How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[cesmonkey]

Interesting post by Rybar on the current situation near Avdiivka. Some excerpts below:
https://t.me/rybar/58209
 

Quote

For the last few days, heavy fighting has been going on in the Avdeevka direction in Berdychi and Tonenkoe , where the Russian Armed Forces were able to “drop in on the shoulders” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units retreating from Avdeevka .

However, the enemy recovered quickly enough and was able to quickly transfer reinforcements to the sector, creating a numerical superiority in the entire direction and gathering over 15 brigades by March 6 . Thus, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were able to stop the rapid advance of the Russian Armed Forces, even if at the beginning they had to cut off their own personnel with artillery from the evacuation routes.

Quote

In general, the situation is greatly complicated by the abundance of enemy drones. Not only vehicles and armored vehicles, but even single soldiers are subject to drops and strikes from FPV drones, which indicates that there is no shortage of weapons. And this, in turn, complicates not only promotion, but also the retention of previously occupied positions in principle.

 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, JonS said:

Despite your effort to boil the ocean here I think we are in pointed agreement once again, albeit coming at it from different directions.

If I read you correctly, you're saying that trying graft a western style military onto Afghanistan didn't work because their government wasn't compatible with that style of military. I agree with that, and if I'm understanding him correctly, so does @Kinophile. That is actually his main point, despite your effort to disagree with it.

Anyhoo, I agree. However, in Afghanistan's case I think the original sin was trying to trying to give them a military that looked like some weird amalgam^ of western expeditionary-ish doctrines that was never going to work in their context. The Afghan people can obviously fight, really well and really effectively, when they fight in ways that suit them. In other words, like you, I think there was a mismatch between the civil/political milieu and the indigenous military forces in Afghanistan, but unlike you I think that effort should have gone into creating a military that fit that milieu, rather than trying to impose or import a political ideology that would have been able to support "our" way of fighting.

Hopefully the relevance to Ukraine is obvious. And I think on that we definitely agree.

 

 

^ given the number and variety of different training teams from different nations they weren't even trying to adopt a single doctrine. Instead they had to try and make sense of all the doctrines at once.

Not really but maybe half way there….?  My point was that a societies military is a lot more than a lone political ideological data point.  If we somehow built a perfect Afghan military that aligned with their society and culture the outcome would have likely been the same.  This is because the issues with Afghanistan were deeper than defence and security.  The ANA was very often a domestic army of strangers because the locals were voting with IEDs. No equipment or training was going to solve that. Maybe a couple hundred years of social evolution but it really wouldn’t matter how we built a central military in that nation because it did not want to be the nation we wanted it to be.  Hell the Taliban do not have full internal security control and they are far better aligned to Afghan reality.  The failure to “graft” an Afghan security force was a symptom of a larger disease, not the disease in itself.

My larger point is that there is a link between a society and its military (obviously) but we should avoid oversimplifying that relationship or ignore a lot of other factors as we apply a nice neat template to the war in Ukraine.  When one is doing Military Assistance, you definitely have to take into account “how they fight” but one cannot bet on that single pony and expect success.  “How they live”, “Where they live”, “How they pay for it”, “Who they fight and fight for” and “Why they fight” are much larger than whatever political ideology is in play.

In reality this entire discussion is not about building militaries around the world, it is about intervention as a broader strategy.  Based on the last 30 years it has been the major strategy of the Western world, we are doing a version of it in Ukraine right now.  However, our successes in employing this strategy are spotty at best, with many high profile failures.  How much longer we are going to keep trying it?  Well that is a very good question.

 

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Both can be true and you have no evidence to suggest they aren't.  In fact, since this war started there's far more evidence to suggest that tank for tank, rifleman for rifleman, shell for shell, and drone for drone the Ukrainians are (on average) superior to Russia.  This has been discussed in much detail by many experts, as well as in discussions here.  Artillery effectiveness has been a big one, with Russian laying waste to empty fields while Ukrainian gunners successfully sniped actual targets with their far more limited artillery.

