How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

Not entirely fair to other countries, but still... 

 

[Kraft]

14 hours ago, chrisl said:

If you multiply it out and take the conservative 1/7, that's about 475 hits/day of something, and over 14,000 hits/month.  Those are all either damaged/destroyed vehicles of casualties, or some combination.  If each hit on average damages two people/things (not a big stretch, since most successful FPV attacks we see are on a vehicle or small group), that's 28K casualties or vehicles/month that have to be replaced, and 170K/year. 

Keep in mind a large portion of FPV are used on a single MG, AGS, or even just an empty dugout. Its a systematic way how defenses are continously degraded more than can be replenished before attacks.

 

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The third is the 350K artillery shells per month that RU is producing/procuring/refurbing.  If we assume that RU has fired 10K shells/day through the war to get 31,000 Ukrainian KIAs, and assume 3 WIA/KIA, those shells are producing about 170 Ukrainian casualties/day and it's taking ~275 shells to produce a single casualty. 

...

The other thing that's not making a lot of sense are the various claims that Russia can make or buy even more FPV drones than Ukraine.  We're not seeing the same kind of effectiveness - if they were just as numerous and effective as Ukr drones we'd be seeing 4 or 5x higher Ukr casualties than we are.  And I don't think we have reason to think that they are that effective and it's just good Ukr OpSec keeping us from hearing about it.

What makes you think so? There are plenty people who count FPV attacks and russia is just a sliver behind in the number of attacks, and completely dominating with artillery.

If you arent seeing the gruesome results, its because you are not frequenting russian TG channels I assume.

In attritional casulties russia is doing better, the only reason they have more dead at the end of the day is because of the constant meatwaves that get destroyed. Were it a completely static line with both sides not attacking, russia would be way ahead in causing dead & wounded and not even close to the 3:1 ratio that is needed to maintain force parity

 

Edited March 15 by Kraft

[chrisl]

14 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Keep in mind a large portion of FPV are used on a single MG, AGS, or even just an empty dugout. Its a systematic way how defenses are continously degraded more than can be replenished before attacks.

 

What makes you think so? There are plenty people who count FPV attacks and russia is just a sliver behind in the number of attacks, and completely dominating with artillery.

If you arent seeing the gruesome results, its because you are not frequenting russian TG channels I assume.

 

 

Because if RU is both dominating with artillery AND using FPVs as numerously and effectively as Ukraine, then Ukraine would be consistently suffering higher casualties than RU.  And I don’t think there’s any indication that that’s true.  
 

I don’t spend time on Russian TG, and nobody has posted numbers here to suggest that russia is doing as well with FPVs.  If you’ve got data, post it or link it.

[Kraft]

26 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Because if RU is both dominating with artillery AND using FPVs as numerously and effectively as Ukraine, then Ukraine would be consistently suffering higher casualties than RU.  And I don’t think there’s any indication that that’s true.  
 

I don’t spend time on Russian TG, and nobody has posted numbers here to suggest that russia is doing as well with FPVs.  If you’ve got data, post it or link it.

Imagies like this exist for both sides

Here is the data

 

[chrisl]

11 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Imagies like this exist for both sides

Here is the data

 

Yes. Images like that exist for both sides.  That’s datum, not data. It doesn’t tell me anything about how numerously or effectively Ru is using FPVs.  If it takes them 100 FPVs to inflict the same damage as Ukraine does with 10, then they’re using them 10x less effectively. (Edit- I see the link below went to plots on attacks. It didn’t display inline on my phone.  Thats number of attacks, but not effectiveness)

Edited March 15 by chrisl

[Kraft]

32 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Thats number of attacks, but not effectiveness)

You asked for data you got data.

If you want to go into dreamland where 1 ZSU drone has the effectiveness of 10 russian ones and cancels out the 10 to 1 artillery shell disadvantage, go ahead.

Theres 0 evidence for that though.

 

Edited March 16 by Kraft

[Vet 0369]

On 3/12/2024 at 11:15 PM, Kinophile said:

Il-76 Engine fell off, as cause? 

 

Probably por, shoddy, or lack of maintenance. Virtually all large turbine engines on commercial and military engines are secured with three large bolts, a thrust bolt just aft of the intake (the largest) and two sway bolts on either side of the exhaust module to prevent it from swaying fron side to side. Amazing eh!

[poesel]

19 minutes ago, Kraft said:

You asked for data you got data.

