How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

18 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Then in 1991 we had one of the largest confirmation bias events in military history.  We looked at the Gulf War and said “the system works!”  While conveniently missing the fact that the Gulf War was not a peer-on-peer conflict.  We beat up a one eyed goat with developmental challenges and went “see, now let’s spend another few trillion on this stuff.”

And then when we saw weird stuff happening in places like Chechnya, Nagorno Karbak, and Ukraine…we went “silly Soviet doctrine”.

Oh, and there's way more than that.  You're just being too kind   The Vietnam War showed that tanks aren't very useful for some environments.  I didn't say useless, just not useful.  The pro-tank people excused the lack of general utility by pointing at a handful of cherry picked examples where they were used effectively and concluding "the tank has limitations, but still has a role to play".  Sure, and the water boy has a role to play in the success of a sports team in a grueling final match against a tough opponent.  But does one cater the bulk of the roster and team resources to supporting that water boy?  No.

Then we get to the armed conflicts we've had since the 1970s that were not either version of the Gulf War.  How useful was the tank in the Falklands?  How about Panama?  No shows in both.  How well did they perform against Hezbollah in Lebanon?  Pick any conflict in Africa and wonder how tanks would have changed the course of any of those conflicts had they been employed NATO style.

Added to this is the lessons taken from Kosovo.  The tank performed so poorly there as a weapons system that we wound up with an entirely new (for the US) class of brigades; Stryker Brigade (aka Medium).  This was a rare instance of the US military recognizing something had to be done about the tank's limitations, yet not addressing the tank's limitations.  The Stryker was always conceived of as an additional capability and yet the pro-heavy (tank and tracked IFV) supporters freaked out and circled their heavy tracked wagons.

The two biggest wars that the US has been involved in since Vietnam were OIF and Afghanistan.  The tank played a big role in only one of them.  For that war, OIF, the question of "was the tank even necessary?" isn't talked about much.  Yes, we know the tank was there and it contributed to the successful conclusion.  But how much?  Was there another system that could have performed the same role?  Is there a chance that the substitute would have done better?  Maybe even cheaper?  My feeling is that OIF's opening phase would have been almost the same if Strykers had been around, Humvees armored, and probably some more Brads.  Tanks were mostly useful because they were there, not because they needed to be there.

As a long time tank lover, the conclusion I've come to a while ago is that the tank is a niche platform when the full range of conflicts are considered.  More recently I've questioned how big the niche is and if something else could work better.  This war, the sort of niche I was thinking of back in 2022, seems to suggest it's a lot smaller than I imagined it to be.  Perhaps to the point where there really isn't one worth supporting.

Steve

[The_Capt]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Oh, and there's way more than that.  You're just being too kind   The Vietnam War showed that tanks aren't very useful for some environments.  I didn't say useless, just not useful.  The pro-tank people excused the lack of general utility by pointing at a handful of cherry picked examples where they were used effectively and concluding "the tank has limitations, but still has a role to play".  Sure, and the water boy has a role to play in the success of a sports team in a grueling final match against a tough opponent.  But does one cater the bulk of the roster and team resources to supporting that water boy?  No.

Then we get to the armed conflicts we've had since the 1970s that were not either version of the Gulf War.  How useful was the tank in the Falklands?  How about Panama?  No shows in both.  How well did they perform against Hezbollah in Lebanon?  Pick any conflict in Africa and wonder how tanks would have changed the course of any of those conflicts had they been employed NATO style.

Added to this is the lessons taken from Kosovo.  The tank performed so poorly there as a weapons system that we wound up with an entirely new (for the US) class of brigades; Stryker Brigade (aka Medium).  This was a rare instance of the US military recognizing something had to be done about the tank's limitations, yet not addressing the tank's limitations.  The Stryker was always conceived of as an additional capability and yet the pro-heavy (tank and tracked IFV) supporters freaked out and circled their heavy tracked wagons.

The two biggest wars that the US has been involved in since Vietnam were OIF and Afghanistan.  The tank played a big role in only one of them.  For that war, OIF, the question of "was the tank even necessary?" isn't talked about much.  Yes, we know the tank was there and it contributed to the successful conclusion.  But how much?  Was there another system that could have performed the same role?  Is there a chance that the substitute would have done better?  Maybe even cheaper?  My feeling is that OIF's opening phase would have been almost the same if Strykers had been around, Humvees armored, and probably some more Brads.  Tanks were mostly useful because they were there, not because they needed to be there.

As a long time tank lover, the conclusion I've come to a while ago is that the tank is a niche platform when the full range of conflicts are considered.  More recently I've questioned how big the niche is and if something else could work better.  This war, the sort of niche I was thinking of back in 2022, seems to suggest it's a lot smaller than I imagined it to be.  Perhaps to the point where there really isn't one worth supporting.

Steve

Very good points.  I can recall some of these debates as a young (and svelter) sprog back in the day.  Add to this, the Former Yugoslavia where tanks played a supporting mobile gun role at best. The answer was “Well those are not real wars.  In a real war you will see.”  Well I think can all agree that this is a “real” war.  Further it is a war on terrain tailor made for mechanized warfare.  Most of our western tanks were originally designed to fight other tanks on terrain nearly identical to what we see in Southern Ukraine - seriously, bust out Google Maps and take a look at the rolling open countryside.