Further, there's the qualitative difference in the weaponry being used.  You can't seriously argue that the Western equipment being provided to Ukraine doesn't (generally) achieve better results than the Russian equivalent.  All I have to do is say "Javelin" and that discussion is done.

So, you have a false premise and that is that Russian and Ukrainian capabilities are on par when on defense.  That is demonstrably counter factual.  The best you can argue is that if Russia adopts a defensive posture or ceases wasteful attacks the gap between relative casualties (as seen thus far) will shrink.  I'd even go along with that to the degree the delta adjusted in favor of Russia is supported by factual evidence.  Yet you are arguing parity, and I find that nonsensical and counter factual.

No, the disregard for demonstrated qualitative superiority of Ukrainian capabilities is what refutes the idea that if Russia were to cease attacking that casualties would more or less equalize.

We have already had this discussion recently, as we have many times in the past, and it's (at best) a partial view of reality.

You really should listen to Perun's video from 2 weeks ago about this topic.  The fact is that it doesn't matter if Russia can replace its losses if it needs more than it has to achieve its' goals.  I'll put it in abstract form.

I have 100 beers, you have 10.  We get into a drinking contest to see who can drink the most.  We both start drinking and we're 5 beers in.  It's looking like I'll win because, well, I have 95 left and you only have 5.  But oh wait a minute... you're German and were raised, from the time of infancy, to drink real beer.  I am American and when I was born we had Miller and Budweiser.  Which means you're probably still capable of drinking a few more beers, whereas I get half way through my 6th one and I get sick.  Doesn't matter that I still have 94 beers available, you win.  Especially because we're drinking in your bar and you have an incentive to push yourself harder than I do.

The fact is neither side can afford to lose its men and equipment indefinitely.  We know this to be true.  We also know that Russia is digging deeper and deeper into ever lowering quality of replacements, both men and material, due to the catastrophic losses.  Ukraine, on the other hand, has arguably a higher quality force now than it did when the war started.  It could even be that Ukraine has increased the amount of certain things fielded while Russia has seen a decline. 

For example, Ukraine's starting IFVs contained exactly 0.0% Western models, now it's some number higher.  This is significant because nobody disputes Western IFV superiority over Russian IFVs.  On the other hand, loss records seem to indicate Russia is suffering from declining numbers of BMP-2s and is having to substitute with BMP-1, MTLB, and even trucks, thus indicating that their force quality is declining (there is plenty of other supporting evidence of this).

This is all stuff we know with varying degrees of specificity.  What we do not know is where each side's fail points are and how close they are to reaching them.  We only know they exist and that both sides are getting closer to them, not further away.

Steve

I have a serious problem with this narrative that somehow Russia “did Adiivka” and has now fully recovered.  This entire position is based on some pretty sketchy vehicle production stats, most of the info coming out of Russia itself.  As far as we can tell the RA wrecked an entire MRD at Adiivka.  This is on top of loses elsewhere.  The idea that Russia simply stamped out an entire shiny new MRD to replace it is disinformation as far as I am concerned.  Russian force quality has been on a one way trajectory from the start of this war, except for a few notable areas: UAS and ISR - and we still are not sure if these are anomalies or trends.  In other capability areas it is exactly as you describe, more older equipment. (equipment less suitable for this environment) This is due to RA losses exceeding Russian industrial capacity to generate modern equipment.  It has been noted by more than one expert that Russia is draining its Soviet legacy force pool of equipment and ammunition.

So the idea that Russia is simply shrugging off all these losses - losses that Ukraine is barely able to sustain, while quaking under the giant footsteps of an unstoppable Russia, all the while the weak and puny west sits back and watches…well this borders on propaganda not worthy of this forum.  These sorts of gross oversimplifications without any real evidence, or skewing evidence need to stop as they play directly in Russian information operations.