If you want to go into dreamland where 1 ZSU drone has the effectiveness of 10 russian ones and cancels out the 10 to 1 artillery shell disadvantage, go ahead.

Theres 0 evidence for that though.

 

I guess most people here (me included) don't read Russian and thus don't read the relevant TG groups. Since most stuff here is Pro-Ukrainian, we get a very biased view of what is really happening.

For a better opinion I would have to watch more of the Russian stuff and, even if that is a bit stupid, I don't really want to do that.

[Vet 0369]

On 3/13/2024 at 12:02 AM, Kinophile said:

Not sure of the timeline. It's much lower there so is it possible the engine burned through its support and fell? Puts this vid after the seen ones where its higher with flames. Engine matches. 

Still, four engines down to 3 and it pancakes? Can't  even level off? 

Pilot might have already retarded the throttles and power control levers for landing, or pilot or copilot might have panicked and thrown the fuel-cutoffs to all engines.

[dan/california]

Rarely is the karma for asking a stupid question quite this fast, and quite this harsh.

[dan/california]

You can go to Siberia for a PR stunt, or you can go to Siberia for railroad sabotage. Choose wisely.

[The_Capt]

43 minutes ago, Kraft said:

You asked for data you got data.

If you want to go into dreamland where 1 ZSU drone has the effectiveness of 10 russian ones and cancels out the 10 to 1 artillery shell disadvantage, go ahead.

Theres 0 evidence for that though.

 

I guess the primary evidence is not in losses or numbers, it is in the fact that the RA have not been able to translate tactical advances into an operational breakout/breakthrough.  If the UA were totally overmatched the RA would be advancing tens of kms, if not hundreds.  Does anyone think that Russia can do this right now but is holding back due to restraint?  

What is clear is that the UA is still able to deny air, land and sea spaces even with the ammunition disparities.  Now as to how long either side can sustain this, or if Ukraine is somehow losing more than the RA - well we do not know, none of us.  The UA has been holding actual casualty numbers very close to their chest.  So far the Ukrainian president has said openly that the UA has lost about 31k KIA and one can extrapolate about x3-5 wounded.  Is that enough to buckle UA force generation?  Again, unknown.  

All we do know is that neither side appears close to operational collapse, and the UA is holding the line and costing the RA heavily.  We do not know what the breaking points of either military are or are not.  Any other “bright and shiny” or “doom and gloom” assessments are pretty much being pulled out of @sses by this point.

[Kraft]

19 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

guess the primary evidence is not in losses or numbers, it is in the fact that the RA have not been able to translate tactical advances into an operational breakout/breakthrough.  If the UA were totally overmatched the RA would be advancing tens of kms, if not hundreds.  Does anyone think that Russia can do this right now but is holding back due to restraint?  

My point in the response is to the daily attrition, which has shifted in favor of russia. Ie a situation where neither side attacks

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In attritional casulties russia is doing better, the only reason they have more dead at the end of the day is because of the constant meatwaves that get destroyed. Were it a completely static line with both sides not attacking, russia would be way ahead in causing dead & wounded and not even close to the 3:1 ratio that is needed to maintain force parity

Attacking in the current environment successfully at scale is near impossible for anyone. 

That russia continues to do so evens the casulties out, whether the russian offensive capabilities outlast the defense and results in a crumbling of the front is known not even to the commanders. 

Edited March 16 by Kraft

[Vet 0369]

On 3/14/2024 at 3:16 AM, Carolus said:

Yeah, it seems strange. If what he says is true, then Ukraine leadership should reassess their targeting.

 

Just a thought, but can any one say, with any certaincy that some of the European aid ISN’T predicated on Ukraine NOT hitting those targets?

[Battlefront.com]

32 minutes ago, Kraft said:

My point in the response is to the daily attrition, which has shifted in favor of russia. Ie a situation where neither side attacks

Attacking in the current environment successfully at scale is near impossible for anyone. 

That russia continues to do so evens the casulties out, whether the russian offensive capabilities outlast the defense and results in a crumbling of the front is known not even to the commanders. 

Yeah, but you're missing chrisl's primary point, which is that Ukraine must be doing something better than Russia or Ukraine's casualties would be HIGHER than Russia's.  And, as he said, there is ZERO indication that is the case.  All indications are the opposite.

