How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[ArmouredTopHat]

36 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

Two things, 90 plus percent of the drones in Ukraine are just civilian grade stuff the has literally had an RPG warhead with a fiddled fuse taped to it. Spare a thought for the people doing that job. They cost a $1000 or less. If it takes twenty of them to kill an MBT, that is still a war winning exchange.

Secondly, the next generation of drones are not going to be hacktivists creative art projects. The are going to be murderous little kamikazes that are purpose built for the task, and have warheads that will punch through any armor that is ever going to move under its own power. Even if they come in a $5000, and takes five of them per tank, it is an exchange rate that will run heavy armor right off the battlefield.

 

Cost is absolutely one of the FPV's strong points, but I would be hesitant to cite cost when it comes to tank killing. Most AT options were already -much- cheaper than tanks already well before FPV's were a thing, even a Javelin missile is relatively peanuts, let alone an RPG-7. If cost was the only consideration for the battlefield it would be very different by default. 

The real value is capability. FPV's provide a very good, capable option on the cheap. Tanks provide a powerful, mobile firing capability that can readily delete strong points or other vehicles, and are largely immune to the biggest killer on the battlefield that is shrapnel. Being rifle proof is also pretty nice. I have read plenty of accounts from UA and RU telegrams that having a tank shooting into your position is utterly terrifying and effective, which makes sense when you realise said tank is shooting what are in effect artillery rounds at high velocity and point blank into your dugout. 

While next gen drones are no doubt going to be terrifying, it is still likely a generation or two away from being fielded so I feel it has no real relevance to the topic at hand (though it is interesting. Interesting in the same way a shark is interesting but also damn terrifying. 

Again, I get strong feelings of this being the Yom Kippur war all over again, where several people thought that massed ATGM fire from the Egyptians signalled the end of mechanised warfare in the initial days of Israeli counter attacks being blunted. Instead the evolution of war proceeded and tanks remained relevant on the battlefield. 

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

NYT article on the rapidly approaching decision point for U.S approving western weapons fired on Russian soil. Interesting justification for nuclear rhetoric being empty, Russia won't signal rising on the nuclear escalation ladder by attacking NATO directly to stop arms shipments. Terrifying idea but makes sense.

The attacks against radar sites is mentioned which I quoted, but no response on how Ukraine reacted. I do wonder if it's a trade off situation, Ukraine stops attacking early warning sites, if the U.S lets Ukraine defend Kharkiv.

I mean it is the 2nd largest city in Ukraine.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/29/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-weapons.html

 

Oh look, the US government thinks attacking Russian nuclear infra is a bad idea and it is shadowing deep strike conversations…how surprising.  The article specifically notes the US concern over escalation. And just because Russia has not gone there yet does not mean they have no panic line - there are these things called tipping points and plain old human error.  The “they have not done it yet” logic is as flawed as it was in Fall ‘21 when Russia was signalling like crazy.  “Well they have never done a full on invasion of Ukraine…it won’t happen.”

Before everyone gets all gaga on strikes into Russia - 1) these will likely be tightly controlled and 2) have limited effect.  Russia is a really big country in case people did not notice.  They will pull back and it will make life harder but don’t expect the RA to fold up shop because the UA can use HIMARs in Belograd. Ukraine does not have enough systems to wage a full on strategic strike campaign, hell the US would be challenged against Russia.  But every little bit helps and it does send a message.

 I think air power should be top priority and extending the air denial umbrella out into Russian territory is a no brainer.  If it is military and flying within 200km of the Ukrainian border it should be fair game for UA AD.  Infra gets much trickier.

Keep in mind that despite all the angst we are currently living the “best bad” timeline, there are a lot worse way this thing could go down. We are working very hard to stay off those.

[ArmouredTopHat]

34 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Here is the thing though, it was noted well before the 2024 FPV scourge that tanks were becoming unsuitable for their primary role.  The evidence is all over Ukraine.  We noted the lack of performance from armor going back to 2022.  In reality it was a combination of factors - ISR, Artillery, ATGMs, mines and UAS.  Once AirPower was essentially denied and the Wild West below 2000 feet broke out, the tank became hunted out of its ability to be a pillar within a combined arms context.  

We have seen far too much evidence to support this, and not just edited war porn.  RUSI and CSIS reports have noted a lot of strange behaviours on both sides with respect to armor.  The easy button excuse has been “well that is Soviet legacy - they don’t know how to do combined arms”.  That does not even make sense as the Soviets knew combined arms very well.  They just went about it differently. Further it stretches credibility to argue that both sides after two years have somehow been unable to solve for Cbt Team/Battlegroup operations.  Something else is clearly going on.  We have seen reports of Russian concentration being picked up and hammered well before they can even get into direct fire ranges.  Both sides are keeping tanks well back for indirect roles, or sending them forward in ones and twos for sniping. They are doing this not because they have forgotten how to put 12 tanks together, they have done it because putting 12 tanks in the same grid square is asking for 12 tanks to be detected and die.

Now FPVs have arrived in scope and scale and are making things worse.  It has been noted many these crazy little bastards are crippling and mauling at scales that rivalled artillery support - in fact one could make a coherent argument they kept the UA in the game during the Ammunition Famine of  winter spring ‘24.  What your video is showing is not that a T64 got hit by a couple FPVs and survived, it is showing that this strikes were recorded by another drone.  That T64 was fixed by ISR likely well before those FPVs showed up.  So while it shrugged off the two FPVs, it would not shrug off the artillery, ATGMs or more FPVs coming their way because they were spotted and tracked by ISR the whole time.