I suspect the Ukrainian posters who have pitched these angles are a combination of war weary and/or are thinking that by continuing to promote a desperate Ukrainian situation that we will somehow become politically motivated.  However, they are missing the very real risk that some who read this forum may take this entire narrative as a sign that Ukraine is a lost cause, and we are all out of patience with lost causes.  By continually shouting “Ukraine is dooooomed” they might just convince enough people that they are right.  The answer won’t be to “double down and support Ukraine” it may wind up being “cut out losses and move on”.   That is what makes this angle such a powerful pro-Russian tool.  Russia must make this war appear “too hard, too complicated” because we in The West hate those situations.  Any and all skewed or heavily biased assessments like these simply play into Russian hands.

[Holien]

 

 

This really helped me understand the Russian pyramid problem. 

Also touched on why Ukraine is protecting its younger generation from recruitment. 

Imo worth the 30 minutes watching as he explains the issues really well.

Ties into Russian increase of invalids...

[cesmonkey]

https://t.me/s/legionoffreedom/
https://t.me/s/russvolcorps/
https://t.me/s/SiberianBattalion

[Kinophile]

6 hours ago, JonS said:

if I'm understanding him correctly, so does @Kinophile. That is actually his main point, despite your effort to disagree with it.

Correct 

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, hcrof said:

I don't think your argument really addresses the point here. Russia does not have to be as effective pound for pound as Ukraine, they can use more resources sustainably. So in a static situation they can use more shells than Ukraine so even if they are more wasteful the number of casualties may end up being the same.

That's not what was being debated.  Kraft is making the argument that, defensively, there's parity between the two sides and that means parity in casualties.  The evidence doesn't support this notion and, anyway, it's not particularly relevant since Russia has shown no signs (or motivation) to cease wasteful offensive action.

7 hours ago, hcrof said:

That is obviously not ideal for Ukraine - if both sides are just sitting in trenches taking 500 casualties a day then the war is not going to end any time soon.

It's not ideal for either side because Russia does not have endless resources any more than Ukraine does.  As has been stated 1000s of times here, it isn't about who has more stuff it is about who gives up first.  The two are related, but quantity doesn't include ability or will.

In fact, arguably Ukraine has vastly more material resources than Russia does (provided Western aid continues).  Since Ukraine is facing extinction, they have a vastly superior reason to sacrifice manpower than does Russia.  So in theory if it is a contest of attrition, Ukraine has an advantage.

 

OK, so let's get back to casing out a "frozen conflict" since we haven't done that in a while.  Let's say Russia finally figures out that attacking isn't sustainable and it goes on the defensive.  What happens?

Let's presume that the lethality at the frontline is roughly the same for both sides, which means Russia gets some advantage because it has more stuff and Ukraine gets some advantage because it presents fewer targets.  Parity.

But what else is going on?  How many ships is each likely to sink in the months that follow the end of ground offensives?  Ukraine has none, Russia has many and Ukraine's ability to reach out and destroy them is increasing while Russia's ability to use its navy is decreasing.

Ukraine's ability to destroy critical Russian infrastructure is also increasing, seemingly exponentially.  Russia has not found any way to thwart these growing attacks, therefore each passing day means growing disruption and costs to Russia's economy that, so far, Russia has been unable to do to Ukraine.

Russia's airforce is also under renewed pressure on the ground, not to mention the air.  Ukraine is hitting Russia airbases and repair facilities 100s of KMs behind the lines.  What is Russia going to do... relocate it's entire airforce to the Far East?

Then there's the cumulative effects of sanctions.  We see their impact taking nibbles and even some bites out of Russia's ability to function as a modern economy.  Those problems are compounding and will only get worse over time, never better.  At best Russia may find ways to stabilize some parts of its economy at a less optimal state (either poorer quality, more costly, less of it, etc.).

Civil society in Russia is not going to indefinitely accept an ever degrading quality of life in exchange for some invented reasons.  Ukraine's civil society, on the other hand, has far more incentive to struggle through this because the alternatives are all worse.  This doesn't mean the Russian populace will "blink" first, just that the objective reasons for each to call it quits are not equal to each other.