Let me break this down for using hypothetical numbers:

Russia has 25% more infantry, 200% more tanks and AFVs, 200% more artillery, 300% more artillery shells expended per day, massive glide bombs Ukraine doesn't have, etc.

If Russia was exactly as effective as Ukraine, then Ukraine should be suffering more casualties per day than Russia by a large margin.  Perhaps 50% more per day.

Plug in whatever numbers you want and Russia's are all higher and therefore Ukraine's casualties should be too if there was anything close to parity between the two.  This is just simple math.  No blinders, pure and simple math.

So unless you have some sort of irrefutable sources of "data" that show Ukraine is suffering more casualties per day than Russia is, then you can not conclude "the daily attrition, which has shifted in favor of russia".

Further, this is an outlandish statement to make:

"Ie a situation where neither side attacks "

Russia absolutely must keep attacking if it is to force Ukraine to surrender, therefore unless something massive changes in the near future Russia will continue to attack and therefore we won't see war-wide situation where "neither side attacks".  Sure, on X sector of front it could be near parity in casualties... but guess what, that's been the case since 2014.  It's just that in 2024 there's going to be a lot of daily casualties, on both sides, even in fairly quiet sectors.

That said, it's pretty clear that Ukraine's previous level of superiority of UAS vs. Russia seems to be equaling out.  Of course, that is not good for Ukraine.

Steve

[Kraft]

43 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

So unless you have some sort of irrefutable sources of "data" that show Ukraine is suffering more casualties per day than Russia is, then you can not conclude "the daily attrition, which has shifted in favor of russia".

Attrition in my mind is the constant cost of war, where as casulties from offensive operations are seperate. The naming here is pretty irrelevant though because as I said, the ZSU is not suffering more absolute casulties*

This is not because the average drone pilot is 10 times better or has 10 times more drones and thus somehow offsets the total lack of shells.

Its just a result that attacking in an environment where units can be reliably spotted kilometers away before they even assembled for a large scale attack, and can be killed more easily with the cheap-o FPV PGM, is near suicidal as russian meatwaves prove day in day out.

Even if they make it past no mans land, a focused drone effort wipes most of the exposed and often EW-unprotected / unentrenched survivors out before much of any momentum can be gained. 

Its the same for both sides in this way but as Ukraine is not attacking, its not subject to this exposure as much, just the daily bombing and artillery shelling

Quote

Russia absolutely must keep attacking if it is to force Ukraine to surrender, therefore unless something massive changes in the near future Russia will continue to attack and therefore we won't see war-wide situation where "neither side attacks".

Yes, I agree with this. Beyond 2025-2026, this war will reach non sustainability for putin and keeping a stalemate will just help get there safer. But this does not refute the idea that the disparity in casualties is caused by offensive actions, which compensate for the firepower difference.

 

*although, when it comes to relative losses I think the picture depends on the weapon system. I made the case for the Avdiivka losses, where russia ended up basically at a zero change with the captured, refurbished and produced vehicles in that timeframe, while the losses to Ukraine are permanent and lowered the capabilities of the armed forces, since there is close to no heavy gear still being supplied in quantity. 

Edited March 16 by Kraft

[cesmonkey]

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Kraft said:

This is not because the average drone pilot is 10 times better or has 10 times more drones and thus somehow offsets the total lack of shells.

Its just a result that attacking in an environment where units can be reliably spotted kilometers away before they even assembled for a large scale attack, and can be killed more easily with the cheap-o FPV PGM, is near suicidal as russian meatwaves prove day in day out.

Both can be true and you have no evidence to suggest they aren't.  In fact, since this war started there's far more evidence to suggest that tank for tank, rifleman for rifleman, shell for shell, and drone for drone the Ukrainians are (on average) superior to Russia.  This has been discussed in much detail by many experts, as well as in discussions here.  Artillery effectiveness has been a big one, with Russian laying waste to empty fields while Ukrainian gunners successfully sniped actual targets with their far more limited artillery.

Further, there's the qualitative difference in the weaponry being used.  You can't seriously argue that the Western equipment being provided to Ukraine doesn't (generally) achieve better results than the Russian equivalent.  All I have to do is say "Javelin" and that discussion is done.

So, you have a false premise and that is that Russian and Ukrainian capabilities are on par when on defense.  That is demonstrably counter factual.  The best you can argue is that if Russia adopts a defensive posture or ceases wasteful attacks the gap between relative casualties (as seen thus far) will shrink.  I'd even go along with that to the degree the delta adjusted in favor of Russia is supported by factual evidence.  Yet you are arguing parity, and I find that nonsensical and counter factual.