Finally, and again…this is not all about UAS.  If all we had to worry about were UAS in all there shapes and sizes it would be bad enough.  This is a confluence of C4ISR, PGM and Unmanned - combined with extant forms of fires.  We are living in a Fires dominate age, which like the last one led to Defensive primacy. I personally think we are in Denial primacy but can see Defensive from here. The entire package, particularly C4ISR are what are changing the entire game.  C4ISR means manoeuvre is detected well out and engaged starting at around 20kms and progressively worse as one gets closer to a front line. Concentrating is toxic under these conditions and other sides have seen this. Battalion concentrations without air superiority, ISR superiority and some sort of non-existent shielding are dying before they can cross the start line. 

So here we are, the first day of the rest of lives.  Manoeuvre and mass are broken.  ISR, precision and denial broke them. The real question is, “can it be unbroken in this war?”  Or do we have to wait until the next one?

Again, I would be curious to see the factual data when it comes to what is knocking tanks out and what is not. A lot of perceived trends in the second world war when it came to tank warfare turned out to be very different when statistics were eventually collected and actually examined in detail. US Army in particular did a great series of studies on this, Chieftain brings them up quite a bit and I recommend them as they make for a fascinating read that challenges many preconceived notions about armoured combat in that period. 

I think the truth of the matter is that the situation is far too complicated to know for sure why mechanised warfare has stagnated. I think it has more to do with the peer to peer level of the conflict and that defence is certainly favoured over the offensive due to ISR changes. This stage of the war gives me Kursk vibes honestly: namely that armoured divisions that were once able to blitzkrieg their way around suddenly start to struggle when trying to break through layers of prepared fortifications ect. The point of this reference is that despite this, mechanised warfare remained very important in that conflict. We even got a taste of that in the Kharkiv rout where suddenly it was very important to have a lot of mobility when the line fragmented enough for the Ukrainians to exploit hard. 

I think its very premature to decide that mechanised warfare or tanks for that matter are simply done however. Neither side certainly thinks so because both are actively clamouring to get more vehicles, including tanks. If tanks were truly performing so dismally in the conflict, then why do both put great emphasis on the continued sustainment of such vehicles and are desperate to gain more? For all we know the ebb of war might change in ways we have not considered and suddenly attacking becomes more feasible. Its happened plenty of times in the history of warfare, it will happen again.

I think you do make some good points though, especially regarding concentration being much harder to achieve. This I suspect more than anything is what is hampering mechanised warfare given the important of achieving local superiority on the attack, and I suspect EWAR and drone countering technology will be a critical aspect for future successful mechanised manoeuvres. I simply think focussing on the tank as a particular failure point is perhaps a little too zoomed in on an issue that is more operational if not strategic in nature.

Edited May 30 by ArmouredTopHat

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Again, I get strong feelings of this being the Yom Kippur war all over again, where several people thought that massed ATGM fire from the Egyptians signalled the end of mechanised warfare in the initial days of Israeli counter attacks being blunted. Instead the evolution of war proceeded and tanks remained relevant on the battlefield. 

Did it though. I have heard this a number of times. We went on like they did but we had no real evidence.  We never fought in Europe and the Gulf War was not about tanks it was about air supremacy, it created a false positive bias that lasted years.  Then we had a bunch of dirty insurgency wars.  I am really reaching to find hard evidence that the signals from Yom Kipper were in fact wrong.  Israel overcame those initial setbacks at significant cost but I am. It convinced that we were seeing the beginning of the end.

[ArmouredTopHat]

13 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Did it though. I have heard this a number of times. We went on like they did but we had no real evidence.  We never fought in Europe and the Gulf War was not about tanks it was about air supremacy, it created a false positive bias that lasted years.  Then we had a bunch of dirty insurgency wars.  I am really reaching to find hard evidence that the signals from Yom Kipper were in fact wrong.  Israel overcame those initial setbacks at significant cost but I am. It convinced that we were seeing the beginning of the end.

Its by no means the only time there was widescale belief that tanks were obsolete.

The perfection of HEAT weaponry post war had convinced the Americans that tanks were not worth the time in an age of the atomic bomb....until the war in Korea kicked off a massive conventional conflict and they were suddenly scrambling to get as many tanks as they could into combat. 

Increasingly potent AT weapons in the late cold war sparked another debate about tank protection being inadequate until ERA and composite armours were developed that significantly improved tank protection. The point is that there will be adaptation and adjustment for all equipment as technology filters through. Its very rare for technology to develop that completely changes the entire face of warfare and it is usually more widespread than a singular weapons system becoming obsolete. 

Tanks continue to have a valuable purpose on the battlefield, even though said battlefield is as you say increasingly hostile to them. One could argue that this is to be expected when pitching what are essentially late cold war era tank designs that were simply not designed for the challenges tanks currently face now on the battlefield. When you consider that it seems more credible to realise that these tanks have actually pretty well held up in a very fast evolving battlefield. 

*Edit*
I forgot to refer to the Gulf war. While it was significant air campaign, it also featured a truly perfect demonstration of mechanised warfare at its most potent. Certainly plenty of tank combat on display and it serves as pretty good demonstration of what tanks can do at their best: being the tip of the spear on the ground in combined arms warfare. 