Soooo... if Russia wants to try and play a defensive game with Ukraine, which so far it has shown zero intention of doing, I don't think it will come out better than it is right now.  Losing 100s of millions of Dollars of ships, aircraft, and money making infrastructure isn't sustainable.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So the idea that Russia is simply shrugging off all these losses - losses that Ukraine is barely able to sustain, while quaking under the giant footsteps of an unstoppable Russia, all the while the weak and puny west sits back and watches…well this borders on propaganda not worthy of this forum.  These sorts of gross oversimplifications without any real evidence, or skewing evidence need to stop as they play directly in Russian information operations.

Yup.  Even a quick check of the facts shows that there's significant flaws in the theory that Russia can sustain its losses.  At best one can argue that Russia has enough to keep the war going, though that premise relies heavily on Ukraine being motivated to surrender rather soon.  Like 2024.  And there's no sign of that on the horizon.

Steve

[The_Capt]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

That's not what was being debated.  Kraft is making the argument that, defensively, there's parity between the two sides and that means parity in casualties.  The evidence doesn't support this notion and, anyway, it's not particularly relevant since Russia has shown no signs (or motivation) to cease wasteful offensive action.

It's not ideal for either side because Russia does not have endless resources any more than Ukraine does.  As has been stated 1000s of times here, it isn't about who has more stuff it is about who gives up first.  The two are related, but quantity doesn't include ability or will.

In fact, arguably Ukraine has vastly more material resources than Russia does (provided Western aid continues).  Since Ukraine is facing extinction, they have a vastly superior reason to sacrifice manpower than does Russia.  So in theory if it is a contest of attrition, Ukraine has an advantage.

 

OK, so let's get back to casing out a "frozen conflict" since we haven't done that in a while.  Let's say Russia finally figures out that attacking isn't sustainable and it goes on the defensive.  What happens?

Let's presume that the lethality at the frontline is roughly the same for both sides, which means Russia gets some advantage because it has more stuff and Ukraine gets some advantage because it presents fewer targets.  Parity.

But what else is going on?  How many ships is each likely to sink in the months that follow the end of ground offensives?  Ukraine has none, Russia has many and Ukraine's ability to reach out and destroy them is increasing while Russia's ability to use its navy is decreasing.

Ukraine's ability to destroy critical Russian infrastructure is also increasing, seemingly exponentially.  Russia has not found any way to thwart these growing attacks, therefore each passing day means growing disruption and costs to Russia's economy that, so far, Russia has been unable to do to Ukraine.

Russia's airforce is also under renewed pressure on the ground, not to mention the air.  Ukraine is hitting Russia airbases and repair facilities 100s of KMs behind the lines.  What is Russia going to do... relocate it's entire airforce to the Far East?

Then there's the cumulative effects of sanctions.  We see their impact taking nibbles and even some bites out of Russia's ability to function as a modern economy.  Those problems are compounding and will only get worse over time, never better.  At best Russia may find ways to stabilize some parts of its economy at a less optimal state (either poorer quality, more costly, less of it, etc.).

Civil society in Russia is not going to indefinitely accept an ever degrading quality of life in exchange for some invented reasons.  Ukraine's civil society, on the other hand, has far more incentive to struggle through this because the alternatives are all worse.  This doesn't mean the Russian populace will "blink" first, just that the objective reasons for each to call it quits are not equal to each other.

Soooo... if Russia wants to try and play a defensive game with Ukraine, which so far it has shown zero intention of doing, I don't think it will come out better than it is right now.  Losing 100s of millions of Dollars of ships, aircraft, and money making infrastructure isn't sustainable.

Steve

I think you have just articulated why Russia cannot simply sit back on defence.  Add to this political considerations etc.  A defensive war against an opponent that can hammer really expensive stuff, like infrastructure - while the same opponents warfighting infrastructure is effectively inside NATO nations is a sure fire way to losing in the long run.

Putin needs to keep the pressure up until something gives because he really has no real other viable options.  If he can get the west to falter and start talking ceasefires, he can then reframe this fiasco as the greatest Russian victory since Bagration.

[kimbosbread]

9 hours ago, dan/california said:

If Ukraine can really dent Russian refining capacity it will be as big a success as they have had in this war.