Military folks are a pretty conservative bunch, led by the most conservative of them - old men.  So it is not surprising that we see a lot of caution and skepticism.  I think it is healthy to be honest.  But while I have written pages on where this thing looks like it may be going, I am straining to find a role for heavy going forward.  “Hard-points”, ok but that is still HE in the right location that is currently being delivered well by other systems.  “Breakout”, ok, but why not go lighter and faster? If I need a drone swarm to setup for breakout…why push heavy metal up?  Why not keep pushing with the swarm.  “Combined arms” sure, but I suspect that we are looking at the emergence of a new combined arms.  “It will rebalance.”  Ok, but that is really a ‘hope’ statement without any real evidence to back it up.

The battleship was pushed into a shore bombardment role and then eventually got broken up between aircraft, subs and missile cruisers. I suspect the tank is going to go through the same sort of evolution.  Yes, people have said the tank was obsolete before…but here is the thing, one day they will be right.  So is today that day?

[hcrof]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Oh, and there's way more than that.  You're just being too kind   The Vietnam War showed that tanks aren't very useful for some environments.  I didn't say useless, just not useful.  The pro-tank people excused the lack of general utility by pointing at a handful of cherry picked examples where they were used effectively and concluding "the tank has limitations, but still has a role to play".  Sure, and the water boy has a role to play in the success of a sports team in a grueling final match against a tough opponent.  But does one cater the bulk of the roster and team resources to supporting that water boy?  No.

Then we get to the armed conflicts we've had since the 1970s that were not either version of the Gulf War.  How useful was the tank in the Falklands?  How about Panama?  No shows in both.  How well did they perform against Hezbollah in Lebanon?  Pick any conflict in Africa and wonder how tanks would have changed the course of any of those conflicts had they been employed NATO style.

Added to this is the lessons taken from Kosovo.  The tank performed so poorly there as a weapons system that we wound up with an entirely new (for the US) class of brigades; Stryker Brigade (aka Medium).  This was a rare instance of the US military recognizing something had to be done about the tank's limitations, yet not addressing the tank's limitations.  The Stryker was always conceived of as an additional capability and yet the pro-heavy (tank and tracked IFV) supporters freaked out and circled their heavy tracked wagons.

The two biggest wars that the US has been involved in since Vietnam were OIF and Afghanistan.  The tank played a big role in only one of them.  For that war, OIF, the question of "was the tank even necessary?" isn't talked about much.  Yes, we know the tank was there and it contributed to the successful conclusion.  But how much?  Was there another system that could have performed the same role?  Is there a chance that the substitute would have done better?  Maybe even cheaper?  My feeling is that OIF's opening phase would have been almost the same if Strykers had been around, Humvees armored, and probably some more Brads.  Tanks were mostly useful because they were there, not because they needed to be there.

As a long time tank lover, the conclusion I've come to a while ago is that the tank is a niche platform when the full range of conflicts are considered.  More recently I've questioned how big the niche is and if something else could work better.  This war, the sort of niche I was thinking of back in 2022, seems to suggest it's a lot smaller than I imagined it to be.  Perhaps to the point where there really isn't one worth supporting.

Steve

One big post-1973 war that involved thousands of tanks was the Iran-Iraq war. Does anyone know how tanks performed then? I know there was criticism that "they weren't using them right" but I just don't know the details. 

[kimbosbread]

14 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I think we need to bear in mind something pretty important, in that we are suffering from an acute reporting bias when it comes to FPV usage on tanks, and tank losses overall. (This notion extends to drone footage and use in general really)

For FPV drones, we typically only see successful strikes posted, we dont tend to see the many many many misses, poor angled attacks, EWAR casualties or simply hits that fail to inflict major damage.
…
Secondly, often we see FPV strikes on vehicles already disabled, typically by mines or other means. FPVs make an excellent 'finisher'
…
I suspect most are knocked out by more traditional methods such as mines and ATGM / RPG / shoulder launchers.

I think that’s totally fair. FPV drones by their very nature are the most media-friendly weapon ever designed, and there’s certainly massive selection bias due to this. However, the reports you read from the front are that drones are a huge problem, and are forcing troops to walk to the front on both sides because vehicles have a high chance of getting destroyed because of the proliferation and range of the damn things.

14 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

There is also the issue of 'latency'. FPV drones typically have a 'call in time' for the drone unit to be alerted, drone prepared and launched and then led to its target. All of this takes precious time, enough time for vehicles to potentially make an assault or for a target to escape. This is one thing that more traditional anti tank methods have an advantage with in comparison. Your NLAW operator can fight a tank straight away from his trench, FPV support like any external support is not guaranteed nor is it likely to be timely all the time.

There is some latency, but that’s honestly least concern because there always some to be another observation drone up in the sky, and that will let you see the vehicles approaching say 15 minutes before, and your drone latency is 5 minutes, and the vehicles will only be able to fire in the last 5 minutes LOS. Obviously that’s hand wavy, but ISR is what allows the drones to efficiently be dispatched, and ISR is the thing (to me) that makes the tank dead when combined with cheap weapons.

14 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Furthermore, we have clear evidence that adaptions can and will be made against FPV drones. Drone cages have proven effective both against FPV and heavier drones such as lancet, and are a minimal cost modification that do not compromise the effectiveness of tanks. ERA has also proven effective (Ill try and dig up that notable photo of a UA tank that survived a lancet hit which set off a Kontact-1 block on the turret) Obviously future tanks will have to be designed to deal with the changing battlefield dynamic, but its telling that tanks made in the cold war can put up reasonable well with things despite the myriad of threats.