2 hours ago, Kraft said:

Yes, I agree with this. Beyond 2025-2026, this war will reach non sustainability for putin and keeping a stalemate will just help get there safer. But this does not refute the idea that the disparity in casualties is caused by offensive actions, which compensate for the firepower difference.

No, the disregard for demonstrated qualitative superiority of Ukrainian capabilities is what refutes the idea that if Russia were to cease attacking that casualties would more or less equalize.

2 hours ago, Kraft said:

*although, when it comes to relative losses I think the picture depends on the weapon system. I made the case for the Avdiivka losses, where russia ended up basically at a zero change with the captured, refurbished and produced vehicles in that timeframe, while the losses to Ukraine are permanent and lowered the capabilities of the armed forces, since there is close to no heavy gear still being supplied in quantity. 

We have already had this discussion recently, as we have many times in the past, and it's (at best) a partial view of reality.

You really should listen to Perun's video from 2 weeks ago about this topic.  The fact is that it doesn't matter if Russia can replace its losses if it needs more than it has to achieve its' goals.  I'll put it in abstract form.

I have 100 beers, you have 10.  We get into a drinking contest to see who can drink the most.  We both start drinking and we're 5 beers in.  It's looking like I'll win because, well, I have 95 left and you only have 5.  But oh wait a minute... you're German and were raised, from the time of infancy, to drink real beer.  I am American and when I was born we had Miller and Budweiser.  Which means you're probably still capable of drinking a few more beers, whereas I get half way through my 6th one and I get sick.  Doesn't matter that I still have 94 beers available, you win.  Especially because we're drinking in your bar and you have an incentive to push yourself harder than I do.

The fact is neither side can afford to lose its men and equipment indefinitely.  We know this to be true.  We also know that Russia is digging deeper and deeper into ever lowering quality of replacements, both men and material, due to the catastrophic losses.  Ukraine, on the other hand, has arguably a higher quality force now than it did when the war started.  It could even be that Ukraine has increased the amount of certain things fielded while Russia has seen a decline. 

For example, Ukraine's starting IFVs contained exactly 0.0% Western models, now it's some number higher.  This is significant because nobody disputes Western IFV superiority over Russian IFVs.  On the other hand, loss records seem to indicate Russia is suffering from declining numbers of BMP-2s and is having to substitute with BMP-1, MTLB, and even trucks, thus indicating that their force quality is declining (there is plenty of other supporting evidence of this).

This is all stuff we know with varying degrees of specificity.  What we do not know is where each side's fail points are and how close they are to reaching them.  We only know they exist and that both sides are getting closer to them, not further away.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

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https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/deep-state-radio/id1245002955?i=1000649355232

An interview with Koffman about the risk of Russian nuclear escalation. He makes some good points. He also unintentionally makes an excellent, though unintentional,  case that Poland needs its own nukes.

[Kinophile]

 

 

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, Kinophile said:

 

 

Burn baby burn! Is there a good source for Russias daily/weekly production of refined petroleum products? I vaguely remember something about a commodities firm that tried to track the level of more or less every large storage tank on earth by satellite? 

If Ukraine can really dent Russian refining capacity it will be as big a success as they have had in this war.

[hcrof]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Both can be true and you have no evidence to suggest they aren't.  In fact, since this war started there's far more evidence to suggest that tank for tank, rifleman for rifleman, shell for shell, and drone for drone the Ukrainians are (on average) superior to Russia.  This has been discussed in much detail by many experts, as well as in discussions here.  Artillery effectiveness has been a big one, with Russian laying waste to empty fields while Ukrainian gunners successfully sniped actual targets with their far more limited artillery.

Further, there's the qualitative difference in the weaponry being used.  You can't seriously argue that the Western equipment being provided to Ukraine doesn't (generally) achieve better results than the Russian equivalent.  All I have to do is say "Javelin" and that discussion is done.

So, you have a false premise and that is that Russian and Ukrainian capabilities are on par when on defense.  That is demonstrably counter factual.  The best you can argue is that if Russia adopts a defensive posture or ceases wasteful attacks the gap between relative casualties (as seen thus far) will shrink.  I'd even go along with that to the degree the delta adjusted in favor of Russia is supported by factual evidence.  Yet you are arguing parity, and I find that nonsensical and counter factual.