Yeah that’s basically what needs to happen. Along with destroying every locomotive in Russia or some other means of taking out their railroad network. I don’t think Ukraine can win unless Russia is physically incapable of fighting anymore as long as Putin is in control.

45 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ukraine's ability to destroy critical Russian infrastructure is also increasing, seemingly exponentially.

Yeah that’s the other side of the coin. China isn’t capable of backfilling Russia’s oil production for them. I guess Iran could send Russia oil/gas, but how is Russia going to pay for it if they aren’t selling oil? What happens in Russia if every refinery or major petroleum facility with 500km of Ukraine is damaged to the point it cannot function?

45 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Russia has not found any way to thwart these growing attacks, therefore each passing day means growing disruption and costs to Russia's economy that, so far, Russia has been unable to do to Ukraine.

I could definitely see China testing out new lightweight drone defense tech in Russia, but you still have the basic fact that Russia is a giant country with many targets. Refineries too well defended? Take out all the sewage treatment facilities in major cities.

[chrisl]

6 hours ago, hcrof said:

Relevent video for the previous sea drone conversation. Defending against them seems like a hard problem to solve, especially when you are in a peer conflict and you can't just be pumping out radiation all the time to try and spot drones. 

Having watched the video, I tried to think of solutions to the problem he described. A tethered observation drone might help, but quite easy to spot if it is emitting radar and less effective if it relies on passive measures. Sonar may be the solution but it limits your speed and is only really usable by high-end ships with quiet propulsion. Finally the defensive sea/air drone swarm may work but also limits your speed and is resource-intensive. 

It's awfully close to what the US experienced in 2002 in the Millenium Challenge wargame, where the Red Team used an armada of small speedboats to get inside the pickets and first spot all the ships to hit them with cruise missiles, then later used more small speedboats on suicide attacks.  The Red Team sank 16 ships. If you don't have to find suicidal volunteers to drive the motorboats, it's easier to put more of them on the water to overwhelm the defenses.  The Navy's first response to the Red Team win was denial.  Not denial of the motorboats the ability to get through, but denial that it  was a valid and effective tactic.

As for the detection problem that he describes, I suspect the problem is worse than he describes.  It's not obvious that the US has really solved it with technology, particularly since there have been a few high profile major collisions at sea not all that long ago.  They depend a lot on the age old Mk I Eyeball all around the ship, and use further out ships and aircraft to extend the range of the eyeballs.  It's why big ships have historically traveled in fleets with smaller "sacrificial" ships spread out around them.  I've seen various systems for repelling the little motorboats (some of which depend on them having people in them) but not a lot of detail on detection systems, which I suspect are still hard for everybody.

I'm not a radar person, but a lot of the same things apply in the optical.  He doesn't go into technical details, but I suspect part of why the surface clutter problem is reduced at longer range is because the size of resolution elements gets bigger as you go farther (same angle per element, farther away), so it gets averaged over each whole element.  Plus the smaller reflected signals may be below a set detection threshold.  That all makes the screen look clearer at a some longer distance, but if the target you're looking for is down in the same size range and radar reflectivity as the clutter, it's also going to get averaged down and you're still not going to see it when it's far away.  The most effective way to see the little boats far out is going to be with a picket of helicopters (or now drones) that fly around and watch the sea far enough out to spot them from above at what is relatively short range for the pickets.  

[The_Capt]

37 minutes ago, chrisl said:

It's awfully close to what the US experienced in 2002 in the Millenium Challenge wargame, where the Red Team used an armada of small speedboats to get inside the pickets and first spot all the ships to hit them with cruise missiles, then later used more small speedboats on suicide attacks.  The Red Team sank 16 ships. If you don't have to find suicidal volunteers to drive the motorboats, it's easier to put more of them on the water to overwhelm the defenses.  The Navy's first response to the Red Team win was denial.  Not denial of the motorboats the ability to get through, but denial that it  was a valid and effective tactic.