Yeah, but most FPV drones are COTS with an RPG warhead or a brick of HE. You start putting a Javelin warhead (ie Switchblade 600) and I suspect things look different. That said, plastering a robust vehicle with ERA is certainly a mitigation, and I think passive measures like these are much better bang for the buck than APS.

14 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

At the end of the day, nothing beats being able to pull up a 120mm gun rapidly to a position, destroy a target and make off while the majority of threats on the battlefield (shrapnel, small arms and lighter AT systems) are less of a threat to you in turn. I do not see that changing anytime soon. 

As I’ve almost certainly said in the last few hundred pages, I have two points of disagreement:

• 120mm gun with LOS
• Rapidly to position

The former I think replaced with a NLOS option, say a breech-loading mortar or mini howizter is more flexible. You still get the direct fire option, but you also signficantly extend your range and use cases, particularly around quickly delivering precision munitions.

The latter is the real killer for all future weapons systems: What is the probability of survival while you get to position and deliver whatever effect you are trying to deliver? You have a big noisy hot target you need to get to within LOS of a target, and there is ISR everywhere.

EDIT: TLDR persistent ISR combined with cheap, flexible weapons makes tanks obsolete in terms of $$$ for boom

Edited May 30 by kimbosbread

[ArmouredTopHat]

9 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Again, here is the thing…maybe they were.  We never tested our c-ATGM doctrines beyond exercises in Europe…and shockingly the mighty tank (we had spent billions on) was still relevant.  Much like the lessons observed in the wars leading up to WW1 we basically ignored stuff that did not fit our model.  If that model was never truly tested, and it wasn’t, then one cannot simply say “ well tanks were relevant because we kept using them”.  I mean, sure, human history of warfare is not full of examples of us hanging onto military capability well past its expiry date…he says reading about cavalry wearing shiny armor in WW1.

And then there is the inconvenient fact that ATGM technology developed a lot in the last 50 years while the tank really hasn’t evolved that much.  We stuck on some better armor and a computer in the gun.  They also got larger, heavier and burn more gas.  APS was about the only major development and it is lagging ATGM capability, let alone drones.

Then in 1991 we had one of the largest confirmation bias events in military history.  We looked at the Gulf War and said “the system works!”  While conveniently missing the fact that the Gulf War was not a peer-on-peer conflict.  We beat up a one eyed goat with developmental challenges and went “see, now let’s spend another few trillion on this stuff.”

And then when we saw weird stuff happening in places like Chechnya, Nagorno Karbak, and Ukraine…we went “silly Soviet doctrine”.  So going all the way back to the last real peer on peer tank actions we see the major impact of small, smart and precise missiles and go “meh, Israel still won and we kept using them…so they must still work.”

Tanks may have been put on the endangered species list back in 1973 but we ignored it.  Here we are in 2024 watching all sorts of weird evidence over a two year period and the analysis is still. “Meh, Ukraine is winning enough…they must still work…we will keep using them.”  Probably the last thing Austro-Hungarian Cavalry said after shining their breast plates in 1914.

For me this war is an Ostfreisland moment, and frankly I think it is for most modern militaries.  And what happens next will likely follow the same pattern:

”The leadership of the US Navy, however, was outraged by Mitchell's handling of the tests; the 2,000 lb bombs had not been sanctioned by the Navy, which had set the rules for the engagement. Mitchell's bombers had also not allowed inspectors aboard the ship between bombing runs as stipulated by the Navy. The joint Army–Navy report on the tests, issued a month later and signed by General John J. Pershing, stated that "the battleship is still the backbone of the fleet."^[62] Mitchell wrote his own, contradictory account of the tests, which was then leaked to the press. The sinking of the battleship sparked great controversy in the American public sphere; Mitchell's supporters exaggerated the significance of the tests by falsely claiming Ostfriesland to be an unsinkable "super-battleship" and that "old sea dogs ... wept aloud."^[62] Senator William Borah argued that the tests had rendered battleships obsolete. Mitchell was widely supported in the press, though his increasingly combative tactics eventually resulted in a court-martial for insubordination that forced him to retire from the military.^[63]”

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMS_Ostfriesland

I would wait and see how other militaries respond in the next twenty years before making any decided conclusions. For now it seems everyone still wants tanks, though of course it could just be everyone playing catch-up. Some nations are going utterly tank crazy for instance (Poland with its massive K2 orders)

A note on tank evolution. I would argue it has evolved significant since the second world war in pretty much all aspects, even if it might just be a perfection of an established concept. Major factors would be stabilisation systems, sophisticated firepower and protection, ergonomics, situational awareness ect. As modern warfare has evolved so has the tank.

I mentioned it before but typically infantry are -terrified- of tanks, even with Javelins, NLAWs and now FPV drones littering the battlefield. (Reading up on accounts pre war and current war can be pretty harrowing) The fact of the matter is that when a tank has you in its sights, squishy infantry tend to get pulverised. Seen plenty of infantry say they prefer artillery fire to tanks simple because they at least get warning when artillery is shooting at them in comparison to tanks usually hitting them hard and fast. We have seen this frequently in Ukraine. In fact I would point out most successful pushes in Ukraine, no matter how small are usually achieved with clever use of vehicular support blasting the infantry in. Firepower is still key. Infantry only attacks have suffered perhaps even more heavily from artillery / FPV drones given their relative lack of speed onto target, which is a death sentence with the amount of ISR around on the battlefield. 
 

https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/12al6a4/ukrainian_t72_from_the_54th_mechanized_brigade/?utm_source=embedv2&utm_medium=post_embed&utm_content=post_body&embed_host_url=https://community.battlefront.com/index.php