We should really be thinking about what evolutions tanks could potentially undergo, as their role remains very much important on the battlefield. We are not quite at the point of the drone apocalypse just yet.

Edited May 30 by ArmouredTopHat

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I think its very premature to decide that mechanised warfare or tanks for that matter are simply done however. Neither side certainly thinks so because both are actively clamouring to get more vehicles, including tanks. If tanks were truly performing so dismally in the conflict, then why do both put great emphasis on the continued sustainment of such vehicles and are desperate to gain more? For all we know the ebb of war might change in ways we have not considered and suddenly attacking becomes more feasible. Its happened plenty of times in the history of warfare, it will happen again.

A year ago I would agree with you but the evidence is mounting too high not to consider that something fundamental is happening.

On this, I was very interested to note that this spring Ukraine did not ask for more tanks. They asked for ammunition. Mech and manoeuvre is performing terribly in this conflict..and here is the thing…it shouldn’t be. Troop densities on an 800+ km front are running about 300 per km (this from RUSI), that is extremely low. Well below historic norms. 300 troops should not be able to hold up against mechanized manoeuvre of Cbt Team sized.

Yet we have seen Cbt Tm sized manoeuvre and higher fail repeatedly, even the RA appears to be getting it right.  With that level of density on a front that large we should be seeing all sorts of manoeuvre, not WW1 advancing by inches.  We have done map studies and even MS Flight Sim fly over this terrain and it is optimal mech country.

Something simply does not add up. Either both sides have been unable to crack the code on “send more than four tanks” or there is a good reason why troop densities this low are working so well, too well. 

Finally, something is killing all these tanks.  We know from open source sites like Oryx that RA has lost over 3000 tanks confirmed, and coming up on 6000 AFVs, IFVs and APCs.  We are definitely getting the sense these losses were not from DF.  Some sources are noting that FPVs have killed these vehicles at higher rates than anything else, but as you note we will likely have to wait after the war.

So my deductions are a combined what we are seeing with what we should be seeing, but are not.  Something is definitely not right here on more than one level.  Force ratios no longer make sense, mass no longer seems to work.  Manoeuvre is dead right now and for the life of me I cannot see how  it re-engages short of operational collapse by one side or the other.  A collapse that looks more and more like it will be engineered by a combination of Artillery, PGM and Unmanned all on the back of a new age of C4ISR.

[ArmouredTopHat]

17 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

A year ago I would agree with you but the evidence is mounting too high not to consider that something fundamental is happening.

On this, I was very interested to note that this spring Ukraine did not ask for more tanks. They asked for ammunition. Mech and manoeuvre is performing terribly in this conflict..and here is the thing…it shouldn’t be. Troop densities on an 800+ km front are running about 300 per km (this from RUSI), that is extremely low. Well below historic norms. 300 troops should not be able to hold up against mechanized manoeuvre of Cbt Team sized.

Yet we have seen Cbt Tm sized manoeuvre and higher fail repeatedly, even the RA appears to be getting it right.  With that level of density on a front that large we should be seeing all sorts of manoeuvre, not WW1 advancing by inches.  We have done map studies and even MS Flight Sim fly over this terrain and it is optimal mech country.

Something simply does not add up. Either both sides have been unable to crack the code on “send more than four tanks” or there is a good reason why troop densities this low are working so well, too well. 

Finally, something is killing all these tanks.  We know from open source sites like Oryx that RA has lost over 3000 tanks confirmed, and coming up on 6000 AFVs, IFVs and APCs.  We are definitely getting the sense these losses were not from DF.  Some sources are noting that FPVs have killed these vehicles at higher rates than anything else, but as you note we will likely have to wait after the war.

So my deductions are a combined what we are seeing with what we should be seeing, but are not.  Something is definitely not right here on more than one level.  Force ratios no longer make sense, mass no longer seems to work.  Manoeuvre is dead right now and for the life of me I cannot see how  it re-engages short of operational collapse by one side or the other.  A collapse that looks more and more like it will be engineered by a combination of Artillery, PGM and Unmanned all on the back of a new age of C4ISR.

I entirely agree that -something- is going on. It could very well be a fundamental change in the nature of modern warfare as we know it. It would be foolish to deny that as a potential explanation. I just think the conclusion is premature and the issues / explanations are...extremely complicated. Were talking about everything from technology to doctrine to training to terrain ect being a potential cause of explanation here, or a mix of all of these. 

Ukraine was until very recently asking for tanks near constantly, perhaps they view this year as one largely for defence and they are focussed on dealing with more severe issues at the moment in the shape of ammunition shortages. Time will tell on that one I suppose.

With regards to scale of losses, I think this is primarily a Russian issue to put it simply. Ukraine's vehicle losses are a fraction of the Russians, despite them having a reasonably sizable amount of tanks fielded. I dont think driving mechanised assaults straight into well established killzones covered in mines again and again is particularly helping the Russians in this case. (Using armoured divisions to create a breakthrough instead of relying on the infantry to do so tended to go very poorly even in WW2)

The big thing that I think keeps mechanised warfare relevant is that there could always be another phase in this war where exploitation suddenly becomes possible. I think it might take some time to achieve the conditions for this yet going on either side, so its very much a matter of seeing how things play out. Kharkiv / Sumy showed us that it can happen very quickly, and you dont want to be deprived of armoured / mobile units when it happens. While not as successful, the initial Russian attack also featured some pretty extensive and deep mechanised penetrations, which were let down more by the lack of a proper consolidation and a severe over extension as well as a host of other issues. 

