to enable (slow, limited) offensive actions. Can still last for years and years.

- helicopters

Rarely seen, rarely hit. Russia won't run out in the foreseeable time, but usefulness of helicopters also seems limited.

- artillery

The only actual heel where a shortage might manifest with tangible effects within 12 months, unless Putin manages to strike a deal and finds new suppliers of a lot of tubes and SPGs. Not easy for him, but also not impossible.

"Operational" targets:

- fixed wing drones

Losing these seems to really hurt, but there seems to be no true antidote yet. FPV interceptors still seem to be in the "prototype" phase. Interesting field if tech gets better here.

- SAM vehicles

Most strikes seem to have destroyed or damaged S300 or S400 launchers, of which Russia has hundreds. Seem to be only a temporary inconvenience for Russia. Radar and command vehicles are more worthwhile, but the number of losses seems to be single digits. Not enough for true frontline impact.

- fixed wing fighter aircraft 

Seem to be a major pain due to sheer unlimited glide bombs.

While Russia still has a large stock, both of machines and low quality pilots, building them is extremely slow, so every loss hurts.

Definitely a priority target, but most airfields are taboo for Western weapons.

- fixed wing special aircraft 

Long range radar craft and such. Extremely rare and always worthwhile targets, with likely direct benefits for Ukrainian operations 

- Marine Vessels

Ukraine can only strike within the Black Sea, would be more interesting to sink weapon and ammo freighters, but those are out of reach. Direct frontline impact of taking out the BSF is low, but taking out missile carriers reduces infrastructure damages and terror strikes.

- ammo dumps

Russians seem to have largely dispersed their ammunition dumps. Occasionally a strike is reported, but rare. It does not seem like it is a lever that can bring tangible effects

Strategic targets:

- ammunition factories

Seem to be untouchable, maybe a sabotage act here and there

- military vehicle factories

Seem to be untouchable, maybe a sabotage act here and there

- airfields

Seems to be mostly out of range and seem to be increasingly well-guarded against drones

- oil refineries and depots

Many refineries have reserve capacities which they can scale up to make up for damaged segments or other damaged refineries. No significant effects yet. but may become a lever in the future

- locomotives and rolling stock cars

Seem to be very hard to hit and/or very hard to destroy and Russia has thousands. The ball bearing shortage for heavy duty applications does not seem to have materialized into a tangible reduced efficiency of the railway system yet.  Russia is extremely good at repairing and laying rail.

- Electric substations

Huge, huge benefits from targeting these, but Ukraine just won't do it. Extremely hard to replace for Russia. Rather vulnerable structures, too.

Maybe Western allies asked Ukraine to spare these to a) reduce impact on Russian civilians b) reduce impact on Russian industry so sales and exports don't dry up for the West.

 

My amateur assessment for best impact for Ukraine:

- Tactical targets to stabilize the frontline are numerous every day and have to continue to hold the line; artillery should be a focus whenever possible, but this is mostly to secure the stalemate. Don't let the stalemate run through your fingers or the international mood will turn sour and funding will begin to trickle out

- As much PATRIOT shoot-and-scoot as possible; hurting the Russian airforce helps in the long run and possibly even in the short run

- SEAD/DEAD: I wish I could believe that this will have a tangible effect, but I think the air denial bubble (not concenring small UAVs) will continue to be in effect. F-16s are just tools to hold the line in the air stalemate, not something that will offer much new capability to Ukraine.

- Oil refinery strikes: if they are regularly continued a tangible effect may materialize in the future but not in the short term. 

- Rolling stock: seems to be hard to take out and Russia still has tons. Direct strikes seem inadvisable unless Ukraine finds a real "train killer" drone and uses it en masse. But I don't think that will happen.

- Electric substations: Someone press Syrskyi's face against a map of the Russian power grid, for the love of Mars and Ares. It affects everything. Regime stability, industrial output, logistics, railway, economy, morale, 3D printers for FPV drones. Everything. That is also most likely why these things are taboo, though. The potential civilian impact and crushing Russia's nuts too hard too quickly. There be dragons.

Edited Monday at 06:59 PM by Carolus
typos

[Eddy]

https://mastodon.social/@MAKS23/112673396499245278

Quote

Russian resources hint at the "shooting down" of an American reconnaissance UAV in the Black Sea…

[Centurian52]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

After the costly summer offensive of 2023, I think it is wise for Ukraine to maintain a defensive posture. 

There are plenty of signs that Russia can not afford a "forever war" at this level of activity.  Yet currently they are nowhere near close to achieving even the most basic of Putin's stated war aims (full occupation of the Donbas).  Logically, reducing their level of offensive activity means a reduction in what they can expect to get from this war.  So far, anyway, Putin has shown absolutely no interest in reducing his war aims and that means that Russia will have to continue with a similar level of investment.  And then we're back to how long Russia can maintain that without breaking.