Now, I think there is certainly an argument to be made that tanks will probably undergo a radical change in the far future. Automation or even drone tanks could very much be a thing, with tanks potentially becoming more of a munition to be expended than a a vehicle. I still think we are a long way off viable drone platforms as part of a unit (even with experimental use in Ukraine) 

[The_Capt]

“More than two-thirds of the Russian tanks that Ukraine’s military has destroyed in recent months have been taken out using first-person-view (FPV) drones, a NATO official told Foreign Policy, an increasing sign of Kyiv’s reliance on the unpiloted aircraft as it awaits more artillery ammunition from the United States and other Western countries. “

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/09/drones-russia-tanks-ukraine-war-fpv-artillery/#:~:text=More than two-thirds of,ammunition from the United States
 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/04/24/why-is-russia-losing-the-fpv-drone-war/?sh=4f97658572dc
 

https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/detailed_fpv_drone_usage_statistics_show_russias_starting_to_outpace_ukraine-9361.html

At some point we have to simply admit that this is not social media bias.  These are some big numbers being tossed around that match what we are seeing.  So either this is a really big misread or something else is going on.

 

 

[The_Capt]

24 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I mentioned it before but typically infantry are -terrified- of tanks, even with Javelins, NLAWs and now FPV drones littering the battlefield. (Reading up on accounts pre war and current war can be pretty harrowing) The fact of the matter is that when a tank has you in its sights, squishy infantry tend to get pulverised. Seen plenty of infantry say they prefer artillery fire to tanks simple because they at least get warning when artillery is shooting at them in comparison to tanks usually hitting them hard and fast. We have seen this frequently in Ukraine. In fact I would point out most successful pushes in Ukraine, no matter how small are usually achieved with clever use of vehicular support blasting the infantry in. Firepower is still key. Infantry only attacks have suffered perhaps even more heavily from artillery / FPV drones given their relative lack of speed onto target, which is a death sentence with the amount of ISR around on the battlefield.

I really need to see some evidence of infantry saying they “prefer artillery to tank fire.”  That sounds very anecdotal.  Given the levels of artillery fire in some sectors I would argue far more infantry have never even seen a tank in this war but just about everyone has come under artillery fire.  Artillery fire does not give you as much warning as Hollywood would portray.  Single salvos do give a second or two but the ripping sound gets lost pretty fast when a continuous bombardment kicks in.  Artillery also has a grinding effect over hours, days weeks.  You lose sleep, never given time to recover…it is what they mean by shell shock.

I have never been under tank fire.  I am sure it is terrifying and has a very personal feel.  But so does any direct fire (which I have familiarity with).  Someone trying to kill you with an HMG is not particularly easier.  I am sure a 30mm coming at me would give the same effect.  But right now Russian soldiers are terrified of FPVs and it would appear that UA armor are feeling the same way:

https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/29/europe/ukraine-war-us-tanks-intl/index.html

Finally, FPVs don’t need speed, they have persistence.  They are already on top of targets, all the time. They keep piling on until an area is denied.  But hey, this thing may be leaning but perhaps we simply need to wait and see. I suspect 2024 will be the year of the FPV and unmanned, in many ways it already it is. But what will 2025 hold?  Hopefully and end to this thing but we may see more developments.  I am not betting beer money on heavy mech making a come back but let’s wait and see.

Edit: just found this one, there is a lot out there on this.  Pretty good basic explainer. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/
 

 

Edited May 30 by The_Capt

[hcrof]

30 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I really need to see some evidence of infantry saying they “prefer artillery to tank fire.”  That sounds very anecdotal.  Given the levels of artillery fire in some sectors I would argue far more infantry have never even seen a tank in this war but just about everyone has come under artillery fire.  Artillery fire does not give you as much warning as Hollywood would portray.  Single salvos do give a second or two but the ripping sound gets lost pretty fast when a continuous bombardment kicks in.  Artillery also has a grinding effect over hours, days weeks.  You lose sleep, never given time to recover…it is what they mean by shell shock.

I have never been under tank fire.  I am sure it is terrifying and has a very personal feel.  But so does any direct fire (which I have familiarity with).  Someone trying to kill you with an HMG is not particularly easier.  I am sure a 30mm coming at me would give the same effect.  But right now Russian soldiers are terrified of FPVs and it would appear that UA armor are feeling the same way:

https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/29/europe/ukraine-war-us-tanks-intl/index.html

Finally, FPVs don’t need speed, they have persistence.  They are already on top of targets, all the time. They keep piling on until an area is denied.  But hey, this thing may be leaning but perhaps we simply need to wait and see. I suspect 2024 will be the year of the FPV and unmanned, in many ways it already it is. But what will 2025 hold?  Hopefully and end to this thing but we may see more developments.  I am not betting beer money on heavy mech making a come back but let’s wait and see.

Edit: just found this one, there is a lot out there on this.  Pretty good basic explainer. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/
 

 

Another aspect of drones that I think could be explored more is their suppressive effects. Infantry in a trench can potentially be suppressed for 20 minutes by a single drone buzzing overhead and you don't even need to expend ammunition! 

Denying the defence...

[ArmouredTopHat]

51 minutes ago, hcrof said:

Another aspect of drones that I think could be explored more is their suppressive effects. Infantry in a trench can potentially be suppressed for 20 minutes by a single drone buzzing overhead and you don't even need to expend ammunition! 

Denying the defence...