Collapse could very well be caused by Artillery / PGM and whatnot, which would in turn open up the door again for mass mechanised movements again. I feel another eerie sense of comparison when thinking about the First World War. Everyone thought it was going to be a permanent state of trench warfare....until it suddenly wasn't in 1918 and conditions suddenly became more akin to mobile warfare. Big shifts like that can and will happen. 

Edited May 30 by ArmouredTopHat

[The_Capt]

7 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Its by no means the only time there was widescale belief that tanks were obsolete.

The perfection of HEAT weaponry post war had convinced the Americans that tanks were not worth the time in an age of the atomic bomb....until the war in Korea kicked off a massive conventional conflict and they were suddenly scrambling to get as many tanks as they could into combat. 

Increasingly potent AT weapons in the late cold war sparked another debate about tank protection being inadequate until ERA and composite armours were developed that significantly improved tank protection. The point is that there will be adaptation and adjustment for all equipment as technology filters through. Its very rare for technology to develop that completely changes the entire face of warfare and it is usually more widespread than a singular weapons system becoming obsolete. 

Tanks continue to have a valuable purpose on the battlefield, even though said battlefield is as you say increasingly hostile to them. One could argue that this is to be expected when pitching what are essentially late cold war era tank designs that were simply not designed for the challenges tanks currently face now on the battlefield. When you consider that it seems more credible to realise that these tanks have actually pretty well held up in a very fast evolving battlefield. 

We should really be thinking about what evolutions tanks could potentially undergo, as their role remains very much important on the battlefield. We are not quite at the point of the drone apocalypse just yet.

We kind of covered this topic in depth hcrof had some really good ideas.  Personally I think the tank may hold onto niche assault and indirect fire roles but as a pillar of combined arms manoeuvre we may be at the end of the road - happens.  The killer is not things that kill the tank, we have these for decades as you noted.  It is the things that can find the tank and pull all those lethal things on top of the tank.

This puts us in an awkward position of either abandoning the platform or doubling down and try to keep it alive long enough to deliver value.  But all those protections are going to cost more money.  There comes a point where keeping the tanks value gets priced out.  Particularly if other systems can deliver the same effects.  We need boom at the right place and time.  Everything about the tank, or any DF for that matter is about getting booms on the X at a pace that will neutralize or suppress an opponent.  We need to do this at a rate faster than an opponent so that we sustain manoeuvre options to dislocate and annihilate the opponents system through shock. Ok, so what happens when we can get booms on Xs cheaper, faster and better than a tank?  Or worse, farther?  If I want a hard point to die I have several options to do so through precision fires that do not cost a 60 ton hunk of metal that drinks gas at an alarming rate and needs a logistical tail from hell.

 Now the question is are those options really more effective?  We know they are cheaper.  As to effectiveness, the jury is out but it does not look good.  The trend is definitely pointing towards fully autonomous unmanned, cheap high precision and over the horizon fires.  They are so effective because…and we are back to C4ISR.

This is so much larger than a tank.  It is the entire mechanized system in question here. And that system underpins our entire theory of offensive manoeuvre- the stakes are incredibly high.  Is suspect the technological trends of processing power, miniaturization, energy density and materials are all conspiring to destroy our conventional systems.  Worse our opponents are investing hard in these areas in way design specifically to defeat these systems; we have heavily incentivized where things are going.

We shall have to see but investing billions in tank development may just be right next to investing billions in battleships as carriers arrived on the scene.  UAS, PGM and long range strike are a lot like carries and aircraft - they can do a better job than a battleship but much cheaper.

I guess we will find out.

[chris talpas]

I think your carriers and battleships analogy is bang on especially in the way that the introduction of AirPower changed the nature of naval warfare.  The carrier battle group brought with it not only long range strike that could kill the battleship long before it could engage but also with its superior ability to find targets as well -however imperfect that was during ww2

[ArmouredTopHat]

16 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

We kind of covered this topic in depth hcrof had some really good ideas.  Personally I think the tank may hold onto niche assault and indirect fire roles but as a pillar of combined arms manoeuvre we may be at the end of the road - happens.  The killer is not things that kill the tank, we have these for decades as you noted.  It is the things that can find the tank and pull all those lethal things on top of the tank.

This puts us in an awkward position of either abandoning the platform or doubling down and try to keep it alive long enough to deliver value.  But all those protections are going to cost more money.  There comes a point where keeping the tanks value gets priced out.  Particularly if other systems can deliver the same effects.  We need boom at the right place and time.  Everything about the tank, or any DF for that matter is about getting booms on the X at a pace that will neutralize or suppress an opponent.  We need to do this at a rate faster than an opponent so that we sustain manoeuvre options to dislocate and annihilate the opponents system through shock. Ok, so what happens when we can get booms on Xs cheaper, faster and better than a tank?  Or worse, farther?  If I want a hard point to die I have several options to do so through precision fires that do not cost a 60 ton hunk of metal that drinks gas at an alarming rate and needs a logistical tail from hell.

 Now the question is are those options really more effective?  We know they are cheaper.  As to effectiveness, the jury is out but it does not look good.  The trend is definitely pointing towards fully autonomous unmanned, cheap high precision and over the horizon fires.  They are so effective because…and we are back to C4ISR.