On the other hand, Ukraine's ground strategy of letting the Russians come to them is a viable way to defeat Russia.  Add to this Russia's inability to protect large, expensive, and difficult to replace assets/infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes, it's very obvious that Russia can't absorb the totality of the costs forever as it could the 2015-2022 situation.

All the while this is going on there's the cumulative weight of sanctions and trade restrictions on the Russian economy playing into Russia's ability to continue the war "as is".

I've been saying this since the start of the war and, despite Ukraine's manpower issues, I will keep saying... time is on Ukraine's side.

Steve

I agree that it's probably wise for Ukraine to maintain a defensive posture for the time being. But I think a defensive posture needs to be temporary. Sooner or later I think they're going to want to go back over to the offensive. The Russians certainly can't maintain this tempo of operations forever. But as long as they have the initiative they get to decide how intense the fighting is. When they start approaching a point of exhaustion where they can no longer maintain the current intensity, they have the option of ratcheting down the intensity of the fighting until it is something they can maintain. If the Ukrainians are going to push them over the point of collapse, they have to go onto the offensive eventually. I know of no examples of anyone ever winning a war without attacking.

But the Ukrainians have a lot of options when it comes to how and when to attack. There certainly doesn't seem to be much need to attack right now, as long as the Russians are willing to continue sending large numbers of their troops into the teeth of Ukrainian defenses. When it does come time to attack I suspect a 1918* style nibbling away at vulnerable chunks of the line, with lateral exploitation of success along the length of the line, might be a more effective way to conduct an offensive in the current environment then another attempt at a 1939-41 style rapid breakthrough and deep exploitation into the enemy's rear. Though the situation may have changed by the time Ukraine does go back over to the offensive.

I think a lot comes down to the enablers. Now that artillery ammunition is being supplied again I expect Ukraine should be (or will soon be) winning the counterbattery fight once more, like they were before the gap in aid. Russia was already down to its towed artillery, and there was only so much more of that left in storage the last time Covert Cabal bought satellite imagery of it. So it should be possible for Ukraine to grind out Russia's artillery advantage and achieve artillery superiority (say, over the next 1-2 years assuming no further gaps in aid). More Patriot batteries and the arrival of F16s sometime this year should help Ukraine contest the skies more effectively, especially if the US ever gets around to lifting restrictions on the use of US provided weapons against Russian territory and airspace. My understanding is that the pledged F16s so far won't be enough for Ukraine to win complete dominance of the skies. But they might be able to achieve something close to air parity if just a few dozen more F16s (or similar western aircraft) are pledged in the coming year or so. If Ukraine can achieve artillery superiority and air parity I think liberating all of their occupied territory starts to become a lot more achievable.

*Edit: I should clarify that by a 1918 style offensive I'm referring to the Entente Hundred Days offensives, not the German Spring Offensive. So limited-objective attacks with lateral exploitation. Not attempts to penetrate the enemy line with exploitation in-depth.

Edited Monday at 08:35 PM by Centurian52

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, Centurian52 said:

I agree that it's probably wise for Ukraine to maintain a defensive posture for the time being. But I think a defensive posture needs to be temporary.

Why?

Let’s say Ukraine wipes out every substation, refinery, oil storage facility within 500km of their border. None of these things are easy to repair or replace. Russia will stop functioning as a state.

[Centurian52]

3 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Why?

Let’s say Ukraine wipes out every substation, refinery, oil storage facility within 500km of their border. None of these things are easy to repair or replace. Russia will stop functioning as a state.

Hoping that destroying Russia's strategic infrastructure will cause it to collapse sounds to me a lot like hoping that strategic bombing alone would win WW2. It didn't work in WW2, and there's no reason to assume it would work now. Destroying the enemy's strategic infrastructure will make them extremely vulnerable. But you still need to attack on the ground in order to exploit that vulnerability.

The stresses of this war might cause the Russian state to collapse. But that's not something we can count on. Frankly it's not entirely clear what it takes to make a state collapse. States seem to regularly hold out when we think they should collapse, or collapse when we think they should hold out. Even if the Russian state does collapse, that still leaves a bunch of stateless troops occupying Ukrainian territory. Those troops will still need to be evicted. They should be easy to evict at that point, since they should be severely demoralized and won't be backed up by the recruitment or logistics infrastructure of a state. But they don't just automatically vanish.

[Fenris]

20 hours ago, danfrodo said:

Very interesting, thanks for sharing this.  8 years pay is quite the enticement.  Of course, once the poor sucker is killed, I bet Putin rarely pays or only pays a fraction.  