No, the disregard for demonstrated qualitative superiority of Ukrainian capabilities is what refutes the idea that if Russia were to cease attacking that casualties would more or less equalize.

We have already had this discussion recently, as we have many times in the past, and it's (at best) a partial view of reality.

You really should listen to Perun's video from 2 weeks ago about this topic.  The fact is that it doesn't matter if Russia can replace its losses if it needs more than it has to achieve its' goals.  I'll put it in abstract form.

I have 100 beers, you have 10.  We get into a drinking contest to see who can drink the most.  We both start drinking and we're 5 beers in.  It's looking like I'll win because, well, I have 95 left and you only have 5.  But oh wait a minute... you're German and were raised, from the time of infancy, to drink real beer.  I am American and when I was born we had Miller and Budweiser.  Which means you're probably still capable of drinking a few more beers, whereas I get half way through my 6th one and I get sick.  Doesn't matter that I still have 94 beers available, you win.  Especially because we're drinking in your bar and you have an incentive to push yourself harder than I do.

The fact is neither side can afford to lose its men and equipment indefinitely.  We know this to be true.  We also know that Russia is digging deeper and deeper into ever lowering quality of replacements, both men and material, due to the catastrophic losses.  Ukraine, on the other hand, has arguably a higher quality force now than it did when the war started.  It could even be that Ukraine has increased the amount of certain things fielded while Russia has seen a decline. 

For example, Ukraine's starting IFVs contained exactly 0.0% Western models, now it's some number higher.  This is significant because nobody disputes Western IFV superiority over Russian IFVs.  On the other hand, loss records seem to indicate Russia is suffering from declining numbers of BMP-2s and is having to substitute with BMP-1, MTLB, and even trucks, thus indicating that their force quality is declining (there is plenty of other supporting evidence of this).

This is all stuff we know with varying degrees of specificity.  What we do not know is where each side's fail points are and how close they are to reaching them.  We only know they exist and that both sides are getting closer to them, not further away.

Steve

I don't think your argument really addresses the point here. Russia does not have to be as effective pound for pound as Ukraine, they can use more resources sustainably. So in a static situation they can use more shells than Ukraine so even if they are more wasteful the number of casualties may end up being the same. 

That is obviously not ideal for Ukraine - if both sides are just sitting in trenches taking 500 casualties a day then the war is not going to end any time soon.

[JonS]

20 hours ago, The_Capt said:

In the examples you cite, these are less failures in military transposition but in a larger political ideology.  More bluntly we cannot reproduce western democracies in many of these nations.

Despite your effort to boil the ocean here I think we are in pointed agreement once again, albeit coming at it from different directions.

If I read you correctly, you're saying that trying graft a western style military onto Afghanistan didn't work because their government wasn't compatible with that style of military. I agree with that, and if I'm understanding him correctly, so does @Kinophile. That is actually his main point, despite your effort to disagree with it.

Anyhoo, I agree. However, in Afghanistan's case I think the original sin was trying to trying to give them a military that looked like some weird amalgam^ of western expeditionary-ish doctrines that was never going to work in their context. The Afghan people can obviously fight, really well and really effectively, when they fight in ways that suit them. In other words, like you, I think there was a mismatch between the civil/political milieu and the indigenous military forces in Afghanistan, but unlike you I think that effort should have gone into creating a military that fit that milieu, rather than trying to impose or import a political ideology that would have been able to support "our" way of fighting.

Hopefully the relevance to Ukraine is obvious. And I think on that we definitely agree.

 

 

^ given the number and variety of different training teams from different nations they weren't even trying to adopt a single doctrine. Instead they had to try and make sense of all the doctrines at once.

[hcrof]

Relevent video for the previous sea drone conversation. Defending against them seems like a hard problem to solve, especially when you are in a peer conflict and you can't just be pumping out radiation all the time to try and spot drones. 

Having watched the video, I tried to think of solutions to the problem he described. A tethered observation drone might help, but quite easy to spot if it is emitting radar and less effective if it relies on passive measures. Sonar may be the solution but it limits your speed and is only really usable by high-end ships with quiet propulsion. Finally the defensive sea/air drone swarm may work but also limits your speed and is resource-intensive. 

Edited March 16 by hcrof

[cesmonkey]