You could argue the same thing with conventional firepower over watching a position. I will concede that the buzzing sound of a drone overheard no doubt plays havoc with morale.

Edited May 30 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

“More than two-thirds of the Russian tanks that Ukraine’s military has destroyed in recent months have been taken out using first-person-view (FPV) drones, a NATO official told Foreign Policy, an increasing sign of Kyiv’s reliance on the unpiloted aircraft as it awaits more artillery ammunition from the United States and other Western countries. “

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/09/drones-russia-tanks-ukraine-war-fpv-artillery/#:~:text=More than two-thirds of,ammunition from the United States
 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/04/24/why-is-russia-losing-the-fpv-drone-war/?sh=4f97658572dc
 

https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/detailed_fpv_drone_usage_statistics_show_russias_starting_to_outpace_ukraine-9361.html

At some point we have to simply admit that this is not social media bias.  These are some big numbers being tossed around that match what we are seeing.  So either this is a really big misread or something else is going on.

 

 

This is very useful data indeed, though the article itself points out this is largely due to shortages of weapons that would otherwise be doing the job just fine. Said article also does make it clear that there are lots of misfires, misses and other issues that significantly reduce the hit rate. We also dont know how 'complete' the data is, due to other weapon systems not getting nearly as much media attention. 

That being said, it -is- significant that such a cost effective solution can supplement more traditional options and give what would otherwise be doomed light infantry a very potent means to defend themselves when twenty years ago they would be getting steamrolled. Its pretty obvious that Ukraine would be in a far more dire position without the innovative use of FPVs in the last couple of years. Russian armour would have almost certainly been able to do a lot more than what they are able to do currently. 

As I said before, I am not trying to disparage the very effective use of these drones on the battlefield, but like any weapons system, they are a cog in the machine and not the end all be all. 

 

Edited May 30 by ArmouredTopHat

[hcrof]

1 minute ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

You could argue the same thing with conventional firepower over watching a position. I will concede that the buzzing sound of a drone overheard no doubt plays havoc with morale.

Presumably the conventional overwatch needs to send a few rounds downrange from time to time to remind the enemy they are still there? And drones don't miss much if they spot you so I imagine the enemy will stay very quiet while the drone is overhead. And the drone is constantly changing view angle so to stay hidden you need to be deep in your hole...

[ArmouredTopHat]

Just now, hcrof said:

Presumably the conventional overwatch needs to send a few rounds downrange from time to time to remind the enemy they are still there? And drones don't miss much if they spot you so I imagine the enemy will stay very quiet while the drone is overhead. And the drone is constantly changing view angle so to stay hidden you need to be deep in your hole...

Its clear that for a pretty cheap cost (although FPVs dont tend to have a very significant loiter time) a drone can very much freeze a position, though again typically FPVs have a pre selected target from a spotting drone and they dont tend to hang around. Presumably due to things like EWAR being liable to snag them or simply running out of juice. 

There are certainly some disturbing tactical implications with using drones to keep a bottled up unit constantly awake and pinned in place until it exhausts them.

[Bearstronaut]

Here's a CNN report from today detailing extensive Russian torture and sexual violence in occupied Ukrainian territories. It's not an easy read. This is what Ukrainians have to look forward to if they give up. This is what other Eastern Europeans have to look forward to if we do not stand strong with NATO.

Survivors say Russia is waging a war of sexual violence in occupied areas of Ukraine. Men are often the victims | CNN

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I really need to see some evidence of infantry saying they “prefer artillery to tank fire.”  That sounds very anecdotal.  Given the levels of artillery fire in some sectors I would argue far more infantry have never even seen a tank in this war but just about everyone has come under artillery fire.  Artillery fire does not give you as much warning as Hollywood would portray.  Single salvos do give a second or two but the ripping sound gets lost pretty fast when a continuous bombardment kicks in.  Artillery also has a grinding effect over hours, days weeks.  You lose sleep, never given time to recover…it is what they mean by shell shock.

I have never been under tank fire.  I am sure it is terrifying and has a very personal feel.  But so does any direct fire (which I have familiarity with).  Someone trying to kill you with an HMG is not particularly easier.  I am sure a 30mm coming at me would give the same effect.  But right now Russian soldiers are terrified of FPVs and it would appear that UA armor are feeling the same way:

https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/29/europe/ukraine-war-us-tanks-intl/index.html

Finally, FPVs don’t need speed, they have persistence.  They are already on top of targets, all the time. They keep piling on until an area is denied.  But hey, this thing may be leaning but perhaps we simply need to wait and see. I suspect 2024 will be the year of the FPV and unmanned, in many ways it already it is. But what will 2025 hold?  Hopefully and end to this thing but we may see more developments.  I am not betting beer money on heavy mech making a come back but let’s wait and see.

Edit: just found this one, there is a lot out there on this.  Pretty good basic explainer. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/
 

 

I will admit that it very much is anecdotal. Being shot at in general is not very nice, but in at least a few accounts tanks are typically specifically referred to outside of mortars / drones ect. This might be for the reason that they can be very visually intimidating when under assault I suppose. 

On a side note, despite the dangers vehicles face on the battlefield, it is still -far- worse for the infantry, who have to deal with the drones just as much as the vehicles do if not more, while also being appallingly venerable to shrapnel, thermobaric and all the other nasty stuff present in this peer to peer large scale conflict. Vehicles do provide protection to a lot of battlefield elements and this is why they remain relevant more than anything. 