This is so much larger than a tank.  It is the entire mechanized system in question here. And that system underpins our entire theory of offensive manoeuvre- the stakes are incredibly high.  Is suspect the technological trends of processing power, miniaturization, energy density and materials are all conspiring to destroy our conventional systems.  Worse our opponents are investing hard in these areas in way design specifically to defeat these systems; we have heavily incentivized where things are going.

We shall have to see but investing billions in tank development may just be right next to investing billions in battleships as carriers arrived on the scene.  UAS, PGM and long range strike are a lot like carries and aircraft - they can do a better job than a battleship but much cheaper.

I guess we will find out.

A really good post that has some very very important questions. 

I suspect like anything, the tank will simply undergo a metamorphosis again, potentially with wider changes to vehicle design to reflect the rather sudden change in ISR competence and other technological advancements. 

I have seen quite a few different schools of thought, a lot of people think lighter, smaller tanks will see a resurgence, with an emphasis on stealth characteristics to become harder to detect on the battlefield. 

I personally think that in the short term there are some clear lessons to be learned and implemented.
 

• APS systems in my view are now a mandatory feature for tanks going forward, both as a means to intercept loitering munitions at a reasonable cost as well as provide a measure of defence to sophisticated missile weapons. They are not fool proof but at least provide a last line of defence and seem more than justified if they save a vehicle from otherwise certain destruction.
• Protection considerations are likely to become more focussed on all round protection instead of an overwhelming emphasis on frontal armour. Vital systems such as ammunition and crew might become the focus.
• I think crew dynamics are going to change most certainly, with autoloaders being more widely introduced to help reduce the size of vehicles and allow better concentration of armour on a smaller surface area. 
• EWAR / Jamming is going to be a very significant feature for vehicles going forward in general. It would not surprise me if we see more dedicated EWAR vehicles on the platoon / company level, if not suites of jammers and other gear on most vehicles.   
• A renewed importance on the use of RWS systems in order to give vehicles greater means to defend themselves from all types of drones as well as a larger emphasis on the ability to track, engage and destroy said smaller drones more consistently. 
• Increasing emphasis on situational awareness and the ability to spot and engage targets quickly and faster than the opposition. This is already a strong point of tanks and is probably important to build upon further. 
   

Edited May 30 by ArmouredTopHat

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I entirely agree that -something- is going on. It could very well be a fundamental change in the nature of modern warfare as we know it. It would be foolish to deny that as a potential explanation. I just think the conclusion is premature and the issues / explanations are...extremely complicated. Were talking about everything from technology to doctrine to training to terrain ect being a potential cause of explanation here, or a mix of all of these. 

Ukraine was until very recently asking for tanks near constantly, perhaps they view this year as one largely for defence and they are focussed on dealing with more severe issues at the moment in the shape of ammunition shortages. Time will tell on that one I suppose.

With regards to scale of losses, I think this is primarily a Russian issue to put it simply. Ukraine's vehicle losses are a fraction of the Russians, despite them having a reasonable sizable amount of tanks fielded. I dont think driving mechanised assaults straight into well established killzones covered in mines is particularly helping the Russians in this case. (Using armoured divisions to create a breakthrough instead of relying on the infantry to do so tended to go very poorly even in WW2)

The big thing that I think keeps mechanised warfare relevant is that there could always be another phase in this war where exploitation suddenly becomes possible. I think it might take some time to achieve the conditions for this yet going on either side, so its very much a matter of seeing how things play out. Kharkiv / Sumy showed us that it can happen very quickly, and you dont want to be deprived of armoured / mobile units when it happens. While not as successful, the initial Russian attack also featured some pretty extensive and deep mechanised penetrations, which were let down more by the lack of a proper consolidation and a severe over extension as well as a host of other issues. 

Collapse could very well be caused by Artillery / PGM and whatnot, which would in turn open up the door again for mass mechanised movements again. I feel another eerie sense of comparison when thinking about the First World War. Everyone thought it was going to be a permanent state of trench warfare....until it suddenly wasn't in 1918 and conditions suddenly became more akin to mobile warfare. Big shifts like that can and will happen. 

The UA are running at about 1/3 RA losses but is this better equipment and training or worse Russian ISR?  The reasons are very complex and will take some time to sort out. I have been in the profession for 35 years and fully understand all the factors at play…but something is not right.  I have had that sense of growing unease for two years now.  I did not come to this deduction on Day 1 either.  It took months, the first year at least of watching this war closely to come to some of these hypothesis.  

The major problem is what was not happening but should be. It is far too easy to write off poor Russian tactics or Ukrainian adherence to Soviet doctrine - these narratives sound like western arrogance, which is unearned in a war like this one.  The West has not fought a war like this one since Korea, it is the height of arrogance to believe that we managed to keep doing everything right all these years later without a real test of our own doctrine.

So accepting that both Russia and Ukraine are behaving as they are for good reasons - some force generation driven, others force employment, we have to step back and ask ourselves “ok, what is really happening here?”