As for the detection problem that he describes, I suspect the problem is worse than he describes.  It's not obvious that the US has really solved it with technology, particularly since there have been a few high profile major collisions at sea not all that long ago.  They depend a lot on the age old Mk I Eyeball all around the ship, and use further out ships and aircraft to extend the range of the eyeballs.  It's why big ships have historically traveled in fleets with smaller "sacrificial" ships spread out around them.  I've seen various systems for repelling the little motorboats (some of which depend on them having people in them) but not a lot of detail on detection systems, which I suspect are still hard for everybody.

I'm not a radar person, but a lot of the same things apply in the optical.  He doesn't go into technical details, but I suspect part of why the surface clutter problem is reduced at longer range is because the size of resolution elements gets bigger as you go farther (same angle per element, farther away), so it gets averaged over each whole element.  Plus the smaller reflected signals may be below a set detection threshold.  That all makes the screen look clearer at a some longer distance, but if the target you're looking for is down in the same size range and radar reflectivity as the clutter, it's also going to get averaged down and you're still not going to see it when it's far away.  The most effective way to see the little boats far out is going to be with a picket of helicopters (or now drones) that fly around and watch the sea far enough out to spot them from above at what is relatively short range for the pickets.  

I remember hearing about that ex, caused quite a stir.  They ended up re-setting and re-floating the fleet.  I think we are going to see hybrid surface/sub-surface systems.  Sub-surface for long range positioning and then pop them up and go fast for close in kill.  Very small USV/UUVs are hard to pick up on sonar and impossible on radar.  Once they get close enough surface and go hydrofoil or somesuch and swarm.  Not a bad idea to launch a bunch of air systems at the same time.  Like UAS only way to really counter this will be a screen of ones own USVs.

This approach basically takes the strength of sea mines but makes em a lot more mobile and flexible.  Further it allows for offensive employment.  Like heavy in land warfare, large expensive platforms are at risk of becoming liabilities as opposed to assets in this sort of environment.

[chrisl]

5 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I remember hearing about that ex, caused quite a stir.  They ended up re-setting and re-floating the fleet.  I think we are going to see hybrid surface/sub-surface systems.  Sub-surface for long range positioning and then pop them up and go fast for close in kill.  Very small USV/UUVs are hard to pick up on sonar and impossible on radar.  Once they get close enough surface and go hydrofoil or somesuch and swarm.  Not a bad idea to launch a bunch of air systems at the same time.  Like UAS only way to really counter this will be a screen of ones own USVs.

This approach basically takes the strength of sea mines but makes em a lot more mobile and flexible.  Further it allows for offensive employment.  Like heavy in land warfare, large expensive platforms are at risk of becoming liabilities as opposed to assets in this sort of environment.

the funny thing is that they refloated the fleet (because he destroyed it on the first day of a two week exercise) and he did it again. Then they just kept changing rules until they validated that they could defend themselves from conventional attacks that they were designed for and pretended attackers would do what they were asked.  Or something like that.

Fixed targets like the kerch bridge are somewhat easier to defend against drones. Basically a lot of nets.  Torpedo nets to several meters deep and up a few meters above the surface for the speedboat drones, birdblock/deer net for the aerial drones (probably so much plastic it will consume a month of russian oil) and radars/missiles for ships and planes. Like a huge aviary.  Ships basically have to be turned into minesweepers/fishing trawlers with nets hanging from bow mounted cranes to get the same kind of net coverage.  On the positive side, they can probably feed the crew from all the sea life they sweep up in the nets.

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, chrisl said:

the funny thing is that they refloated the fleet (because he destroyed it on the first day of a two week exercise) and he did it again. Then they just kept changing rules until they validated that they could defend themselves from conventional attacks that they were designed for and pretended attackers would do what they were asked.  Or something like that.

Fixed targets like the kerch bridge are somewhat easier to defend against drones. Basically a lot of nets.  Torpedo nets to several meters deep and up a few meters above the surface for the speedboat drones, birdblock/deer net for the aerial drones (probably so much plastic it will consume a month of russian oil) and radars/missiles for ships and planes. Like a huge aviary.  Ships basically have to be turned into minesweepers/fishing trawlers with nets hanging from bow mounted cranes to get the same kind of net coverage.  On the positive side, they can probably feed the crew from all the sea life they sweep up in the nets.