As for what the future holds, 2025 will be very interesting when Russian cold war stocks begin to run dry (Based on current loss rates) Who knows what happens then. 

[MikeyD]

It appears the game changer in the war was the US Switchblade kamakazi drone, but not in the way it was intended. I recall a report that the Ukrainians considered $600+ a shot to be much too expensive to deliver what was ostensibly a 40mm grenade round on-target. So they threw themselves into reproducing Switchblade's benefits at a fraction of the cost. That gave birth to 'drone warfare on the cheap', which is quite different from the TB2s and Orlans which had started the war.

[ArmouredTopHat]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Oh, and there's way more than that.  You're just being too kind   The Vietnam War showed that tanks aren't very useful for some environments.  I didn't say useless, just not useful.  The pro-tank people excused the lack of general utility by pointing at a handful of cherry picked examples where they were used effectively and concluding "the tank has limitations, but still has a role to play".  Sure, and the water boy has a role to play in the success of a sports team in a grueling final match against a tough opponent.  But does one cater the bulk of the roster and team resources to supporting that water boy?  No.

Then we get to the armed conflicts we've had since the 1970s that were not either version of the Gulf War.  How useful was the tank in the Falklands?  How about Panama?  No shows in both.  How well did they perform against Hezbollah in Lebanon?  Pick any conflict in Africa and wonder how tanks would have changed the course of any of those conflicts had they been employed NATO style.

Added to this is the lessons taken from Kosovo.  The tank performed so poorly there as a weapons system that we wound up with an entirely new (for the US) class of brigades; Stryker Brigade (aka Medium).  This was a rare instance of the US military recognizing something had to be done about the tank's limitations, yet not addressing the tank's limitations.  The Stryker was always conceived of as an additional capability and yet the pro-heavy (tank and tracked IFV) supporters freaked out and circled their heavy tracked wagons.

The two biggest wars that the US has been involved in since Vietnam were OIF and Afghanistan.  The tank played a big role in only one of them.  For that war, OIF, the question of "was the tank even necessary?" isn't talked about much.  Yes, we know the tank was there and it contributed to the successful conclusion.  But how much?  Was there another system that could have performed the same role?  Is there a chance that the substitute would have done better?  Maybe even cheaper?  My feeling is that OIF's opening phase would have been almost the same if Strykers had been around, Humvees armored, and probably some more Brads.  Tanks were mostly useful because they were there, not because they needed to be there.

As a long time tank lover, the conclusion I've come to a while ago is that the tank is a niche platform when the full range of conflicts are considered.  More recently I've questioned how big the niche is and if something else could work better.  This war, the sort of niche I was thinking of back in 2022, seems to suggest it's a lot smaller than I imagined it to be.  Perhaps to the point where there really isn't one worth supporting.

Steve

Whew, trying my best to keep up with everyone here.

https://murtiedjokobayu.medium.com/armored-warhorse-the-relevance-of-tanks-in-the-modern-battlefield-e13b0feaad74#:~:text=Tanks play a multifaceted role in contemporary warfare%2C offering mobile,and protection in urban combat.

Plenty of post war conflicts featured heavy and significant usage of tanks. Even if these conflicts were not particularly excellent case studies of decisive mechanised warfare as a whole. (I think that is actually very difficult to achieve and requires significant shaping of the battlefield such as in the Gulf war) Even in such messy conflicts, tanks were pretty ubiquitous and are in use by most countries. 

Off the top of my head, the Indo-Pakistani conflicts featured some pretty intense tank combat (Chawinda comes to mind)
Israel demonstrated just how potent armoured warfare is by defeating its neighbours several times over. Gaza conflict even now shows the value of well protected and equipped tanks even in an environment where they would normally suffer gravely. 
Iran-Iraq war despite being largely static featured a lot of tank combat as well.

The problem with the notion that tanks are 'obsolete' is that no one is offering any actual better replacements for the role/function tanks currently fill. Had there been one then militaries would be scrambling to replace their tanks with that solution. I simply think its too early to tell even with some potential role replacements being suggested. I will personally wait until major militaries are seriously testing alternative platforms that perform the role of a tank more efficiently. At minimum significant changes will clearly have to be made, though that seems to be with warfare in general. Evolve or die and all that. 

Edited May 30 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

As a side note, I hope I am articulating myself reasonably well here. I am still somewhat new here despite having lurked for an ungodly amount of time on the forum. Its certainly lovely to discuss / talk to you all!


 

[hcrof]

1 minute ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

As a side note, I hope I am articulating myself reasonably well here. I am still somewhat new here despite having lurked for an ungodly amount of time on the forum. Its certainly lovely to discuss / talk to you all!


 

I, for one, appreciate the lively discussion!

[ArmouredTopHat]

We do get useful data points with Andrews regular loss identifications. FPV drones feature a lot, though about half of them are disabling knocked out / abandoned vehicles. The majority of tank hits via FPV drone are damaging and not destroying them. (remember this what gets uploaded, presumably there is a greater amount of footage not uploaded due to negligible impacts, misses ect) Ratios vary by day as well. 

Being able to deny recoverable vehicles is -very- tactically useful though, and no doubt exasperates heavy Russian equipment losses. This is obviously an area where FPV / drones shine. Blowing up an IFV or tank with a drone dropped grenade is up there when it comes to value trades. 

Edited May 30 by ArmouredTopHat

[omae2]

Did something changed at Kharkiv?

The news in my country media is talking about a russian summer offensive, but im not sure if they talk about the one on the early days of may or there is something going on that im not aware.