On break out and exploitation.  So at Kharkiv in Fall of ‘22 we saw maps and video graphics of the UA breakout and again it did not look right.  We did not see mech or heavy spearheads.  We saw them hold the shoulders while light and SOF did the exploit…why?  Was internal logistical limitations?  Or was it speed?  Again it was weird.  If we see an operational collapse at this point it will likely be an engineered collapse or corrosion.  My next question is that if one has to erode an entire enemy operational system to achieve breakout…what do I need mech for in the exploit?  I can do it with light, artillery, PGM and Unmanned.  The RA c-moves, even if they are heavy, will be detected well out, likely by space based/operational ISR and denial can be projected on those forces any number of ways.  Hardpoints maybe but isolated and cut off they pose limited threat.

Again we are at “what is the real value added of mech/armor”.  I do not think it is zero but it clearly is not as core as it once was - well except the RA who keep sending mech to die in company sizes to take 100m at a time.

To be honest, I am not even really concerned with this war, I am thinking about the next one.  Where is this trend going?  Some appear to think we will see re-equalization but I have some severe doubts.  The demon is out of the box. Too much money is going to be invested too fast after this war.  In the end I think Arquilla was right all along: Small many beat few large, finding beats flanking, swarming beats surging.

[ And my own axiom - Mass beats isolation, precision beats mass, mass precision beats everything.  Sorry, could not resist]

[ArmouredTopHat]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The UA are running at about 1/3 RA losses but is this better equipment and training or worse Russian ISR?  The reasons are very complex and will take some time to sort out. I have been in the profession for 35 years and fully understand all the factors at play…but something is not right.  I have had that sense of growing unease for two years now.  I did not come to this deduction on Day 1 either.  It took months, the first year at least of watching this war closely to come to some of these hypothesis.  

The major problem is what was not happening but should be. It is far too easy to write off poor Russian tactics or Ukrainian adherence to Soviet doctrine - these narratives sound like western arrogance, which is unearned in a war like this one.  The West has not fought a war like this one since Korea, it is the height of arrogance to believe that we managed to keep doing everything right all these years later without a real test of our own doctrine.

So accepting that both Russia and Ukraine are behaving as they are for good reasons - some force generation driven, others force employment, we have to step back and ask ourselves “ok, what is really happening here?”

On break out and exploitation.  So at Kharkiv in Fall of ‘22 we saw maps and video graphics of the UA breakout and again it did not look right.  We did not see mech or heavy spearheads.  We saw them hold the shoulders while light and SOF did the exploit…why?  Was internal logistical limitations?  Or was it speed?  Again it was weird.  If we see an operational collapse at this point it will likely be an engineered collapse or corrosion.  My next question is that if one has to erode an entire enemy operational system to achieve breakout…what do I need mech for in the exploit?  I can do it with light, artillery, PGM and Unmanned.  The RA c-moves, even if they are heavy, will be detected well out, likely by space based/operational ISR and denial can be projected on those forces any number of ways.  Hardpoints maybe but isolated and cut off they pose limited threat.

Again we are at “what is the real value added of mech/armor”.  I do not think it is zero but it clearly is not as core as it once was - well except the RA who keep sending mech to die in company sizes to take 100m at a time.

To be honest, I am not even really concerned with this war, I am thinking about the next one.  Where is this trend going?  Some appear to think we will see re-equalization but I have some severe doubts.  The demon is out of the box. Too much money is going to be invested too fast after this war.  In the end I think Arquilla was right all along: Small many beat few large, finding beats flanking, swarming beats surging.

[ And my own axiom - Mass beats isolation, precision beats mass, mass precision beats everything.  Sorry, could not resist]

In my view the Kharkiv situation was a bit of a surprise to everyone and it was pretty much improvised. SOF / humvees happening to be the fastest things available and therefore used while mech units were held in the event of a potential counter thrust. (I do recall tanks being used though, especially to help clean up anything left over) My overall impression was Ukraine wanted to go as fast as possible to exploit a potentially narrow window and this came at a cost of a more organised armoured offensive. 

Certainly food for though when it comes to the future war and the implications for how it might be waged. I imagine a lot of data crunchers will be very busy for the next ten years...

[The_Capt]

12 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

A really good post that has some very very important questions. 

I suspect like anything, the tank will simply undergo a metamorphosis again, potentially with wider changes to vehicle design to reflect the rather sudden change in ISR competence and other technological advancements. 

I have seen quite a few different schools of thought, a lot of people think lighter, smaller tanks will see a resurgence, with an emphasis on stealth characteristics to become harder to detect on the battlefield. 

I personally think that in the short term there are some clear lessons to be learned and implemented.
 

• APS systems in my view are now a mandatory feature for tanks going forward, both as a means to intercept loitering munitions at a reasonable cost as well as provide a measure of defence to sophisticated missile weapons. They are not fool proof but at least provide a last line of defence and seem more than justified if they save a vehicle from otherwise certain destruction.
• Protection considerations are likely to become more focussed on all round protection instead of an overwhelming emphasis on frontal armour. Vital systems such as ammunition and crew might become the focus.
• I think crew dynamics are going to change most certainly, with autoloaders being more widely introduced to help reduce the size of vehicles and allow better concentration of armour on a smaller surface area. 
• EWAR / Jamming is going to be a very significant feature for vehicles going forward in general. It would not surprise me if we see more dedicated EWAR vehicles on the platoon / company level, if not suites of jammers and other gear on most vehicles.   
• A renewed importance on the use of RWS systems in order to give vehicles greater means to defend themselves from all types of drones as well as a larger emphasis on the ability to track, engage and destroy said smaller drones more consistently. 
• Increasing emphasis on situational awareness and the ability to spot and engage targets quickly and faster than the opposition. This is already a strong point of tanks and is probably important to build upon further. 
   