If those USVs bring UAS with them those nets will have to cover the entire ship.  I am interested in a few ideas beat nets.  First are very small unmanned bots who swim in and manually cut the nets up.  Second is tandem attacks.  Third are standoff EFP which will simply blow through the nets.

[Haiduk]

12 hours ago, Kinophile said:

 

 

870 km from closest point on the border. 

Both these refineries maintained about 10 % of Russian oil products output. Reportedly, one of this refineries lost 70 % of output, so total loss Russia oil production capabilities already declined on about 15 % or even 20 %

Edited March 16 by Haiduk

[TheVulture]

49 minutes ago, chrisl said:

the funny thing is that they refloated the fleet (because he destroyed it on the first day of a two week exercise) and he did it again. Then they just kept changing rules until they validated that they could defend themselves from conventional attacks that they were designed for and pretended attackers would do what they were asked.  Or something like that.

That could be a reasonable thing to do though.

The point of that kind of wargame isn't like playing through a Combat Mission scenario to see who wins and by how much,. It is to practice co-ordination in the real world and to test doctine. If you've gone to the trouble and expense of getting a significant US fleet there for the exercise, and they've all been sunk on the first day, then you could

a) play on to the bitter end in a losing scenario, and have all the USN people sit on their hands for two weeks

b) note that their is a fatally exploitable deficiency in your fleet defense doctrine, make a note to start looking at solutions, and restart the exercise with that avenue banned so that you can meaningfully test how other things behave.

b is valid, as long as they don't sweep the whole fatal vulnerability under the carpet and forget about it, but treat it as a problem that needs to be solved and quickly.

[Haiduk]

About 1-1,5 month ago video, how Russian "tankodesant" tried to burst in UKR trench on Kreminna direction. Three soldiers of 1st National Guard Presidental "Bureviy" brigade destroyed the tank and enemy infantry in the trench fight, one Russian surrendered

 

Edited March 16 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

UKR likely could enter to service again and upgrade as ersatz-cruise missile some more old Tu-143 jet UAVs. Unlike long-range UAV Tu-141 with 1000 km of range, Tu-143 is similar to it, but much smaller, lighter and can fly only on 180 km. Russians reported about intercepted Tochka-U missile in Belgorod or Briansk oblast, maybe it was this Tu-143  

 

Edited March 16 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Bradley destroys BTR-82A in Berdychi NW from Avdiivka. Recenly was issued the same vide from thermal camera of drone.

And likely the same episode from point of view of Bradleys' gunner

 

[Haiduk]

The story with 250 US M117 APCs, which US offered in the end of 2022, but it's turned out they need in repair, upgrade and additional arming with AGLs, so terms of delivering was shifted on 2025, at last came to finish. These APCs now arriving to Ukriane. First units, which got thm on armament became 425th separate assault battalion "Skala" ("Rock")

 

Edited March 16 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

How it looks from inside, when FPV flies into blindage entrance, covered by carpet %). Probably Russian footage.

 

Edited March 16 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, chrisl said:

It's awfully close to what the US experienced in 2002 in the Millenium Challenge wargame, where the Red Team used an armada of small speedboats to get inside the pickets and first spot all the ships to hit them with cruise missiles, then later used more small speedboats on suicide attacks.  The Red Team sank 16 ships. If you don't have to find suicidal volunteers to drive the motorboats, it's easier to put more of them on the water to overwhelm the defenses.  The Navy's first response to the Red Team win was denial.  Not denial of the motorboats the ability to get through, but denial that it  was a valid and effective tactic.

As for the detection problem that he describes, I suspect the problem is worse than he describes.  It's not obvious that the US has really solved it with technology, particularly since there have been a few high profile major collisions at sea not all that long ago.  They depend a lot on the age old Mk I Eyeball all around the ship, and use further out ships and aircraft to extend the range of the eyeballs.  It's why big ships have historically traveled in fleets with smaller "sacrificial" ships spread out around them.  I've seen various systems for repelling the little motorboats (some of which depend on them having people in them) but not a lot of detail on detection systems, which I suspect are still hard for everybody.