Edited May 30 by omae2

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

The problem with the notion that tanks are 'obsolete' is that no one is offering any actual better replacements for the role/function tanks currently fill. Had there been one then militaries would be scrambling to replace their tanks with that solution. I simply think its too early to tell even with some potential role replacements being suggested. I will personally wait until major militaries are seriously testing alternative platforms that perform the role of a tank more efficiently. At minimum significant changes will clearly have to be made, though that seems to be with warfare in general. Evolve or die and all that. 

I think we might be seeing the early days of what will do the job of tanks better - a system of C4ISR, PGM, infantry and unmanned vehicles.  “Better” also cannot only mean just tactically better.  Tanks are extremely expensive and operationally heavy.  So a cheap mass producible option with a fraction of the operational logistics load is a very good start - and that system we are seeing an early version of is very likely at an advantage.

So we are down to Booms on Xs and mobility-I am even willing to put Survivability to the side because in reality anything can be killed by many things on the modern battlefield. The system I describe above is more mobile through over the horizon fires, light and air.  So we really are down to Boom on X.  The tank is strong.  Gun tech has evolved to the point tanks can hit effectively out 3-5kms.  But what we are seeing are FPVs and precision fires hitting out well past 15km.  Even as inefficient as they are, the offset is costs.  At 1k a pop we can see 50% inefficiencies, hell even 75% and still come out ahead.  So if we are talking moving firepower around the battlefield, a dispersed system of fires linked into a next-gen C4ISR system appears to be a contender.  In reality what is dying is not the tank, it is direct fires.  We still see them, but they appear to no longer be the predominant form of fires.  In fact one could argue they have not been for some time as artillery continues to be then main killer on the battlefield.  What is happening in Ukraine is simply a natural extension of ranges put to over the horizon.  This is a trend that is not going to go away or reverse.  It is pretty simple really - better to kill an enemy before we even get to them.  Driving over corpses is much easier than assaulting.

The other victim of this shift could very well be tac aviation, which has also come under enormous strain.  The offset with be c-UAS, but to use a tank argument, “Well just because a UAV can be killed doesn’t make it obsolete.”  In fact we can lose thousands of UAS based on cost, we cannot lose thousands of MBTs because we cannot produce replacements fast enough.  I would encourage you to spend some more time on this one, I am going to.  The evidence has been mounting steadily but I am not sure when we can call it definitive, maybe not until after this war or beyond.

[NamEndedAllen]

New War 2024 Marches On
https://www.twz.com/news-features/russian-fpv-drone-seen-attacking-ukrainian-uncrewed-surface-vessel-for-the-first-time

[JonS]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

At some point we have to simply admit that this is not social media bias.  These are some big numbers being tossed around that match what we are seeing.  So either this is a really big misread or something else is going on.

Context matters.

The article was written at the start of April, 'recent months' there being Dec '23 - Mar '24, ie. the low point of supply.

When you're out of everything else, you use what you have left - if the Finns had supplied them with 40,000 pinecones in Nov '23 and training on how to use them we'd be sitting around talking about the end of tanks presaged by the Cone of Death(tm).

(All the more so if Nokia had installed cameras in the cones)

Edited May 30 by JonS

[The_Capt]

11 minutes ago, JonS said:

Context matters.

The article was written at the start of April, 'recent months' there being Dec '23 - Mar '24, ie. the low point of supply.

When you're out of everything else, you use what you have left - if the Finns had supplied them with 40,000 pinecones in Nov '23 and training on how to use them we'd be sitting around talking about the end of tanks presaged by the Cone of Death(tm).

(All the more so if Nokia had installed cameras in the cones)

Good point.  Not the stupid pinecone thing, but this also demonstrates that we are looking at a major shift nicely.  Ukraine was running out of ammunition of many natures.  Artillery rationing was noted.  They were also still deep into manpower shortages.  So the UA just conducted a 3-4 month defence and the backbone of that defence was ah hoc drone technology.

And it worked. The RA did not achieve any operational level breakthroughs and their losses were eye watering.  I have to be honest, I am not even sure why Unmanned Age debate is still a thing.  The largest conventional peer on peer war in over 40 years just saw an entire phase of defence done on the back of civilian drones with RPG warheads glued on them.  The RA threw everything but the washing machine at this offence over the winter based on their losses…and all those losses were in the majority delivered by cheap, nearly disposable drones. To the point it was being successfully employed as a substitute for artillery.

If the UA had used pinecones I am sure you and a few others would be arguing that “well you see the pinecone is less efficient than a tank…ahem, ahem.”  But your support in my argument is well appreciated.

[hcrof]

On 5/27/2024 at 7:29 PM, hcrof said:

I have been thinking some more about the lessons of Ukraine for future warfare, as well as the conversations on this forum, and have been trying to develop a coherent concept on how to fight in the transparent battlefield of the present/future. I will try to keep this post as short as possible but this is a complex subject!

Throughout I will be referring to the concepts in this thread:

How to attack: I have talked about this before a bit, I think you need to mass drones and long range indirect fires to blow a hole in the enemies line. You cannot mass forces in the traditional sense because they will be identified and destroyed so you need to send a swarm of vehicles together in roughly platoon sized elements into this breach in order to exploit it. These need to be extremely mobile because artillery can hit slow or static vehicles at extreme range and also because you should expect the enemy to use mobile assets like drones, fast moving artillery (Caesar) and mobile reserves to fill the breach. 