Great discussion btw.  My honest guess is that we will take the tank and break it into several vehicle/platforms. APS and EW will go some way but fully autonomous systems side step EW in many ways and APS will lag EFP and sub-munitions.  Better to disperse what used to be tank-based capability and de aggregate it across several cheaper, harder to detect platforms.  Lean in heavily on unmanned and precision.  Light and fast with much lower logistics loads (those are the real killer).  Greater self containment.  Focus on integrated fires - we likely need to become firepower centric as fire to manoeuvre will be the game as opposed to other way around.

We discussed at length the bubble idea.  More like naval warfare than what we recognize as land warfare because C4ISR, range and precision make terrain transparent - no joke, I saw a news story on how the Russians were taking an area to seize “high ground”; like terrain elevation matters to either ISR or fires anymore. Beyond that I ask “what does c-C4ISR look like?”  “What does c-AI look like?”  “Can we use AI to detect patterns that tell us what an opponent AI is thinking?”  And “what does silencing look like?” - it is not enough to kill something, we need to make sure a kill is data silent to avoid giving up advantage.

Going to be a crazy next decade…

[ArmouredTopHat]

18 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Great discussion btw.  My honest guess is that we will take the tank and break it into several vehicle/platforms. APS and EW will go some way but fully autonomous systems side step EW in many ways and APS will lag EFP and sub-munitions.  Better to disperse what used to be tank-based capability and de aggregate it across several cheaper, harder to detect platforms.  Lean in heavily on unmanned and precision.  Light and fast with much lower logistics loads (those are the real killer).  Greater self containment.  Focus on integrated fires - we likely need to become firepower centric as fire to manoeuvre will be the game as opposed to other way around.

We discussed at length the bubble idea.  More like naval warfare than what we recognize as land warfare because C4ISR, range and precision make terrain transparent - no joke, I saw a news story on how the Russians were taking an area to seize “high ground”; like terrain elevation matters to either ISR or fires anymore. Beyond that I ask “what does c-C4ISR look like?”  “What does c-AI look like?”  “Can we use AI to detect patterns that tell us what an opponent AI is thinking?”  And “what does silencing look like?” - it is not enough to kill something, we need to make sure a kill is data silent to avoid giving up advantage.

Going to be a crazy next decade…

I could certainly picture a breakdown of tanks into such components, though I would consider that to be such a radical shift in unit make up / organisation that it would be a decade or two down the line, maybe longer in the event we actually succeed in not having a third world war sometime soon. 

I think we will see more gradual changes first before major structural changes occur. One should keep an eye out for experimental brigades / units that countries attempt in the future, could be the new generation of experimental mobile brigades we saw in the years after the First World War testing out new theories, with said new units of course testing out varying levels of drone integration etcetera. 

Agreed on the discussion though! Its a very interesting area of thought. The conflict certainly makes for a fascinating case study (while also being a god damn tragedy)

Edited May 30 by ArmouredTopHat

[fireship4]

15 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ah, ok I see where you are going.

I think not!  It was a dig at your verbosity, and I recieved an essay in return!

 

15 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The Millennials and whatever the hell they are calling the new ones never grew up in a mass existential conflict environment  - the closest they ever get is watching Oppenheimer.

Again, the Millenial cadre starts in 1981, the oldest were ten years old or so when the USSR dissolved.

 

15 hours ago, The_Capt said:

They talk a good game on climate change and economic woes but they grew up with "bad things happening over there to other people." 

Something like 45% is the number of Millenials deployed by the US in OIF/Afghanistan in 2010 [1].  The oldest Millenials were 20 on 9/11.

Edited May 30 by fireship4

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, fireship4 said:

Something like 45% is the number of Millenials in OIF/Afghanistan in 2010[*].  The oldest Millenials were 20 on 9/11.

And what % of Millenials served in either theater? Single digit?

Anyway, overstated or not, The_Capt's point is that the younger generation grew up with peace not only being the norm but expected to be the norm.  I'm not that old and yet I remember nuclear attack drills and my elementary school had fallout shelter signs for us to follow.  So while peace has largely been the norm for my lifetime, my formative years were spent without the expectation that it would continue.  Hell, I used to brag to others that I lived in a great place because in the event of a nuclear war I'd likely be killed outright because I lived next to a massive US Air Force base.  Millenials and younger have not had the same experience.

Not sure what any of this has to do with this thread any more, so probably best to let this drift off into the ether.

Steve

[chris talpas]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

 I'm not that old and yet I remember nuclear attack drills and my elementary school had fallout shelter signs for us to follow.  So while peace has largely been the norm for my lifetime, my formative years were spent without the expectation that it would continue.  Hell, I used to brag to others that I lived in a great place because in the event of a nuclear war I'd likely be killed outright because I lived next to a massive US Air Force base.  Millenials and younger have not had the same 

Steve

Yes I remember those drills as well.  Having grown up in Windsor, across the river from Detroit, this article from Time was especially sobering back in its day

https://search.app.goo.gl/JkTsRnS

 

[Offshoot]

In light of the ongoing conversation, the little tank that could:

 

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

While next gen drones are no doubt going to be terrifying, it is still likely a generation or two away from being fielded so I feel it has no real relevance to the topic at hand (though it is interesting. Interesting in the same way a shark is interesting but also damn terrifying. 