I'm not a radar person, but a lot of the same things apply in the optical.  He doesn't go into technical details, but I suspect part of why the surface clutter problem is reduced at longer range is because the size of resolution elements gets bigger as you go farther (same angle per element, farther away), so it gets averaged over each whole element.  Plus the smaller reflected signals may be below a set detection threshold.  That all makes the screen look clearer at a some longer distance, but if the target you're looking for is down in the same size range and radar reflectivity as the clutter, it's also going to get averaged down and you're still not going to see it when it's far away.  The most effective way to see the little boats far out is going to be with a picket of helicopters (or now drones) that fly around and watch the sea far enough out to spot them from above at what is relatively short range for the pickets.  

A couple of years from now I expect that anything we now consider a major surface combatant will have a continuous circuit of drones somewhere between two and ten kilometers out. I suspect that looking for the wakes of the USVs might be one of the more effective strategies, at least until they start to operate underwater full time. Barring a full bore physics/engineering miracle I am not sure underwater USVs are a solvable problem. And a tech break thru that size would be truly world shaking since I suspect it could https://www.threads.net/@meme.lawd.kenya/post/C4kOhTDs1VO

 

42 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

870 km from closest point on the border. 

Both these refineries maintained about 10 % of Russian oil products output. Reportedly, one of this refineries lost 70 % of output, so total loss Russia oil production capabilities already declined on about 15 % or even 20 %

 

Quote

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/deep-state-radio/id1245002955?i=1000649355232

In this interview I referenced earlier about Russia's nuclear threats, Koffman states that he didn't think the Russians have been all that close to using nukes yet. But he also thinks it IS a real risk if regime survival is at stake. It will be very interesting to see what the Kremlin says about the campaign against its refining capacity once it is done with its fake election silliness. I can see at least a possibility that Putin goes all in threatening nuclear retaliation over them once it doesn't interfere with the everything is fine theme he has been pushing for this so called campaign.

Edited March 16 by dan/california

[chrisl]

1 minute ago, dan/california said:

A couple of years from now I expect that anything we now consider a major surface combatant will have a continuous circuit of drones somewhere between two and ten kilometers out. I suspect that looking for the wakes of the USVs might be one of the more effective strategies, at least until the start to operate underwater full time. Barring a full bore physics/engineering miracle I am not sure underwater USVs are a solvable problem. And a tech break thru that size would be truly world shaking since I suspect it could https://www.threads.net/@meme.lawd.kenya/post/C4kOhTDs1VO

The underwater USV problem is basically what it's been for at least 80 years - listening for the high speed screws of torpedos with passive sonar.  And watching for their wake if they're near the surface.  I don't know that there are a lot of other options - RF won't work through the water. Active sonar won't have the speed or spatial resolution, and advertises your position.  Navies have done various things to make active and passive sonar more effective, like using towed buoys so they're spatially separated from the ship, and helicopter dropped active and passive buoys for the same reasons.  But water sucks to look through.

Maybe sharks with laser beams.

[The_Capt]

49 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

b is valid, as long as they don't sweep the whole fatal vulnerability under the carpet and forget about it,

There you go.  You finally landed on it.  So this is pretty much what they tried to do.  In fact they started to tie the hands of the Red Team to stop them from winning.

[Haiduk]

Operation in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts still under a fog of war. 

Today we had only free-Russian fighters "presentation" of 25 captured enemies, among them was platoon commander of 45th engineer-sapper brigade of Western military district, which unit set minefield, was attacked and destroyed. 

Free-Russia fighters wrote, Russian aviation is dropping many KABs/FABs on own villages and settlements, and its number is more that was in Bakhmut.  

Russian milbliggers became more pessimistic (therea are no more reports about completely repelled attack) - they report  about fierce clashes, especially in Kozinka and Spodariushyno. Graivoron is under artillery shelling. Belgorod is under periodical MLRS strikes and... under fallings of Pantsyr S1 launch stages. For today more than a dozen buildings got damages, were destroyed and damaged more than two dozens of cars