Large armoured vehicles are very hard to hide so enemy resistance in the local area will not likely consist of tanks or other mobile elements, since they will be largely destroyed in the initial strikes. Local resistance will consist of relatively isolated, but well hidden, infantry. However even a single enemy squad with lots of ATGMs and a radio threatens to slow the advance, especially since the attackers are lightly armoured and dispersed. The attackers must accept attrition of the leading elements (recon by boom) and have large quantities of organic fires to reduce these strongpoints quickly. Mobile mortars, 105mm guns and drone carriers have the range for the swarm to offer mutually supporting and responsive fires even when dispersed.  

The vehicle swarm needs to protect itself from incoming artillery and drones. The key points if the "survivorability onion" are: speed to avoid being hit by indirect fires, extensive drone surveillance to destroy direct fires before they are a threat, a combination of simple radar with autocannons and "goalkeeper" drones for self defence (see the other thread for the maths) and mechanical redundancy to keep vehicles moving even after taking damage. 

So what does the swarm look like? The leading edge is a picket line of (ideally) unmanned car-sized tankettes armed with autocannons and a few AT/AA missiles that aggressively recon by fire, covered by a lot of surveillance drones. Should the enemy fire on them then the source of fire is very quickly identified and eliminated. Following this are simple APCs carrying infantry and command vehicles acting as sensor fusion and drone control platforms (they look exactly like APCs) as well as air defence. Then you have specialist elements such as the mobile guns, drone carriers, engineering, heavier tanks(!) etc. interspersed with the APCs. Finally you have small car-sized unmanned logistics carriers pushing supplies forward, as well as a stream of new tankettes to replace losses (an advantage of unmanned platforms is that they are 100% replaceable even in combat).  A bubble of surveillance and defensive drones surround the swarm at all times and this bubble is the key to identifying and eliminating the majority of threats before they enter line of sight. This may all be visible on enemy radar but it will be difficult to identify patterns and to distinguish important fighting elements from random (and expendable) logistics carriers or even quadbikes with radar reflectors - the protective drone/AD bubble prevents enemy drones from clearly identifying what is going on. 

Operationally the force never masses in one point. The prepositioned leading edge of the attack is mostly tankettes and some APCs that have been dispersed: either concealed (easy with a car-sized vehicle in a village) or moving to look like random logistics vehicles on radar. A previously stockpiled FPV drone swarm largely destroys the enemy and the prepositioned elements begin the attack as the leading echelon. The main echelon are organised and fuelled across a zone potentially of hundreds of km in radius. They deploy "from the march" with wheeled APCs self-driving and tracked tankettes being carried by civilian grade trucks (maybe 3 per truck) and unloaded a few tens of km back from the front lines. By the time the enemy knows the main direction of the attack, the second echelon is already beginning to arrive. Eventually (before the drone/AD bubble is exhausted) the infantry will dig in and the tankettes and other supporting elements will withdraw to prepare for a new attack. 

The key here is not to gold-plate things, especially the tankettes and logistics carriers, which need to be cheap and replaceable. But humans are spared the worst of the attrition since their job is to sit in APCs and get delivered to key points rather than be subject to enemy fire. Also I have not covered minefield breaches, but that is for a different post...

Following on from this post I have had some thoughts on breaching minefields. Upon reflection I think mines will continue to be an important part of warfare after this war, not least because they are incredibly cheap, store for a long time and are proven effective in Ukraine. So any future army needs to prepare for breaching operations through deep and complex minefields. 

So to clear a minefield I would first saturate the area in drones to wipe out as many enemies in the vicinity of the minefield as possible. It is important to hunt down enemy EW systems too, especially if they are currently inactive, since the enemy activating EW will make the mine clearing operation much more difficult.  

Next, a group of tankettes approach the minefield (which is pre-mapped using drones and humans) and be as provocative as possible, shooting up likely enemy positions and drawing fire. Shortly after a drone carrier vehicle releases a small swarm of drones from close range to loiter over known or suspected enemy positions to either suppress them with their sound or straight out kill them. Flying cargo drones carrying MANPADs and ground based AD is pushed forward to intercept helicopters, while a bubble of defensive drones is formed. 

With the enemy suppressed, 3-4 cargo carriers loaded with a MICLIC and a mine plow approach the minefield, blowing lanes through it and immediately following through with plowing to prove the lane. These cargo carriers are unmanned and may even be operating entirely autonomously to reduce the effects of EW. Tankettes follow the plow closely to secure the other end of the breach. 

The enemy may choose to re-seed the minefield during or shortly after the breaching operation with artillery or drone delivered mines. Importantly you have a drone in the air doing nothing but observing the lane so you will see and record exactly where the mines fall. If this happens a) small drones carrying 40mm grenades can identify and blow up the fresh mines b) if the ground is muddy and the fresh mines are too hard to identify, a heavy lift drone can drop a short line charge onto the area where mines were observed to fall c) spare cargo carriers with plows can re-prove the lane. 

In many ways the breaching operation is conventional, but the key differences are the complete drone coverage/suppression and the use of entirely attritable vehicles for the operation. If you lose a $100k cargo carrier or $400k tankette then you just keep pushing them through until the breach is successful. Also, being able to observe the lanes with permanently overwatched drone and having a plan to re-clear the lane quickly means the lanes can stay open. 

On the speculation side, I wonder whether using a geotextile or geogrid on the proven lanes would be a good idea? They are easy to lay and would improve the ground to stop vehicles bogging down, but also keep artillery delivered mines on the surface so they are easy to clear away again.