In this war that is August, if not sooner. 

[JonS]

5 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

For FPV drones, we typically only see successful strikes posted, we dont tend to see the many many many misses, poor angled attacks, EWAR casualties or simply hits that fail to inflict major damage. We have a few videos of tanks shrugging off numerous FPV hits its true but the majority of footage we see is usually pretty spectacular. The point is we tend to get the footage of the 'good stuff' when in reality both sides admit that a large percentage of drones will never reach a target due to the various factors involved. 

Heh. Imagine if the internet had existed, and cellphones with cameras had been ubiquitous, in 1973.

We would be inundated with videos from AT-3 operators as somewhere north of 1,000 Centurions, Pattons, and what else not were destroyed or damaged in less than 3 weeks, leading, obviously, to Israel's defeat and the end of tanks as a weapon system.

Edited May 30 by JonS

[cesmonkey]

 

[fireship4]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

And what % of Millenials served in either theater? Single digit?

Out of about 65 Million male Millenials [2], it's about 3.4% of the 17+ males.  The approximately 43% of the deployed that were Gen X make up 2.85% of their fighting age males.  3.83% if you just count 30-34 year-olds (keeping within the Army enlistment age cap of 35).

 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

The_Capt's point is that the younger generation grew up with peace not only being the norm but expected to be the norm.

I concede if you mean WW3, but as I said the oldest of them spent 10 years in the same boat, and [I'd guess] the generation on the whole has been at war [for more of their lives] than the last two.  The last [high casualty] war before OIF/OEF was Korea I suppose.

 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not sure what any of this has to do with this thread any more, so probably best to let this drift off into the ether.

Content to leave the subject now that I've answered your question and said my piece.  I had edited it onto my last post, but put it here in case that doesn't activate the quote alarm and it gets lost in the torrent.

Edited May 30 by fireship4

[Carolus]

US government sets target of 100.000 shells per months until the end of 2025, with a new plant by General Dynamics opening to produce 30.000 per month.

 

 

[Pete Wenman]

More sea drone attacks if confirmed.

 

 

with added Geolocation info

 

 

P

Edited May 30 by Pete Wenman

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, JonS said:

Heh. Imagine if the internet had existed, and cellphones with cameras had been ubiquitous, in 1973.

We would be inundated with videos from AT-3 operators as somewhere north of 1,000 Centurions, Pattons, and what else not were destroyed or damaged in less than 3 weeks, leading, obviously, to Israel's defeat and the end of tanks as a weapon system.

Again, here is the thing…maybe they were.  We never tested our c-ATGM doctrines beyond exercises in Europe…and shockingly the mighty tank (we had spent billions on) was still relevant.  Much like the lessons observed in the wars leading up to WW1 we basically ignored stuff that did not fit our model.  If that model was never truly tested, and it wasn’t, then one cannot simply say “ well tanks were relevant because we kept using them”.  I mean, sure, human history of warfare is not full of examples of us hanging onto military capability well past its expiry date…he says reading about cavalry wearing shiny armor in WW1.

And then there is the inconvenient fact that ATGM technology developed a lot in the last 50 years while the tank really hasn’t evolved that much.  We stuck on some better armor and a computer in the gun.  They also got larger, heavier and burn more gas.  APS was about the only major development and it is lagging ATGM capability, let alone drones.

Then in 1991 we had one of the largest confirmation bias events in military history.  We looked at the Gulf War and said “the system works!”  While conveniently missing the fact that the Gulf War was not a peer-on-peer conflict.  We beat up a one eyed goat with developmental challenges and went “see, now let’s spend another few trillion on this stuff.”

And then when we saw weird stuff happening in places like Chechnya, Nagorno Karbak, and Ukraine…we went “silly Soviet doctrine”.  So going all the way back to the last real peer on peer tank actions we see the major impact of small, smart and precise missiles and go “meh, Israel still won and we kept using them…so they must still work.”

Tanks may have been put on the endangered species list back in 1973 but we ignored it.  Here we are in 2024 watching all sorts of weird evidence over a two year period and the analysis is still. “Meh, Ukraine is winning enough…they must still work…we will keep using them.”  Probably the last thing Austro-Hungarian Cavalry said after shining their breast plates in 1914.

For me this war is an Ostfreisland moment, and frankly I think it is for most modern militaries.  And what happens next will likely follow the same pattern:

”The leadership of the US Navy, however, was outraged by Mitchell's handling of the tests; the 2,000 lb bombs had not been sanctioned by the Navy, which had set the rules for the engagement. Mitchell's bombers had also not allowed inspectors aboard the ship between bombing runs as stipulated by the Navy. The joint Army–Navy report on the tests, issued a month later and signed by General John J. Pershing, stated that "the battleship is still the backbone of the fleet."^[62] Mitchell wrote his own, contradictory account of the tests, which was then leaked to the press. The sinking of the battleship sparked great controversy in the American public sphere; Mitchell's supporters exaggerated the significance of the tests by falsely claiming Ostfriesland to be an unsinkable "super-battleship" and that "old sea dogs ... wept aloud."^[62] Senator William Borah argued that the tests had rendered battleships obsolete. Mitchell was widely supported in the press, though his increasingly combative tactics eventually resulted in a court-martial for insubordination that forced him to retire from the military.^[63]”

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMS_Ostfriesland