On this topic, this clip came out overnight and is doing the rounds.  At first I saw it on UKR twitter feed and didn't understand what it was about.  It's now popped up on english tweeters.  Seems pretty awful, almost too awful so could be propaganda.

Quote

Russian serviceman and blogger Guzenko ("13th") shares a video from a “pigsty” in which wounded and untreated Russian military personnel are kept, from whom “disabled” regiments are formed. However, Guzenko himself describes what is happening in vivid colors - just read his comment:

"Everything that the presidential administration media tells you from TV is complete bull****.

This is the true attitude towards soldiers by the command.

They keep everyone like cattle, the wounded, the untreated, the mobikss, the contractors, for many things - for example, for sending some faggot major Kovalev to go **** himself, or for something else, and they make “disabled” regiments out of them, and do you know why? Yes, because there are NOT ENOUGH PEOPLE! HELLO!

ANNOUNCE MOBILIZATION! LET GO HOME THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN FIGHTING FOR YOU FOR TWO ****ING YEARS, BITCHES.

Granpais simply afraid to announce mobilization, so that the people will not know for sure what you are really doing there.

This is a natural PURGATORY!

PUT YOUR CHILDREN THERE YOU ****ING ****ING ****ERS!

The coordinates of this place, all the information was passed on to the military prosecutor and department employees who will turn those responsible for this nonsense inside out.

And this is not all, so you understand."

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

Hoping that destroying Russia's strategic infrastructure will cause it to collapse sounds to me a lot like hoping that strategic bombing alone would win WW2. It didn't work in WW2, and there's no reason to assume it would work now. Destroying the enemy's strategic infrastructure will make them extremely vulnerable. But you still need to attack on the ground in order to exploit that vulnerability.

The stresses of this war might cause the Russian state to collapse. But that's not something we can count on. Frankly it's not entirely clear what it takes to make a state collapse. States seem to regularly hold out when we think they should collapse, or collapse when we think they should hold out. Even if the Russian state does collapse, that still leaves a bunch of stateless troops occupying Ukrainian territory. Those troops will still need to be evicted. They should be easy to evict at that point, since they should be severely demoralized and won't be backed up by the recruitment or logistics infrastructure of a state. But they don't just automatically vanish.

For sure conducting some sort of large scale ground offensive to liberate it's terrain is the most assured way of regaining the occupied lands.  Waiting for Russia to implode or sue for peace are less assured.  Theoretically.

In reality Russia has shown that it can use its superior scale of resources (including a compliant populace) to thwart any significant moves on the battlefield.  They can too easily make advances too costly, especially in light of Ukraine's manpower limitations.  This is not to say that Ukraine can't come out ahead from an actuarial standpoint (I believe they did in the 2024 offensive), but not ahead in terms of gaining significant ground while Russia is still a cohesive state willing to continue investing in the war.

Soooo... the best thing for Ukraine to do is stay on the defensive and build up an offensive force (including manned aircraft) to, at a minimum, counter attack any significant offensive moves made by Russia.  Then, hopefully, something will happen that will open up some sort of opportunity.  Given the vast amounts of defenses Russia has prepared, it would have to be a fairly significant and prolonged military collapse on Russia's side for the opportunity to be realistically exploitable.

 

Now, back to the point you made in your previous post and reinforced with your second one.  We have NO IDEA what it might take to get Russia to collapse economically.  There's a lot of near failed states that somehow seem to hold on, with Venezuela being a more recent example.  However, traditionally many of history's dead-economies-walking examples were probably only possible because of the patronage of the Soviet Union/Russia and/or China.  We've talked about who can keep Russia propped up and we're not sure that there is anybody.  Even China seems to be averse to sinking its resources into Russia.  In fact, China seems to be kinda predatory.

Even if Russia doesn't collapse, it is going to find it harder and harder to keep the war going.  Since it requires offensive activities to fulfill it's goals, this is a very important point to consider.  Sure, Russia can just say "we're done and we're going to just sit with what we have", but I'm not sure if that's viable.  Ukraine isn't likely going to stop blowing stuff up just because Russia wants them to.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://x.com/JohnLiniger/status/1805256235232510321/photo/1

 

 

[Carolus]

Assange reached a plea deal. I heard people say this might be the result of him providing information to the DoJ and could result in something that helps against some of the Russian information warfare that is going on in the West. 

Obviously this is thread is mainly about the hard conflict on the ground and I don't want to derail it, but the hybrid warfare of Russia is affecting the ground war too, since it can modify Western support for Ukraine. 

Politics and war are unfortunately tied together (but no one should talk too much about politics, of course).

Edited Tuesday at 06:19 AM by Carolus